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In October 1978, diverse members of the West Berlin Left founded the 
Alternative Liste für Demokratie und Umweltschutz (Alternative Ballot for 
Democracy and Environmental Protection- AL).  This new political organization 
initially stood in fundamental opposition to the parliamentary system.  
Nevertheless, within three years, the AL had won a significant presence in the 
West Berlin Parliament, and in 1989, the party joined the Social Democrats in 
governing West Berlin.  This dissertation examines the origins and evolution of 
this organization.  It shows that, from the late 1970s through the end of the 1980s, 
a significant segment of the radical West German Left grew to accept 
parliamentary democracy. 
This occurred through the interplay of several different factors.  First, the 
AL’s parliamentary participation had a moderating, integrative effect on the 
party and its members.  When the radical West Berlin Left decided to try to 
harness the parliaments in service of their movement, the 5 percent barrier to 
parliamentary representation forced disparate groups to abandon past 






presence there meant that the issue of violence and its perception of democracy 
were constantly under debate.   
Second, the rise of ecological concerns played an important role in the 
AL’s evolution.  Environmental issues proved key in keeping the new 
organization’s diverse components together.  In addition, the AL’s involvement 
with West Germany’s Green Party meant that the AL was under constant 
pressure to revise its stance on violence.   
Finally, historical events, often focused in West Berlin, led the AL’s 
members increasingly to renounce their radical beliefs.  Over the course of the 
eighties, these events led AL members to distance themselves from violence and 
question their support for the GDR.  The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 initially 
unleashed a flood of utopian hopes by the Left that the end of the GDR regime 
would mean radical changes in both East and West Germany.  When these 
changes failed to materialize, the AL turned back to parliamentary democracy in 
a newly unified Germany.  Its experiences over the last decade made this not 
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The Left and Germany’s Long Way West 
In October 1978, members of the Maoist West German Communist Party, 
housing squatters, representatives of feminist and gay rights organizations, and 
some skeptical environmentalists founded the Alternative Liste für Demokratie und 
Umweltschutz (Alternative Ballot for Democracy and Environmental Protection- 
AL).  This new political organization initially stood in fundamental opposition to 
the parliamentary system.  Nevertheless, within three years, the AL had won a 
significant presence in the West Berlin Parliament, and in 1989, the party joined 
the Social Democrats in governing West Berlin.  This dissertation examines the 
origins, activities, and evolution of this organization.  It shows that, from the late 
1970s through the end of the 1980s, a significant segment of the radical West 
German Left came to accept and embrace parliamentary democracy. 
This change occurred through the interplay of several different factors.  
First, the AL’s parliamentary participation had a moderating, integrative effect 
on the party and its members.  When the radical West Berlin Left decided to 
harness the parliaments in service of their movement, the 5 percent minimum 
vote required for representation forced disparate groups to abandon past 
dogmatism and find common ground.  Once the AL entered parliament, its 
presence there meant that the issue of violence and its perception of democracy 
were constantly under debate.  Second, the rise of ecological concerns played an 





keeping the new organization’s diverse components together.  In addition, the 
AL’s involvement with West Germany’s national Green Party meant that the AL 
was under constant pressure to revise its stance on violence.  Finally, historical 
events, often focused in West Berlin, led the AL’s members increasingly to 
renounce their radical beliefs.  Over the course of the eighties, these events led 
AL members to distance themselves from violence and question their support for 
the GDR.  The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 initially unleashed a flood of utopian 
hopes by the Left that the end of the GDR regime would mean radical changes in 
both East and West Germany.  When these hopes failed to materialize, the AL 
turned back to parliamentary democracy in a newly unified Germany.  Its 
experiences over the last decade made this possible. 
The process of accepting and embracing parliamentary democracy in turn 
relates to a central problem in postwar German history.  Heinrich August 
Winkler’s enormously influential history of Germany interprets the German past, 
especially the last fifty years, as the story of a “long way West:” the gradual 
embrace of the political, social, and cultural values and institutions associated 
with Western Europe and the United States.1  Similarly, Peter Graf 
Kielmannsegg’s history of divided Germany interprets postwar German history 
as the story of Germany’s finding “its place among the constitutional 
                                                 






democracies of the Western tradition.”2  There are many indications that this 
interpretation will provide the new metanarrative for German history.3   
But accepting postwar German history as a “long way West” necessarily 
raises numerous questions that historians must address.  What accounts for the 
stability of the Federal Republic between 1949 and 1989, without which this 
metaphorical journey westward would have been unimaginable?  What 
historical events and processes promoted this journey?  How did memories of 
Germany’s recent past hinder or advance this process?  These are some of the 
questions driving three major historiographical issues for postwar West 
Germany: the discussion about the roots of West German stability; the debate 
about the significance and the legacy of the events known collectively, if 
misleadingly, as “1968”; and the discussion about Vergangenheitsbewältigung, or 
coming to terms with the German past, and its implications for German identity 
and nationhood.  These are the issues to which I attempt to contribute with this 
dissertation. 
 To make this contribution, I focus on the radical postwar Left in West 
Germany.  Specifically, I examine the Left in West Berlin from 1945 to 1990, with 
                                                 
2 Die Bundesrepublik hat ihren Platz unter den demokratischen 
Verfassungsstaaten westlicher Tradition gefunden.  Peter Graf Kielmansegg, 
Nach der Katastrophe : eine Geschichte des geteilten Deutschland (Berlin: Siedler, 
2000), 629.  All translations are mine. 
3 See the commentary on Winkler’s book by Anselm Doering-Manteuffel, 
“Eine politische Nationalgeschichte für die Berliner Republik.  Überlegungen zu 
Heinrich August Winkler’s ‘Der Lange Weg nach Westen.’”  Geschichte und 





particular emphasis on the years 1967-1990.  The Left figured prominently in all 
three of the above debates.  It was the radical Left that seemed to pose a serious 
threat to the stability of the Bonn Republic, both in the Left’s hostility to 
parliamentary democracy and in the form of the terrorist violence of the Rote 
Armee Fraktion (Red Army Faction- RAF) and the Bewegung 2. Juni (June 2 
Movement), among others.  Furthermore, the Left was the driving force behind 
many of the social and cultural changes associated with “1968,” changes that 
helped propel Germany into the ranks of modern Western nations.  Finally, it 
was the radical Left that constantly condemned the Federal Republic for having 
failed to make a genuine break with the Nazi past, and whose rejection of the 
Bonn Republic as compromised by the past resulted in its ambivalence or 
outright hostility toward German unification in 1990.  But the radical West 
German Left also underwent a profound transformation during the time period 
under examination here, as will be seen.  
This conceptual emphasis on the radical West German Left makes this 
work’s geographical focus on West Berlin a logical next step for several reasons.  
For one thing, West Berlin was arguably the center of the radical West German 
Left: most commentators agree that the impetus for the New Left and the student 
movement in West Germany came out of West Berlin.4  Moreover, during the 
                                                 
4 Christoph Klessman asserts that several factors explain the student 
movement’s origin in West Berlin, noting that the higher degree of politicization 
of West Berlin students, the geographical and political situation of West Berlin, 
and the near-monopoly of the Springer Press contributed to a confrontation 





1970s, offshoots of the New Left in the form of extremely radical anti-
parliamentary cells known as K-groups thrived in the island city.  West Berlin 
was also the birthplace of several terrorist groups, including the RAF and the 
June 2 Movement, which attacked the West German state using force of arms.  
Finally, West Berlin’s geopolitical position as an outpost in the Cold War also 
meant that confrontations between East and West, between pro- and anti-
Communists, but also between Germans and Allied forces emerged with 
particular intensity there.5  This also meant West Berlin radicals were much more 
aware of developments in the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc than their West 
                                                                                                                                                 
Berlin’s general population.  Christoph Klessmann, “1968-Studentenrevolte oder 
Kulturrevolution,” in Revolution in Deutschland?  1789-1989, ed. Manfred Hettling 
(Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1991), 91.  According to Thomas Fichter 
and Siegward Lönnendonker, “the Berlin students were the locomotive of the 
revolt” [Die Berliner Studenten waren die Lokomotive der Revolte.]  Tilman 
Fichter and Siegward Lönnendonker, Kleine Geschichte des SDS (Berlin: Rotbuch 
Verlag, 1977), 85.  For an examination of the central role played by West Berlin 
and especially the Free University as the place where the unrest began, see Ernst 
Richert, Die Radikale Linke. Von 1945 bis zur Gegenwart (Berlin: Colloquium Verlag, 
1969), 108-112.  This is not to downplay the importance of the Left in other West 
German cities, especially Frankfurt.  There, the student movement and its legacy 
have been exceptionally well-documented in the volumes by Wolfgang 
Kraushaar.  See Wolfgang Kraushaar, ed., Frankfurter Schule und 
Studentenbewegung von der Flaschenpost zum Molotowcocktail 1946-1995, 3 vols.  
(Hamburg: Rogner and Bernhard, 1998). 
5 These factors also helped make West Berlin into a center of the European 
alternative movement.  See Roland Wünsch, Das Ende der Alternative: Die Grünen 





German counterparts.  As a result, they tended to reject Soviet-style Marxism in 
favor of Maoist forms of Marxism-Leninism.6  
In many ways, then, West Berlin was a hothouse where political and social 
conflicts bred with special intensity.  Yet the city was also the site of the most 
remarkable transformation of anti-parliamentary forces.  During the time I 
examine here, West Berlin witnessed key developments in the West German 
Left’s integration into the system of Western parliamentary democracy.  This 
process exemplified larger trends.  Accordingly, focusing on West Berlin allows 
historians to follow a particularly intense version of developments that 
happened elsewhere.  In West Berlin, as in the rest of West Germany, the radical 
Left for years had failed to achieve any of its stated goals: it utterly failed to 
achieve its main goal, a proletarian revolution; it gained no parliamentary 
representation whatsoever that it could use to promote its agenda; it even failed 
to keep its own organizations from disintegrating.7  In the late 1970s, with these 
organizations on the brink of extinction, leaders made a fateful decision to 
cooperate with other groups and participate in parliament.  They justified this 
course of action by emphasizing that they planned to exploit the parliaments to 
                                                 
6 As Fichter and Lönnendonker phrased it, “The unsentimental glance of 
the Berliners soon led to an ideological confrontation with Soviet Marxism” [Der 
unsentimentale Blick der Berliner führte schon bald zur ideologischen 
Auseinandersetzung mit dem Sowjetmarxismus].  Tilman Fichter and Siegward 
Lönnendonker, Macht und Ohnmacht der Studenten (Hamburg: Rotbuch Verlag, 
1998), 25-26. 
7 In retrospect, however, the Left has been credited with driving 





advance the goals of their respective movements.  But the moment they 
committed themselves to the parliamentary route, the stage was set for a 
stunning reversal of fortune.  Members of the radical Left had embarked on an 
ideological journey that would transform them from frustrated revolutionaries 
into effective reformers.  They had begun the transition from a force attacking the 
political system of the Federal Republic to one accepting and embracing Western 
parliamentary democracy.  
West Berlin also was the home of the organization that serves as the 
central focus of this project, the AL.  The AL’s founders were adamant that the 
organization was not a new political party, but rather a kind of anti-party formed 
to serve as the parliamentary wing of the hundreds of various citizens’ initiatives 
and grassroots organizations then active in West Berlin.  Initially, this new 
political organization embraced radically anti-parliamentary views.  
Furthermore, many of its supporters apparently wished to turn back the clock on 
Western economic and social development, seeking a return to pre-modern 
communal forms.  Despite its staunch antiparliamentarianism, the AL entered 
the West Berlin Parliament three years later, and its support continued to grow 
throughout the 1980s.  During this time, the organization increasingly embraced 
the parliamentary process as the best way to enact changes and address 
grievances.  It attracted technocrats, especially in the realm of city planning and 
mass transit, who helped reshape the city.  Moreover, in a process initially born 





composition of society, the AL sparked numerous changes in the makeup of 
parliament, bringing women, gays and lesbians, and foreigners into the West 
Berlin legislature.  In 1989, the rise of the AL culminated when it joined the Social 
Democratic Party in governing West Berlin.  An anti-parliamentary anti-party 
had evolved into a party that actively embraced the parliamentary path in 
pursuit of its goals. 
West Berlin offers a wide variety of excellent and extensive sources for a 
study of the transformation of the Left.  The dissertation draws on sources 
primarily gathered during a research year in Berlin from 2000-2001.  These 
sources include campaign posters and song lyrics, as well as party 
correspondence, political programs, and pamphlets.  These come from several 
largely untapped archives in Germany.  The Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis, the Green 
Party’s archive, includes an extensive collection pertaining to the AL.  Moreover, 
the Green Party’s comparative willingness to provide materials relating to recent 
events makes this archive an outstanding source of information regarding all 
areas of the AL’s founding and evolution.  The Matthias-Domaschk-Archiv holds 
documents relevant to the East German opposition and the activities of the East 
German secret police.  These contain information regarding the AL’s support of 
the East German opposition, as well as transcripts of meetings between AL spies 
and their Stasi handlers.  The Free University’s Archive of the Extra-
Parliamentary Opposition hosts a rich collection of documents and newspapers 





political home for much of the radical West German Left in the 1970s.  The West 
Berlin Abgeordnetenhaus, the parliamentary body responsible for governing the 
city, provides another important source of documentation.8  The 
Abgeordnetenhaus has published transcripts of its proceedings since its founding 
in 1951.  These transcripts are an excellent source regarding the parliamentary 
self-perception of the AL, as well as the AL’s interactions with the other political 
parties in Berlin, in particular when debating issues such as relationships with 
the Western Allies, the symbolically charged adoption of West German law in 
West Berlin, and the oversight of the controversial governmental body 
responsible for protecting the constitution.   
Despite these excellent resources and the potential to provide insights into 
larger historical and historiographical issues, the AL remains relatively little-
researched, especially from a historical perspective.  In many respects, this 
reflects the state of research on the Green Party, research on which has generally 
been conducted from within the disciplines of political science or sociology.  
                                                 
8 The AL’s involvement in the West Berlin Abgeordnetenhaus would play an 
important role in integrating the Left and inculcating parliamentary values.  
Initially, the parliament’s influence was restricted by its lack of credibility in the 
eyes of the AL: decades of scandals and the “Berliner Filzokratie” (the spoils 
system in city government) made the Abgeordnetenhaus an initially weak factor in 
the parliamentarization of the AL.  As time went on, however, the 
Abgeordnetenhaus came to be an arena where a remarkable debate about 
democracy took place, with AL members at times striving to educate members of 
other parties about what they held to be the true meaning and place of 
democratic values.  A full account of the nature of the Abgeordnetenhaus, its 
responsibilities and areas of competence is given in Horst Naubert, Das Berliner 
Parlament: Struktur und Arbeitsweise des Abgeordnetenhauses von Berlin (Berlin: Der 





While some outstanding studies of the Greens have been produced, few have 
delved into the historical roots and context of the Greens, aside from mentioning 
in passing their links to the student protest movements of the 1960s.9  The best 
examination of the history of the German environmental movement ends in 1971, 
and mentions the German Greens mainly to refute attempts to trace similarities 
between Green and Nazi ideologies.10   
The few full-length histories that exist have been written by people within 
the Green Party itself, and while not uncritical of the Greens, show a clear 
political bias.11  Literature on the AL follows a similar pattern, although given the 
                                                 
9 Joachim Raschke’s magisterial Die Grünen: Wie sie wurden, was sie sind 
(Cologne: Bund-Verlag, 1993) is an example of the best quality of work on this 
subject.  It is extremely comprehensive, covering all local manifestations of the 
Greens and providing highly useful information on all aspects of the party, 
including the AL.  Raschke provides what he terms “a history of the Greens”; 
however, it is presented as a chronology of important events in the history of the 
Greens, devoid of analysis.  Andrei Markovits and Philip Gorski’s pathbreaking 
study The German Left: Red, Green and Beyond examines the decline of the link 
between the Left and workers’ movement through the rise of the Green Party. 
Andrei Markovits and Philip Gorski, The German Left: Red, Green and Beyond 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 3. 
10 Raymond Dominick, The Environmental Movement in Germany: Prophets 
and Pioneers 1871-1971 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), 111-112.  
Anna Bramwell in Blood and Soil: Richard Walther Darré (Bourne End: Kensal, 
1985) noted numerous alleged similarities between the Green Party’s 
environmental policies and those of Walther Darré, Nazi Minister of Agriculture 
from 1933-1945.  Dominick’s refutation was devastating. 
11 Werner Hülsberg, The German Greens: A Social and Political Profile 
(London: Verso, 1988), and Hubert Kleinert, Vom Protest zur Regierungspartei 
(Frankfurt am Main: Eichborn, 1992) are the two histories of the Greens written 





importance of the AL, its history remains surprisingly unexplored.12  Two 
historical studies of the AL have been undertaken, both by writers closely 
connected to the party.  The nearest thing to a complete history of the party, Zehn 
Jahre Alternative Liste: Bilder und Geschichte(n), was assembled by various 
members of the AL, and was published to celebrate the party’s achievements in 
its first decade of existence.  This account ends in 1988, and consists mainly of a 
chronology interspersed with personal comments by AL members themselves, 
and is best viewed as a primary source.13  The second, Die Alternative Liste Berlin: 
Entstehung, Entwicklung, Positionen, provides a good overview of the AL’s early 
years.  The work is particularly useful for the documents it publishes on the AL’s 
formative period.  However, even its authors, most of whom were closely 
associated with the AL, admit that their account is not objective.14 
This dissertation therefore is the first archives-based exploration by a 
historian of the origins and evolution of the AL.  To my knowledge, it is also the 
only historical study focusing on a specific geographical area that traces the 
evolution of the West German Left from its radical anti-parliamentary origins to 
                                                 
12 Joachim Raschke’s section on the AL, though full of very useful insights 
and structural information, gives more of a snapshot of the party at a particular 
time, and is based aside from interviews on only a few published works by AL 
members.  See Raschke, Die Grünen, 274-283. 
13 Elkebarbara Mayer, Martina Schmolt, and Harald Wolf, Zehn Jahre 
Alternative Liste: Bilder und Geschichte(n) (Bremen: Steintor, 1988). 
14 Michael Bühnemann, Michael Wendt and Jürgen Wituschek, eds., Die 






the founding of the Green Party and its rise to a coalition partner accepting and 
embracing Western parliamentary democracy.15  As such, it draws on new 
evidence to illuminate questions of interest to historians and social scientists 
focusing on postwar Germany.  In particular, the dissertation addresses the 
sources of West German stability, the legacy of the events collectively labeled 
‘1968,’ and the process of Vergangenheitsbewältigung, or coming to terms with the 
Nazi past. 
Consider first the issue of stability.  At first glance, Western European and 
German history appears turbulent indeed.  Revolutions, two devastating world 
wars followed closely by a Cold War with the potential to cause even more loss 
of life, and tremendous social, technological, and cultural changes left their mark 
on the continent.  But the twentieth century in Europe contained also the seeds of 
stability.  Post-World War II reconstruction, the creation of the European Union, 
and remarkable economic and political developments have also shaped the 
region.  Much of European history for the post- World War II era, and especially 
West German history, must entail a search for the roots of this stability, a stability 
that provided the preconditions for Germany’s ‘long way West.’ 
Questions posed by the Western European and in particular the West 
German success story are therefore at least as important as the search for 
explanations for Western Europe’s turbulence in the first half of the century.  In 
                                                 
15 Andrei Markovits’ and Philip Gorski’s The German Left looks at general 






this sense, this dissertation heeds Anselm Döring-Manteuffel’s call for research 
not only regarding the rise of the dictatorships of the twentieth century, but 
above all “regarding the development and stabilization of free societies.”16  How 
have radical movements in European and German history come to accept liberal 
democratic norms?  What has encouraged a deradicalization of fringe elements, 
and how has this deradicalization taken place?  What mix of political institutions 
and cultural developments has fostered these changes?  Specifically for the case 
of West Germany, how did the Bonn Republic avoid the fate of the Weimar 
Republic?  This study of the Left in West Berlin attempts to provide some 
answers to these important questions. 
Commentators have offered a number of explanations regarding 
Germany’s transition from a totalitarian state to a prosperous democracy.  Many 
authors, especially those writing in the post-unification era, have emphasized the 
political as well as economic stability of the Bonn Republic. 17  Some of these 
                                                 
16 Hinsichtlich der Entstehung und Stabilisierung freier Gesellschaften.  
Anselm Doering-Manteuffel, “Deutsche Zeitgeschichte nach 1945: Entwicklung 
und Problemlagen der historischen Forschung der Nachkriegszeit,” 
Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte  41, no. 1 (1993): 29. 
17 On the stability of the Federal Republic, see especially Manfred 
Görtemaker, Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Von der Gründung bis zur 
Gegenwart (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1999), 13.  Jeffrey Herf looks to “trends in political 
culture and the nature of democratic institutions to account for the unexpected 
resilience of West German democracy from 1977 to 1983.”  Jeffrey Herf, War By 
Other Means: Soviet Power, West German Resistance, and the Battle of the Euromissiles 
(New York: The Free Press, 1991), 2.  For a useful review of several contributions 
to understanding Germany’s transformation, see Marc Morje Howard, 
“Continuity and Change in Germany’s Turbulent Twentieth Century,”German 





credit the political parties with helping contribute to this stability.18  Still others 
have gone so far as to label this stability a “political miracle” on a par with 
Ludwig Erhard’s “economic miracle.”19 
Roughly speaking, explanations as to the nature of the postwar German 
“political miracle” can be broken down along the lines of “institutionalists” 
versus “culturalists.”  Institutionalists hold that Germany’s successful 
transformation was rendered possible by strong institutions such as the Basic 
Law, the parliaments, and the political parties.  Culturalists on the other hand 
                                                                                                                                                 
analyses, the political transformation of the postwar Federal Republic has been 
an undeniable success story.”  Howard, “Continuity and Change,” 140.  
Furthermore, for Peter Baldwin, again, “Politically, the Federal Republic is a 
remarkable success story, even in comparison with her European neighbors and 
certainly with its predecessor regimes.”  Peter Baldwin, “Postwar Germany in 
the Longue Duree,”  German Politics and Society 16, no. 1 (1989): 7. 
18 Peter H. Merkl notes the power of the mainstream political parties to 
exclude extremist parties on the Left and the Right in “The German Response to 
the Challenge of Extremist Parties,” in The Postwar Transformation of Germany, ed. 
John S. Brady, Beverly Crawford, and Sarah Elise Wiliarty (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 1999).  Stephen Kalberg notes the role of the Green 
Party in integrating citizen activism into its party program and thus channeling it 
into the parliaments.  See Stephen Kalberg, “The Federal Republic at Forty: A 
Burdened Democracy?”  German Politics and Society 16, no. 1 (1989).  For a general 
treatment of the role of the New Social Movements in democratizing West 
Germany, see Ruud Koopmans, Democracy from Below (Boulder, San Francisco, 
Oxford: Westview Press, 1995).  For an interesting treatment of cities’ 
contributions to democratization, including West Berlin, see Jutta A. Helm, “The 
Politics of German Cities: A Tale of Visions, Money and Democracy,” in The 
Federal Republic at Fifty, ed. Peter H. Merkl (New York: New York University 
Press, 1999). 
19 See for example E. Gene Frankland, “The Green Party’s Transformation: 
The New Politics Party Grows up,” in The Federal Republic of Germany at Fifty: The 
End of a Century of Turmoil, ed. Peter H. Merkl (New York: New York University 





look to historical and cultural factors to explain the West German transition.  In 
this view, the total breakdown and discrediting of the Nazi government purged 
German culture and society of absolutist tendencies and allowed other cultural 
and historical trends to come to the fore.  These influenced subsequent 
developments, including the development of political institutions.20 
 In its analysis of the transition from an extremist left-wing organization to 
a political party accepting and embracing parliamentary democracy, this 
dissertation touches on processes attributable to both institutional and cultural 
factors.  But these concepts strike me as rather arbitrary and in their binary 
opposition to each other not reflective of the more complexly intertwined reality.  
In lieu of the concepts of institutional and cultural factors, this dissertation 
describes processes I have labeled parliamentarization and deradicalization.  
Though these correspond roughly to institutional and cultural factors 
respectively, I believe that they are more useful and less misleading than these 
other terms.  Two sides of the same coin, these concepts capture the overlapping 
and intertwining nature of the processes I am attempting to describe.   
My understanding of parliamentarization relates closely to that expressed 
by Winkler in his Der lange Weg nach Westen: that is, the growing acceptance of 
                                                 
20 For a recent discussion of the institutionalist/culturalist debate 
regarding developments in the Federal Republic of Germany, see Beverly 
Crawford, John S. Brady, and Sarah Elise Wiliarty, “Germany Transformed? A 
Framework for Analysis,” in The Postwar Transformation of Germany: Democracy, 
Prosperity, and Nationhood, ed. John S. Brady, Beverly Crawford, and Sarah Elise 





Western parliamentary democracy.21  More specifically for the case of the AL, this 
parliamentarization consisted of the renunciation of violence as a tool of political 
protest and the growing conviction that the parliamentary arena was the best 
forum in which to air grievances and to enact change.  The story of the AL 
illustrates another dimension to parliamentarization, however.  As Ralf 
Dahrendorf notes in his classic study of German political culture, “There is an 
experimental attitude that allows anybody to propose new solutions, but rejects 
any dogmatic claim to the truth….  There is a conception of liberty that holds that 
man can be free only where an experimental attitude to knowledge, the 
competition of social forces, and liberal political institutions are combined.”22  
Later in the same study, he asserts, “Liberal democracy is government by 
conflict.”23  I show that, early in its development, the AL embraced a political 
culture bearing a striking resemblance to that described by Ralf Dahrendorf in 
his analysis of the ‘German Question.’  Though initially adopted by necessity as a 
reaction against certain aspects of the K-groups and as a way to enable its 
various constituent groups to work together, the AL’s commitment to a culture 
of debate and discussion and its renunciation of a “dogmatic claim to the truth” 
became strong forces for the democratization of the party. 
                                                 
21 Winkler, Der lange Weg. 
22 Ralf Dahrendorf, Society and Democracy in Germany (New York: Norton, 
1967), 16. 





Germany’s Long Way West also entailed a phenomenon I call here 
deradicalization.  I have borrowed this term from Jerry Muller, who applied the 
concept to explain why German intellectuals initially embraced, then 
subsequently rejected, the totalitarian forms of government and society they 
helped bring about in reaction to the changes of modernity.24  In many ways, the 
West German Left followed a similar path.  The small communist cells that were 
the immediate predecessors of the AL embraced a proletarian revolution, but 
were disillusioned with what they viewed as the imperialistic, revisionist policies 
of the Soviet Union.  The death of Mao Tse Tung in 1976 and the reign of the 
Gang of Four in China sparked the Left to distance itself from its remaining ideal: 
it is no accident that parts of the West Berlin Left founded the AL shortly 
thereafter.  In addition, many on the political left realized that the K-groups also 
provided no solution, instead producing only burnout and division.  Some of 
these disillusioned members responded by forming the AL.  Moreover, the 
methods and goals of the terrorist groups of the 1970s and 1980s such as the RAF 
and the June 2 Movement lost their appeal as their human costs became clear:  
significantly, the AL was formed in the immediate wake of the ‘German 
Autumn’ of 1977.  Finally, during the course of the 1980s, the environmental and 
human rights abuses rampant in the GDR sparked the faction within the AL that 
still viewed that country positively to become increasingly disillusioned. 
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Another source of deradicalization and parliamentarization in the 1980s 
derived from an increasing concern with environmental protection.  In fact, the 
integration of the radical Left into the parliamentary system in the course of the 
1980s through the Green Party could not have come about without the rise of the 
ecology paradigm beginning in the preceding decade.25  This ecology paradigm 
was quite broadly and vaguely defined; however, as Manfred Görtemaker has 
noted, this ambiguity proved advantageous, as it provided room for 
interpretation and hence helped unite a variety of people and projects.26   
Indeed, the new emphasis on ecology brought numerous disparate groups 
into the parliamentary system.  Most significant for the present context were 
attempts to revivify socialism using ecological elements.  The GDR émigré 
Rudolf Bahro perhaps best epitomized this approach.  Bahro described his 
attitude to Marxism after the shift from Red to Green in a revealing way:  "There 
are many particular elements in Marx that I still find useful, but the structure 
itself I have abandoned.  For me Marxism is a quarry.  After the fall of the Roman 
Empire ordinary people used the stones of the fallen temples to build their 
homes and their churches.  This is productive use of material.  There are also 
                                                 
25 On the revival of the ecology paradigm, see Anna Bramwell, Ecology in 
the Twentieth Century.  A History.  (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989).  
Bramwell argues that “the ecology movement” dates back to the mid-nineteenth 
century: the evident revival of ecology in the 1970s came about due to the 
simultaneous rise of the economics-related, “finite resources” root of ecology and 
the “biology” root, which emphasized the interconnectedness of man with 
nature.  Bramwell, Ecology, 238. 





structural elements that I use….  My whole Marxist background has, of course, 
gone into this restructuring."27  Less well known is the fact that student leader 
Rudi Dutschke himself recognized the potential of socialism to be reconciled 
with ecology.  Just before his premature death in 1979, Dutschke helped found 
the ‘Green Ballot’ in Bremen.  In an interview after the Bremen election, in which 
the party earned 5.1 percent to become the first green party to enter a state 
parliament, Dutschke noted that the future survival of the human species was 
uncertain, and that this threat of course transcended class interests.  Marxism 
could still contribute, however, as Marxist writings went beyond class to 
emphasize “the liberation of the entire species.”28   
In the case of the AL, ‘ecology’ functioned in several ways to deradicalize 
the organization.  For one thing, ‘Green’ doctrines provided the ideological glue 
that could be used to keep the diverse factions together enough so that the 
organization could win the 5 percent of the vote required as a minimum in order 
to gain parliamentary representation.29  Green ideas also served as a means of 
holding the organization together in times of crisis.30 
                                                 
27 Rudolf Bahro, From Red to Green: Interviews with the New Left Review 
(London: Verso, 1984), 219.  See also Rudolf Bahro, Elemente einer neuen Politik: 
zum Verhältnis von Ökologie und Sozialismus (Berlin: Olle and Wolter, 1980).   
28 Die Befreiung der ganzen Gattung.  Ulrich Chaussy, Die drei Leben des 
Rudi Dutschke (Darmstadt: Hermann Luchterhand, 1983), 333. 
29 Under the West German Basic Law, the so-called “five percent clause” 
was created in order to prevent a splintering of the parties as occurred in the 
Weimar Republic, with devastating consequences.  See Peter Graf Kielmannsegg, 





Bringing in other groups interested in ecology helped moderate the views 
of more radical individuals, as they were forced to find common ground, while 
elements of the ecology paradigm still appealed to more radical groups.  The 
presence of modernizers and technocrats in the AL helped temper the anti-
modernist rhetoric embraced by many members.  By the same token, radical 
opponents of the Allied forces in Berlin found that they could use the rhetoric of 
environmental protection to great effect in mobilizing opposition to the presence 
of Allied troops in West Berlin, a long-standing grievance of the Left.  This, too, 
helped attract radicals from the K-groups to the AL.  Furthermore, the AL’s 
opposition to nuclear power brought in still other veterans of the anti-nuclear 
movement: even though West Berlin did not have a nuclear power plant, its 
proximity to the GDR was enough cause for concern.  Moreover, the social justice 
                                                                                                                                                 
FDP, SPD, the Greens, ed. Robert Gerald Livingston (Washington, DC: American 
Institute for Contemporary German Studies, 1986), 2.  In the case of the AL, 
however, the five percent clause functioned to force disparate, often antagonistic 
groups to work together in order to meet and exceed the five percent threshold.  
The fractious K-groups, tired of meeting defeat after defeat at the polls, finally 
reached out to environmentalists, women’s groups, and so on to form a new 
organization.  Instead of dominating the new group, however, the K-groups 
were themselves dominated.  Hence it could be argued that the five percent 
clause worked, though certainly not in the intended way. 
30 For this reason, this dissertation takes issue with Joachim Raschke’s and 
others’ downplaying of the importance of the “greenness” of the AL. Raschke 
may be correct in asserting that “Green is not [the AL’s] first color,” but I have 
found that Green ideas were far more important than previously assumed, both 
in holding the party together and in characterizing the ideology of the party.  See 





component of this paradigm helped bring homosexuals, women, and other 
minorities into the party, thus attracting their voices to the constitutional system.  
An obvious effect of the rise of the ecology paradigm was the creation of 
the West German Green Party.  This in turn helped integrate radical leftists into 
the parliamentary system.  The example of Joschka Fischer, prominent Green and 
Germany’s Foreign Minister at the time of writing, illustrates this phenomenon.  
In early 2001, revelations about Fischer’s past as a militant street fighter in 
Frankfurt sparked an unprecedented debate about the legacy of the 1968 student 
revolt in West Germany and the violent decade of the 1970s.31  Some have 
questioned whether someone who once threw stones in street protests should 
now represent Germany internationally.  This controversy ignored the most 
interesting aspect, however: what Daniel Cohn-Bendit called the passage “from 
state-hater to state’s representative.”32   
It is my assertion that the 1970s and 1980s witnessed a crucial 
transformation of West German political culture that enabled such a transition.33  
The Green Party helped bring such individuals as Fischer into the political 
                                                 
31 For a good summary of the controversy, see M. Anne Sa’adah, “Ein 
Staatsmann mit Geschichte: Joschka Fischer’s German Past,” German Politics and 
Society 19, no. 3 (2001). 
32 Vom Staatshasser zum Staatsrepräsentanten.  Daniel Cohn-Bendit, “Ein 
Segen für dieses Land,” interview.  Der Spiegel 5 (29 January 2001), 86. 
33 For a sometimes hilarious account of this transformation, see Till Meyer, 
Staatsfeind (Hamburg: Spiegel Buchverlag, 1996).  Meyer describes the changes 





institutions of the Federal Republic, thus making it possible for them to apply 
their formidable talents and abilities to advancing rather than attacking 
parliamentary democracy.  Fischer is far from being the only prominent German 
politician with roots in the student movement of the 1960s: many of his 
colleagues in the Green Party (as well as a substantial number of Social 
Democrats) share a similar biography.  
The same was true of the AL: in fact, Otto Schily (currently Minister of the 
Interior), Renate Künast (who served as Minister for Consumer Protection, Food 
and Agriculture under the Red-Green Coalition), and Hans-Christian Ströbele 
(prominent member of the German Bundestag, often critical of United States 
policy) were all involved in the formation of the AL, and gained their first 
parliamentary experience as AL delegates.  Thus this dissertation uses the 
example of the AL to show that the New Left’s Long March did not necessarily 
end in terrorism or the undermining of democracy, as contemporaries and later 
observers feared and claimed.  Far more often, the Long March brought 
representatives of the New Left into the parliaments themselves, where they 
helped strengthen German parliamentary democracy.  The developments under 
consideration in this dissertation help explain how this happened. 
The relationship between the AL and the Green Party had a profound 
impact on the AL’s evolution into a political party working within constitutional 
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bounds.  Of particular importance here were attitudes toward using violence as a 
tool of political protest.  In part because of West Berlin’s unique situation, but 
also because of the nature of the relationship between the Green Party and the 
AL, the affiliation with the Green Party did not go as far in integrating the AL 
into the parliamentary system as one might have expected.  Nevertheless, 
especially by exerting constant pressure on the AL to reconsider its stance on 
violence, the Green Party in the end helped bring the radical Left in West Berlin 
into the parliamentary fold. 
The recent proliferation of analyses of the Federal Republic as a success 
story can sometimes obscure the fact that, from its founding in 1949 to German 
unification in 1990, historians, political scientists, and commentators of virtually 
every political stripe worried that the Bonn Republic was fraught with the same 
instabilities as the Weimar Republic had been.34  The rise of the New Left in the 
1960s merely increased these concerns.  Many of the works on the New Left 
either implicitly or explicitly expressed the concern that the Bonn Republic was 
coming increasingly to resemble the ill-fated Weimar Republic.  Richard 
Löwenthal took up classic themes about the fall of Weimar and the rise of the 
                                                 
34 For an example of these concerns during the 1960s, see Klaus 
Schönhoven, “Unbehagen an der Bonner Demokratie.  Ein Rückblick auf die 
politikwissenschaftliche Diskussion in den sechziger Jahren,” in Geschichte als 
Möglichkeit: über die Chancen von Demokratie, ed. Karsten Rudolph and Christl 
Wickert (Essen: Klartext-Verlag, 1995).  Early in the history of the Federal 
Republic, these fears provoked an early attempt at a rebuttal with the title 
directly inspired by the issue.  See Fritz Rene Allemann, Bonn ist nicht Weimar 





Nazis when he diagnosed the violence of the student movement as a “romantic 
relapse,” a return of the anti-Western, anti-liberal tendencies to which German 
intellectuals seemed especially prone.35  Hermann Lübbe’s tract asserting 
continuities between the student movement and the terrorist organizations of the 
1970s argued that a lack of conviction in defending West German democracy 
against terrorists lay at the roots of the spread of terrorism.  His arguments 
closely resembled those of historians blaming the demise of the Weimar Republic 
on a lack of committed democrats.36  Zbigniew Brzezinski dismissed the violence 
and the revolutionary rhetoric of the New Left as a “farewell performance of the 
historically irrelevant.”37  In addition, the rise of the Green Party further 
increased fears that the postwar consensus was unraveling.38  These worries 
haunted onlookers until the eve of German unification.  For Stephen Kalberg, the 
Federal Republic at age forty in 1989 was “a burdened democracy.” While 
generally successful in overcoming the problems that had plagued Germany in 
the past, the Federal Republic still could not feel secure in its accomplishments.  
                                                 
35 Richard Löwenthal, Romantischer Rückfall (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1970), 
8. 
36 Hermann Lübbe, Endstation Terror: Rückblick auf lange Märsche (Stuttgart: 
Seewald, 1978). 
37 Eine Abschiedsvorstellung der historisch Irrelevanten.  Zbigniew 
Brzezinski, “Revolution oder Konterrevolution- zum historischen Standort des 
Revolutionismus der ‘Neuen Linken,’“ in Wiedertäufer der Wohlstandsgesellschaft, 
ed. Erwin Scheuch (Cologne: Markus, 1968) , 222. 





It faced a number of new dilemmas that could potentially undermine the general 
trend toward a stable, participatory democracy.39  
Part of the task of the historian of the Federal Republic therefore must be 
to explain why the predictions of doom regarding the Federal Republic’s stability 
were mistaken.  This dissertation examines developments in West Berlin from 
the mid-1960s to 1990 in order to help understand this phenomenon.  There, anti-
Western, anti-parliamentary elements became reconciled with modern Western 
parliamentary democracy.  There, the new generation consigned to the ash heap 
of historical irrelevance by Brzezinski made itself relevant again.  There, the West 
German parliamentary system demonstrated its ability to absorb and integrate 
challenges from the far Left.  
As we have seen, one facet of the concerns about the stability of the Bonn 
Republic related to terrorism.  Not only the acts of terror themselves represented 
a threat to the Federal Republic, however: contemporary observers were correct 
to point out that the state’s response to these acts also could undermine 
democracy.  Critics accused the West German state of both overreacting and 
applying a double standard in its fight against terror, suspending civil liberties in 
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its zeal to track down left-wing terrorists while downplaying acts of terror from 
the Right.40 
Left-wing intellectuals complained that the West German state tended to 
tar the legal opposition by alleging association with terrorists.41  Writing in the 
foreword to a collection of letters from intellectuals protesting the BRD’s 
response to terrorism, and especially the tendency to accuse intellectuals of 
complicity in the terrorist acts, Heinrich Böll, Freimut Duve, and Klaus Staeck 
asserted that one idea united the terrorists and those who used their acts as a 
means of advancing their own power: the view that the Federal Republic neither 
needed nor was capable of reform.  According to the publishers, a contrasting 
idea united the letters included in their publication: the belief that ending 
terrorism required the recognition that German democracy both needed and was 
capable of reform.42 
The story of the AL is also the story of precisely this recognition on the 
part of the radical Left.  Jeremy Varon described the “eschatological impulse” 
                                                 
40 For an overt statement of the accusation that the BRD government had a 
double standard when it came to cracking down on left-wing as opposed to 
right-wing terror, see Hermann Vinke, Mit zweierlei Mass: Die deutsche Reaktion 
auf den Terror von Rechts. Eine Dokumentation (Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 
1981).  Vinke explicitly compared this to the situation in the Weimar Republic 
when the government cracked down on the Left while ignoring the Right.  Vinke, 
Mit zweierlei Mass, 8. 
41 Rolf Schroers,  “Demokratie-Extremismus-Terrorismus,” in Extremismus 
im demokratischen Rechtstaat, ed. Manfred Funke (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1978), 536. 
42 Freimut Duve, Heinrich Böll, and Klaus Staeck, eds., Briefe zur 





that motivated groups such as the RAF and that was rooted in the conviction 
“that the existing order was irredeemably corrupt and had to be destroyed; that 
its destruction would give birth to something radically new and better; and that 
the transcendent nature of this leap rendered the future into a largely blank or 
unrepresentable utopia.”43  When it entered the parliamentary system, the 
extreme Left in West Berlin distanced itself from this impulse.  By accepting the 
rules of parliamentary democracy instead of making a fateful leap into the 
unknown, the AL in essence asserted its conviction that the Bonn Republic 
needed change, but also conceded that its political system made this change 
possible.  In this way, members expended their energies in bolstering democracy 
rather than attacking it.  The subsequent implications for Germany’s stability 
cannot be overstated. 
The AL did not, of course, arise out of nowhere: this dissertation 
interprets the AL in part as a product of the New Left of the 1960s.  Foremost 
among the historians of the New Left has been Ingrid Gilcher-Holtey.  Drawing 
on the work of social movement theorists Friedhelm Neidhart and Dieter Rucht, 
Gilcher-Holtey’s scholarship has done much to advance historians’ 
understanding of the New Left.44   
                                                 
43 Jeremy Varon, Shadowboxing the Apocalypse: New Left Violence in the 
United States and Germany (Ph.D. diss., Cornell University, 1998), 378. 
44 See especially Ingrid Gilcher-Holtey, ed., Neunzehnhundertachtundsechzig 
(1968): Vom Ereignis zum Gegenstand der Geschichtswissenschaft (Göttingen: 
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According to Gilcher-Holtey, the New Left differed from the traditional 
Left in five key aspects.  First, the New Left re-interpreted Marx’s theories to 
emphasize alienation of the individual more than class exploitation.  Second, 
rather than concentrating exclusively on revolution in the spheres of industry 
and politics as a way of achieving socialism, the New Left also emphasized 
socialism’s potential to alter and liberate the individual in his or her personal, 
familial, and sexual relationships.  Third, New Leftists viewed cultural changes 
as preceding and helping pave the way for social and political revolution.  
Fourth, the New Left placed much more emphasis on action than on theory, and 
hoped to alter both spectators and participants through provocative forms of 
protest.  Finally, the New Left marked a shift away from viewing the proletariat 
as the agent of revolution, instead looking to new educated workers, young 
intellectuals, and fringe groups.45   
As Gilcher-Holtey reminds us, social movements cannot perpetually 
remain mobile, and they constantly face the threat of dissolution and decline.  By 
their very nature, they are a temporary phenomenon.  Indeed, demobilization is 
a key component of social movements.  This demobilization typically comes 
about either through disintegration into sects and subcultures, through 
                                                                                                                                                 
Friedhelm Neidhart and Dieter Rucht, especially their “The Analysis of Social 
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ed. Dieter Rucht (Frankfurt: Campus, 1991). 
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institutionalization as a party or association, or by transformation into a 
successor organization that takes up components of the social movement and 
advances them.46 
In West Berlin, the New Left underwent similar processes of decay and 
rebuilding, and the AL was actually the result of two of these processes.  First, 
the most important of the student organizations of the 1960s, the Sozialistischer 
Deutscher Studentenbund (League of Socialist German Students- SDS) 
disintegrated into numerous smaller groups with highly varying degrees of 
organization.  Among these were the sects of the K-groups: this disintegration 
will be examined in the next chapter.  Second, around a decade later, the K-
groups and several other groups with roots in the SDS themselves merged into 
the AL: this will be explored in Chapter Four.47 
                                                 
46 Ingrid Gilcher-Holtey, “Mai 1968 in Frankreich,” in Ingrid Gilcher-
Holtey, ed., Neunzehnhundertachtundsechzig (1968): Vom Ereignis zum Gegenstand 
der Geschichtswissenschaft (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1998), 12. 
47 Intellectual continuities may also be traced: for example, the work of 
Herbert Marcuse continued to be of crucial importance to the ideology of the AL.  
As Timothy Luke put it, Marcuse “anticipates virtually every critique made by 
contemporary radical ecology groups.” Timothy W Luke, “Marcuse and 
Ecology,“ in Marcuse: From the New Left to the Next Left, ed. John Bokina and 
Timothy Lukes (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1994), 204.  See in 
general Marcuse: From the New Left to the Next Left for an account of the 
importance of Marcuse’s ideas and their relevance to the New Left as well as to 
ecology and post-modernism.  On the importance of the ideas of Herbert 
Marcuse for the West German student movement, see Ingo Juchler, Rebellische 






 In emphasizing the continuities between the New Left and the AL, this 
dissertation supports and builds on the findings of Andrei Markovits and Philip 
Gorski, whose study Red, Green, and Beyond demonstrated conclusively the 
connections between the Green Party and the New Left.48  From its affiliation 
with the student movement to its participation in the so-called K-groups to its 
final formal relationship with the Green Party, the experiences of the AL’s 
membership embodied the New Left’s ‘Long March.’  Thus this dissertation’s 
examination of the prehistory, founding, and subsequent development of the AL 
contributes to the debate about the significance and legacy of the phenomenon 
often known simply, and misleadingly, as ‘1968’.49  This serves as the second 
major area of emphasis of this dissertation. 
                                                 
48 Markovits and Gorski, German Left. 
49 In general, I have found that in West Berlin, the year 1967 is remembered 
as playing a much more significant role than 1968.  Informal conversations with 
eyewitnesses indicate that 1967 was the key year in Berlin, not 1968.  Only once a 
national and international perspective is adopted does 1968 become more 
significant.  This occasionally leads to interesting mistakes in attributing certain 
historical events.  Matthias Horx for instance delivers an unwitting example of 
the pull ‘1968’ has on his generation: he incorrectly identifies 1968 rather than 
1967 as the year in which Benno Ohnesorg was shot, thus confusing two events 
of momentous importance: the shooting of Benno Ohnesorg and that of Rudi 
Dutschke, which did occur in 1968.  The fact that not only the author made this 
mistake, but that it clearly made it past numerous editors without being caught, 
is testament to the importance of ‘1968’ in the popular imagination. See Matthias 
Horx, Aufstand im Schlaraffenland.  Selbsterkenntnisse einer rebellischen Generation 
(Munich: Carl Hanser Verlag, 1989), 15.  On the student movement and the 
importance of the year 1967, see Rainer Bieling, Die Tränen der Revolution: die 68er 





‘1968’ has been widely cited as a source and time of important social and 
cultural change.50  The nature of this change, however, has been intensely 
debated.  What did the protest movement mean for West German society and 
culture?  Was it a force for modernization?  Was it a revolution? What does the 
AL tell us about the consequences of participation in the protest movement?  
How did participants’ involvement shape their subsequent political or 
professional career?  Their political outlook?  Where did their Long March 
through the institutions lead them?  
Again, Ingrid Gilcher-Holtey has been at the forefront of attempts to 
evaluate the meaning and significance of ‘1968.’  As she notes, however, it is 
difficult to determine the influence of social movements like the New Left.  While 
                                                 
50 Readers interested in 1968 from an international perspective are referred 
to the volume edited by Carole Fink, Philipp Gassert, and Detlef Junker, 1968: 
The World Transformed (Washington, DC: German Historical Institute and 
Cambridge University Press, 1998).  For an examination of 1968 and its historical 
meaning in international comparative perspective, see the volume edited by 
Ingrid Gilcher-Holtey, “1968.”   For a comparison of the events of 1968 in 
Germany and France which is exemplary in its systematic use of conceptual tools 
for the analysis of social movements, thus facilitating cross-national 
comparisons, see Ingrid Gilcher-Holtey, “1968 in Deutschland und Frankreich: 
ein Vergleich,” in 1968- Ein europäisches Jahr?, ed. Etienne Francois and others 
(Leipzig: Leipziger Universitätsverlag, 1997).  Ronald Fraser et al provide 
another example of recent attempts to study the 1968 revolts from an 
international comparative perspective, “based on the memories of over three 
hundred people who took part in the student movements.”  Ronald Fraser and 
others, eds., 1968: A Student Generation in Revolt (New York: Pantheon, 1988), 2.  
Pavel Richter in “Die APO in der BRD,” in Neunzehnhundertachtundsechzig (1968): 
Vom Ereignis zum Gegenstand der Geschichtswissenschaft, ed. Ingrid Gilcher-Holtey 
(Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1998), gives a succinct account of the 
developments leading up to and culminating in the student protest of 1967-1968. 
This is probably the best, most compact account of FRG-wide developments 





social movements define new issues and bring them into public debate, other 
actors, especially political parties, are needed to effect the changes demanded.  
This makes it hard to evaluate the direct role of social movements in enacting 
change and in driving political, social, and cultural developments.51 
Nevertheless, as Gilcher-Holtey noted, observers have ascribed a variety 
of effects to the protest movement, ranging from the emancipative to the 
destructive.52  According to Rainer Bieling, the 1968 revolt resulted in a new sense 
of maturity and responsibility in West German society.53  Daniel Cohn-Bendit 
attributed a novel radical democratic tradition and a general expansion of 
democracy to the protest movement, claiming that “a society which claimed to be 
democratic was made to confront its authoritarian structures, the authoritarian 
personality was challenged, society’s smooth running profoundly shaken.”54  
Christoph Klessmann, far more careful and more scholarly in his assessment of 
the social consequences of the protest movement, examined the question as to 
whether the protest movement actually sparked a “lifestyle revolution” or 
                                                 
51 Ingrid Gilcher-Holtey, prologue to Neunzehnhundertachtundsechzig 
(1968): Vom Ereignis zum Gegenstand der Geschichtswissenschaft (Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1998), 9.  On the difficulty of determining what can 
legitimately be seen as the legacy of the 1968 movement, see Gilcher-Holtey, 68er 
Bewegung, 111-125. 
52 Gilcher-Holtey, 68er Bewegung, 114. 
53 Bieling, Tränen, 120. 





whether it merely coincided with developments that were happening anyway.55  
He concluded that the movement had more of an amplifying function for 
tendencies already present in West German society, and its cultural-
revolutionary results should thus not be overestimated.  Others have credited the 
New Left with forcing a confrontation with the Nazi past and advancing debate 
about the Holocaust.  Klessmann addresses this question as well.  Taking issue 
with Hermann Lübbe, who claimed that the student movement actually 
hindered the process of coming to terms with the past, Klessmann asserted that 
the student movement forced and intensified the debate about the German past, 
if occasionally through problematic means.  But giving the student movement 
credit for initiating the debate would also be inaccurate.56 
On the other hand, its critics have blamed the New Left for everything 
from terrorism to the decline of parliamentary democracy.  Some commentators 
have located in the protest movement of the 1960s the origins of the terrorist 
violence of the 1970s and 1980s.  Hitler’s Children, Jillian Becker’s famous 
monograph on the RAF, traces the roots of the terrorist group directly to 
developments in West Berlin, the student movement, the anti-Shah protest, and 
the shooting of Benno Ohnesorg.57  Hermann Lübbe claimed that terrorism was 
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the direct result of the 1960s protest movement.58  Jeremy Varon’s brilliant 
comparative study of New Left violence in the United States and West Germany 
draws a similar conclusion.  While Varon is careful to distance himself from 
those who view terrorism as a direct consequence of the protest movement, 
Varon suggests that the terrorist violence of the RAF represented a purified form 
of the New Left’s nihilistic ideology.59 
Others emphasize the anti-parliamentary aspects of the New Left.  
According to Franz Schneider, APO, the German acronym for extra-
parliamentary opposition, stood just as much for anti-parliamentary opposition.60  
In his view, implicit in the New Left’s program was a genuine hostility to 
parliamentary democracy.  For Bernd Guggenberger, the radical democratic 
elements advocated by the New Left essentially renounced the crucial 
components of West Germany’s fragile parliamentary democracy, with 
dangerous authoritarian implications.61 
                                                 
58 Lübbe, Endstation Terror. 
59 Varon, Shadowboxing, 378.  For the results of a cooperative undertaking 
sponsored by the German federal government on the roots of terrorism, see the 
massive work by Fritz Sack and Heinz Steinert, eds., Analysen zum Terrorismus, 4 
vols. (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1984). 
60 Ausserparlamentarische Opposition; antiparlamentarische Opposition.  
Franz Schneider, ed., Dienstjubiläum einer Revolte: 1968 und 25 Jahre (Munich: 
Hase and Koehler Verlag, 1993), 49. 
61 Bernd Guggenberger, Wohin treibt die Protestbewegung?  Junge Rebellen 





Thus reviews have been mixed regarding the legacy of the New Left, with 
many contemporaries seeing in the New Left the beginning of the end of the 
Bonn Republic.  Despite all these predictions of doom, however, the Bonn 
Republic survived to provide the basic blueprint for the unified Berlin Republic, 
and the New Left did not succeed in tearing down West German society.  
Instead, in the minds of many, quite the opposite occurred.  According to this 
view, the New Left helped usher in reforms and modernize and democratize 
German society.  Gerd Koenen’s account of the ‘Red Decade’ of the 1970s 
epitomizes the dilemma regarding the legacy of the New Left.  To him, the New 
Left was quite clearly anti-parliamentary and anti-Western.  He finds it thus all 
the more puzzling why the movement has been credited with advancing the very 
causes it originally opposed.  Koenen expresses this paradox explicitly when he 
asks, “How can a movement that, until the early 1980s, had precisely the 
opposite inscribed on its banners, have advanced liberalism, democracy and 
westernization?”62  Koenen addresses changes said to have occurred during the 
1960s and 1970s, whereas I look to the 1980s for the source of these changes.  To 
extend Koenen’s metaphor, I assert that, during the course of the eighties, the 
Left rewrote its banners. 
                                                 
62 Wie kann aber eine Bewegung Liberalität, Demokratisierung und 
Verwestlichung vorangetrieben haben, die bis in die frühen 80er Jahre hinein das 
deutliche Gegenteil auf ihre Fahnen geschrieben hatte?  Gerd Koenen, Das Rote 






 As has already been seen, one of the debates about the legacy of the 1960s 
concerns the protest movement’s role in promoting a discussion about and a 
coming to terms with the Nazi past.  Whether or not the protest movement can 
be credited with being the first to advance discussion in this area, there can be no 
question that the New Left helped force a confrontation with the legacy of 
National Socialism in West German society.  But the Nazi past was significant for 
the New Left in other ways as well.  In fact, a key aspect of the history of the 
New Left involves its own coming to terms with the German past.  This process 
of Vergangenheitsbewältigung is the third major theme of this dissertation.  
Analyses of the different ways the past has been understood and 
interpreted in the two Germanys have added much to our understanding of the 
political and intellectual cultures of the two German states.63  In the post-war era, 
the legacy of the German past presented serious obstacles to the Left’s ability to 
identify with the West.  But experiences in the AL and events in West Berlin in 
the 1980s helped overcome these obstacles.  This, too, was a crucial aspect of 
Germany’s Long Way West. 
A critical part of understanding the ideas and attitudes of the New Left 
involves appreciating the implications of its self-understanding as ‘anti-fascist.’  
                                                 
63 See especially Jeffrey Herf, Divided Memory: The Nazi Past in the Two 
Germanys (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997).  For a critical 
examination of several of the dominant theses regarding the varying 
interpretations of the Nazi past in the two Germanys, see Antonia Grunenberg, 
“Antitotalitarianism versus Antifascism- Two Legacies of the Past in Germany.”  





This anti-fascism had several consequences.  For one thing, the Left’s anti-fascism 
led to a remarkable and unfortunate blind spot when it came to understanding 
the nature of the Nazi past and the lessons to be applied to the present.  A 
dogmatic and simplistic analysis of the rise of National Socialism that 
emphasized the fascist nature of the regime to the exclusion of other elements 
such as racism and anti-Semitism permitted the Left, which considered itself 
staunchly anti-Nazi, to occasionally perpetuate anti-Semitic rhetoric and 
images.64 
This understanding of the Nazi past persisted to a large degree within the 
AL.  As an outgrowth of the New Left, the AL continued to promote discussions 
about the legacy of National Socialism.  But it also continued some of the 
problematic aspects of the New Left’s approach to coming to terms with the past, 
especially regarding an undifferentiated discussion and analysis of fascism.  This 
was still present on the Left in the 1980s, as I show in the section on the housing 
squatters in West Berlin.  This dissertation also shows, however, that the AL 
confronted these attitudes and distanced itself from them in the course of the 
1980s.  
The anti-fascist ideology extended far beyond a condemnation of the Nazi 
past: it also entailed a rejection of the West.  Like its predecessor in the Weimar 
                                                 
64 On anti-Semitism on the Left, see Martin Kloke, Israel und die deutsche 
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Republic, this ideology equated capitalism and liberal democracy with fascism.65  
Already at the time of the student movement, this hindered identification with 
the West.  As Antonia Grunenberg noted, the protest movement rejected the 
West on moral grounds because of the fascism allegedly rooted in its political 
and economic systems.66 
Most fatefully for the Left, and potentially most threatening for 
Germany’s position as a ‘normal’ Western nation, the radical Left rejected the 
Federal Republic for its alleged failure to break with the Nazi past.  In fact, the 
attitude of the New Left toward the Federal Republic was in every way colored 
by the perception that the Federal Republic was a successor to the Nazi 
government.67  The Left could in fact point to numerous examples of individuals 
who had played prominent roles in the Nazi era who continued to serve in high 
offices in the Federal Republic.  Based on this compromised nature of the West 
German state, it became a moral imperative for the Left to resist the Federal 
Republic, rendering violent resistance to the state not only acceptable but 
admirable.68   
                                                 
65 Antonia Grunenberg, Antifaschismus, ein deutscher Mythos. (Reinbek bei 
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66 Grunenberg, Antifaschismus, 162. 
67 Grunenberg, Antifaschismus, 161. 





This has several interesting implications.  It follows that when the AL 
debated the use of violence as a tool of protest, it in fact also debated the nature 
of the West German state.  In distancing itself from violence, however gradually, 
the AL reconciled itself to the Federal Republic and to the West.  Thus, this 
dissertation interprets the controversies over violence that erupted during the 
1980s as the final stages of the New Left’s coming to terms with the Federal 
Republic and the final chapter in the history of the troubled relationship between 
the Left and the West German state.  In the course of the 1980s, in West Berlin, 
the rift between the Left and the West German state was gradually closed.  
The three historiographical issues outlined at length above serve as 
thematic threads running throughout the dissertation rather than providing an 
organizational structure.  The dissertation itself is organized chronologically, 
with Chapters Four through Seven covering periods corresponding to the 
legislative periods in West Berlin.  It may be objected that adopting the 
legislative periods as caesuras automatically imposes an undue emphasis on the 
role of parliament in shaping the development of the AL.  In fact, this was one of 
the interesting aspects of my research findings with broader implications 
involving radical movements in parliamentary democracies: I found that the 
electoral cycles imposed themselves upon the AL, influencing what was under 
debate, the nature of the debate, the timing of the issues the AL raised, and the 
general strategy of the party.  In other words, parliament insinuated itself into 





This introduction serves as Chapter One.  Chapter Two commences by 
briefly examining the Wandervogel and the bohemian movement as reactions to 
the problems of modernity.  It turns quickly to the postwar era, emphasizing the 
exiling of the radical Left from the parliamentary arena.  It then addresses the 
student movement in West Berlin, from the shooting of Benno Ohnesorg in 1967 
to the anti-Springer Campaign and the attack on Rudi Dutschke.  The chapter 
concludes with the dissolution of the SDS.  Chapter Three focuses on West Berlin 
in the 1970s, paying particular attention to the KPD-Rote Fahne.  The chapter 
explores this party’s radical anti-parliamentary sentiments, and contrasts them 
with the attitudes it expressed at the end of the decade, when it participated in 
the creation and founding of the AL.  Chapter Four addresses the first years of 
the AL.  It examines the reasons for the decline of the K-groups and the 
implications for the AL, and analyzes its first program, formulated for the 1979 
elections, when the AL entered several District Assemblies.  The chapter looks 
briefly at the work in these assemblies.  It then explores the AL’s increased 
appeal to other segments of the radical Left that had earlier declined to work 
with the AL, and the reasons for this shift.  Chapter Five examines the 1981 
election, when the AL gained representation in the West Berlin Abgeordnetenhaus.  
In particular, it focuses on the AL’s attitudes toward parliamentary participation 
and violent protest.  Chapter Six begins with the 1985 election campaign, and 
looks at the attempts of the AL to balance the extra-parliamentary and the 





and turns increasingly to its activities in parliament for the insights these give as 
to the processes of parliamentarization and deradicalization.  Chapter Seven 
turns to the 1989 election and its aftermath, when the AL joined the SPD to 
govern West Berlin.  The momentous changes of 1989 released unexpected 
energies and impulses among the AL, which, once thwarted, turned back to the 
parliament.  The changes also resulted in the end of the AL-SPD coalition.  
Chapter Eight presents conclusions about the material presented here, then 
provides a brief epilogue on the fate of the AL in a unified Germany and a 
unified Berlin. 
 The story of the AL related here then is part of a larger pattern.  In its 
gradual acceptance of the rules of parliamentary democracy, in distancing itself 
from violence and terror, and in coming to terms with the legacy of the Nazi 
past, the AL was both part of and contributor to Germany’s “Long Way West.”  
But before we can examine the process of overcoming the gap between the state 
and the radical Left that was an important part of this journey, we turn first to an 
examination of when this gap opened the widest: the turbulent 1960s and the 







Setting the Szene:  
Berlin, 1900-1970 
 Following Markovits and Gorski’s findings on the Green Party as a whole, 
this dissertation interprets the AL as the logical outcome of historical 
developments relating to the extra-parliamentary opposition and the New Left.  
This chapter examines developments affecting the West German Left, 
emphasizing as a general theme the alienation and marginalization of the radical 
Left from the SPD after the end of World War II.  But the AL was also an 
organization arising out of and at home in West Berlin, and the AL cannot be 
understood apart from its geographical and historical context.  This chapter 
provides this context up to 1970, primarily focusing on the Left in Berlin after 
1945, tracing its development up to the dissolution of the SDS in 1969.  It 
examines Berlin as a center for alternative movements and the location of 
particularly intense conflicts between socialists and communists.  Finally, the 
chapter focuses on West Berlin in the postwar era, paying particular attention to 
student protest and the role of the Free University of Berlin. 
Berlin has historically been a center of radical and alternative movements 
sparked by the urban environment and the contradictions of modernity.  One 
such movement with interesting parallels to the AL was the Wandervogel.1  This 
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back-to-nature movement grew rapidly and spread across Germany.  From about 
one hundred adherents in 1901, membership had reached over twenty-five 
thousand by the outbreak of the First World War.  
Historians have offered a variety of explanation for the origins of the 
Wandervogel.  The group had its origins in Steglitz, then a Prussian town on the 
outskirts of Berlin.  Berlin at the time was the center of the developments against 
which the Wandervogel reacted.  Urbanization, the decline of free space available 
for youth, and stuffy and restrictive schools motivated these youths to escape the 
city and wander about in the surrounding countryside.2 
Another key contributor to the strength of the Wandervogel movement 
was the large number of students in Steglitz.  The student population in Prussia 
increased dramatically in the second half of the nineteenth century, and the 
number of pupils in Steglitz rose even more sharply since the town was 
expanding so rapidly.  A dense student population meant that Steglitz had the 
right conditions for students to find others with similar interests.  Also, 
inhabitants and students in Steglitz were faced with particularly intense mobility 
                                                                                                                                                 
Wandervogels: vom Aufstieg, Glanz und Sinn einer Jugendbewegung (Gutersloh: S. 
Mohn, 1960).  For an extensive collection of documents relating to the 
Wandervogel, see Werner Kindt, compiler, Die Wandervogelzeit. Quellenschrift zur 
deutschen Jugendbewegung 1896-1919 (Düsseldorf; Cologne: Eugen Diederichs, 
1986).  A comprehensive account of this history would be beyond the scope of 
this account: instead, this chapter focuses as much as possible on developments 
in Berlin. 
2 Gerhard Ille, “Schülernot und Jugendkult im deutschen Kaiserreich- zur 
Situation der bürgerlichen Jugend um 1900,” in Der Wandervogel.  Es begann in 





and population fluctuations, developments that were occurring throughout the 
Reich.3  This growth had its impact in the form of an increasing regimentation of 
society, significantly impacting the lives of young people.  This was seen in the 
seventy-eight police regulations passed from 1875 to 1909, “For the Maintenance 
of Safety, Comfort, Order, and Cleanliness in Steglitz.”4  In addition, the areas 
where children and students had played or enjoyed their own space were rapidly 
disappearing.  Nature came increasingly under pressure by developers, and the 
green spaces that had previously served as playgrounds lost their wild character 
as the city of Steglitz converted them into manicured parks.5  Expelled from their 
natural world as a result of industrialization, early adherents of the Wandervogel 
sought to recapture their space and their freedom by escaping into the 
comparatively undeveloped land outside of the cities. 
Another group with certain parallels to the AL were the bohemians, a 
movement of artists and students that sprouted up in European cities in the 
nineteenth century.6  While the ‘capital’ of the bohemian movement was Paris, 
the most famous centers of bohemian culture and activity in Germany were 
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5 Ille, “Schülernot,” 50-52. 
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Berlin and Munich, the latter of which would become their most well known 
center in Germany.  The bohemians were small islands of counterculture with 
only a few hundred members.  These individuals were mostly middle-class 
artists and students whose biggest commonality was opposition to the 
bourgeoisie.7  According to the scholar of the bohemian movement Helmut 
Kreuzer, the word bohemian is most commonly applied to the groups of 
“marginal artists and authors, their non-normative way of life, and their milieu.”8   
While these individuals often lived in poverty, it was not this poverty that 
was distinctive to them, but the combination of the non-bourgeois way of life 
with their anti-bourgeois attitudes.  This was seen most clearly in their rejection 
of conventional notions of employment.  Bohemians viewed a normal career as 
the antithesis and archenemy of their carefree approach to life.  Indeed, a 
bohemian’s fondest ambition was to free himself from the confines of everyday, 
bourgeois life and concentrate instead on the development of his own 
individuality.  So important was this escape from the ordinary that one 
bohemian entitled his memoirs Life Without the Everyday.  This author made clear 
his disdain for ordinary, bourgeois work: “The expression ‘the everyday’ was the 
most terrifying specter, and I imagined it embodied in long corridors lined with 
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numbered doors, doors behind which care-laden, unhappy men sit and write 
figures in books.”9   
The biggest priority for bohemians centered on achieving the all-
important intoxication.  “For everything bohemian strove for intoxication.  The 
intoxication of parties and of all-nighters, the intoxication of love and of alcohol 
and drugs, the intoxication of losing oneself in conversations.”10  Additionally, 
bohemians showed a remarkable preference and sympathy for the outsiders of 
society.  The ugly, the lowly, and social outcasts including the sick, the alcoholic, 
and the prostitute, all found favor in bohemian circles, both in literature, 
reflected in Naturalism, and in real life ideology.11 
The large city played a key role for bohemians: 
The relationship of bohemians to the city is ambivalent: the city 
both fascinates and repulses; this is of course not true only for the 
bohemians, but is particularly characteristic for them.  The 
beginners and outsiders need the numerous chances offered by the 
city as compared to the province in the intellectual realm.  But at 
                                                 
9 Aber von jeher war mir der Begriff des ‘grauen Alltags’ das 
schrecklichste Gespenst, das sich besonders gerne in langen Korridoren mit 
numerierten Türen zeigt, hinter denen sorgenvolle, unfrohe Männer sitzen und 
Zahlen in Bücher schreiben.  Rolf von Hoerschelmann, Leben ohne Alltag (Berlin: 
Wedding-Verlag, 1947), 7. 
10 Denn alles in der Boheme erstrebt den Rausch.  Rausch der Feste und der 
durchwachten Nächte, Rausch der Liebe und des Alkohols, Drogenrausch und 
Rausch der selbstvergessenen Gespräche.  Conti, Abschied, 11.  Emphasis in 
original. 
11 Kreuzer, Boheme, 52.  This privileging of the underprivileged 
foreshadowed New Left theorists’ emphasis on the role of fringe groups as a 
force for social revolution.  See especially Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional 






the same time, the coldness of economic struggle for existence is 
more threateningly felt in the city.12 
 
Accordingly, Berlin was an important setting for bohemian culture.  Cafes like 
the Schwarzes Ferkel and Cafe des Westens were important meeting places and 
centers for literary movements and discussions.  Contemporaries noted the 
intense richness of intellectual contacts, impressions and concomitant excitement 
that life in Berlin offered, as they experienced with a “mighty gasp…the 
powerful potential for movement, the thrilling juggling-act of its pulsating 
thoughts and feelings.”13  Interestingly, however, a significant segment of the 
bohemian scene fled the city, meeting in the meadows of Friedrichshagen 
outside Berlin instead of in the cafes of the capital.14 
World War I had a devastating impact on the bohemian scene, with 
adherents being called to fight or choosing emigration.  The war resulted in both 
a political and a literary radicalization.  The revolution of 1918 involved many 
bohemians, and many entered the realm of politics as members of the soldiers’ 
                                                 
12 Das Verhältnis der Boheme zur Grossstadt ist zwiespältig; diese 
fasziniert und stösst ab; das gilt natürlich nicht nur für die Boheme, ist aber für 
sie wesentlich.  Die Anfänger und Aussenseiter bedürfen der zahlreichen 
Chancen, die sie, mit der Provinz verglichen, den Intellektuellen bietet; dennoch 
lässt sie zugleich die Härte des wirtschaftlichen Existenzkampfes bedrohlicher 
spüren.  Kreuzer, Boheme, 219. 
13 Der mächtige Atemschlag Berlins, die gewaltige Bewegungsmöglichkeit, 
der Austausch des spannenden Gaukelspiels seiner pulsierenden Gedenken und 
Gefühle.  Else Lasker-Schüler, Prosa und Schauspiele (Munich: Kösel, 1962), 676; 
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councils or other revolutionary bodies.15  With the rise of the Weimar Republic, 
the bohemians experienced a cultural resurgence, particularly in Berlin.  The 
young Bertolt Brecht is probably the most famous product of the bohemian scene 
of 1920s Berlin, a scene that became increasingly influential and international 
until the rise of the Nazis suppressed them.16 
Hitler’s ascension to power meant the gradual end of conditions fostering 
a bohemian scene.  Many bohemians went into exile, where some became 
politically active.  Others drank themselves to death.  After the war, there was no 
strong bourgeoisie against which the bohemians could react.  Not until the 1950s, 
the decade after currency reform and the beginnings of the ‘economic miracle,’ 
did bourgeois society recover sufficiently for the bohemians to begin recreating 
themselves.  In the 1960s, bohemian society experienced a renaissance.  
Significantly, there was a substantial degree of overlap between the bohemian 
movement and the realm of student politics and alternative experiments such as 
West Berlin’s Kommune I.17 
                                                                                                                                                 
14 Julius Bab, Die Berliner Boheme (Berlin: H. Seeman Nachfolger, 1904), 33-
37. 
15 Kreuzer, Boheme, 56. 
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As well as hosting these important cultural manifestations of protest 
against the modern world, Berlin was the center of working class activism.  The 
city was the center of the workers’ council movement in the immediate wake of 
defeat in the First World War, and it was the site of the two rival declarations of 
the Weimar Republic on 9 November 1918: tellingly, one by the centrist Social 
Democrat Philipp Scheidemann and the other by the radical communist Karl 
Liebknecht.  It has also been the locus of the most severe crackdowns and 
divisions between the radical and centrist Left.  It was there that Freikorps agents 
murdered the communist leaders Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht.  The 
SPD’s tacit acceptance of this act helped foster the animosity between the KPD 
and the SPD that haunted the Weimar Republic.18 
                                                 
18 Mary Fulbrook, The Divided Nation: A History of Germany 1918-1990 (New 
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York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993), 323.  So crucial was this cooperation to the 
survival of the Weimar Republic that Heinrich Winkler called it “the unwritten 
basic law of the Weimar Republic” (das unbeschriebene Grundgesetz der 
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two leftist Weimar parties.  Whereas the KPD sought to achieve the violent 
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revolution.  On the revisionist debates between Eduard Bernstein and Karl 
Kautsky, see Carl Schorske, German Social Democracy 1905-1917: The Development 
of the Great Schism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955), esp. 16-24.  See 





 At the end of World War II, Berlin and the left-wing and alternative 
movements it had spawned lay in ruins, destroyed by the consequences of the 
Nazi regime.  Rebuilding the Left initially occurred far more quickly than 
reconstructing the devastated city.  Thanks to its solidly anti-Nazi credentials, 
the Left in both its centrist and more radical versions in Germany seemed in 
good position to return to power.  Against most people’s expectations, however, 
it was not the Left that played a key role in the rebuilding of Germany, but the 
conservative, though this time staunchly democratic, Right under Konrad 
Adenauer.  For its part, the Left met continual defeat in the postwar period.  The 
KPD, once proud postwar successor to the KPD of Rosa Luxemburg and Karl 
Liebknecht, was banned outright in West Germany in 1956.  Moreover, the SPD 
met repeated defeats, both of its political priorities and at the polls.  This led the 
SPD to move to the center, which alienated and marginalized its more radical 
fringes. 
The SPD faced three major blows to its policy agenda in the period before 
1960.  Its efforts to achieve codetermination and socialization of the German 
economy collided with United States interests in a free market economy as a 
means of achieving a strong West Germany as a bulwark against the Soviet 
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Union.  The Left’s desire to preserve a unified, sovereign Germany after the fall 
of Hitler ran aground on Adenauer’s willingness to sacrifice a unified Germany 
in favor of parliamentary democracy and integration in a Western military 
alliance.  Finally, the SPD was unable to prevent the CDU from carrying out 
plans to station nuclear weapons in the Federal Republic.19 
The SPD’s efforts to thwart West German nuclear armament and its 
subsequent defeat are of particular interest for the birth of the APO.  In 1958, the 
SPD established the Kampf dem Atomtod (Fight Against Nuclear Death- KdA) as 
an information campaign.  This from the outset “was conceived as a genuine 
mass mobilization beyond the boundaries of the SPD and the established 
channels of parliamentary politics.”20 
Through the KdA, the SPD was able to mobilize large demonstrations in 
opposition to nuclear armament in cities across West Germany.  Nevertheless, 
the campaign was unsuccessful, which itself led to further frustrations.  But a 
number of significant characteristics marked the SPD’s efforts that in retrospect 
were more important than the campaign’s success or failure.  First, the unions 
did not support the SPD’s campaign: their priorities lay elsewhere.  Second, the 
way in which the KdA was dismantled after the failure of the campaign served 
to alienate many.  This amounted to the SPD abandoning “the concerns of 
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middle-class radicals and independents in order to concentrate on the 
achievable, material goals of the ‘man in the street.’”21  Finally, the nature of the 
arguments used in the campaign was significant.  Instead of arguing along 
traditional class-based lines, campaigners had invoked ideas of all humanity’s 
struggle against “a detached, heteronymous and menacing bureaucratic force.”22  
This foreshadowed arguments pitting the interests of humanity as a whole 
against impersonal, bureaucratic and technological forces seen later in the Green 
Party and its forerunners. 
Along with the KdA, the Sozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund (Socialist 
German Students’ League- SDS) also had close links to the SPD, though it was 
conceived as an independent organization.  The SDS was formed in 1946 in 
Hamburg, primarily by social democrats, but the founding members also 
included small groups of independent, anti-fascist student groups, socialists and 
communists critical of both the SPD and the KPD, as well as members and 
sympathizers of the KPD.  In spite of their differences, the group was held 
together by the intensity of their experiences during the Nazi period.23  In 1959, 
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the SPD cut off support for the group in reaction to the participation of the SDS 
in a Berlin congress where communists also were present, and in 1961, the SPD 
declared membership in the SDS incompatible with membership in the SPD.24 
Meanwhile, the Left continued to be stymied at the polls.  Its anti-fascist 
record did not count for much in the postwar, Cold War climate of Germany, 
and Adenauer’s CDU trounced the SPD regularly.  These electoral defeats, 
together with the series of disappointments for the SPD in its major priorities 
outlined above, helped propel the SPD to make the momentous decision to 
abandon the doctrine of proletarian revolution at the SPD conference in Bad 
Godesberg in 1959.25  With the Godesberg decision, the SPD became a mass party, 
or Volkspartei, and committed itself to working within and upholding the 
political, economic, and social system of the Federal Republic.  
While the SPD’s explicit acknowledgment of its commitment to the 
Federal Republic’s institutions was an important step in securing the Federal 
Republic’s stability, it by no means reflected the attitudes of the Left as a whole.  
In fact, the Godesberg decision marked a further stage in the radical Left’s 
marginalization and alienation, as it rendered many on the Left politically 
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homeless.  Markovits and Gorski note that the established Left “had become so 
firmly integrated into the social and political system of the Federal Republic by 
the early to mid-1960s that they could no longer represent or absorb the utopian 
aspirations of middle-class radicals.  Instead the energies of this group found an 
outlet in the APO.”26   
One of the leaders of the APO to emerge in the mid-1960s was Rudi 
Dutschke, a leader within the SDS.  As will be seen, Dutschke and his political 
goals were to play an important role in the development of both the protest 
movement in West Berlin and the development of the AL.  The most famous 
formulation of Dutschke’s political agenda was his exhortation for a ‘long march 
through the institutions.’  Many have interpreted these words as a call for 
gradual reformism and “a renunciation of illegality and violence.”27  According 
to Gerd Koenen, however, when one considers the context, it becomes clear that 
Dutschke was actually calling on the radical Left to infiltrate the institutions of 
the bourgeois state and use them to intensify the inherent contradictions in 
society, presumably thereby sparking a revolution.   
Three additional developments at the national level served further to 
alienate and marginalize the radical Left from the Federal Republic and its 
political institutions.  First, in November 1966, the Nationaldemokratische Partei 
Deutschlands (National Democratic Party of Germany- NPD), a new right wing, 
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neo-fascist party, entered the state parliaments in Hesse and Bavaria.  Nationalist 
and anti-communist, the NPD embraced apologist views regarding the rise and 
reign of Hitler.  Second, the SPD and the CDU entered into the Grand Coalition 
in December 1966, meaning that the very small FDP was the sole opposition 
party in the Bundestag.28 
 The third development, the ratification of measures to provide for 
emergency powers in the event of extreme threats to the Federal Republic, did 
nothing to ease the fears of the Left that fascism was poised to reemerge in the 
Federal Republic.  Moreover, these measures’ adoption with the support of the 
SPP under the Grand Coalition in 1968 only confirmed the far Left’s view of the 
SPD.  As Markovits and Gorski put it, “perhaps more than any other action by 
the Social Democrats in the Bonn Republic, it was their ultimate consent to the 
creation of the Emergency Laws that convinced many leftists of the SPD’s total 
conversion to becoming a faithful servant of the established capitalist order.”29 
Overall, the banning of the KPD in 1956, the SPD’s defeats at the polls and 
in the realm of policy, and its resultant compromise with the existing social and 
economic order made at Godesberg meant that the far Left was exiled from the 
political spectrum for decades to come.  Furthermore, the rise of the Right, the 
                                                 
28 During the second half of the 1960s, left-wing intellectuals were certain 
that the Federal Republic found itself in a pre-fascist phase as a result of the 
Grand Coalition and the rise of the Right at the state level.  See Reinhard 
Schmöckel and Bruno Kaiser, Die vergessene Regierung: die grosse Koalition 1966 bis 
1969 und ihre langfristigen Wirkungen (Bonn: Bouvier, 1991), 367.  





creation of the Grand Coalition, and the SPD’s support for the Emergency Laws 
served further to alienate the Left and to convince it that a return of Germany’s 
fascist past was imminent, and that the SPD was partially responsible. 
Many of the consequences of this situation were found in Berlin.  In the 
immediate postwar era, the Left appeared well poised to return to its previous 
power in Berlin.  East-West confrontation in the city served to block this return, 
however.  Although the city in 1947 selected as its leader the former Communist 
turned Social Democrat Ernst Reuter, Adenauer’s slogan of ‘no experiments’ 
captured the mood in the former capital of the Reich as well as in the rest of 
western Germany.  The 1948 Berlin blockade and the airlift were the most 
tangible signs of the threatened status and security of Berlin at the hands of the 
Soviets.  Increasingly divided between Eastern and Western sectors, cut off from 
the West, and facing constant harassment from Soviet troops, the Berlin populace 
had little tolerance for alternative or protest politics. 
 In the immediate postwar era, however, events occurred that lay the 
foundation for Berlin to regain its status as center of protest.  One such event was 
the founding of the Free University, the United States-sponsored response to the 
virtual takeover of Berlin’s historic and once-prestigious Humboldt University, 
which lay in the eastern section of the city and thus fell under Soviet jurisdiction.  
The Free University adopted a structure known as the “Berlin model” that gave 
the students a voice in the university administration, supported student political 





universities.  This progressive model, while well-intended, helped transform the 
Free University into a hotbed of student political dissent.  It also helped make the 
city of West Berlin a center of student and leftist culture.30  The fact that West 
Berlin’s unique status made its residents exempt from the military draft also 
fostered this, as West Berlin increasingly attracted those rejecting military 
service.  
Even in the late 1940s, Berlin witnessed political events foreshadowing the 
protests of the 1960s.  The most famous of these, the ‘Kunyists,’ were the first 
significant incident of student protest and clashes with police in postwar Berlin.  
In the beginning of December 1949, a German cook employed by the British 
army in Berlin named Jakob Kuny caused a scene on the streets of Berlin.  In his 
“artist’s mane” reminiscent of the bohemians, Kuny declared himself a work of 
art and called upon students of the Technical University to join his ‘Kunyist’ 
movement.31  Five hundred students gathered at the Zoo train station demanding 
“Kunyology at all universities.”32  Police responded with clubs, arresting around 
30 students.  In its absurdist theatrical elements and in its direct, violent 
confrontation with authority, the event foreshadowed elements of the coming 
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developments in West Berlin in the years of student protest.  Fichter and 
Lönnendonker appropriately labeled the Kuny demonstration an “anti-
authoritarian happening,” and detected in it a “tendency toward intellectual 
non-conformism” that would come to characterize the West Berlin student 
movement.33 
 Berlin students first demonstrated their anti-fascist political leanings in a 
demonstration against the neo-fascist Socialist Reich Party in July 1950.  In 
December of the same year, the students first began to flex their political muscle 
when four thousand students broke through police barriers to prevent a 
performance involving Werner Krauss, the actor who played the main role in 
Veit Harlan’s anti-Semitic film Jud Süss.34 
 West Berlin did not achieve its status as the center of the student protest 
movement until the 1960s, however.  The 1961 construction of the Berlin Wall 
literally cemented West Berlin’s separation from the Federal Republic.  The 
nearest West German border was more than one hundred miles away, and the 
Island City was militarily indefensible.  It also greatly contributed to that 
particular mentality of those living in the city on the front of the Cold War, this 
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“mix of fear, threat, stagnation, corruption, narrow-minded arrogance, and 
individual inhibition” described by Fichter and Lönnendonker as a contributing 
factor to what they label the “Berlin Syndrome.”35 
 Indeed, Fichter and Lönnendonker ascribe a great deal of importance to 
West Berlin and its students in launching the student movement.  In their phrase, 
“The Berlin students were the locomotive of the revolt.”36  The SDS and the Free 
University played a key role in this development.  By the mid-1960s, the SDS was 
able to initiate and see through a drift to the Left in the universities, which had 
been dominated by the Right for more than a century.37  In West Berlin, because 
of the factors mentioned above, this took a particularly intense course.  But 
developments in West Berlin took a different path than in the Federal Republic 
for other reasons as well.  Because of the direct proximity to East Berlin, West 
Berlin students could interact closely with students at the Humboldt University 
and partake of cultural and political activities in the East until the construction of 
the Wall in 1961.38  Moreover, they witnessed and experienced the developments 
in the East far more intensely than did their counterparts in the Federal Republic.  
For this reason, the SDS in West Berlin was forced to confront and examine the 
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ideology of Soviet Marxism far earlier (and reached far less positive conclusions) 
in West Berlin than in West Germany.39  This also helps explain why in West 
Berlin in the 1970s, K-groups emphasizing Maoist doctrines as opposed to 
Stalinism dominated the far-left scene.  (See below, Chapter Three.) 
 These developments can be followed in the history of the Free University.  
In early 1963, the Right still held the majority in the Free University’s student 
parliament, with Eberhard Diepgen, West Berlin’s future mayor, being elected 
head of the student body in January 1963.  In 1965, however, the Left gained 
more or less permanent control of the elected student parliament.  This 
development was typical of German universities in the 1960s.40   
The “Krippendorf Case” also was symptomatic of the changed university 
climate of 1965.  In this incident, Ekkehart Krippendorf, an assistant in the Otto 
Suhr Institute, had falsely accused the Free University’s rector of having refused 
to invite the philosopher and critic of the Federal Republic Karl Jaspers to speak 
on the twentieth anniversary of German capitulation.  Although Krippendorf 
corrected the mistake and apologized to the rector, his contract was not renewed, 
which amounted to a dismissal.  This sparked a large student protest and 
contributed significantly to the already tense atmosphere at the Free University.41 
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 Much of the left-wing student agitation related to opposing the American 
involvement in Vietnam.  During the winter semester 1965-1966, the student 
government supported a “Vietnam Semester” at the Free University that 
included exhibits, films, podium discussions, and demonstrations regarding the 
war.42  On 5 February 1966, the anti-Vietnam protests crossed the line in the eyes 
of many West Berliners, when protesters hurled five eggs at the America House, 
symbol of American culture and American contributions to West Berlin’s 
freedom.  As Ingrid Gilcher-Holtey noted, this act “found more notice in the 
German public than all previous banners, appeals, and declarations.”43  The 
Berlin press responded with headlines such as “The Jesters from West Berlin,” 
“SED Supports Student Demonstrations,” “An Abomination for our Berlin,” and 
“Shameful!  Unthinkable!  Shortsighted!”44 
 Besides the Free University, another unique West Berlin creation 
contributed to West Berlin’s status as capital of the alternative movement and 
created a stir in its approach to political protest.  Kommune I (Commune I- KI) 
was founded on 1 January 1967.  One of KI’s principal cofounders, Dieter 
Kunzelmann, would go on to help found the AL in 1978, and would be elected to 
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the Abgeordnetenhaus as an AL delegate in 1981.  A man with distinctly bohemian 
leanings, Kunzelmann was originally active in the Munich group Subversive 
Aktion.  He moved to West Berlin in 1966 when he realized the potential media 
attention his particular brand of attention-grabbing political theater could 
attract.45 
KI ostensibly aimed to shake up what its founders and fans saw as a 
repressed, prudish bourgeoisie.  As such, it derived much of its shock value from 
its highly unconventional living arrangements, complete with partner swapping, 
orgies, and the like.  Kunzelmann summarized the supposed political program of 
Kommune I in his infamous quote, “What do I care about the Vietnam War, as 
long as I have orgasm problems?”46  Beneath the apolitical surface of this 
provocative statement lay a fundamental critique of West German society.  
According to an often-read body of work by Wilhelm Reich, sexual repression 
could lead to neuroses, deformations of character, cancer, and fascism.  Other 
commentators have noted the strong influence of Herbert Marcuse, in particular 
his emphasis on the problem of isolation in modern society, as inspiration for the 
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founding and program of KI.47  KI, and in particular Dieter Kunzelmann, were 
quite gifted at inventing new, provocative forms of political demonstration, 
injecting forms of street theater and theater of the absurd into street protest.48 
 Some contemporary observers saw in KI a far more threatening specter, 
however.  Gerd Koenen asserted that instead of sex, violence played a far more 
important role for KI, and it is no accident that all three of its principal founders, 
Kunzelmann, Fritz Teufel, and Rainer Langhans, were associated with terrorist 
and extremist groups.49  Early in the group’s history, one particular attempt at a 
political happening provoked an intense if rather embarrassing reaction by the 
state.  On the eve of a visit by United States Vice-President Hubert Humphrey, 
KI and SDS members were arrested as they allegedly prepared bombs with 
which to attack the vice president.  The ‘bombs’ consisted of flour and pudding 
in plastic bags.50  
 All of these incidents helped prepare the way for the floodgates of protest 
to open only a few months later.  At least in West Berlin, ‘1968’ began in 1967.  
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Konrad Jarausch put it unequivocally when he wrote, “The student rebellion 
began on June 2, 1967.”51  On this date, during a student protest against the Shah 
of Iran, a policeman shot and killed a student demonstrator named Benno 
Ohnesorg.  The event proved to be the catalyst for the release of immense protest 
energy that took the form of hitherto unprecedentedly large demonstrations, and 
became the symbol for a generation.  It also inspired the creation of a terrorist 
group named after the date of the event, the June 2 Movement, to which 
Kunzelmann had close ties. 
 On the evening of June 1, several thousand students had attended a 
presentation in the Free University’s main auditorium where an Iranian exile 
spoke at length about the tortures, murders, and oppression under the Iranian 
Shah.52  The next day, several thousand student protesters greeted the Shah with 
catcalls in front of West Berlin’s City Hall.  The students faced a large number of 
police, as well as pro-Shah demonstrators, who attacked the students with 
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boards and steel rods.  Angry at the lack of response by the police, thousands of 
demonstrators gathered later that evening outside the German Opera, where the 
Shah and his wife were to attend a performance.  Once the performance had 
begun, authorities gave the order to charge the protesters.  A group of the 
demonstrators fled into the Krumme Strasse, which runs perpendicular to the 
Bismarckstrasse, near the site of the German Opera. 
 According to eyewitness accounts, police took some of the captured 
demonstrators into the fenced open-air courtyard below an apartment building 
on the Krumme Strasse, where they allegedly beat them.53  In the heat of the 
battle, two shots were fired, and afterward, the student protester Benno 
Ohnesorg lay dead.  The fact that Heinrich Albertz, the Social Democratic 
Governing Mayor of West Berlin at the time of the shooting, had approved the 
tactics and immediately after the shooting vociferously defended the actions of 
the police, certainly did not help heal the growing wound between the SPD and 
the far Left in West Germany and West Berlin.54 
 As well as triggering further demonstrations, the shooting of Benno 
Ohnesorg and the events surrounding it, including the attacks on demonstrators 
by police, were widely held to be a preview of what West German society would 
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be like under the Emergency Laws.  Thus the Left interpreted the police reaction 
as evidence of the decline of democracy in the Federal Republic.  As Gilcher-
Holtey phrased it, “The shots in front of the German Opera were viewed as the 
high point of a policy that tried to eliminate minorities and non-conformity.”55  
After Ohnesorg’s death, blocking the Emergency Laws shifted from being an end 
in itself to being viewed as a stage in the re-democratization of the Republic.  
Thus in the wake of the events of 2 June 1967, the students channeled their 
political energy into an attempt to stop the Emergency Laws.56   
 This reaction also pushed Rudi Dutschke to sharpen his rhetoric and the 
intensity of his attacks against the Emergency Laws.  In arguing for the 
establishment of action centers against the laws in universities across Germany, 
Dutschke insisted, “that the established rules of the game of this unreasonable 
democracy are not our rules, that the point of departure for the politicization of 
the student body must be the intentional breaking of these unreasonable rules.”57  
It was this statement that sparked Jürgen Habermas to express his concern that 
Dutschke was advocating a left-wing fascism. 
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 Relationships between the general West Berlin populace and West Berlin’s 
students deteriorated significantly as a result of the June events.  In particular, 
the newspapers and magazines owned by Axel Springer attacked the students, 
who responded in kind with calls for boycotts and with demands for the 
expropriation of Springer’s media empire.58  Those attending the university 
articulated their depression in light of the “aggressive mood of the populace 
toward the students,” and described the “smoldering deterioration” in relations 
and the “serious conflicts” with the West Berlin general public in the wake of the 
shooting.59 
 Another shooting brought the conflict between the students and the 
Springer press to a climax.  On 11 April 1968, Rudi Dutschke, by then a leading 
light of the SDS, was shot in the head and critically wounded by Joseph 
Bachmann, a deranged worker who traveled to West Berlin from the West in 
order to carry out the shooting.60   The SDS explicitly blamed the Springer press 
for the attack.  In particular, the SDS accused Springer’s media empire of 
dehumanizing the student movement’s participants and inciting violent acts 
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against its members.  As a result, the day after the shooting, the radical Left 
renewed calls to boycott the Springer press, and across the Federal Republic and 
in West Berlin, protesters attempted to block the delivery of BILD and related 
papers.61  Students paraded to the Kochstrasse in West Berlin where Axel 
Springer’s publishing house stood.  The students smashed windows, damaged 
printing presses, and, allegedly as the result of the machinations of an agent 
provocateur employed by the West Berlin Office for Constitutional Protection, 
set delivery vehicles on fire.62  Increasingly violent confrontations with the police 
were the only tangible result.   
On the surface, the student movement and the SDS seemed in May 1968 to 
be very strong, with large demonstrations in West Berlin and the Federal 
Republic mobilizing thousands.  The events of 1968 that by some accounts 
“transformed the world” have been well documented and need not be explored 
in greater depth here.63  One more event of particular relevance to subsequent 
developments in West Berlin must be mentioned briefly, however: the 4 
November 1968 ‘Battle at Tegeler Way.’  A group of protesters gathered at the 
State Court on Tegeler Way to protest the upcoming disciplinary action against 
Horst Mahler, the attorney who had defended Free University students facing 
                                                 
61 Bauss, Studentenbewegung, 96-104. 
62 Fichter and Lönnendonker, Kleine Geschichte, 127. 
63 See Fink, Gassert, and Junker, eds., World Transformed, for a global, 






charges as a result of their participation in protests.  Mahler stood accused of 
violating professional codes by participating in the actions against the Springer 
organization after Dutschke’s shooting.  The protesters attacked the group of 
police in front of the courthouse with paving stones.  In the ensuing melee, 130 
police officers and 21 students were injured.64 
This event had double significance for the Left in West Berlin.  First, it 
marked the birth of the so-called Gewaltfrage, the ‘question regarding violence.’  
The day after the ‘Battle at Tegeler Way,’ a prominent Free University professor 
raised the question of violence in the Free University’s main auditorium, 
asserting, “only for fascists is violence not a problem.”65  This was the opening 
salvo in the debate over violence that occupied the Left and its critics for the next 
twenty years. 
Second, Fichter and Lönnendonker assert that the Battle at Tegeler Way 
marked a watershed for the SDS, and by implication, a watershed for the 
development of the AL and the Greens.  In the immediate wake of the attack on 
the police, the SDS believed that the next time protesters attacked police, the 
police would respond in kind, initiating a civil war.  The SDS could only hope to 
continue its policy of confrontation in cooperation with the working class.  This 
alliance with the working class did not come about, however, and as a result, the 
                                                 
64 Fichter and Lönnendonker, Kleine Geschichte, 136. 
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SDS dissolved itself.66  This event thus highlighted the declining link between the 
Left and the workers’ movement crucial to the theses of Markovits and Gorski 
regarding the rise of the Green Party.67 
After the SDS dissolved itself at a conference in Frankfurt in 1970, its 
members and followers sought a new ‘political homeland.’  They found these in 
one of four areas: the attempts to attract a mass following in preparation for a 
socialist revolution, as epitomized by the K-groups; the turn to violence to 
provoke the state into a harsh reaction, thus triggering a revolutionary counter-
stroke by the masses, as embodied by the terrorist groups like the RAF and the 
June 2 Movement; the ‘drop-out’, countercultural response found in the 
alternative scene in West Berlin and eventually in the housing squatters’ 
movement; and the radical reformism of those who attempted to transform 
political parties, especially the SPD.68  The initial three of these four responses 
were critical to the history of the AL, and will be examined in the next chapter.  
As I have shown in this chapter, Germany, and especially Berlin, was 
since the beginning of the twentieth century the home of important 
developments foreshadowing the development of the AL.  The Wandervogel 
began as a reaction against the apparent superficiality and greed of Wilhelmine 
middle-class society and one of its consequences: the limitations on freedoms of 
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young people and the stifling environments that confronted them, both at school 
and at home.  In the case of the bohemians, they too reacted against the middle 
class.  Importantly, while the city remained crucial to their movement, a 
significant part of their reaction to modernization consisted in abandoning the 
city and returning to unspoiled nature, and numerous strains of their work 
targeted the modern world, especially the world of work, for criticism.69  
Besides developments relating specifically to Berlin, this chapter has 
traced the processes of alienation and marginalization of the Left at both the 
West German and West Berlin levels.  Frustrated at the polls, meeting defeat 
after defeat in its ambitious political agenda, the SPD renounced the doctrine of 
revolution in favor of becoming a ‘people’s party.’  As a result, the spectrum 
dissatisfied with this course was left without a political homeland.  It recreated 
this homeland in the APO.  At the same time, in West Berlin, a series of events 
occurred that served to further intensify this alienation and exclusion, especially 
involving the West Berlin student movement and SDS.  The SDS could not 
translate its superficial power to real political gains, however, and the 
organization fragmented.  As Fritz Sack noted, “While the SDS as an 
organization disappeared, the alienation from and abandonment of established 
politics on the part of large segments of the academic and non-academic youth 
                                                 





remained and massively increased.”70  When the SDS officially dissolved itself, 
the West Berlin chapter did not bother to send a delegation; its former members 
were already busy founding new groups.  The next chapter examines several of 
these groups in detail. 
                                                 
70 Der SDS ist zwar als Organisation verschwunden- geblieben ist jedoch 
und hat sich massenhaft fortgeschrieben die in diesem Zulauf zum SDS nach 
dem 2. Juni manifest gewordene Entfremdung und Abwendung grosser Teile 
der akademischen und nichtakademischen Jugend von der etablierten Politik.  
Fritz Sack, "Die Reaktion von Gesellschaft, Politik und Staat auf die 
Studentenbewegung," in Analysen zum Terrorismus, ed. Fritz Sack and Heinz 






The Red Decade in the Island City 
 Alexandra Richie has likened the West Berlin of the 1970s to a “quiet 
backwater.”1  When examined more closely, however, one sees that the pool was 
stagnant, with dangerous and sometimes violent undercurrents simmering 
beneath the surface.   
Geopolitically speaking, the Cold War crisis had been at least partially 
tamed, with Brandt’s Ostpolitik helping prepare the ground for the Quadripartite 
Agreement on Berlin, which went into effect in June 1972.  The agreement 
regulated the relations between the two Germanys, with the Federal Republic 
renouncing the claim to solely represent Germany on the world stage (the so-
called Alleinvertretungsanspruch), while travel to East Berlin and East Germany 
was eased for West Berliners.  This agreement formalized the status quo of the 
divided Germany cemented in 1961 with the construction of the Berlin Wall.  A. 
J. Nicholls described the post-agreement situation in very optimistic terms: 
“West Berlin became more and more of a privileged island, cocooned in a cozy 
web of western subsidies and special privileges, not the least of which was 
exemption from military service.”2 
In real life, things were not so cozy.  West Berliners caught carrying 
kitchen knives could still theoretically receive a death sentence under occupation 
                                                 
1 Alexandra Richie, Faust’s Metropolis: A History of Berlin (New York: 
Carroll and Graf, 1998), 775. 
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law.3  Moreover, the danger of nuclear annihilation had by no means vanished: 
Western Europe was increasingly threatened by Soviet mid-range nuclear 
missiles, the SS-20s, deployed beginning in 1974.  NATO’s “double-track 
decision,” the Doppelbeschluss of 1979, responded to this threat by trying to 
persuade the Soviet Union to remove its SS-20s while announcing the planned 
deployment of its own mid-range nuclear forces if the Soviet Union refused.  
This decision set the stage for extensive debates in the 1980s, and helped the 
Greens to power.4 
Domestically, the SPD remained firmly in control in West Berlin 
throughout the 1970s.  It occupied all Senate seats until 1975, when the SPD 
shared power in a coalition with the FDP.  Klaus Schütz was Governing Mayor 
of Berlin from 1967 to 1977, when he was replaced by Dietrich Stobbe, also of the 
SPD.  Not until 1981 did the CDU win control of the West Berlin parliament.  
None of these SPD mayors could come close to rivaling the power or prestige of 
their predecessors Willi Brandt or even Heinrich Albertz, and a great deal of the 
discontent of the West Berlin Left can be traced to disillusionment with the SPD 
in running the city. 
                                                                                                                                                 
2 Nicholls, Bonn Republic, 234. 
3 Richie, Faust’s Metropolis, 774. 
4 Dennis Bark and David Gress, A History of West Germany, vol. 2, 
Democracy and its Discontents (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 308-309.  On the 
double-track decision in general, see Herf, War. 
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Economically, too, the Quadripartite Agreement could not solve all 
problems.  West Berlin was basically on life support, sustained by massive 
economic infusions from the Federal Republic.  These subsidies could not 
compensate for the problems caused by West Berlin’s unique status, and the 
drastic rise in oil prices beginning in 1973 only exacerbated matters.  Between 
1970 and 1980, West Berlin lost over one hundred thousand jobs.  Industries 
traditionally strong in West Berlin such as the electronics firms Siemens and AEG 
were far from immune from these losses.  Federal jobs provided a critical source 
of employment: 20 percent of all jobs were in the federal sector, approximately 
twice as many as in the Federal Republic, and the federal government was the 
second-largest employer in the half-city.5  A declining population due in part to 
‘Wall Fever’- a term describing the psychological consequences of being shut in 
the Island City for too long with the ever-present possibility of invasion by 
Eastern Bloc forces hanging over one’s head- would have sunk further if not for 
an influx of foreign workers: in 1968 there were less than nineteen thousand such 
workers, at the beginning of the 1970s there were over eighty thousand, and by 
1980, the number had reached ninety-four thousand.6  
Architecturally, urban blight seemed to particularly affect West Berlin: the 
destruction of landmarks and the construction of ugly, often massive buildings 
                                                 
5 Hansjoachim Hoffman, Berlin: Eine politische Landkunde (Berlin: 
Landeszentrale für politische Bildungsarbeit, 1998), 156-157. 
6 Richie, Faust’s Metropolis, 777; Hoffman, Berlin, 15. 
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in their stead continued.  West Berlin was certainly a diverse city, with a large 
Turkish population, especially in Kreuzberg.  But the economic downturn and 
the general tristesse of the city took their toll: the drug dealers, prostitutes and 
general derelicts endemic around West German train stations seemed to have 
found their Mecca in the Bahnhof Zoo.7  
Beneath this stagnant surface churned dangerous and violent 
undercurrents.  The first shots of the 1970s in West Germany’s struggle with 
terrorism were fired in the West Berlin district of Dahlem, when Andreas Baader 
was forcibly liberated while ostensibly assisting in research for a book under 
police guard in an archive near the Free University.  Baader and the individuals 
who freed him formed the nucleus of the Rote Armee Fraktion (Red Army Faction- 
RAF), otherwise known as the Baader-Meinhof gang.8  
In December 1971 Georg von Rauch, the alleged head of another terrorist 
group, was shot in an exchange of gunfire with the West Berlin police.  His 
group, the Bewegung 2. Juni, named after the date on which Benno Ohnesorg was 
fatally shot after the student protest against the Shah turned violent, had close 
ties with Kommune I: Dieter Kunzelmann, who later became one of the AL’s 
delegates to the West Berlin Parliament, was good friends with both the group’s 
main leaders, Ralf Reinders and Fritz Teufel, whom he knew from Kommune I.  
                                                 
7 See Christiane F., Wir Kinder vom Bahnhof Zoo (Hamburg: Gruner und 
Jahr, 1979) for an account of this scene from the late 1970s. 
8 The best account of the history of the RAF is found in Stefan Aust, Der 
Baader-Meinhof-Komplex (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1997). 
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This group carried out the only ‘successful’ bloodless action in the history of 
West German terrorism, when the Bewegung 2. Juni abducted Peter Lorenz, the 
CDU’s candidate for mayor, in March 1975.  The group released Lorenz after 
police released a number of political prisoners.  This action was widely admired 
by the Left both for its success in achieving the release of prisoners and for its 
peaceful outcome; however, recent research has shown how close the event came 
to becoming a bloodbath.9  
The squatters’ movement sparked by West Berlin’s housing shortage as 
well as the activities of numerous left-wing extremist groups gave impetus to a 
variety of alternative artistic projects.  They also provided plenty of inspiration 
for an alternative musical scene: if there had been a soundtrack playing in the 
background in the 1970s West Berlin counterculture, most of the music would 
have been written and performed by the band Ton Steine Scherben.  Their lyrics 
reflect the concerns and ideals of the thousands of young people who came to 
West Berlin to avoid mandatory military service, to attend the Free University, to 
make their living selling arts and crafts or drugs or both, or just to enjoy the 
alternative lifestyle that had by then become famous. 
Ton Steine Scherben’s 1972 album Keine Macht für Niemand (No power for 
nobody) teems with songs reflecting the vigorous West Berlin counterculture and 
                                                 
9 Koenen, Das rote Jahrzehnt, 375. Kunzelmann’s role in the abduction or 
the exact nature of his association with the Movement June 2 has never been 
conclusively demonstrated, but this did not render him immune to accusations 
of guilt by association. 
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references to West Berlin politicians and political developments, mostly 
concerning housing squatters and their battles with police and politicians.  Their 
music provides evidence of a grassroots, left-wing nationalism, as well as a 
strong undercurrent of anti-Americanism that increasingly came to characterize 
the West German Left.  The ballad “Der Traum ist aus” (The Dream Is Over) 
describes a leftist utopia in terms reminiscent of the Book of Genesis: of a 
“paradise” filled with sunshine, where animals and man lived in peace, in a 
world without war, weapons, or prisons.  Asking whether there is such a place 
on earth, the lyrics only answer that West Germany is certainly not it.  While the 
dream remains only a dream for the present, this will not last long: “Prepare 
yourself for the fight for paradise!  We have nothing to lose but our fear, it is our 
future and our country.”10 The song ends with a musical quote from Handel’s 
Judas Maccabeus.11 
The “Rauch House Song” contrasts sharply with “Der Traum ist aus” in 
theme and style.  Repeatedly singled out in informal conversations with 
contemporaries as particularly important to the West Berlin countercultural 
scene, the song refers to the Von Rauch House, a squatted house on the 
                                                 
10 Mach dich bereit für den Kampf um's Paradies!  Wir haben nichts zu 
verlieren ausser unserer Angst, es ist unsere Zukunft, unser Land.  Ton Steine 
Scherben, “Der Traum ist aus,” Keine Macht für Niemand, David Volksmund 
LC3773, 1972, compact disc. 
11 Judas Maccabeus, or Judah Maccabee, was the Jewish military leader 
who waged a guerrilla war against Syrian rule in Jerusalem and reconsecrated 
the Temple in 165 B.C.  
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Mariannenplatz in Berlin-Kreuzberg named after Georg von Rauch, the leader of 
the Bewegung 2. Juni killed in a gunfight with police in 1971.  Scheduled to be 
razed, demolition was put off until police allegedly found bomb-making material 
in the house.  The lyrics claim that this material consisted of ten empty wine 
bottles.  The refrain calls for prominent West Berlin politicians and housing 
speculators to be tossed out of Kreuzberg.  More interestingly, in the original 
version of the song, the second refrain noted, “if you are looking for bomb-
setters, toss the Amis out.”12 
 If stagnation and an undercurrent of violence plagued West Berlin, 
fragmentation beleaguered the West German Left.  The 1970s were characterized 
by what Gerd Koenen has termed a “founding fever,” the frenzied rush to form 
political organizations in the wake of the dissolution of the SDS.13  Indeed, 
scholars investigating the left-wing political scene in the 1970s confront an 
imposing tangle of similarly-named groups, all claiming to be the genuine 
successor to the venerable Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (Communist Party 
of Germany- KPD) of Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht.  In East Germany, 
this KPD was forcibly merged with other parties and became the Sozialistische 
Einheitspartei Deutschlands (Socialist Unity Party of Germany- SED).  But in the 
                                                 
12 Das ist unser Haus- wenn ihr Bombenleger sucht, schmeisst doch die 
Amis raus. “Amis” is the half-affectionate, half-deprecatory German term for 
Americans.  Ton Steine Scherben, “Rauch-Haus Song,” Keine Macht für Niemand, 
David Volksmund LC3773, 1972, compact disc.  Note on original refrain from 
http://www.riolyrics.de/macht72.html.   
13 Gründungsfieber.  Koenen, Das rote Jahrzehnt, 183. 
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West, the KPD persisted, before it was banned in 1956.  The situation gets even 
more complicated, as the Deutsche Kommunistische Partei (German Communist 
Party- DKP) emerged in 1968, two-thirds of whose members came from the 
former KPD outlawed in 1956.  This party was constantly at war with the 
Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands-Rote Fahne (Communist Party of Germany- 
Red Banner- KPD-Rote Fahne).14  The KPD-Rote Fahne should not be confused 
with the Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands- Marxisten Leninisten (Communist 
Party of Germany-Marxists Leninists- KPD-ML), which, incidentally, changed its 
name to ‘KPD’ in 1980 after the dissolution of one of its competitors.  A relative 
late-comer, the Kommunistischer Bund Westdeutschlands (Communist Federation of 
West Germany- KBW) was formed in 1973 after a series of meetings of various 
groups across West Germany comprised of communist-oriented groups wishing 
to overcome the splintered nature of the groups and to come together at a 
national level.15  The confusion resulting from this jumble of similar names and 
                                                 
14 I refer to this particular group as the KPD-Rote Fahne, after its main 
newspaper, in an effort to (slightly) lessen potential confusion with other groups.  
Other scholars refer to the KPD-Rote Fahne as the KPD-Maoisten, which in my 
view does not clarify matters sufficiently, as the KPD/ML was also Maoist, and 
the designation KPD-AO would only have been accurate for part of the group’s 
history. 
15 Robert Hofmann, Geschichte der Deutschen Parteien: Von der Kaiserzeit bis 
zur Gegenwart (Munich: Piper, 1993), 270-281; see also Gerd Langguth, 
Protestbewegung: Entwicklung Niedergang Renaissance.  Die Neue Linke seit 1968 
(Cologne: Wissenschaft und Politik, 1983). 
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acronyms could partially explain why these groups have not been examined 
more closely or accurately.16 
 The phrase “founding fever” could also be applied to the countercultural 
sphere.  Alternative, communal living arrangements known as 
Wohngemeinschaften, artists’ studios, entrepreneurial efforts such as health food 
stores, independent cafes and pubs, and alternative day-care centers all sprang 
up in West Berlin during the 1970s.17  As the alternative scene in West Berlin 
grew, its reputation spread, and it attracted even more individuals from the West 
who wished to escape the somewhat stuffy, ‘bourgeois’ society of West 
Germany.  
This mushrooming of countercultural organizations, as well as the 
formation of the numerous small political organizations in an initial attempt to 
gather support to spearhead a violent revolution, were responses to the demise 
of the SDS.18   With the sudden collapse of this student organization, thousands 
of committed individuals lost their political homeland.  Many found it again in 
                                                 
16 The pitfall these groups represent for the researcher is epitomized in 
Richie’s otherwise good chapter on the West Berlin of this era.  Despite a fairly 
extensive examination of the RAF and the beginnings of the AL, the K-groups 
receive one sentence which lumps them into the same category as the Autonome, 
“Marxist-Leninist Maoist groups whose members advocated random violence 
and resistance to all forms of authority.”  She then concludes that they were 
financed by the East German government. At best this oversimplifies, however, 
and merely combines numerous groups, many of which detested the GDR, into 
one unrecognizable amalgam.  Richie, Faust’s Metropolis, 782. 
17 Richie, Faust’s Metropolis, 784. 
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one of the K-groups during what Gerd Koenen labeled the “Red Decade” of the 
1970s.19  These K-groups too represented a reaction to the failure of the New Left 
of the 1960s, as epitomized by the dissolution of the SDS.  Thus, the K-groups 
were a return to orthodox Marxism-Leninism.20  Marxism-Leninism emphasized 
the role of a small vanguard party.  This highly-organized, central organization 
would play the leading role in beginning the violent revolution that would bring 
about a socialist society.   
Two of these K-groups, the KPD-Rote Fahne and the KBW, played an 
especially important role in West Berlin.  Because members of the former group 
actively participated in the founding of the AL, this chapter concentrates on the 
history and ideology of the KPD-Rote Fahne.21  By taking a closer look at the 
ideology of the KPD-Rote Fahne, this chapter will set the stage for an assessment 
of the degree to which it influenced the AL and the extent to which certain 
organizational and programmatic aspects carried over into the AL.  For other 
reasons, too, it is worth examining the KPD-Rote Fahne in more detail.  For one 
thing, the KPD-Rote Fahne (as well as the other K-groups) was extremely radical, 
                                                                                                                                                 
18 On the varying responses to the collapse of the SDS, see Markovits and 
Gorski, German Left, 57-58. 
19 K-Gruppen.  “K” comes from the German word Kommunisten, meaning 
Communists.  See Koenen, Das Rote Jahrzehnt, for the groundbreaking account of 
these groups. 
20 Markovits and Gorski, German Left, 59. 
21 The KBW, which embraced a very similar ideology, played a significant 




aiming to overthrow the bourgeoisie and to establish a proletarian dictatorship.  
The KPD-Rote Fahne’s radicalism serves to highlight the AL’s role as a bridge for 
the far Left to enter the constitutional system of parliamentary democracy.22  By 
examining the KPD-Rote Fahne’s ideology, especially its attitudes toward 
parliament and the notion of class warfare, it becomes clear just how 
extraordinary it was when its members elected to support the AL- a decision that 
in the end amounted to an unspoken, gradual Godesberg for the far Left.23 
Moreover, much evidence indicates that the KPD-Rote Fahne viewed the 
AL as a kind of Trojan horse with which it could infiltrate and exploit parliament 
(See below, Chapter Four).  While it is clear that certain elements of the structure 
and ideology of the K-groups persisted and found their way into the AL, 
however, it is important to emphasize that the K-groups were by no means 
identical to the AL.  The point is not that the AL was the continuation of the 
KPD-Rote Fahne in another guise, as many politicians and journalists claimed at 
the time: to claim this would be to oversimplify.24  As will be seen in the next 
                                                 
22 As will be seen, the West German parliamentary system also was able to 
cope with challenges from the Right, the process of which in fact played an 
important role in the cementing and integration of the AL within the 
parliamentary system. 
23 Bad Godesberg is the village just outside Bonn where the SPD met in 
1959 to reform their program.  At this meeting, the SPD consciously elected to 
forego the notion of class struggle and dictatorship by the proletariat and thus 
became a mass party. 
24 If one were inclined to ascribe to conspiracy theories, one could note the 
full name of the AL, the “Alternative ballot for democracy and environmental 
protection,” then point out that the KPD-Rote Fahne viewed the dictatorship of 
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chapter, the AL was both a reaction against the K-groups and a continuation of 
certain of their elements.  
 The KPD-Rote Fahne was founded in West Berlin in 1971 by SDS veterans 
Jürgen Horlemann and Christian Semler, who initially called it the KPD-AO (for 
Aufbauorganisation, an organization intended to “build up” the future KPD).  In 
an act of self-criticism typifying the K-groups, the leaders soon acknowledged 
that the AO-suffix had been a mistake and dropped it, since the party from the 
beginning had supposedly upheld its revolutionary responsibility to the working 
class.  As was so often the case in the climate of this era, self-criticism converted 
readily to self-congratulation and self-delusion.25   
The KPD-Rote Fahne was avowedly Maoist.  Maoists emphasize mass 
cultural transformation, whereas Marxist-Leninists emphasize the central role of 
“a vanguard-type party in the process of progressive transformation.”26  Most 
Maoist organizations of the Cold War era were anti-Soviet Union, which they 
saw as a force against the spread of global progressive politics, and the KPD-Rote 
Fahne clearly fell into this category.  Maoists harshly criticized the path of 
communism under the Soviet Union as being revisionist and social imperialist.  
Instead of the course chosen by the Soviet Union, the KPD-Rote Fahne idealized 
                                                                                                                                                 
the proletariat as “the highest form of democracy.”  Statut der Kommunistischen 
Partei Deutschlands (Cologne: Verlag Rote Fahne, 1974), Point I. 
25 See Helmut Bilstein et al, Organisierter Kommunismus in der BRD 
(Opladen: Leske und Budrich, 1977), 79.   
26 Markovits and Gorski, German Left, 60, 63. 
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China and the path forged by Mao Zedong.  Strongly influenced by Mao’s 
writings, these young revolutionaries glorified Chinese communism, sometimes 
with comical slavishness, as will be seen below.27  
In many ways the KPD-Rote Fahne, founded in February 1970, can be seen 
as a reaction against the student movement, which while numerically large was 
inefficiently organized and ineffective.  It also turned away from the Critical 
Theory of the Frankfurt School, which annoyed Marxists by denying a significant 
role for the working class as a force for revolution.  Instead of sitting around 
theorizing in philosophical seminars, some veterans of the West Berlin SDS 
decided to abandon theory for practical experience within the workers’ 
movement.  The result was the KPD-Rote Fahne.28  
Jürgen Bacia, one of the few scholars to attempt to sort out the K-groups, 
divides the historical developments within the KPD-Rote Fahne into three main 
stages.  During the first stage, from 1970-1974, the group idealized the KPD of the 
                                                 
27 Mao Zedong’s essays “Über die Praxis” and “Über den Widerspruch” 
were particularly important, and were published in German translation in 1968.  
The latter essay addresses, among other things, the contradiction between the 
bourgeoisie and the proletariat, between city and country, and between nature 
and society, the resolution of which comes from unleashing productive forces 
under socialism.  Mao Zedong, Ausgewählte Werke- Band I (Peking: Verlag für 
fremdsprachige Literatur, 1968). 
28 Alexander von Plato, “Einige Thesen zur Vergangenheit, Gegenwart 
und Perspektive unserer Organisation,” in Zur Bilanz und Perspektive der KPD.  
Beiträge zur Diskussion “Über die Kommunistische Partei” (Cologne: Zentralkomitee 
der KPD, 1980), vol. 1, 102-103.  Quoted in Jürgen Bacia, “Die Kommunistische 
Partei Deutschlands (Maoisten),” in Parteienhandbuch.  Die Parteien in der BRD, ed. 
Richard Stöss (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1984), vol. 2, 1810. 
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Weimar Republic.  It also criticized the ‘social imperialism’ of the Soviet Union as 
well as the alleged unadulterated imperialism of the United States, and rejected 
the DKP, the would-be successor to the KPD, as revisionist.  The notion of ‘social 
fascism’ so popular in the Weimar Republic returned to play an important role in 
attacks on the SPD: KPD-Rote Fahne members were convinced that this 
particular brand of fascism advocated by the bourgeois SPD was about to take 
over in the Federal Republic.29  
 Bacia calls the second stage, from 1975 to 1978, the “antihegemonic 
democratic people’s movement.”30  This stage was dominated by the introduction 
in China of notions of the theory of the Three Worlds, which in turn led Marxists 
to seek out the primary enemy of socialism in Germany.  The answer was not 
hard to find for the KPD-Rote Fahne: it viewed both the USSR and the United 
States as part of the “First World” as the enemies of the world’s peoples.  An 
important corollary of this notion was the idea that the dictatorship of the 
proletariat could not be achieved until both superpowers were driven out of 
Germany and the nation reunited: this notion would continue to dominate the 
thinking and the propaganda of the party throughout the 1970s.  As a resolution 
                                                 
29 Bacia, “Kommunistische Partei”, 1814. 
30 Die antihegemonisch-demokratische Volksbewegung.  Bacia, 
“Kommunistische Partei,” 1814. 
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passed at the party convention in 1977 put it, “the struggle for national 
independence and unity is part of the struggle for the proletarian revolution.”31   
 Bacia labels the third stage, beginning in 1979, “the connection between 
the workers’ movement and the democratic people’s movement.”32  Attempts to 
overcome internal divisions by dumping ideological ballast characterized this 
phase.  While the moves failed to save the party, the discussions about the 
party’s future opened the way to cooperation with the newly coalescing ecology 
and alternative movement.33  
The KPD-Rote Fahne was highly structured.  The party statute of 1974 
describes the structure as follows:  “The organizational principle of the party is 
democratic centralism.  The entire party subjects itself to unified discipline: 
subordination of the individual below the party, subordination of the minority to 
the majority, subordination of the lower levels to the higher ones, subordination 
of the entire party under the Central Committee.”34  The party consisted of two 
                                                 
31 Der Kampf um nationale Unabhängigkeit und Einheit ist Bestandteil des 
Kampfes um die proletarische Revolution.  Resolutionen, Kommunique und 
Grussadressen des II. Parteitags der KPD 28-31 Juli 1977 (Cologne, no publisher 
given, 1977), 12.  Cited in Bacia, “Kommunistische Partei,” 1815. 
32 Die Verbindung von Arbeiterbewegung und demokratischer 
Volksbewegung.  Bacia, “Kommunistische Partei,” 1816. 
33 Bacia, “Kommunistische Partei,” 1816.  This chapter examines this last 
stage in much greater detail below.   
34 Das organisatorische Prinzip der Partei ist der demokratische 
Zentralismus.  Die gesamte Partei fügt sich der einheitlichen Disziplin: 
Unterordnung der Minderheit unter die Mehrheit, Unterordnung der unterne 
Ebenen unter die höheren, Unterordnung der gesamten Partei unter das 
Zentralkomitee.  Statut der KPD, 1974, point 4. 
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major bodies: the Party Assembly (Parteitag) and the Central Committee.  The 
Party Assembly was the highest level of the KPD-Rote Fahne.  It determined the 
general line of the party, decided on the statute and the program and elected the 
Central Committee.  The Party Assembly consisted of delegates from local 
membership assemblies, was required to meet at least once every two years, and 
was convened by the Central Committee.35   
The Central Committee was regarded as the leading core of the party.  It 
“consists of experienced comrades who possess political vision and a large 
measure of ideological firmness and who have proven their absolute devotion to 
the cause of proletarian revolution.”36  The Central Committee elected the 
Politburo, which led the party between sessions of the Central Committee.  In 
turn, between sessions of the Politburo, power was held by the Standing 
Committee of the Politburo comprised of members of the Politburo appointed by 
the Central Committee.  The picture that emerges is clearly of an obsessively 
well-organized, highly-structured party apparatus harking back to orthodox 
Marxism-Leninism. 
Statistics regarding the number of members of the KPD-Rote Fahne are 
hard to come by.  The German Office for Constitutional Protection placed the 
                                                 
35 Statut der KPD, 1974, point 5. 
36 [Das Zentralkomitee] besteht aus erfahrenen Genossen, die politische 
Weitsicht und ein hohes Mass an ideologischer Festigkeit besitzen und ihre 
absolute Ergebenheit für die Sache der proletarischen Revolution im Kampf 
bewiesen haben.  Statut der KPD, 1974, point 5. 
 
 89
membership at around 900 at its peak in 1975, and at around 550 by 1978.37   If 
funding levels are any indication, the membership in West Berlin was by far the 
largest: in 1976, of the six regional committees, West Berlin’s took in more than 
three times as much money as any other district.  Numerically, the 
Kommunistische Studentenverband (Communist Students’ League- KSV) was 
probably the most important sub-organization of the KPD-Rote Fahne.  Its 
members were largely recruited from student radicals, especially at the Free 
University of Berlin.  Attempts to ban some seminars of the Free University’s 
German Studies department helped recruiting efforts, as activists mounted a 
large campaign in protest.  Partly as a result, membership figures of the KSV 
actually exceeded those of its parent organization, reaching 1,100 in 1974, but this 
figure plummeted quickly, and by 1978 membership was down to 400, most of 
which was in West Berlin.38   
The ideological reach of the KPD-Rote Fahne far exceeded the central core 
of its members.  Circulation figures for its newspaper, which at the 
organization’s zenith appeared weekly but went to a bi-weekly publication as 
members and money became scarcer, give a rough idea of their influence.  The 
German Federal Minister of the Interior estimated the circulation of Rote Fahne 
to have been twenty-five thousand in 1972, sixteen thousand in 1974, and 
fourteen thousand five hundred in 1976.  The group’s own estimates regarding 
                                                 
37 Bacia, “Kommunistische Partei,”1821. 
38 Bacia, “Kommunistische Partei,” 1822. 
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the number of newspapers actually sold are perhaps more instructive, though 
still almost certainly inflated: sixteen thousand in January 1974 and nine 
thousand in July 1979.39  
Data regarding the composition of the party in terms of education, 
income, class, and so on are also very sketchy.  By the party’s own admission, the 
middle-class dominated and workers formed only a minority.40  Indeed, most 
members were affiliated with a university or were university-educated.  Here 
again, the Free University of Berlin served as a central location for organization 
and recruitment.  “Red cells,” especially at the Free University, already existed, 
and threw their support behind the activities of the KPD-Rote Fahne.  The 
university was of course the very milieu out of which the party hoped to break, 
but again, the leaders of the party were forced to rely on their ties to active 
student radicalism to form and support their party. 
The electoral fortunes of the KPD-Rote Fahne were less than rosy.  In fact, 
they were organizationally only able to take part in the elections in 1974-75, and 
the results were pathetic.  Their strongest area of support was in West Berlin, 
where they polled 0.7 percent in 1975.  According to Bacia, it is not known what 
types of voters supported the KPD-Rote Fahne.41   
                                                 
39 Bacia, “Kommunistische Partei,” 1829. 
40 Bacia, “Kommunistische Partei,” 1826. 
41 Bacia, “Kommunistische Partei,” 1819. 
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To say that the KPD-Rote Fahne viewed parliaments with contempt 
would be a gross understatement.  Given the hostility with which the group 
viewed parliament as a general institution and the Berlin Parliament in 
particular, its subsequent decision to participate in the parliamentary system is 
all the more astonishing.  
The KPD-Rote Fahne’s main statement of its program leaves no doubt that 
the group aimed to achieve the dictatorship of the proletariat through violence.  
As Point One of its statute notes, “The basic mission of the KPD is to lead the 
working class and the other exploited and repressed classes in the struggle 
against the bourgeoisie, to overthrow the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, and to 
build the dictatorship of the proletariat.”42 
From the perspective of the KPD-Rote Fahne, parliament was only a 
means to this end.  The party program asserts, “The KPD combats the parliament 
as an instrument the bourgeoisie uses to betray the masses.  But it participates in 
elections and uses these as well as parliament itself as platforms for class 
struggle.”43  Furthermore, the party would work within bourgeois institutions, 
                                                 
42 Das grundlegende Programm der KPD besteht darin, die Arbeiterklasse 
und die anderen ausgebeuteten und unterdrückten Schichten des Volkes in den 
Kampf gegen die Bourgeoisie zu führen, die Diktatur der Bourgeoisie zu stürzen 
und die Diktatur des Proletariats zu errichten.  Statut der KPD, point 1. 
43 Die KPD bekämpft das Parlament als Instrument der Bourgeoisie, die 
Massen zu betrügen.  Sie beteiligt sich jedoch an den Wahlen und nutzt diese wie 
das Parlament selbst als Tribüne des Klassenkampfs.  Programm und 
Aktionsprogramm der Kommunistischen Partei Deutschlands (Dortmund: Verlag Rote 
Fahne, 1974), 57. 
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including parliament, to advance the idea that the working class could only free 
itself by achieving the fall of the bourgeoisie and establishing a communist 
government: “[The KPD-Rote Fahne’s] struggle for seat and voice in parliament 
is carried out with the declared purpose of using every possibility to promote the 
proletarian cause.  The KPD is not a bourgeois electoral party.  Its parliamentary 
struggle is free of any illusion regarding the possibility of achieving a new order 
of society by means of an electoral majority.”44  Instead, this would only come 
about through the violent overthrow of the bourgeois state: “The ruling class will 
not make way voluntarily for the assault of the proletariat.  In light of the 
repressive violence of the bourgeois state, the revolutionary violence of the 
masses is necessary and unavoidable.  The dissolution of the bourgeois state 
through the proletarian state is not possible without violence.”45 
Once the working class held power, it would disarm the bourgeoisie and 
dissolve parliament, constructing unified representative bodies with the power 
to both make and enforce the laws.  Additionally, it would nationalize all 
                                                 
44 Ihr Kampf um Sitz und Stimme im Parlament wird mit der erklärten 
Absicht geführt, jede gebotene Möglichkeit zu nutzen, die der Propagierung der 
proletarischen Sache dienlich ist.  Die Kommunistische Partei ist keine 
bürgerliche Wahlpartei.  Ihr parlamentarischer Kampf ist frei von jedweder 
Illusion über die Möglichkeit, vermittels einer Stimmenmehrheit zu einer neuen 
Ordnung der Gesellschaft zu gelangen.  Programm und Aktionsprogramm der KPD, 
40. 
45 Die herrschende Klasse wird dem Ansturm des Proletariats nicht 
freiwillig weichen.  Der Repressionsgewalt des bürgerlichen Staates gegenüber 
ist die revolutionäre Gewalt der Massen notwendig und unvermeidlich.  Die 
Ablösung des bürgerlichen Staates durch den proletarischen ist ohne Gewalt 
nicht möglich.  Programm und Aktionsprogramm der KPD, 42. 
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factories, banks, insurance companies, transit authorities, and the media.  It 
would end all membership in “imperialistic military alliances,” and would 
dissolve all military bases of foreign powers in Germany as well as German bases 
in other nations.46 
Articles in the party’s newspaper Rote Fahne and pamphlets issued 
throughout the 1970s show that these were not sentiments to be hidden away in 
a political program and then forgotten.  Indeed, some of the documents reveal 
that hatred of parliamentary institutions exceeded even that which was reflected 
in the party’s political program.  Commenting on the elections in West Berlin in 
1971, an article in Rote Fahne noted: “[The bourgeois parties] still manage to 
throw sand in the eyes of the working masses and have them believe that their 
interests are represented through the ruling SPD in the Abgeordnetenhaus.  The 
anti-communist propaganda of the SPD and CDU leadership still succeeds in 
binding the masses to bourgeois parliamentarianism.”47 
                                                 
46 Imperialistische Militärbündnisse.  Programm und Aktionsprogramm der 
KPD, 42-43. 
47 Es gelingt [den bürgerlichen Parteien] jedoch immer noch grossen Teile 
[sic] der werktätigen Massen Sand in die Augen zu streuen und in dem Glauben 
zu wiegen, im Abgeordnetenhaus und durch die Herrschaft der SPD-Führung 
würden ihre Interessen weitgehend vertreten.  Noch immer gelingt es der 
antikommunistischen Propaganda von SPD-Führung und CDU, die Massen an 
den bürgerlichen Parlamentarismus zu binden.  “Zu den Wahlen in West Berlin,” 
Rote Fahne 2, no. 14 (February 1971), 8.  The Abgeordnetenhaus is the lower 
representative body in the Berlin parliamentary system.  The upper house is 
known as the Senat. 
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The same article went on to note that the main task of the KPD-Rote Fahne 
for the current election was to unveil the reactionary policy of the SPD and to 
fight against the illusion of parliament perpetuated by the SEW.  Not in the 
position organizationally to contest the 1971 election, the KPD-Rote Fahne 
advised “all workers, democrats and socialists” not to give their vote to any of 
the parties in the election, as they all represented to a various extent “the 
reactionary interests of West German monopoly capitalism and the US-
imperialists.”48  Voter participation reached 88.9 percent that year, up from 86.2 
percent in 1967, indicating the degree of response the call to boycott received.  
Finally, the KPD-Rote Fahne criticized the SEW for participating in the 1971 
election, and in the process made clear its own feelings regarding parliament: 
“The SEW is again taking part in the elections to the Abgeordnetenhaus.  But its 
motive in so doing is not in order to use the parliamentary stage as a means of 
revealing the class character of the bourgeois parliament and state, in other 
words it is not participating in parliament in order to destroy it, but is spreading 
the illusion among the masses that the parliament could implement decisive 
improvements for the working masses.”49  Thus the KPD-Rote Fahne criticized 
                                                 
48 Die KPD-Aufbauorganisation rät allen Arbeitern, Demokraten und 
Sozialisten, keine [sic] der sich an den Wahlen beteiligenden Parteien ihre 
Stimme zu geben.  Alle bürgerlichen Parteien betreiben unterschiedlich in 
Westberlin die reaktionären Interessen des westdeutschen Monopolkapitals und 
der US-Imperialisten.  “Zu den Wahlen in West Berlin,” Rote Fahne 2, no. 14 
(February 1971), 9. 
49 Die SEW beteiligt sich wieder massiert an den 
Abgeordnetenhauswahlen.  Sie sieht ihre Aufgabe jedoch nicht darin, die 
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the SEW, the West German branch of East Germany’s Socialist Unity Party, for 
excessive adherence to the principles of democracy and parliamentarianism, and 
condemned it for not using parliament to destroy parliamentary institutions. 
The pamphlet issued in 1974 setting down the electoral program of the 
KPD-Rote Fahne for the 1975 election in West Berlin is also instructive regarding 
its view of parliament.  “THE BOURGEOIS PARLIAMENT IS A DEEP SWAMP 
OF DECEPTION AND CORRUPTION,” the program trumpeted, and it called 
for supporters to “USE PARLIAMENT AS A PLATFORM FOR CLASS 
STRUGGLE.”  In the tradition of its role models Bebel, Luxemburg, Liebknecht, 
Zetkin and Thälmann, KPD delegates would use parliament to preach class 
struggle: “They will mercilessly attack the crimes of the bourgeoisie and corrupt 
parliamentarianism, represent the demands of working people, and use the 
platform of parliament, too, to mobilize the masses for the revolutionary class 
struggle and against this parliamentarianism.”50 
                                                                                                                                                 
Parlamentstribüne als eines der Mittel zur Entlarvung des Klassencharakters der 
bürgerlichen Parlamente und Staatsapparate zu benutzen, d.h. sie beteiligt sich 
nicht am Parlament, um es zu vernichten, sondern verbreitet unter den Massen 
die Illusion, im Parlament könnten entscheidende Verbesserungen für die 
werktätigen Massen durchgesetzt werden.  “Zu den Wahlen in West Berlin,” Rote 
Fahne 2, no. 14 (February 1971), 9. 
50 DAS BÜRGERLICHE PARLAMENT IST EIN TIEFER SUMPF VON 
VERLOGENHEIT UND KORRUPTION…DAS PARLAMENT ALS TRIBÜNE 
DES KLASSENKAMPFES NUTZEN…Wie unsere grossen Vorbilder August 
Bebel, Rosa Luxemburg, Karl Liebknecht, Clara Zetkin und Ernst Thälman 
werden die Abgeordneten der KPD trotz aller Anfeindungen der bürgerlichen 
Scharfmacher das Parlament zur Tribüne des Klassenkampfs machen, sie werden 
die Verbrechen der Bourgeoisie und den korrupten Parlamentarismus 
schonunglos anprangern, die Forderungen des werktätigen Volkes vertreten und 
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Clearly, then, the KPD-Rote Fahne embraced extreme anti-parliamentary 
attitudes, viewing the parliaments at best as platforms from which to preach the 
gospel of class struggle and at worst as corrupt institutions of bourgeois 
oppression fit only to be destroyed.  But this is not especially surprising- it is 
fairly obvious that Marxist groups meant the parliaments no good.  More 
remarkable is the shift toward working within the parliaments that occurred in 
the late 1970s.  In part, this shift was made possible by the presence of other, 
lesser-known ideological strains.  These issues included support for women’s 
rights, especially regarding Article 218; criticism of the Soviet Union and the 
GDR, with corresponding support for the opposition in Eastern Europe; a critical 
stance regarding the Western Allies and NATO; concern with the protection of 
nature; and opposition to nuclear power.  The presence of these elements in the 
ideology of the KPD-Rote Fahne enabled it to cooperate with ‘bourgeois’ 
environmental groups and citizens’ initiatives, and at the same time rendered it 
more palatable and appealing as a partner to these other organizations. 
The issue of women’s rights, especially opposition to Article 218 of the 
penal code restricting women’s access to safe and legal abortions, had firm 
support within the KPD-Rote Fahne.  In political programs, in demonstrations, 
and in leaflets, the KPD-Rote Fahne supported the cause of women’s rights.  
                                                                                                                                                 
auch von dieser Tribüne aus für den revolutionären Klassenkampf, gegen diesen 
Parlamentarismus die Massen mobilisieren. KPD Liste 5 Wahlprogramm (Berlin: 
Regionalkomitee Westberlin der KPD, 1974), 3-4.  Emphasis in original. 
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Furthermore, the KPD-Rote Fahne gave women a chance to participate in the 
political arena.  
The political program of the KPD-Rote Fahne called for complete equal 
rights for women before the law.  The program also promised to end 
enslavement of women in the household, economic exploitation of women, and 
women’s political repression.51   
The political program for the 1975 West Berlin elections gives more 
information regarding attempts of the KPD-Rote Fahne to appeal to women.  
Despite the fact that politicians had declared 1975 ‘the year of the woman,’ the 
program claimed that nothing would change under existing leadership.  “The 
terrible double burden of the working woman through career, household, and 
raising children will not be changed by those who profit by it,” the program 
asserted.  Instead, real changes would only come about through the struggle for 
socialism: “[The struggle for socialism] will create the preconditions for women’s 
participation in leading production and the state, and will enable her to fully 
apply her creative abilities.  Your household and the upbringing of the children 
is then not your private affair, but will be recognized as a useful social activity 
and above all not as your work, but as the social work of all.” 52  The program 
                                                 
51 Programm und Aktionsprogramm der KPD, 51, 57. 
52 Die ungeheure Doppelbelastung der werktätigen Frau und Mutter 
durch Beruf, Haushalt, und die Kindererziehung werden die nicht ändern, die 
gerade daraus ihren Profit schlagen….  Er wird die Voraussetzungen dafür 
schaffen, dass die Frau umfassend an der Leitung der Produktion und des 
Staates sich beteiligt und ihre schöpferischen Fähigkeiten voll einsetzen kann.  
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then exhorted women to fight for equal wages for men and women, for better 
working conditions for pregnant women, for eight weeks leave before and 
twelve weeks leave after delivery, and for release from work of fathers or 
mothers when their child was ill.53 
The KPD also at least attempted to involve women as candidates of the 
party.  For example, twenty-four of the KPD’s eighty candidates (30 percent) for 
the 1975 West Berlin election were women, with women occupying the top slot 
on the ballot in three of the twelve districts.54 
The KPD-Rote Fahne also supported the opposition in Eastern Europe.  
Much of this support was born of anti-Soviet views.  As a Maoist political party, 
the KPD-Rote Fahne was openly critical of the path taken by the Soviet Union 
and the Eastern European Soviet satellite states.  The KPD-Rote Fahne criticized 
the USSR as revisionist and social imperialist, common themes in its publications 
and pamphlets.  Its program made this clear: “Today, the formerly socialist 
Soviet Union has become the center of modern Revisionism, the bulwark of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Euer Haushalt und die Erziehung der Kinder ist dann nicht eure Privatsache, sie 
wird als vollwertige nutzbringende gesellschaftliche Tätigkeit anerkannt und vor 
allem nicht eure, sondern die gesellschaftliche Arbeit aller sein.  KPD Liste 5 
Wahlprogramm, 14. 
53 KPD Liste 5 Wahlprogramm, 14-15. 
54 West German elections operated on the principle of ballot lists 
assembled by the respective political party.  Depending on how many votes that 
particular party received, the party sent a certain number of candidates from 
their list to the representative body.  So if the KPD had managed to earn any 
seats in a particular district, that would have meant that a woman would have 
been the top choice as delegate in three of the twelve districts. 
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proletarian world revolution has become a new imperialist state.  It brought the 
nations of Eastern Europe under its rule, plundered their riches, and hinders 
their independent economic development.”55  
Part of the KPD-Rote Fahne’s resentment of the USSR stemmed from its 
role in the division of Germany and political oppression in the East.  Christian 
Semler, head of the KPD-Rote Fahne, at an event sponsored by the “Committee 
against political oppression in both parts of Germany” in Frankfurt on 31 March 
1978, specifically laid most of the blame for German division at the Soviets’ feet: 
“[We are marching] toward the building of a united people’s movement for 
independence, freedom and unity of both German states, which is primarily 
directed against political oppression and those who are responsible for 
Germany’s national enslavement, and those are- you can’t beat around the bush 
here- both the superpowers, the bourgeoisie in both German states, and today 
above all Soviet social imperialism.”56  Describing the situation in the GDR, a 
                                                 
55 Heute ist aus der ehemals sozialistischen Sowjetunion das Zentrum des 
modernen Revionismus, aus dem Bollwerk der proletarischen Weltrevolution ein 
neuer imperialistischer Staat geworden.  Sie brachte die Länder Osteuropas unter 
ihre Herrschaft, plündert deren Reichtümer und verhindert deren selbstständige 
wirtschaftliche Entwicklung.  Programm und Aktionsprogramm der KPD, 17. 
56 [Wir marschieren] hin zum Aufbau einer Volksbewegung für 
Unabhängigkeit, Freiheit und Einheit beider deutscher Staaten, die ihren 
Hauptschlag gegen diejenigen richtet, die für die politische Unterdrückung und 
die nationale Knechtung Deutschlands verantwortlich sind, und das sind- darum 
könnt Ihr nicht herummanövrieren- die beiden Supermächte, die Bourgeoisien in 
beiden deutschen Staaten, vor allem aber heute der sowjetische 
Sozialimperialismus!  “Solidarität mit der Opposition in der DDR.  
Dokumentation der Veranstaltung des Komitees gegen die politische 
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KPD-Rote Fahne pamphlet noted: “Today a new bourgeoisie gets fat at the cost 
of the workers, who, themselves robbed of all bourgeois democratic freedoms, 
are constantly being driven to higher work performance.  The guarantor of this 
oppressive status quo is the Soviet Union- whose power is based not least upon 
its tanks.”57 
The KPD-Rote Fahne thus naturally came to support those forces that 
fought against what they perceived as Soviet imperialism.  For example, the KPD 
idolized the workers in Gdansk in 1970 for their readiness “to fight against the 
dominance of Soviet social imperialism, against the social fascist dictatorship of 
the revisionists’ clique.”58  The KPD-Rote Fahne also saw a hero in Rudolf Bahro, 
an outspoken critic of the GDR, especially for his criticism of the imperialist 
policy of the Soviet Union and the oppression of its people.  They concluded, in a 
                                                                                                                                                 
Unterdrückung in beiden Teilen Deutschlands.”  Rote Fahne 9, no. 15 (12 April 
1978), 14. 
57 Heute mästet sich eine neue Bourgeoisie auf Kosten der Arbeiter und 
Werktätigen, die beraubt selbst aller bürgerlich-demokratischen Freiheiten zu 
immer höherer Arbeitsleistung getrieben werden.  Garant dieses erdrückenden 
Status quo ist die Sowjetunion- nicht zuletzt mit ihren Panzern.  “30 Jahre BRD-
30 Jahre DDR Kein Grund zum Feiern,” 1979.  AdAPO: Ordner KPD Berlin. 
58 …gegen die Herrschaft der sowjetischen Sozialimperialisten, gegen die 
sozialfaschistische Diktatur der Revisionistenclique zu kämpfen.  “Dezember 
1970: Heldenhafter Kampf der polnischen Arbeiter,” December, 1975.  AdAPO: 
Ordner KPD Berlin. 
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phrase that could later have been the credo of the AL and the Green Party: “Only 
he who advocates democratic freedoms in East and West is credible!”59 
The KPD-Rote Fahne certainly did not spare West Germany’s eastern 
neighbor from criticism.  While a KPD-Rote Fahne publication on the event of the 
thirtieth anniversary of the GDR and the Federal Republic noted that in the GDR 
a more progressive path could be initially pursued, the GDR hardly represented 
the picture of an unbroken democratic and socialist tradition.  Moreover, the 
supposedly socialist USSR was not the “unbreakable guarantor of peace and 
progress” that it claimed to be.60  The brochure then pointed to the events of 17 
June 1953; the construction of the Berlin Wall beginning in August 1961; the use 
of soldiers of the National People’s Army of the GDR to quell the 1968 revolution 
in Czechoslovakia; and the punishments affecting oppositional artists, including 
expulsions and prohibitions on the pursuit of their careers.  The brochure even 
went on to claim that the “rabble-rousing propaganda” against the GDR 
perpetrated by the West came increasingly to reflect actual developments in the 
GDR, developments that found their climax in the 1961 construction of the Berlin 
Wall.  In its reaction to Wolf Biermann’s expulsion from the GDR, the KPD called 
the decision a “new act of political oppression by the fascist dictatorship in the 
                                                 
59 Glaubwürdig ist nur der, der sich für demokratische Freiheiten in Ost 
und West einsetzt!  “8 Jahre Haft für Rudolf Bahro,” 1978.  AdAPO: Ordner KPD 
Berlin. 
60 Der unverbrüchliche Garant für Frieden und Fortschritt.  “30 Jahre BRD-
30 Jahre DDR Kein Grund zum Feiern,” 1979. AdAPO: Ordner KPD Berlin. 
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GDR.”61  Remarking on the fate of other opposition figures in the GDR, the KPD-
Rote Fahne noted: “Nine years prison for the university lecturer Rolf Mainz, 
eight years detention for Rudolf Bahro, five years for the East Berlin 
conscientious objector Nico Hübner: these sentences of the GDR judiciary are 
testaments to the antidemocratic, oppressive character of the social system in the 
GDR.”62 
Interestingly, the KPD-Rote Fahne advocated German unification, and 
insisted that it would be a mistake to leave ideas of national unification to the 
political Right.  In a pamphlet attacking the commemorations of the thirtieth 
anniversary of the GDR and the Federal Republic, the KPD-Rote Fahne noted: 
“Due to the rabble-rousing propaganda in Cold War style, the division of 
Germany was for years a subject reserved for the bourgeoisie.  Today however, 
the national question, the development and division of Germany, has again 
become the subject of a debate within the Left.”63 
                                                 
61 Hetzpropaganda; ein neuer Akt politischer Unterdrückung der 
faschistischen Diktatur in der DDR.  “Neuer Willkürakt der DDR: Biermann 
ausgewiesen,” November 1976. AdAPO: Ordner KPD Berlin. 
62 9 Jahre Gefängnis für den Lektor Rolf Mainz, 8 Jahre Haft für Rudolph 
Bahro, 5 Jahre für den ostberliner Wehrdienstverweigerer Nico Hübner- diese 
Urteile der DDR-Justiz sind Lehrstücke des antidemokratischen, 
unterdrückerischen Charakters des gesellschaftlichen Systems in der DDR.  
“Solidarität mit der demokratischen und sozialistischen Opposition in der DDR,” 
no date.  AdAPO: Ordner KPD Berlin. 
63 Bedingt durch die Hetzpropaganda nach “Kalter Kriegs” Manier, war 
jahrelang die Spaltung Deutschlands ein Thema der Bourgeoisie.  Heute jedoch, 
ist die nationale Frage, die Entwicklung und Spaltung Deutschlands wieder zum 
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Early in its history, the KPD-Rote Fahne had pushed for legal recognition 
of the GDR, not unification.  The first issue of Rote Fahne called for recognition of 
the GDR under international law.64   Soon, however, the KPD-Rote Fahne altered 
its viewpoint, directing its efforts and propaganda “for a unified Berlin in an 
independent unified socialist Germany!”65  The KPD-Rote Fahne placed German 
unification quite high on its list of priorities, with the KPD-Rote Fahne printing 
slogans calling for a unified Berlin in a unified socialist Germany on the cover of 
its electoral program it issued for the 1975 West Berlin elections.66  
In its view, Berlin played a special role for the German nation, especially 
in postwar divided Germany:  
West Berlin is neither part of the Federal Republic nor the GDR: it 
lies on German territory and is part of all of Germany.  The four 
powers agreement sets down the power political claims of the US 
and the USSR, it is an Occupiers’ Statute and was decided over the 
heads of Berliners.  The federal government’s policy of détente 
means for West Berliners a worsening of working and living 
conditions, and an increasing dependence on the GDR; and thus 
they are subject to blackmail.  A progressive Berlin policy must take 
into consideration the interests of the populace.67 
                                                                                                                                                 
Gegenstand der Auseinandersetzung in der Linken geworden.  “30 Jahre BRD-30 
Jahre DDR Kein Grund zum Feiern,” 1979.  AdAPO: Ordner KPD Berlin. 
64 Printed as a slogan in Rote Fahne 1, no. 1 (April/May 1970), 4. 
65 Für ein vereintes Berlin in einem unabhängigen, vereinten 
sozialistischen Deutschland!  “200 Jahre USA: Nieder mit dem USA-
Imperialismus! Es lebe die Freundschaft zwischen dem Deutschen und 
Amerikanischen Volk,” 1976.  AdAPO: Ordner KPD Berlin. 
66 KPD Liste 5 Wahlprogramm, cover. 
67 Westberlin ist weder Teil der BRD noch der DDR, es liegt auf deutschem 
Territorium  und ist Teil ganz Deutschlands.  Das Viermächte-Abkommen 




As good Marxists, they viewed the question of unification too from the 
perspective of class struggle, and asserted that this struggle itself would bring 
back the unity of the German working class and people.  Their program noted 
that “[the proletarian state] will secure the alliance with the working class of the 
GDR and thus create the preconditions for the unification of Germany along 
revolutionary lines.”68  It went on to assert: 
[D]espite the varying conditions of the struggle, the unity of the 
entire German working class and people shall be restored through 
class struggle.  The reunification of the FRG, West Berlin, and the 
GDR will only bring historical progress when it occurs under the 
sign of proletarian revolution and of socialism.  The struggle for the 
reunification of Germany on the basis of revolution is therefore 
simultaneously the struggle against every form of the imperialist 
solution to the national question, be it through the annexation of 
the GDR through FRG-imperialism, be it through a balancing of the 
West German bourgeois monopoly and the new bourgeoisie of the 
GDR.69 
                                                                                                                                                 
Köpfe der Berliner hinweg beschlossen.  Die Entspannungspolitik der 
Bundesregierung bedeutet für die Westberliner Verschlechterung der Arbeits- 
und Lebensbedingungen.  Sie bedeutet zunehmende Abhängigkeit von der DDR 
und damit Erpressbarkeit.  Eine fortschrittliche Berlinpolitik muss ihren 
Standpunkt nach den Interessen der Bevölkerung bestimmen.  “30 Jahre BRD-30 
Jahre DDR Kein Grund zum Feiern,” 1979.  AdAPO: Ordner KPD Berlin. 
68 [Der proletarische Staat...] wird das Bündnis mit der Arbeiterklasse der 
DDR festigen und so die Voraussetzung für die Wiedervereinigung  
Deutschlands auf revolutionäre Grundlage schaffen.  Programm und 
Aktionsprogramm der KPD, 52. 
69 Trotz der unterschiedlichen Kampfbedingungen wird durch den 
Klassenkampf selbst die Einheit der gesamten deutschen Arbeiterklasse und des 
Volkes wiederhergestellt. Die Wiedervereinigung der BRD, Westberlin und der 
DDR wird nur dann einen historischen Fortschritt bringen, wenn sie unter dem 
Zeichen der proletarischen Revolution und des Sozialismus erfolgt.  Der Kampf 
für die Wiedervereinigung Deutschlands auf revolutionärer Grundlage ist 




In many respects, the KPD-Rote Fahne’s view of the Western Allies was 
colored by the Allies’ alleged support for continued German division.  To further 
the cause of German unification, the Program and Action Program demanded 
the “withdrawal of all foreign troops from the Federal Republic and the GDR” 
and called for both the Federal Republic and the GDR to quit NATO and the 
Warsaw Pact respectively.70  In case the reader had not gotten the point the first 
time, the program repeated its demand two pages later: “Down with US 
imperialism and Soviet social imperialism!…  Withdrawal of all US troops from 
Europe!  Withdrawal of all Soviet troops from Eastern European lands!  
Dissolution of NATO and the Warsaw Pact!”71  The KPD-Rote Fahne also 
questioned the status of the United States forces in West Berlin, writing in a 
leaflet, “The superpower USA is not a protective power, but is an imperialist 
superpower that has committed mass murder in the name of its interests.”72 
                                                                                                                                                 
nationalen Frage, sei es durch die Annexion der DDR durch den BRD-
Imperialismus, sei es durch einen Ausgleich zwischen der westdeutschen 
Monopolbourgeoisie und der neuen Bourgeoisie der DDR.  Programm und 
Aktionsprogramm der KPD, 27. 
70 Abzug aller ausländischen Truppen aus der BRD und der DDR. 
71 Nieder mit dem USA Imperialismus und dem sowjetischen 
Sozialimperialismus!… Abzug aller USA-Truppen aus Europa!  Abzug aller 
sowjetischen Truppen aus den Ländern Osteuropas!  Auflösung der NATO und 
des Warschauer Paktes!  Programm und Aktionsprogramm der KPD, 65, 67  AdAPO: 
Ordner KPD Berlin. 
72 Die Supermacht USA ist keine “Schutzmacht,” sie ist eine 
imperialistische Supermacht, die um ihrer Interessen willen Völkermord 
begangen hat.  “Nieder mit dem KSZE Schwindel!  Stärkt die Einheitsfront gegen 
die beiden Supermächte!” August 1, 1975. AdAPO: Ordner KPD Berlin 
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The KPD-Rote Fahne used any excuse to attack United States imperialism 
and its role in the division of Germany: In the program of the KPD, one reads:  
The victory over the fascist Wehrmacht was primarily the 
achievement of the Red Army under Stalin’s leadership.  When the 
Nazi criminals evaded the court of the peoples and their own 
exploited and enslaved working class, then only with the help of 
US imperialism.  After the Second World War the USA supplanted 
German, Italian and Japanese fascism.  The US-imperialists divided 
Germany and in the western part was the driving force behind the 
reestablishment of the class rule of the monopolistic bourgeoisie.73 
 
Another pamphlet asserted: “The division of Germany by the USA imperialists 
with the help of the reactionary Adenauer government had the goal of putting 
the Federal Republic of Germany under [the US imperialists’] control.”  Again, it 
concluded with a call, “Superpowers out of Germany!  For a unified Berlin in an 
independent unified socialist Germany!”74 
Anti-United States and anti-capitalist sentiments had an unfortunate link 
to a surprising left-wing anti-Semitism as well.  Dan Diner has argued that a 
                                                 
73 Der Sieg über die faschistische Wehrmacht war in erster Linie das 
Verdienst der Roten Armee unter Führung Stalins.  Wenn die Nazi Verbrecher 
dem Gericht der Völker und der eigenen ausgebeuteten und geknebelten 
Arbeiterklasse entgingen, so nur mit Hilfe des USA-Imperialismus.  Nach dem 
zweiten Weltkrieg trat der USA-Imperialismus an die Stelle des deutschen, 
italienischen und japanischen Faschismus.  Die USA-Imperialisten spalteten 
Deutschland und betrieben im westlichen Teil die Wiedererrichtung der 
Klassenherrschaft der Monopolbourgeoisie.  Programm und Aktionsprogramm der 
KPD, 22. 
74 Die Spaltung Deutschlands durch die USA-Imperialisten mit Hilfe der 
reaktionären Adenauer Regierung hatte zum Ziel, die BRD ihrer Kontrolle zu 
unterwerfen….Supermächte raus aus Deutschland!  Für ein vereintes Berlin in 
einem unabhängigen, vereinten sozialistischen Deutschland!  “200 Jahre USA: 
Nieder mit dem USA-Imperialismus! Es lebe die Freundschaft zwischen dem 
Deutschen und Amerikanischen Volk!” 1976.  AdAPO: Ordner KPD Berlin. 
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great deal of the anti-American sentiment on the part of the German Left was 
actually thinly-veiled anti-Semitism.75  Indeed, in the KPD-Rote Fahne’s 
publications, anti-capitalism sometimes veered into anti-Semitism.  For example, 
a cartoon in Rote Fahne depicted an injured German worker going to visit a 
doctor who resembled some of the anti-Semitic caricatures straight out of Nazi 
publications and propaganda.  Complete with hooked nose, bleeding scalpel 
behind his humped back, and ape-like hands and pointed toes emphasizing his 
sub-humanity, the doctor assured the patient, “We’ll get you taken care of,” 
while thinking to himself, “Saving the foot is not economical.”76 
 The position of the KPD-Rote Fahne regarding nature and the 
environment was an ambivalent one.  At points in its political program and other 
publications, it appeared to support certain issues that could be labeled 
environmentalist.  At other points, however, it clearly rejected environmental 
ideas outright, such as in its criticism of the Club of Rome report.  Occasionally, 
the slavish and uncritical admiration of China reached comical proportions.  But 
even in its early history, the KPD demonstrated some concern for the 
environment.  
                                                 
75 Dan Diner, Verkehrte Welten: Anti-Amerikanismus in Deutschland 
(Frankfurt: Eichhorn, 1993). 
76 Rote Fahne 2, no. 27 (8 October 1971).  See Figure 2.  Rather than evidence 
of a racialist anti-Semitism, these kinds of images, which would recur in the 
context of the housing squatters, reflect a lack of a coming-to-terms with certain 
aspects of the Nazi past, with the tendency to lump Nazism with fascism and 
thus to ignore other aspects such as racist images which contributed to the 
climate in a society in which the Holocaust was possible. 
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The political program noted the role of the capitalists in the “systematic 
exploitation of the earth.”77  But it did this primarily with a view to the impact 
upon the worker, and mostly approved of the conquest of nature and the 
environment by man as long as workers benefited.  Machinery- and hence 
modernity- was depicted as a neutral force: whether it oppressed or liberated 
depended on the system in which it operated.  The KPD-Rote Fahne program 
carefully distinguished between the machinery itself, which made work easier, 
and machinery functioning within the capitalist system: “Capital changes all 
means for the development of human life into the means for developing its 
enslavement, for means of increasing its exploitation.”78  In and of itself, the great 
machinery looked like “a victory of man over nature,” but employed under 
capitalism, made the worker only partly human and a part of the machine.79  
Again: “Seen in itself, the great machinery makes work easier; applied under 
capitalism, it increases the pressure to work and the torment associated with 
labor, and leads in the hand of the capitalist to a systematic worsening of the 
                                                 
77 …die systematische Ausbeutung der Erde.  Programm und 
Aktionsprogramm der KPD, 11. 
78 Das Kapital verwandelt alle Mittel zur Entwicklung des menschlichen 
Lebens in Mittel zur Entwicklung seiner Herrschaft, in Mittel zur Steigerung der 
Ausbeutung. Programm und Aktionsprogramm der KPD, 11. 
79 Ein Sieg des Menschen über die Natur. 
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worker’s living conditions during worktime: machinery robs him of space, air, 
and light, and exposes him to health- and life-threatening working conditions.”80  
 A publication of the Kommunistische Studentenverband (Communist 
Students’ League- KSV), the KPD-Rote Fahne’s student organization, reveals 
much about KPD-Rote Fahne attitudes toward the environment.  The pamphlet 
claimed that “the energy crisis is in reality the crisis of imperialism!” and thus 
“the crisis of imperialism and social imperialism is also the crisis of bourgeois 
and revisionist science!”81  The same publication attacked the 1974 findings of the 
Club of Rome regarding “the limits to growth.”82  The KSV publication joined 
many others when it called into question the very notion of an energy crisis or a 
shortage of resources, and called the authors of the report “the scientific agents of 
                                                 
80 An sich betrachtet, erleichtert sie [die grosse Maschinerie] die Arbeit, 
kapitalistisch angewandt, steigert sie Arbeitshetze und Arbeitsqual und führt in 
der Hand des Kapitals zur systematischen Verschlechterung der 
Lebensbedingungen des Arbeiters während der Arbeitszeit: sie raubt ihm Raum, 
Luft, Licht und setzt ihn gesundheits-und lebesgefährdenden 
Produktionsbedingungen aus.  Programm und Aktionsprogramm der KPD, 11. 
81 Die ‘Energiekrise’ ist in Wirklichkeit die Krise des Imperialismus!…Die 
Krise des Imperialismus und Sozialimperialismus ist auch die Krise der 
bürgerlichen und revisionistischen Wissenschaft!  Chapter headings in 
Atomenergie im Kapitalismus- eine Gefahr für die Massen!  Kommunistischer 
Studentenverband, 1975. AdAPO: KPD KSV Zentral. 
82 Donella H. Meadows and others, The Limits to Growth: A Report for the 
Club of Rome’s Project on the Predicament of Mankind (New York: Universe Books, 
1974).   
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the two superpowers, who invoke the world crisis in order to prepare their 
intervention and the world war.”83   
The report also praised Stalin’s 1948 massive undertaking “for the 
reshaping of nature,” and noted how the ‘Chinese Miracle’ could only be 
understood by seeing that the workers were the “masters of society, the factories, 
and of nature.”84  In an article called “The Solution of the Energy Question 
Through the Proletarian Dictatorship,” the anonymous author claimed to show 
how “after the destruction of the capitalist state machinery and the conquest of 
political power, the working class will reform all of society and nature in its 
image and place it in its service...  Nature can only be conquered when the 
bourgeoisie has been pulled down.  Only then will the field be clear for the 
creative use of the Marxist dialectic in the area of nature.”85 
                                                 
83 Die wissenschaftlichen Agenten der beiden Supermächte, die die 
Weltkrise beschwören, um ihre Intervention und den Weltkrieg vorzubereiten.  
Atomenergie im Kapitalismus, 29.  One suspects that the KSV was also wary of the 
Club of Rome’s solidly bourgeois and even patrician background, which for 
other audiences contributed to the authors’ credibility and made the report so 
significant. 
84 Stalins Plan zur Umgestaltung der Natur; Dort, wo wie in der VR China 
die Revolution fortgeführt wird und dem Revisonismus der Weg zur Macht 
versperrt wird, sind die Arbeiter die Herren der Gessellschaft, der Fabriken und 
der Natur; nur so lässt sich das ‘chinesische Wunder’ erklären.  Atomenergie im 
Kapitalismus, 77, 82. 
85 Die Lösung der Energiefrage durch die Diktatur des Proletariats; Im 
folgenden Abschnitt wird dargelegt, wie die Arbeiterklasse nach der 
Zerschlagung der kapitalistischen Staatsmaschine und der Eroberung der 
politischen Macht dargangeht, die ganze Gesellschaft und die Natur nach ihrem 
Vorbild umformt und in ihren Dienst stellt…,die Natur nur erobert werden 
konnte, wenn die Bourgeoisie niederungen wurde.  Erst dann war das Feld frei 
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 On the other hand, though, the Program and Action Program included a 
laundry list of environmental improvements.  Its demands were extensive: 
[An] end to the contamination of air, water, and earth! No location 
of industry in the recreational and residential areas of the workers!  
Construction of comprehensive environmental protection 
equipment by the capitalists!  Opposition to the destruction of 
forest and flora through the construction of troop maneuver areas 
and military airports!  Preservation and enlargement of recreational 
areas with free access for all!  Seizure of all private property on 
lakeshore properties and in recreational parks.  Supervision 
through inspections by workers and residents.  Extension of the 
transit network into the areas where the workers live!  Unified 
tariffs for all local transit systems!86   
 
This list of demands foreshadows many of the main concerns of the AL.  Overall, 
the alteration of one word in the party program’s concern about “the exploitation 
of man by man” to the exploitation of nature by man describes the paradigm 
shift made in the course of the 1970s, the shift that made the AL conceivable.87  
                                                                                                                                                 
für die schöpferische Anwendung der marxistischen Dialektik auf das Gebiet der 
Natur und für die schrankenlose Entfaltung der Produtivkräfte.  Atomenergie im 
Kapitalismus, 77. 
86 Schluss mit der Verseuchung von Luft, Wasser und Erde!  Keine 
Ansiedlung von Industrie in den Erholungs- und Wohngebieten der 
Werktätigen!  Einrichtung umfassender Umweltschutzanlagen durch die 
Kapitalisten!  Gegen die Zerstörung von Wald und Flur durch die Anlage von 
Truppenübungsplätzen und Militärflughäfen!  Erhalt und Ausbau der 
Erholungsgebiete, freier Zugang für alle!  Enteignung allen Privatbesitzes an 
Seegrundstücken und Erholungsparks!  Kontrolle durch Arbeiter- und 
Wohngebietsinspektionen!  Ausbau des Verkehrsnetzes in die Wohnviertel der 
Werktätigen!  Einheitstarif bei allen Nahverkehrsmitteln!  Programm und 
Aktionsprogramm der KPD, 60. 
87 Die Ausbeutung des Menschen durch den Menschen.  Programm und 
Aktionsprogramm der KPD, 28. 
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 Nuclear power plants posed an especially interesting issue for the K-
groups, one that continued to play an important role for the Left in the course of 
the 1980s.  In fact, it often seemed that the AL’s clientele provided the foot 
soldiers for various anti-nuclear demonstrations throughout the Federal 
Republic.  The opposition to nuclear power plants became another extremely 
important issue for the K-groups, and helps explain the AL’s continued emphasis 
on nuclear power despite the absence of nuclear plants in West Berlin. 
Nuclear power was so critical an issue because it bound together so many 
different concerns and priorities of the K-groups: it related to issues of 
sovereignty and independence in terms of reliance on the Soviet Union or the 
United States for energy supplies; it fed into concern about and solidarity with 
the Third World; and perhaps most importantly, opposition to nuclear power 
attracted large numbers of demonstrators, often coming from a broad social 
background, who clashed with police.  In West Berlin, the crusade against 
nuclear power plants was an important first stage in the shift “from red to 
green.”88   
The link between nuclear power and the concern about national 
sovereignty can clearly be discerned in a pamphlet of the KSV. “To be dependent 
on one or the other of the superpowers in the energy sector today means 
strengthening of the immediate intervention and control on the part of the 
                                                 
88 Rudolf Bahro, From Red to Green: Interviews with the New Left Review 
(London: Versa, 1984). 
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superpower, it means an undermining of national sovereignty, it means 
subservience and enslavement.”89  The pamphlet went on to assert that a nuclear 
plant would not lessen dependence on the superpowers, but rather increase it, as 
the enriched uranium necessary for the plant would come either from the United 
States or above all from the USSR.90  The alternative would be cooperation and 
dialogue with the Third World nations, which had raw materials, especially oil.  
This would lead to the rise of the Third World and foster its economic 
independence from the superpowers, ending their hegemony.91 
Curiously, however, in this utopia, atomic energy had not been ruled out.  
Here the slavish admiration and uncritical idealization of China became very 
clear.  In a section entitled “The People’s Republic Masters All Problems,” the 
authors note that currently China did not need atomic power, as it had rich 
supplies of other kinds of energy.92  But China was also researching the use of 
                                                 
89 Auf dem Energiesektor von einer der beiden Supermächte abhängig sein 
heisst heute, Verstärkung der unmittelbaren Einmischung und Kontrolle seitens 
der Supermächte, heisst Untergrabung der nationalen Unabhängigkeit, heisst 
Unterjochung und Versklavung.  Atomenergie im Kapitalismus, 3.  In this context it 
is interesting to note the work’s complete title, which is itself quite telling: 
“Atomic Energy in Capitalism: A Danger for the Masses.  For an energy policy 
independent from the superpowers, in cooperation with the Third World.”  The 
title manages to tie atomic energy to two issues of great importance to the KPD-
Rote Fahne: liberation from the yoke of the superpowers and concerns for the 
Third World.  
90 Atomenergie im Kapitalismus, 39. 
91 Atomenergie im Kapitalismus, 70-71. Kommunistischer Studentenverband, 
1975. AdAPO: KPD KSV Zentral. 
92 Die Volksrepublik China meistert alle Probleme. 
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atomic energy, exploring the use of nuclear fusion and the fast-breeder reactor.  
These did not pose a threat, however, as “in research and in politics all decisions 
are made only from the viewpoint of the working class, and the working class 
will have the leadership of the creative solution of the energy question.”93  
The KPD-Rote Fahne also became increasingly aware of the ability of the 
fight against nuclear power to attract large numbers of fairly diverse 
demonstrators.  It noted the success of a demonstration in the Wilster Marsh, 
despite major tactical errors on the part of some participants.94  In the wake of 
another demonstration, the KPD-Rote Fahne declared its solidarity with those 
arrested, calling the arrests an excuse for the state “to begin a new stage in the 
criminalization of the anti-nuclear power movement.”95  
 The KPD-Rote Fahne apparently saw the anti-nuclear movement as an 
opportunity to widen its base.  For instance, one analysis noted that “the farmers 
and vintners from Kaiserstuhl must learn from the experiences of the working 
class that their struggle is not over when the nuclear power plant in Wyhl has 
been stopped.  The common enemy of the worker as of the farmer and the whole 
                                                 
93 Aber in der Forschung und in der Politik werden alle Schritte nur vom 
Standpunkt der Arbeiterklasse aus bestimmt. die Arbeiterklasse wird die 
Führung innehaben in der schöpferischen Lösung der Energiefrage.…  
Atomenergie im Kapitalismus, 88. 
94 “Trotz KDP KB und KBW: 35,000 demonstrieren in der Wilster Marsch,” 
no date.  AdAPO: Ordner KPD Berlin. 
95 …eine neue Stufe der Kriminalisierung der Anti-AKW-Bewegung 
einzuleiten.  “Grohnde-Prozess: Solidarität mit den AKW-Gegnern.”  Rote Fahne 
9, no. 4 (25 January 1978), 6. 
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working people is monopoly capitalism, the bourgeoisie, the ruling class and its 
state.”96  Indeed, by all accounts, there was room in the political spectrum to the 
left of the SPD due to anger over its support for the nuclear industry.  One 
pamphlet shows that the KPD-Rote Fahne hoped to harness the disillusionment 
with the SPD for its atomic program in the late 1970s: it noted that even the left 
wing of the SPD had failed to advocate the hoped-for immediate and complete 
closure of all atomic facilities.97  Rote Fahne also published an article on the 
founding of an organization in West Berlin called “Action Circle Life,” composed 
of union members who opposed the German League of Unions’ support of the 
nuclear power industry.98  In particular, “Action Circle Life” took issue with the 
assertion of the German League of Unions that nuclear power plants secured 
jobs, but would also address restrictions on democratic rights within the unions 
and career restrictions.  This relatively broad spectrum of issues was particularly 
appealing to the KPD-Rote Fahne, which noted that whereas in some questions 
the KPD-Rote Fahne disagreed with the stance of the Action Circle Life, it was 
                                                 
96 Die Bauern und Winzer vom Kaiserstuhl müssen von den Erfahrungen 
der Arbeiterklasse lernen, dass ihr Kampf nicht zu Ende ist wenn das 
Kernkraftwerk in Wyhl verhindert ist.  Der gemeinsame Feind der Arbeiter wie 
auch der Bauern und des ganzen werktätigen Volkes ist das Monopolkapital, die 
Bourgeoisie, die herrschende Klasse samt ihrem Staatsapparat.  Atomenergie im 
Kapitalismus, 1. 
97 “Bundesparteitag der SPD: Todsicher in die 80er Jahre,” December 1979.  
AdAPO: Ordner KPD Berlin. 
98 Aktionskreis Leben. 
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determined to take part all the more intensely in discussions.99  This same 
openness to cooperation stood it in good stead when the time came to work 
together with other groups to form the AL. 
In the waning days of its history, the KPD-Rote Fahne threw its support 
behind efforts to bring together a broad coalition of groups to contest the 1979 
elections in West Berlin.  Its involvement is documented in a series of pamphlets 
and articles issued to inform its members and the interested public about these 
efforts.   
An important aspect of the process was the desire to avoid splitting into 
factions, as this had plagued the K-groups throughout the 1970s.  The KPD-Rote 
Fahne noted with approval that at a gathering of individuals interested in 
creating an alternative electoral slate, those present overwhelmingly approved a 
resolution that emphasized that the group welcomed all who consistently 
supported democracy and environmental protection.  According to this 
statement, the party explicitly rejected decrees rendering the membership in the 
group incompatible with membership in another political party.  As the KPD-
Rote Fahne put it, “all attempts to split [the movement] failed, and the way was 
cleared” to discuss electoral themes.100 
                                                 
99 “Westberlin: ‘Aktionskreis Leben’ gegründet.” Rote Fahne 9, no. 29 (19 
July 1978). 
100 Damit ist allen Spaltungsversuchen eine Absage erteilt worden und der 
Weg frei dafür, über die Themen zu diskutieren….“Abgeordnetenhauswahlen 




Clearly, however, the KPD-Rote Fahne still employed traditional socialist 
themes, emphasizing the role the AL would play in supporting workers’ 
interests.  It also took a critical stance regarding parliaments, dwelling on the 
negative experiences that participating grassroots groups had had with 
‘bourgeois parties’ and ‘bourgeois parliamentarianism.’  The brochure noted that 
“[In Parliament], their interests are not represented, but are talked to death and 
trampled upon.”101  In the flyer, the KPD-Rote Fahne revealed its motivations for 
working to form this new broad-based group: “Such a ballot that does not let 
itself be divided but that brings together as many as possible would be a great 
strengthening of the progressive democratic movement in West Berlin.  That is 
why the KPD is supporting such an alternative ballot for the Abgeordnetenhaus 
elections in 1979.”102  It went on to list a number of issues that in its view the AL 
should address: 
The KPD is of the view that an alternative ballot must take up the 
most important and pressing problems in West Berlin.  This goes 
beyond environmental protection and includes the following 
matters: unemployment, especially among young people and 
women, the destruction of jobs, and the economic and subsidy 
policies of the bourgeoisie; to the decline of democratic rights 
                                                 
101 Dort wurden ihre Interessen nicht vertreten, sondern zerredet und 
zertreten.  “Abgeordnetenhauswahlen im März 1979: Für eine Wehrt Euch Liste 
in Westberlin,” 1979.  AdAPO: Ordner KPD Berlin. 
102 Eine solche Liste, die sich nicht spalten lässt, sondern möglichst viele in 
sich vereinigt, wäre eine grosse Stärkung der fortschrittlichen, demokratischen 
Bewegung in Westberlin- deshalb tritt die KPD für eine solche alternative Liste 
zu den Abgeordnetenhauswahlen 1979 ein. “Abgeordnetenhauswahlen im März 




involving restrictions on employment…; regarding political 
repression in the GDR, such as the terror sentences against Rudolf 
Bahro or Rolf Mainz; and regarding the extension of connections of 
the population in West Berlin with the people in the GDR and the 
Federal Republic, regarding the freedom of movement and travel 
between East and West, in all of Germany.103 
 
 The KPD-Rote Fahne also apparently hoped that work in parliament 
would force the diverse protest groups to focus on what they had in common 
rather than competing with one another, and speculated that “representation in 
Parliament would place our commonalities in the foreground and support our 
struggle.”104  A pamphlet printed in 1979 calls for members and friends of the 
SEW to vote for the AL: “The AL is for us a correct step in order to unite as many 
as possible of those who want to promote democracy, environmental protection, 
and the living conditions of the workers.”  It concludes with a call “FOR AN 
                                                 
103 Die KPD ist der Auffassung, dass eine Alternative Liste die wichtigsten 
und drängenden Probleme in Westberlin aufgreifen muss, d.h. über Forderungen 
zum Umweltschutz z.B. zu folgenden Fragen Stellung nehmen muss: zur 
Arbeitslosigkeit, besonders der Jugendlichen und Frauen, zur Vernichtung von 
Arbeitsplätzen und der Wirtschafts- und Subventionspolitik der Bourgeoisie, 
zum Abbau demokratischer Rechte mit Berufsverboten…zur politischen 
Unterdrückung in der DDR, wie in den Terrorurteilen gegen Rudolph Bahro 
oder Rolf Mainz, zur Erweiterung der Verbindungen der Bevölkerung in 
Westberlin mit der Bevölkerung in der DDR und der BRD, zur Freizügigkeit und 
zu freiem Reiseverkehr zwischen Ost und West, in ganz Deutschland.  
“Abgeordnetenhauswahlen im März 1979: Für eine Wehrt Euch Liste in 
Westberlin,” 1979. AdAPO: Ordner KPD Berlin. 
104 Eine Vertretung im Parlament würde die Gemeinsamkeiten in den 
Vordergrund stellen und unseren Kampf unterstützen.  “Für ein fortschrittliches 
Wahlbündnis,” 1978. AdAPO: Ordner KPD Berlin. 
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INDEPENDENT, UNIFIED, AND SOCIALIST GERMANY!”105  Similarly, a 
document addressing various issues that should be brought up in future 
meetings regarding the establishment of an alternative ballot noted that women’s 
groups, citizens’ initiatives, unions, and so on had been successful in the past at 
placing entrepreneurs and administrators on the defensive through their 
protests.  “How much more successful will we be,” the authors asked, “when we 
manage to bring the diverse forms of resistance together, with equal rights and 
all placed on an equal footing?  One has to conclude that such a step toward 
unity will create more strength than the sum of its parts, that it will make the five 
fingers into a fist.”106 
Yet the enthusiasm for parliamentary institutions remained lukewarm at 
best:  
The majority of those who support a genuinely alternative ballot 
have no illusions about their chances in parliament.  We all know 
from experience that the parliament is mostly there in order to 
cover up the real views of the bourgeois parties and to give 
                                                 
105 Die AL ist für uns ein richtiger Schritt, um möglichst viele zu vereinen, 
die sich für Demokratie, Umweltschutz und die Lebensbedingungen der 
Arbeiter und Werktätigen einsetzen wollen.  FÜR EIN UNABHÄNGIGES, 
VEREINTES UND SOZIALISTISCHES DEUTSCHLAND.  “Keine Stimme der 
SEW.  Wählt die Alternative Liste für Demokratie und Umweltschutz,” no date.  
AdAPO: Ordner KPD Berlin.  Emphasis in original. 
106 Um wieviel mehr wird dies der Fall sein, wenn es gelingt, die 
vielfältigen Formen des Widerstands gleichberechtigt auf einer gemeinsamen 
Ebene zusammenzuschliessen.  Der Schluss, dass ein solcher Schritt zur Einheit 
mehr Kraft schafft als die Summe der Teile, dass er die fünf Finger zur Faust 
macht, ist zwingend.  “Stellungnahme der KPD zu den Diskussionen über eine 
gemeinsame Wahlbeteiligung bei den Abgeordnetenhaus-Wahlen im März 
1979,” March 1979. AdAPO: Ordner KPD Berlin. 
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themselves the illusion of representing the people.  The decisions 
are made in the halls of factories and in the government palaces, 
without and against the will of the populace.  A genuine opposition 
in parliament can reveal this fraud and the interests that lie behind 
it and bring clarity into the house of lies.  But decisions in the 
interests of the majority of the populace cannot be reached there. 107 
 
The KPD-Rote Fahne was quick to dismiss those who placed their faith only in 
increased parliamentary controls, insisting that it was also necessary to continue 
the struggle outside of parliament, in the factory and on the street.  The 
organization continued to express cynicism regarding parliaments and to 
condemn those who would rely on parliaments alone for addressing workers’ 
grievances.108  
In fact, the KPD-Rote Fahne intended to use participation in the Berlin 
Parliament as the parliamentary arm of its activities:  
We believe that both participation in the election as well as possibly 
working in parliament would primarily serve to support and 
expand the existing activities of resistance, and that one should not 
limit oneself to attacking graft and calling for improved 
parliamentary supervision.  It’s not about a ‘renewal’ or a ridding 
of the parliament from the spoils system, but rather using the 
                                                 
107 Die Mehrheit der Unterstützer einer wirklich alternativen Liste macht 
sich wenig Illusionen über die Möglichkeiten im Parlament.  Aus Erfahrung 
wissen wir alle, dass das Parlament hauptsächlich dazu da ist, die wirklichen 
Ansichten der bürgerlichen Parteien zu vertuschen und sich den Anschein von 
Volksvertretern zu geben.  Die Entscheidungen werden in den Konzernetagen 
und den Regierungspalästen gefällt, ohne und gegen Willen der Bevölkerung.  
Eine wirkliche Opposition im Parlament kann diesen Betrug und die Interessen, 
die dahinter stehen, zwar aufzeigen und Klarheit in das Lügengebäude bringen.  
Entscheidungen im Sinne der Mehrheit der Bevölkerung werden dort nicht 
erzielt werden können.  “Für ein fortschrittliches Wahlbündnis.” 
108 “Für ein fortschrittliches Wahlbündnis.” 
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election and possible positions in parliament for the numerous 
struggles outside of parliament.109 
 
 The KPD-Rote Fahne also outlined points it would like to see in the 
political program of the party it was in the process of creating.  It is interesting to 
note that these included environmental protection, though only in the context of 
opposition to the downsizing of programs at the cost of the populace, such as 
city and energy planning, housing construction, public transportation, and 
school and university policy.  The authors argued that top priority should be 
assigned to fighting for unrestricted democratic rights and opposing all attempts 
to limit and restrict these rights.  The KPD-Rote Fahne also insisted that the 
alternative ballot should not remain silent regarding political oppression in the 
GDR, but should address issues that immediately affected the West Berlin 
populace, such as the shootings at the Wall.  If progressive forces did not take up 
these issues, the authors argued, then they would be left for reactionary 
demagogues to address.110 
                                                 
109 Wir meinen, dass sowohl die Wahlbeteiligung als auch eine eventuelle 
Arbeit im Parlament in erster Linie zur Unterstützung der bestehenden Ansätze 
des Widerstands und zur Verbreitung des Widerstands dienen soll und man sich 
nicht auf Forderungen gegen die Filzokratie und für bessere parlamentarische 
Kontrolle beschränken darf.  Es geht nicht um eine Erneuerung oder eine 
Säuberung des Parlaments von “Filzen,” sondern um die Nutzung der Wahlen 
und eventueller Positionen im Parlament für die zahlreichen Kämpfe ausserhalb 
des Parlaments.  “Stellungnahme der KPD zu den Diskussionen über eine 
gemeinsame Wahlbeteiligung bei den Abgeordnetenhaus-Wahlen im März 
1979,” March 1979. 
110 “Stellungnahme der KPD zu den Diskussionen über eine gemeinsame 
Wahlbeteiligung bei den Abgeordnetenhaus-Wahlen im März 1979,” March 1979. 
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 Two pictures further illustrate the attitude toward parliaments held by the 
KPD-Rote Fahne, and simultaneously demonstrate the importance of context 
when interpreting historical materials.  The cover of a flyer printed by the KPD 
calling for voters to support the AL features a picture of a crane with a wrecking 
ball smashing against a building labeled ‘Parliaments.’  The building is 
beginning to crumble where the wrecking ball hit.  A man in a sleeping cap peers 
angrily out the window at the crane operator, who comments with a shrug, 
“Surely one is allowed to knock.…” The crane is labeled “AL.”111  A nearly 
identical sketch appeared in the first issue of the AL’s membership circular, 
Mitgliederrundbrief, also dating from 1979.  The only difference is that the crane is 
labeled “The Greens.”112  Seen in the context of the electoral gains already scored 
by the Greens in West Germany, the sketch in the Mitgliederrundbrief is a 
relatively benign commentary on the strength of the Greens’ advances and the 
changes they had made, shaking up the electoral system.  But in light of the 
KPD-Rote Fahne’s past violent opposition to parliamentary institutions, and with 
                                                                                                                                                 
AdAPO: Ordner KPD Berlin.  The skeleton of the AL’s political program is found 
in this document, as will be seen in the next chapter. 
111 “Die KPD ruft auf: Wählt die Alternative Liste für Demokratie und 
Umweltschutz Liste 6,” 12 August 1979.  AdAPO: Ordner KPD Berlin.  See 
Figure 3. 
112 Mitgliederrundbrief 1, no. 1 (1979), 1.  See Figure 4. 
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the crane labeled “AL,” the sketch can only be understood as advocating an 
assault on parliamentary institutions.113  
As a result of participating in discussions regarding forming an 
alternative ballot, the KPD-Rote Fahne found itself defending the idea of 
parliamentary participation in the face of attacks from its rival, the KBW.  The 
KBW had recently accused the KPD-Rote Fahne of opportunism, saying that it 
was “only after seats in parliament,” and insisting that the only reason to 
participate in elections was to reveal parliament “as a place where just a lot of 
talking goes on” and as a podium to use in advancing the class struggle.114  The 
KPD-Rote Fahne author then posed the question: “Is not the democratic struggle 
of the people against capital and bourgeois government a righteous struggle?  
Why should it not be possible to create a broad alliance that will make the 
numerous and important social and democratic demands from the bourgeois 
parties in power on behalf of workers and other people?”115  Still, however, the 
                                                 
113 It is probably not possible to know which version of the picture is the 
original.  But this kind of borrowing of materials was common for the time: it 
was almost a matter of pride when leftist organizations stole materials and 
artwork from the press and other leftist organizations. 
114 Dass es ihr nur um ‘Parlamentssessel’ gehe; als Schwatzbude zu 
entlarven. “Westberlin: KBW gegen Wehrt Euch Bündnis,” Rote Fahne 9, no. 29 
(19 July 1978). 
115 Ist der demokratische Kampf der Volksmassen gegen Kapital und 
bürgerliche Regierung kein gerechter und notwendiger Kampf?  Warum soll es 
nicht möglich sein, zur Westberliner Abgeordnetenhauswahl ein breites Bündnis 
zu schaffen, das sehr viele und wichtige Forderungen der Arbeiter, der 
Werktätigen und anderer Teile des Volkes- soziale und demokratische- gegen die 
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activities outside of parliament held primary importance: “Today it is possible to 
forge a progressive electoral alliance, to form a progressive alternative for the 
elections, an alliance that will use a possible position in parliament for the extra-
parliamentary struggle.”116 
More evidence of an ambivalent attitude toward parliament and Western 
democratic forms in general is found in another Rote Fahne article.  Updating 
readers on the status of discussions on forming an alternative ballot, the author 
asserted:  
We also are of the view that all means at one’s disposal in 
parliament must be used to advance the interests of workers, in 
other words not just disclosures but also enquiries, propositions, 
legislative initiatives.  Cooperation with delegates of other parties 
must be sought out in such questions in order to exploit 
contradictions to the maximum extent possible.  But the point of 
departure of this work is the extra-parliamentary struggle, which 
must remain our focus.  The just demands and claims of the masses 
must be the guiding principle of such initiatives.  A possible 
alliance with other delegates cannot necessitate giving up 
significant positions of the grassroots; otherwise you end up 
performing pure parliamentary calculation.  This would also betray 
radical democratic assumptions of an alternative ballot: for the 
rejection of bourgeois parliamentarianism as undemocratic, as 
something that gives no possibility of representing the interests of 
the people- this too is the point of departure when creating such a 
ballot.117 
                                                                                                                                                 
staatstragenden bürgerlichen Parteien erhebt?  “Westberlin: KBW gegen Wehrt 
Euch Bündnis,” Rote Fahne 9, no. 29 (19 July 1978). 
116 [Es ist heute möglich], ein fortschrittliches Wahlbündnis zu schliessen, 
eine fortschrittliche Alternative zu den Wahlen zu bilden, ein Wahlbündnis, das 
eine eventuelle Position im Parlament für den Kampf ausserhalb des Parlaments 
nutzt.  “Westberlin: KBW gegen Wehrt Euch Bündnis.” 
117 Wir sind ebenfalls der Auffassung, dass alle zur Verfügung stehenden 




The article also explained the debate about the question of working within 
a certain constitutional framework.  A group within the coalition forming the AL 
had been discussing to what degree one should rely upon the constitutional 
guarantees under basic democratic rights.  If one did not call upon these rights in 
support of the cause, it argued, one risked losing ground to the bourgeois 
democratic movement:  
The background to this debate is of course a differing assessment of 
the Basic Law.  We of course don’t want to fall behind the 
bourgeois-democratic parties, in fact we want to go beyond them 
and demand more democratic rights.  But we are against forcing 
ourselves into the same narrow framework of the catalog of the 
Basic Law, but are in favor of comprehensively advocating 
democratic rights from the standpoint of the needs of workers.118 
                                                                                                                                                 
und Werktätigen einzutreten, also nicht nur Enthüllungen, sondern auch 
Anfragen, Anträge, Gesetzesinitiativen.  Die Zusammenarbeit mit Abgeordneten 
anderer Fraktionen bei solchen Fragen muss gesucht werden, um die 
Widersprüche maximal auszunutzen.  Aber der Ausgangspunkt dieser Arbeit ist 
der ausserparlamentarische Kampf, der weiter Schwerpunkt bleiben muss.  Die 
gerechten Forderungen und Ansprüche der Volksmassen müssen Richtschnur 
solcher Initiativen sein.  Für einen möglichen Zusammenschluss mit anderen 
Abgeordeneten dürfen keine wesentlichen Positionen der Basisbewegungen 
aufgegeben werden, sonst gerät man ins rein parlamentarische Kalkül.  Dies 
wäre auch Verrat am radikaldemokratischen Ansatz einer Alternativen Liste. 
Denn die Ablehnung des bürgerlichen Parlamentarismus als undemokatisch, der 
keine Möglichkeit zur Vertretung der Bevölkerungsinteressen bietet, ist ja 
ebenfalls Ausgangspunkt der Bildung einer solchen Liste.  “Stand der Diskussion 
um eine Alternative Liste,” Rote Fahne 9, no. 37 (13 September 1978), 12. 
118 Der Hintergrund der Auseinandersetzung ist natürlich eine 
unterschiedliche Beurteilung des Grundgesetzes.  Wir sind gleichfalls nicht 
dafür, hinter bürgerlich-demokratische Positionen zurückzugehen.  Wir sind im 
Gegenteil dafür, darüberhinauszugehen, mehr demokratische Rechte zu fordern.  
Wir sind aber dagegen, uns im Kampf für demokratische Recte noch selber in 
den engen Rahmen des Grundrechtekatalogs im Grundgesetz zu zwängen, 




The documents cited above clearly reflect an ambivalence regarding 
parliament that still persisted within the KPD-Rote Fahne.  At times, it appears 
that the KPD-Rote Fahne was trying to convince itself that participation in 
parliament was acceptable, as if it had to overcome its own inhibitions.  The 
picture of the wrecking ball for example probably was intended to rationalize the 
participation of the KPD-Rote Fahne in the founding of the AL to the grassroots 
by making it seem more compatible with the KPD-Rote Fahne’s anti-
parliamentary stance.  Similarly, the repeated plan to use a possible position in 
parliament to support the struggle outside of Parliament can be seen as a way of 
helping to justify the decision to run for parliament.  After all, just five years 
earlier, the KPD-Rote Fahne had called for the violent destruction of the 
bourgeois state and had condemned any sort of parliamentary activities.  
As this chapter has shown, West Berlin in the 1970s was a city of 
contradictions.  An increasingly stagnant isolated backwater, the island city 
nevertheless was the perfect breeding ground for a counterculture of protest: the 
numerous K-groups were only the most visible result.  At the end of the decade, 
however, the Left found itself at a crossroads: the ‘German Autumn’ of 1977 and 
the group suicide of the most prominent of the RAF prisoners symbolized the 
approaching apotheosis.  In West Berlin, the K-groups were burning themselves 
out, and the membership in the K-groups had begun to decline and fragment.  
                                                                                                                                                 
umfassend für demokratische Rechte einzutreten.  “Stand der Diskussion um 
eine Alternative Liste.” 
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The leaders of the KPD-Rote Fahne made a decision to work with other groups to 
form a new organization to contest the 1979 election.  The KPD-Rote Fahne 
played a critical role in providing political experience and committed members 
to this group.  This new group, the AL, was to be successful beyond anyone’s 
expectations.  By the time the AL entered the West Berlin Parliament, the radical 
Left had already begun an important stage in its Long Way West.  In West Berlin, 
when the KPD-Rote Fahne and others formed the AL in 1978, the Red Decade 





Crisis and Opportunity:  
The West Berlin Left, 1978-1981 
 This chapter explores developments from 1978-1981 in West Berlin, from 
the creation of the AL in October 1978 through its representation in the local 
assemblies to the beginning of its second election campaign in 1981.  During this 
time, the radical West Berlin Left took a momentous stride toward accepting and 
embracing parliamentary democracy when it founded the AL.  Ironically, the 
Left apparently took this step with the opposite goal in mind.  The KPD-Rote 
Fahne, the single largest group among the organizations that met to discuss 
forming an alternative ballot and a primary advocate of the AL, apparently 
viewed the AL as a Trojan horse to be used to infiltrate parliament.  In order for 
it to gain enough support to enter parliament under West Berlin electoral law, 
however, the KPD-Rote Fahne toned down its dogmatism and claimed to adopt a 
culture of debate and dialogue.  The result was successful beyond expectations, 
and the AL attracted large levels of support.  Not only did the AL attract voters, 
however; it also successfully ushered in a new era for the Left.  Developments 
explored in this chapter help explain why the New Left did not end in terrorism, 
but rather led to parliamentary representation.  This shows the ability of the 
parliamentary system to attract the Left and to absorb the challenge posed by 




 By the summer of 1978, a number of factors converged to spark the Left to 
try a new approach to its political aims.  A sense of general disgust with the 
moderate course taken by SPD Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, whose domestic and 
especially nuclear policies angered the left wing of his own party, permeated the 
Left.  In addition, the radical Left had recently witnessed events that led to a 
reexamination of another potential course: that of terrorism.  In 1977, the series of 
violent terrorist attacks against prominent Federal Republic representatives of 
the government and industry peaked.  In the mid-1970s, the Left seems to have 
shown an alarming amount of sympathy for terrorism.  In 1976, four thousand 
West Berliners attended the funeral of Ulrike Meinhof, a leading figure in the 
RAF who committed suicide in prison.1  In a phrase that was to become 
infamous, an anonymous pamphleteer in April of 1977 described his 
“clandestine joy” upon hearing of the murder of Siegfried Buback, the Federal 
Attorney General, at the hands of RAF terrorists.2  As summer turned to autumn, 
however, the deaths continued to mount.  On 30 July, Jürgen Ponto, chief 
executive of the Dresdner Bank, was murdered in a failed kidnapping attempt.  
On 5 September came the abduction of Hans Martin Schleyer, head of the 
German Employers’ League and the League of German Industry.  He was found 
dead in a car trunk just over one month later.  Finally, in October, convicted RAF 
                                                 
1 Richie, Faust’s Metropolis, 783.  For the history of the RAF, see Aust, Der 
Baader-Meinhof Komplex. 
2 Nicholls, Bonn Republic, 257. 
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leaders Andreas Baader, Jan-Karl Raspe, and Gudrun Ensslin committed suicide 
in Stammheim prison after a hijacking scheme failed.  This violent denouement 
sparked the Left to reconsider its stance regarding the route chosen by the RAF.  
While some still insisted on taking the fateful leap into the unknown, the 
consequences and costs of terror led many to step back from the brink after 1977 
and to search for alternatives.3 
 The Left found one such alternative in other developments peaking in the 
summer of 1978.  Herbert Grühl’s defection from the CDU to form the Grüne 
Aktion Zukunft (Green Action Future- GAZ) in July 1978 attracted national 
attention.  His initial success recalled the experiences earlier in the 1970s with the 
anti-nuclear movement, when diverse groups of farmers, concerned local 
townspeople, and radical activists united to protest plans for nuclear power 
plants in Wyhl and Brokdorf.  The West German Left was beginning to recognize 
the potential of ecological ideas to give it new life.  For example, the Socialist 
Bureau in autumn 1978 sponsored a meeting inspired by the writings of Ernst 
Bloch.  Bloch’s writings emphasized that humanity could be liberated only when 
it adopted a relationship with nature that did not view the natural world as 
something to be subjugated.  As the opening speaker noted, however, this 
“demanded the revolutionary, radical change of this capitalist society.”4  These 
                                                 
3 For an examination of this “fateful leap,” see Varon, Shadowboxing, 378. 
4 Fordert die revolutionäre Umwälzung dieser kapitalistischen 
Gesellschaftsformation.  Marxismus und Naturbeherrschung.  Beiträge zu den ersten 
Ernst-Bloch-Tagen (Offenbach: Verlag 2000, 1979), 10. 
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were early developments in the rise of a new critique of Western industrial 
society that would become the Green movement.  The radical Left would take 
this opportunity to hitch itself to this trend, which founding AL member Cordula 
Schulz called the “Green Train.”5  
 Developments in West Berlin also contributed to the confluence of events 
culminating in the founding of the AL.  Several of the primary responses to the 
dissolution of the SDS a decade earlier had by now run their course.  The K-
groups were burning out, their members exhausting themselves in a hopeless 
quest to beat their rivals by .1 percent, never coming close to the 5 percent of the 
vote needed to enter parliament.  The terrorist response too had been dealt a 
serious blow in the ‘German Autumn.’  West Berlin’s ‘native’ terrorist group, the 
June 2 Movement, disbanded in 1980.  One legacy of the end of the APO was still 
thriving, however; a large and diverse counterculture remained in West Berlin.  
By one estimate, by 1980, one hundred thousand people lived in West Berlin’s 
alternative scene.6  Large proportions of predominately Turkish guest workers, 
especially in Kreuzberg, served further to enrich West Berlin’s culture, but also 
led to conflicts and resentment. 
 Against this backdrop, in 1978, a diverse group of communists, housing 
squatters, feminists, lesbian and gay rights activists, and environmentalists came 
                                                 
5 Der grüne Zug.  Cordula Schulz, “Nie waren sie wertvoller als heute...,” 
in Perspektiven der Grünen, Bunten und Alternativen (Berlin: Alternative Liste, 
1980), 86. 
6 Richie, Faust’s Metropolis, 787. 
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together to discuss forming a new organization to run in the upcoming March 
1979 elections.  Of these groups, by far the largest was the KPD-Rote Fahne.  The 
evidence indicates that the KPD-Rote Fahne initially sought to use the AL as a 
kind of Trojan horse in order to enter the parliament and exploit it, in a path akin 
to Dutschke’s Long March.7  In order to attract enough allies for this plan to 
work, however, the KPD-Rote Fahne dropped its dogmatism and embraced an 
ideology emphasizing an experimental approach to the truth and emphasis on 
conflict and debate.  This ideology shared some elements of the requirements for 
a democratic system outlined by Ralf Dahrendorf.8  The organization also 
initially claimed to be concerned with democracy and environmental protection, 
but especially the former concern was a minor point, as its program reveals (see 
below).  Even at this early phase, however, this dictum took on a life of its own, 
and the AL began to believe it was what it said it was.  In addition, it soon 
discovered the benefits of parliamentary participation 
 Before turning to the founding of the AL, it is first necessary to consider 
the fate of the K-groups.  By the late 1970s, these radical groups found 
themselves in increasing trouble, losing members with increasing rapidity, and 
the KPD-Rote Fahne dissolved itself in March 1980.  The AL was to be the main 
beneficiary of their decline, as the K-groups and the KPD-Rote Fahne in 
                                                 
7 For this interpretation of Dutschke, see Koenen, Das rote Jahrzehnt, 58. 
8 See Dahrendorf, Society and Democracy, 16. 
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particular provided crucial support for the AL in terms of numbers and 
organizational experience. 
 Why did the K-groups collapse?  Looking at the personal experiences of 
some K-group members helps understand this phenomenon, and gives an 
appreciation of the degree of motivation and commitment of these individuals 
that the AL was later able to tap.  Several published sources document the 
experiences of participants in the K-groups.  These include Wir warn die stärkste 
der Partein [sic] and Partei Kaputt.  Rank and file members of several of the K-
groups wrote the former, while former leaders within the KPD-Rote Fahne 
authored the latter work.9  
One probable explanation for the decline of the K-groups is simply 
burnout.  Indeed, membership in the K-groups took a tremendous physical and 
psychological toll, and heavily impacted members’ personal and professional 
lives.  K-group members had a blistering schedule.  A former member of the 
Kommunistische Hochschulgruppe  (Communist University Group- KHG), the 
university affiliate of the Kommunistischer Bund Westdeutschlands (Communist 
League of West Germany- KBW), recounted in his contribution the hours taken 
up by committee meetings, training, and discussion sessions.  In addition, the 
anonymous author noted, members were expected to distribute leaflets at tables 
set up in the university at the various departments and in front of the dining hall, 
                                                 
9 Wir warn die stärkste der Partein.  Erfahrungsberichte aus der Welt der K-
Gruppen (Berlin: Rotbuch Verlag, 1977); Partei kaputt.  Das Scheitern der KPD und 
die Krise der Linken (Berlin: Olle and Wolter, 1981). 
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and to hang up posters in town.  On top of this, they were expected to sell 
newspapers at least once a week for two to three hours in the early morning, 
often facing the hostility of the very factory workers they were trying to attract, 
as well as to serve as volunteer office help for the organization, typing up 
membership letters late into the night.  Vacations provided no break from the 
class struggle: the organization required its members to bring along propaganda 
materials for distribution wherever they traveled.10  The author described the 
personal consequences of involvement in the following passage:  
In the end the total absorption of the individual through the 
organization makes it impossible to pursue other interests that 
could bring a higher degree of self-realization.  One was often no 
longer capable of going to the movies or reading anything else 
besides the required texts.  One could just rest up for the next 
mission....  And you just became progressively removed from your 
studies- when you went to classes at all, then only to say something 
in order to provoke a political discussion.11 
  
 Another account comes from a veteran of the KPD-Rote Fahne.  This 
activist noted that he generally had only one evening free of meetings, and he 
had to be excused from them if he could not attend. “If I was lucky, I could go 
home after work, but often I had appointments straight through until 11:00 
                                                 
10 Wir warn, 60. 
11 Schliesslich macht es die totale Absorption des Einzelnen durch die 
Organisation unmöglich, anderen Interessen nachzugehen, die einen höheren 
Grad an Selbstverwirklichung bringen könnte.  Man war oft nicht mal mehr in 
der Lage, ins Kino zu gehen oder andere als die vorgegebene Pflichtlektüre zu 
lesen.  Man konnte sich gerade für den nächsten Einsatz erholen…Als Student 
wird nun durch die ständige Arbeit für die Organisation zusehends entrückt, 
man besuchte Lehrveranstaltungen- wenn überhaupt- nur noch, um was 
anzusagen und politische Diskussionen vom Zaune zu brechen.  Wir warn, 61-62. 
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PM.”12  This was especially difficult, as his job began at 7:00AM, and he 
performed heavy work.  The combination took a toll on his health, especially his 
nerves.  When he was put in charge of organizing a May Day event (the 
European Day of Labor celebrated on May 1), his schedule became even more 
unbearable.13   
In addition, his family life suffered.  He noted how his political 
involvement caused problems with his wife and son, whom he rarely saw, 
writing, “I hardly had a relationship with [my wife] any longer.  We just 
happened to be married and living in the same apartment.”14  He increasingly 
spent more time with the organization, and had less time for old friends, 
colleagues, and relatives.  Moreover, he came to see his family and friends solely 
as political objects to be converted.15  
 Added to these factors came a growing disillusionment with the party 
itself.  Appointed co-organizer of a May Day committee, he found himself having 
to do most of the work himself, as his colleague was swamped with 
appointments.  He worked around the clock on preparations, and he narrowly 
escaped having several serious workplace accidents due to fatigue.  Despite all 
                                                 
12 Wenn ich Glück hatte, konnte ich nach der Arbeit gleich nach Hause, oft 
ging es mit Terminen aber gleich durch bis 23 Uhr.  Wir warn, 25. 
13 Wir warn, 32. 
14 Zu [meiner Frau] hatte ich faktisch keine Beziehung mehr, wir waren 
eben verheiratet und wohnten in einer Wohnung.  Wir warn, 28. 
15 Wir warn, 27. 
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these efforts, only one construction worker came to the event he had put 
together.  This failure was both very embarrassing at the time and resulted in 
heavy criticism from his superiors in the party.  Moreover, his work behind the 
scenes also showed him for the first time how events were manipulated and the 
facts distorted: the party bragged in public about the success of his event, then 
subsequently criticized him for the event’s failure.  His position also allowed him 
to see how the events had failed citywide, despite the party’s proclamations of 
success.  In addition, the distortions and manipulations of the Rote Fahne, 
especially its exaggerated claims of the success of membership campaigns, 
became increasingly apparent.16  The final blow came at an event just before the 
May Day holiday:  “When I experienced the hysterical atmosphere at an event on 
the eve of May Day and heard the great, hollow words from the stage, I finally 
just ran out, got drunk, and didn’t show up at any more meetings.”17 
The rigid hierarchy of the party also caused problems.  Formally the party 
was quite rigidly organized, as seen in the previous chapter.  But one author 
noted how the informal structure, too, was both rigid and galling: at each level of 
the pyramid, those with proletarian roots were viewed as superior, “more 
                                                 
16 Wir warn, 32-33. 
17 Als ich die hysterische Stimmung auf einer Veranstaltung am Vorabend 
zum 1. Mai erlebte, die grossen, hohlen Worte von der Bühne hörte, da bin ich 
schliesslich hinausgerannt, habe mich besoffen und bin zu keinem Termin mehr 
hingegangen.  Wir warn, 33. 
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important, more significant, better comrades or buddies.”18  The “Sympis,” or 
sympathizers, and students always ranked at the bottom.  Recounting his 
experiences as a recruit, one author questioned the value of his political training.  
He noted that during instruction in Marxist dialectics and political economy, the 
students rarely understood their lessons, but could not admit to not having 
grasped the concepts, as this would have called into question the whole method 
of instruction.19  Another member explained his frustration with party practices 
and noted the absurdity of some of the speeches and slogans: “I just didn’t know 
if this was the right line: ‘we are for one mark more per hour and for the world 
revolution.’”20  The severity of this syndrome is perhaps best exemplified in a 
declaration issued by ten members of the KBW upon leaving the party in disgust.  
Besides a lack of connection between theory and practice, the authors noted, 
“We, too, have failed to provide answers to certain basic questions of the 
revolutionary movement, such as for example the question as to whether the 
dictatorship of the proletariat is right or not.”21   
                                                 
18 …wichtigere, bedeutendere, bessere Genossen oder Kumpels.  Wir warn, 
30. 
19 Wir warn, 25. 
20 Ich wusste nicht, ob dies gerade die richtige Linie sein kann: wir sind für 
eine Mark mehr in der Stunde und für die Weltrevolution!  Wir warn, 116-117. 
21 Auch wir haben keine Antworten auf bestimmte Grundfragen der 
revolutionäre Bewegung entwickelt, wie z.B. auf die Frage, ob das Konzept der 
Diktatur des Proletariats richtig ist oder nicht.  “Gemeinsame 
Austrittserklärung,” 18 June 1982. AdAPO: KBW Nord C1 Flugblätter. 
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 Membership in a K-group brought with it frustration, exhaustion, and 
possible restrictions on practicing one’s career (Berufsverbot).  What made matters 
worse was a growing conviction that all these sacrifices were for naught.  
Participation in the Berlin elections did not bring the organizations anywhere 
close to the 5 percent needed under West Berlin electoral law to enter parliament.  
One anonymous author put it this way: “Besides around .1 percent [of the vote], 
participating in the election brought the KBW numerous dismissals and career 
restrictions for the comrades who campaigned.”22  Another described a common 
syndrome among K-group veterans: “Through the experience of having one’s 
entire existence end in a political blind alley, many felt victims of a past that they 
suppressed like a school teacher suppresses the lower body: you don’t talk about 
it….”23  
  Yet there is another striking aspect of the K-groups that is at least as 
important for understanding the origins of the AL: despite their frustration and 
their extreme exhaustion, members were determined to continue their political 
involvement, often being quite committed to at least certain aspects of the 
ideology that had brought them to the party.  Committed individuals did not 
                                                 
22 Dem KBW brachte die Wahlbeteiligung nebst etwa 0,1% der Stimmen, 
etliche Entlassungen und Berufsverbote für die kandidierenden Genossen.  Wir 
warn, 58. 
23 Durch das Erlebnis, mit seiner ganzen Existenz in eine politische 
Sackgasse geraten zu sein, fühlten sich viele als Opfer einer Vergangenheit, die 
sie verdrängten wie der Oberlehrer den Unterleib: darüber spricht man 
nicht…Wir warn, 5. 
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wish to give up this political involvement.  This same tendency perhaps helped 
keep members in the K-groups beyond the point where they ordinarily would 
have given up and left the party or protested against its rigid, sectarian nature.  
One K-group member expressed this fear: “Back then I was scared of being 
expelled, I was afraid of losing my political homeland.”24  Indeed, notions of 
‘political homeland’ provide a recurring theme in the accounts of the K-groups.25  
Another ‘survivor’ noted why he hesitated before leaving: ”Politically…there 
was just no other alternative there.  I wouldn’t have known where else to go.  
The alternative to leaving the KPD was not doing anything anymore.  And the 
prospect of not doing anything anymore was what scared me, because I had this 
moral need to be a political person, a communist.”26  Not until the founding of 
the AL in West Berlin in 1978 and other Green groups at about the same time did 
such committed people find a new outlet for their political energies.  Work 
within the AL offered these individuals the chance to continue their political 
                                                 
24 Und damals hatte ich Angst vor einem Ausschluss, vor dem Verlust 
meiner politischen Heimat.  Wir warn, 30. 
25 See Karl Schlögel’s regrets about the lack of a new political homeland in 
his account of leaving the KPD.  Karl Schlögel, “Was ich einem Linken über die 
Auflösung der KPD sagen würde,” in Partei kaputt.  Das Scheitern der KPD und die 
Krise der Linken (Berlin: Olle and Wolter, 1981), 27. 
26 …politisch… war einfach keine Alternative da.  Ich hätte nicht gewusst, 
wohin sonst.  Die Alternative zu “aus der KPD raus” war “nichts mehr machen.”  
Und vor diesem “nichts mehr machen” bin ich eben zurückgeschreckt, weil ich 
diesen moralischen Anspruch hatte, ein politischer Mensh, ein Kommunist zu 
sein.  Wir warn, 122. 
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involvement, while holding out the potential of a successful end to their quest for 
power.  The AL provided the new political homeland for these radical leftists. 
 The contributors to Wir warn die stärkste der Partein give another 
interesting hint regarding another role that the AL played for veterans of the K-
groups.  According to contemporary accounts of experiences in the K-groups, 
cell leaders used tired language consisting of catchphrases and clichés.  One 
author notes that this pattern of speech, which sounded to them like the rote 
recitation of texts and a slavish imitation of prominent leaders’ phrases, made its 
way into the everyday language of the group and into its political propaganda.  
Members variously termed this a “language code” and a “deformation of 
language.”27  The problem was that this jargon was incomprehensible to 
outsiders, thus limiting the appeal of the K-groups.28  As well as providing K-
group veterans with a new political homeland left of the SPD, the AL’s 
environmental component gave them a new vocabulary to replace the worn-out 
language used by the cadre, and the increasing concern for issues of ecology and 
environmental protection enriched the lexicon of political protest and 
involvement.  It certainly gave activists new ammunition in the struggle against 
the Western Allies: on numerous occasions, AL members used environmental 
impacts of the military presence, especially noise and the felling of trees to 
construct firing ranges and landing fields, as arguments with which to criticize 
                                                 
27 Sprachcode; Sprachdeformation. 
28 Wir warn, 54-56. 
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the Allies.  The new ecology paradigm was flexible enough to lend itself to use in 
this way.29 
Finally, work in the K-groups tied up a lot of political potential.  Once this 
involvement was over, individuals had a chance to turn their energies into 
something positive.  As one K-group veteran wrote, “The constant pressure to 
produce political results was gone- this set free a lot of positive energy.”30  In 
West Berlin, much of this energy was applied to creating and working within the 
AL. 
 While the KPD-Rote Fahne and the other K-groups were losing members 
and generally declining in influence, other developments were underway in 
which the K-groups participated but that would eventually render them 
irrelevant.  In January 1978, citizens’ initiatives and voters’ leagues held a series 
of meetings where these organizations declared their intention to make more of 
an impact on political decisions.  They adopted as a model the Wählergemeinschaft 
unabhängiger Bürger Zehlendorf (Voter’s League of Independent Citizens 
Zehlendorf- WUB), an organization active since 1975 in Zehlendorf, a solidly 
middle-class neighborhood in West Berlin near Dahlem, the home of the Free 
                                                 
29 Historians [see Görtemaker, Geschichte] have only recently noted how 
the relative vagueness of the term “ecology” helped disparate groups find 
common ground for cooperation.  The history of the AL is a textbook example of 
this phenomenon.  See below for a more detailed examination of the role of 
ecology in holding the AL together. 
30 Der ständige Druck, politische Leistung zu erbringen, war weg, dass 
machte viel positive Energie frei.  Wir warn, 33. 
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University.  Around the same time, a meeting was held between environmental 
and tenants’ groups as well as groups from the organized political Left in Berlin, 
including the Sozialistisches Büro, the Kommunistisches Büro, and the KPD-Rote 
Fahne.  Attendees here, too, declared their intention to run in the upcoming 
elections, at least at the local level.31  
 Further discussions centered around Otto Schily and Christian Ströbele, 
two attorneys famous for their roles as defenders of RAF members.  In the 
context of these discussions, Schily set down some of his thoughts regarding 
what the role of an “alternative ballot” should be and what it might hope to 
achieve: “Even if an alternative ballot would achieve nothing more than 
supplying prompt and comprehensive information to the public regarding 
certain plans of the Senate… that would be a political benefit not to be 
underestimated.”32  Furthermore, Schily speculated, “It is not out of the question 
that an Alternative Ballot may be used in part: a), to keep tabs on decisions of the 
                                                 
31 Burkhard Schaper, “Die Entstehungsgeschichte der AL,” in Die 
Alternative Liste Berlin.  Entstehung, Entwicklung, Positionen, ed. Michael 
Bühnemann, Michael Wendt, and Jürgen Wituschek (Berlin: LitPol, 1984), 55. 
32 Selbst wenn eine Alternative Liste nicht mehr erreichen würde, als eine 
rechtzeitige und umfassende Information der Öffentlichkeit über bestimmte 
Vorhaben der Senatsverwaltung…, wäre das ein nicht gering zu schätzender 
politischer Gewinn.  Otto Schily, “Überlegungen zu einer Beteiligung an der 
Abgeordnetenhauswahl im Frühjahr 1979 mit einer ‘Bunten/ Grünen/ 
Alternativen... Liste,” Document 1 in Die Alternative Liste Berlin.  Entstehung, 
Entwicklung, Positionen, ed. Michael Bühnemann, Michael Wendt, and Jürgen 
Wituschek (Berlin: LitPol, 1984), 69. 
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Senate and to influence these decisions, and b), to promote initiatives that reflect 
the political ideals of the AL by providing them with money and information.”33   
 As tentative and qualified as Schily’s words were, they exceeded the 
parliamentary expectations of the majority of those who would work in the AL in 
its early phase, and Schily’s initial decision not to work within the AL as a result 
of its failure to distance itself from communist groups meant that the AL was 
deprived of Schily’s thoughts regarding what could be achieved in parliament 
for several years.  His words later in the same address were more typical in 
characterizing subsequent developments: “Participation in the election and 
possible parliamentary work of an alternative ballot cannot and should not 
replace the work of citizens’ initiatives.  On the contrary: an alternative ballot is 
dependent on the cooperation and close ties with the citizens’ initiatives and 
other groups.”34  Overall, Schily’s ideas epitomized the Left’s view of parliaments 
as a source of information and an early warning system for the citizen’s 
                                                 
33 Ausserdem ist die Erwartung nicht völlig wirklichkeitsfern, es sei 
möglich, über eine Alternative Liste im Abgeordnetenhaus wenigstens 
ansatzweise 
a) eine Kontrolle über Entscheidungen der Senatsverwaltung auszuüben 
und auf diese Entscheidungen Einfluss zu nehmen, 
b) Initiativen, die den politischen Zielvorstellungen der Alternativen 
Liste entsprechen, durch finanzielle Zuwendungen und Informationen zu 
fördern.  Schily, “Überlegungen,” 69. 
34 Die Wahlbeteiligung und eine eventuelle Parlamentsarbeit einer 
Alternativen Liste kann und soll die Arbeit in Bürgerinitiativen nicht ersetzen.  
Im Gegenteil: Eine Alternative Liste ist auf die Zusammenarbeit und enge 
Verbindung mit den Bürgerinitiativen und anderen Gruppierungen angewiesen.  
Schily, “Überlegungen,” 69. 
 
 144
initiatives about pending projects.  This perspective would continue within the 
AL.  His words at this juncture also revealed and reflected a certain degree of 
rather typical cynicism regarding parliaments: he maintained that the struggles 
carried out in parliament were merely illusory, and asserted that the real 
decisions were made outside of parliament.  The AL could expose this illusion, 
thus winning leverage over the decision-making process.35  This bears a strong 
resemblance to the arguments made by the KPD-Rote Fahne asserting that, once 
in parliament, a genuine opposition party could reveal parliament’s 
contradictions and thus effect (presumably revolutionary) changes.36 
The extent of ideological and personnel overlap between the AL and the 
K-groups begs the question as to the degree of their influence.  Scholars of 
political parties in Germany have in the past been less than clear regarding the 
role of the K-groups in the founding and development of the AL.  The few 
authors examining the AL have noted in passing the presence of members of the 
K-groups within the party.  According to Gerd Langguth, the KBW expanded the 
ranks of the AL as the KBW declined, and he notes that the German Office for the 
Protection of the Constitution estimated that the KPD-Rote Fahne provided 
about one-fourth of the AL’s members at the time of its founding.37  Robert 
                                                 
35 Schily, “Überlegungen,” 70. 
36 See above, Chapter 3. 
37 Gerd Langguth, Protestbewegung: Entwicklung, Niedergang, Renaissance.  
Die Neue Linke Seit 1968 (Cologne: Wissenschaft und Politik, 1983), 264. 
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Hofmann writes only that Maoists dominated the AL.38 Jürgen Bacia emphasizes 
that the KPD-Rote Fahne played an important role in the AL, more so than in any 
other Green Party affiliate.39  Joachim Raschke asserts that the AL emerged from 
the collapse of the K-groups and the KPD-Rote Fahne’s self-dissolution in 1980, 
and describes in a footnote the surprise expressed by some members of the AL 
that the KPD-Rote Fahne did not swallow up the AL, but that the opposite 
occurred instead.  He also mentions the claim by the German Right that the 
Greens were infiltrated by the K-groups.40   
In fact, the K-groups are more important to understanding the AL than 
has been appreciated in the past.  Ernst Hoplitschek, a cofounder of the AL and 
its press spokesperson in the mid-1980s, noted in a recent interview the critical 
importance of the KPD-Rote Fahne in founding the AL: “The AL marked the end 
of the political sects of the seventies.  But without the old, classical left blocs of 
those years, without the programmatic, personnel, and organizational 
framework of the Maoist KPD, self-critically speaking, the AL would not have 
existed.”41  
                                                 
38 Hofmann, Geschichte, 282-283. 
39 Bacia, “Kommunistische Partei,” 1819. 
40 Raschke, Die Grünen, 275, 471-480. 
41 Die AL markierte das Ende der politischen Sekten der siebziger Jahre.  
Aber ohne die alten, klassischen linken Blöcke jener Jahre, ohne das 
programmatische, personelle und organisatorische Gerüst der maoistischen 
KPD, das muss man selbstkritisch sagen, hätte es die AL nicht gegeben.  Ernst 
Hoplitschek, “Bei Null anfangen, das wäre die Devise,”  interview by Benedict 
Maria Mülder, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 6 June 2001, Berliner Seiten, 1. 
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Frank Koslowski, another veteran of the AL from the beginning, was even 
more specific regarding the pivotal role played by the KPD-Rote Fahne.  
Koslowski noted: 
Precisely these K-groups all went into the AL, especially the former 
KPD with the leading figures such as Semler and Horlemann….  In 
the founding phase of the AL, they essentially renamed themselves 
overnight.  It was the case that over there, where the Green’s office 
was, there was the League Against Imperialism….  Thus there were 
suddenly very firm green structures there, which actually still 
functioned according to the principles of the K-groups.42 
 
 Indeed, already at this juncture, the strong presence of members of the 
KPD-Rote Fahne posed a serious problem for many interested in the future of the 
AL, Schily included.  These early critics feared a reprise of the situation in 
Hamburg, where a communist group was able to dominate an alternative ballot.  
Groups such as the WUB Zehlendorf proposed the complete exclusion of 
communists in the AL and advocated so-called ‘declarations of incompatibility,’ 
or Unvereinbarkeitsbeschlüsse, with communist groups, while others, including 
Schily, wanted to solve the problem by banning all dual memberships.  A 
meeting in late July 1978 rejected a declaration of incompatibility, and created a 
committee to come up with suggestions for the structure and program for the 
                                                 
42 Eben diese ganzen K-Gruppen alle in die sich gründende AL hinein 
sind, insbesondere die damalige KPD, mit sozusagen den Leitfiguren Semler, 
Horlemann… haben sich de facto in der Gründungsphase der AL von einem Tag 
auf den anderen umbenannt.  Es war so, dass da drüben, war ursprünglich mal 
das grüne Büro vorher, war das der Laden der Liga gegen den Imperialismus….  
Damit waren auch sozusagen plötzlich sehr feste grüne Strukturen da, die 
eigentlich im Anfang noch nach dem K-Gruppen Prinzip funktionierten.  Frank 
Koslowski, conversation with author, 10 July 2001, Berlin-Spandau.  The League 
Against Imperialism was a subgroup of the KPD-Rote Fahne. 
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AL.  Certain citizens’ initiatives remained skeptical, however.  In part, they were 
daunted by the prospect of drafting a comprehensive political platform.  The 
citizens’ initiatives were accustomed to dealing with single, specific issues, and 
they worried that the necessity of setting down a comprehensive political 
program would leave them dependent on individuals with broader political 
experience, thus increasing the risk of being dominated by a communist 
organization.  This was especially important to the WUB Zehlendorf, which 
worried, in their case probably correctly given the demographics of Zehlendorf, 
that any presence of communists in the organization would frighten voters 
away.43 
 On 5 October 1978, the organization was officially founded.  Not 
surprisingly, the role of the communists in the organization became the biggest 
issue at the founding meeting.  A compromise suggested by the KPD-Rote Fahne 
was finally adopted: the measure rejected declarations of incompatibility but 
noted that the AL “is supported by its individual members.  Parties or party-like 
groups…cannot be members or supporters of the AL.”44  Thus dual memberships 
were not prohibited, but parties or party-like organizations could not be part of 
the ballot as a bloc.  This makes sense when one recalls that the AL perceived 
itself initially not as a political party, but as an alternative ballot, as a kind of 
                                                 
43 Schaper, “Entstehungsgeschichte,” 57. 
44 Die AL wird von ihren Mitgliedern getragen.  Parteien oder 
parteiähnliche Gruppen … können nicht Träger oder Mitglieder der AL sein.  
Schaper, “Entstehungsgeschichte,” 58. 
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voter’s league comprised of those disgusted with the established parties and 
intended as an alternative to them.  
 In every respect, the structure and grassroots democratic principles of the 
AL reflected its origins as a gathering of diverse groups with varied political 
views.  Initially, the structure aimed to provide as many groups as possible with 
the feeling that they had a voice within the organization.45  According to one 
account, “all bodies of the AL... were nearly always evaluated from this 
standpoint….”  This was an explicit reaction against the divisiveness of the K-
groups.46  
 The AL consisted of three main bodies: the Mitgliedervollversammlung 
(General Members’ Assembly- MVV), the Delegiertenrat (Council of Delegates- 
DR) and the Geschäftsführender Ausschuss (Executive Committee- GA).  The 
General Members’ Assembly was the highest-ranking organ, and every member 
of the party had a chance to attend and to vote on policy and program and elect 
delegates.  Especially in the early phase of the AL, the Members’ Assemblies 
helped forge compromises between clearly discernible trends within the group.47 
 The Council of Delegates was responsible for decisions between meetings 
of the General Members’ Assembly, and was accountable to it.  The Executive 
                                                 
45 Eventually, structures evolved to try to prevent the dominance of a 
particular political tendency.  See below. 
46 Alle Gremien der AL…wurden fast immer unter diesem Gesichtspunkt 
bewertet.  Bühnemann, Wendt, and Wituschek, Alternative Liste, 88. 
47 Bühnemann, Wendt, and Wituschek, Alternative Liste, 93. 
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Committee had a dual role.  It was the body where those AL members with a 
high degree of public recognition could bring publicity to the AL.  Also, it gave a 
voice to those representing political trends in the AL not receiving seats on the 
Council of Delegates.  This three-pronged structure, while it was unwieldy at 
producing results, played a key role in the earliest phases of the party, when it 
was critical to keep the various political trends and organizations intact and to 
make all participants feel that their needs were represented. 
 The most important grassroots democratic principle of the AL at this 
juncture was the principle of consensus.  This quite anti-democratic provision 
stipulated that no “relevant minorities” could be voted down.48  This related 
directly back to the early history of the AL: as a collection of citizen’s movements 
and unsuccessful political organizations rather than a clearly identifiable party, 
decisions made over the head of a “relevant minority” could result in splitting 
the organization.  “Relevant minority” applied to identifiable political trends 
within the group, rather than representing any specific number.  The Left was 
clearly still haunted by its experiences with division and infighting during the 
1970s, and chose this unwieldy strategy as a means of preventing further 
fragmentation.  It could also be interpreted as a way for the KPD-Rote Fahne, still 
numerically a minority though the largest bloc within the AL, comprising 
                                                 
48 Relevante Minderheiten.  Bühnemann, Wendt, and Wituschek, 
Alternative Liste, 90-91. 
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somewhat less than one-third of the members, to hold a disproportionate degree 
of influence. 
 Immediately after those attending the founding meeting rejected the 
Declarations of Incompatibility, prominent groups and individuals involved in 
the formation of the AL announced they would not join.  Otto Schily and the 
WUB Zehlendorf created a public sensation by withdrawing their support for the 
organization on the same night that the AL was officially created.  Schily 
expressed his frustration shortly thereafter, linking his decision directly to the 
role of the KPD-Rote Fahne: “That the founding meeting of the AL on 5 October 
1978 did not even produce a resolution that the AL differs in structure and 
program from the KPD is an unmistakable warning signal that the AL will 
become a failure.  For without distinguishing itself from the KPD, the AL will not 
receive any support from the numerous citizens’ initiatives.”49  
 Other organizations cited different reasons for not getting involved.  For 
example, the BI Westtangente (Citizens’ Initiative West Tangent), formed to 
oppose the construction of a highway in the northwest part of Berlin, viewed 
                                                 
49 Dass die Gründungsversammlung der AL am 5. Oktober 1978 nicht 
einmal eine Entschliessung zustandegebracht hat, die feststellt (Antrag Roland 
Vogt), dass sich die AL in Struktur und Programm von der KPD unterscheidet, 
ist ein unüberhörbares Warnsignal, dass die AL zu einem Misserfolg wird.  Denn 
ohne Abgrenzung von der KPD wird die AL keine Unterstützung von den 
zahlreichen Bürgerinitiativen erhalten.  Otto Schily, “Alternative Liste mit oder 
ohne KPD,” Document 5 in Die Alternative Liste Berlin.  Entstehung, Entwicklung, 
Positionen, ed. Michael Bühnemann, Michael Wendt, and Jürgen Wituschek 
(Berlin: LitPol, 1984), 78. 
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parliamentary work as incompatible with the very principle of citizen’s 
initiatives: 
When we say that we must enter the parliaments in order then to 
‘do it better,’ we are saying that the problem lies with the 
parliamentarians, and not with their roles in a bogged-down 
system.  Citizens’ initiatives not only originated out of a conflict 
with parliamentarianism, but due to the lack of success using 
parliamentary means [they] have from the beginning clearly been 
active in the extraparliamentary realm.  With our participation, the 
ineffectiveness of the parliaments, especially of the district 
parliaments vis a vis the central administration, can only be hushed 
up, not done away with.50   
 
Furthermore, the BI Westtangente disagreed with the assumption that parliaments 
could be used to gather information: 
Participation in the parliaments would not change the structure of 
decision-making.  Because we, too, constantly experienced the 
powerlessness of the parliaments during our citizens’ initiative 
work, it is for us a contradiction to seek parliamentary seats now.  
We also hold that it is a delusion to conclude that participation in 
parliaments can provide more access to information.  Not the 
parliaments, but rather the government administrations are the 
bearers of information, and it is in the administrations where most 
of the politically relevant decisions are made.51  
                                                 
50 Wenn wir meinen, dass wir in die Parlamente müssen, um es dann 
‘besser zu machen,’ sprechen wir damit aus, dass es an den Parlamentarien liegt, 
nicht aber an deren Rollen in einem festgefahrenen System.  Bürgerinitiativen 
sind nicht nur im Konflikt zum Parlamentarismus entstanden, sondern haben 
sich wegen der Erfolglosigkeit parlamentarischer Wege von Anfang an deutlich 
im ausserparlamentarischen Bereich bewegt.  Die Wirkungslosigkeit der 
Parlamente, besonders der Bezirksparlamente gegenüber den zentralen 
Verwaltungen können wir mit unserer Mitarbeit nur vertuschen, aber nicht 
aufheben.  “Diskussionspapier der Bürgerinitiative Westtangente,” Document 4 
in Die Alternative Liste Berlin.  Entstehung, Entwicklung, Positionen, ed. Michael 
Bühnemann, Michael Wendt, and Jürgen Wituschek (Berlin: LitPol, 1984), 75. 
51 Eine Mitarbeit in den Parlamenten würde die Struktur, wie 




 With the public withdrawal of prominent supporters of the AL, the AL 
went into the 1979 elections substantially weakened.  To the surprise of many, 
however, ‘Project AL’ did not collapse, but was actually sustained by the very 
group many perceived as being responsible for the AL’s early difficulties.  The 
KPD-Rote Fahne played an important role in continuing to hold the AL together.  
The energy and commitment of its members as well as their political experience 
helped keep the AL afloat during the next several years. 
 A song written shortly after the AL’s creation reveals much about the 
plans the AL held for parliamentary participation.  Interestingly, the song began 
by gloating over the fact that the AL was “permitted.”52  Asking what the AL 
wanted from parliamentary participation, the text continued:  “Posing questions 
openly, always probing, getting all the info for the extraparliamentary struggle, 
for it must win!”53 
                                                                                                                                                 
der Parlamente während unserer Bürgerinitiativenarbeit ständig erfahren haben, 
ist es für uns ein Widerspruch, nun nach Parlamentssitzen zu streben.  Wir 
meinen auch, dass es ein Trugschluss ist, durch die Mitwirkung in den 
Parlamenten mehr Informationen nach aussen tragen zu können.  Nicht die 
Parlamente, sondern die Verwaltungen sind die wesentlichen 
Informationsträger, und in den Verwaltungen findet auch der grösste Teil der 
politisch relevanten Entscheidungen statt.  “Diskussionspapier der BI 
Westtangente,” 75. 
52 Zugelassen. 
53 Fragen öffentlich stellen, ständig bohren, alle Infos kriegen für den 
ausserparlamentarischen Kampf, denn der muss siegen!  “Gemeinsam in der 
Alternativen Liste,” song lyrics.  Archiv Papier Tiger (APT): AL bis 1983. 
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 Looking at the platform drafted for the 1979 West Berlin elections reveals 
much about the state of the AL at the time, and gives numerous insights into the 
AL’s early views regarding parliamentary democracy.  In the preamble, the AL 
introduced itself to potential voters for the first time.  Judging from this self-
portrait, it is clear that the AL defined itself almost entirely negatively.  The first 
section provided general information about the various groups comprising the 
organization and their reasons for coming together:  
 We are an amalgamation of members of citizens’ initiatives, 
unions, factory and personnel councils, women’s groups, tenant 
and youth groups, democratic committees, student groups, 
grassroots initiatives and many who are tired of the fact that in our 
country, policies are made according to the economic interest of a 
determining minority.  We are taking part in the elections in order 
to give all those who see that the established parties CDU, SPD, and 
FDP do not or no longer represent their interests the chance to 
support their demands for a fundamental alternative with their 
vote as well.  The AL is independent of parties and party-like 
organizations.  We strive for a new form of citizen participation in 
political and parliamentary planning and decision-making 
processes.  Self-determination and grassroots democratic structures 
are obligatory for the way in which decisions are made in the AL.  
The parties of City Hall are neither willing nor able to represent our 
interests.54 
                                                 
54 Wir sind ein Zusammenschluss von Mitgliedern aus Bürgerinitiativen, 
Gewerkschaften, Betriebs- und Personalräten, Frauengruppen, Mieter- und 
Jugendgruppen, demokratischen Kommitees, Studentengruppen, Basisinitiativen 
und vielen, die es leid sind, dass in unserem Land Politik nach den 
wirtschaftlichen Interessen einer bestimmenden Mehrheit gemacht wird.  Wir 
beteiligen uns an den Wahlen, um all denen, die ihre Interessen von den 
etablierten Parteien CDU, SPD und FDP nicht oder nicht mehr vertreten sehen, 
die Möglichkeit zu geben, ihre Forderungen nach einer grundsätzlichen 
Alternative auch durch ihre Wählerstimme zu unterstützen.  Die Alternative 
Liste ist eigenständig gegenüber Parteien und parteiähnliche Organisationen.  
Wir streben eine neue Form der Beteiligung der Bürger an politischen und 
parlamentarischen Planungs- und Entscheidungsprozessen an.  




The AL emphasized in its program that it tried to encourage a culture of 
debate and discussion.  Anyone could speak at assemblies, make proposals, or 
propose initiatives, whether or not they were members: “Everyone who wants to 
work to promote democracy and environmental protection and to improve 
working and living conditions can and should work with us, whether organized 
or independent, independently from his world view.  There are no declarations 
of incompatibility.”55  This tolerance had its limits, as the program asserted, 
“Those who promote fascist and neofascist world views have no place with us, 
however.”56 
 The rest of the lengthy ‘self-description’ provides a textbook example of 
negative definition.  This is not surprising, given the AL’s nature as an 
organization with quite diverse groups of constituent organizations and 
affiliations as yet untried in governing and unable to point to any record of 
achievements.  Indeed, it perfectly reflected the one commonality of all of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
der Alternativen Liste Entscheidungen getrofffen werden, verbindlich.  Die 
Rathausparteien sind weder willens noch im Stande, unsere Interessen zu vertreten.  
Programm zu den Wahlen im März 1979 (Berlin: Alternative Liste, n.d.), 1.  
Emphasis in the original. 
55 Jeder kann und soll mitarbeiten, unabhängig von seiner 
Weltanschauung, ob organisiert oder unorganisiert, der sich für Demokratie und 
Umweltschutz und die Verbesserung der Arbeits- und Lebensbedingungen 
einsetzen will.  Es gibt keine Unvereinbarkeitsbeschlüsse.  Wahlprogramm 1979, 2. 
56 Befürworter faschistischer und neofaschistischer Weltanschauung haben 
bei uns jedoch keinen Platz.  Wahlprogramm 1979, 2. 
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constituent organizations: opposition to the so-called established parties and 
their policies. 
 The self-description listed at length the group’s criticisms of West Berlin’s 
major parties.  Many of these grievances involved a perceived decline of 
democratic rights: the established parties spoke of freedom of opinion, yet they 
had defamed critical voices and increased press censorship.  They spoke of 
“more democracy” but had increased exclusions from civil service careers as a 
result of political beliefs.57  Moreover, the AL viewed this perceived decay of 
basic rights through the prism of German history: “The dark and bloody chapter 
of German fascism, only one generation removed, obliges us to the utmost 
watchfulness in the face of attacks on democratic freedoms.”58  But the program 
also attacked the environmental policies of the established parties from the 
beginning, thus reflecting the twin concerns of democracy and environmental 
protection enshrined in the AL’s full name.  The program condemned the 
established parties for talking of environmental protection while they 
constructed new power plants and permitted the poisoning of water and air.  
                                                 
57 Mehr Demokratie.  Wahlprogramm 1979, 1. 
58 Das düstere und blutige Kapitel des deutschen Faschismus, das erst eine 
Generation zurückliegt, verpflichtet uns zu äusserster Wachsamkeit gegenüber 
Angriffen auf die demokratischen Freiheiten.  Wahlprogramm 1979, 1. 
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The AL’s solution reflected its Marxist roots: “The use of nature may not be 
directed according to the profits of a ruling minority.”59   
 Only later in the program did the AL set down its goals and expectations 
clearly, in the process revealing its view of parliaments as institutions to be 
exploited: 
We have no illusions about the meaning of parliamentary elections, 
especially under the current circumstances.  The goal of our 
parliamentary work is to use motions, criticism, and inquiries to 
force the Senate to take a position, thus making it harder to deceive 
voters….  In this sense we will use our work in parliament so that 
democratic rights will not be further restricted, but will be 
broadened.  Real improvements can be achieved only through our 
activities outside of parliament.  This will also be the case in the 
future.60 
 
 The AL’s 1979 electoral program may have defined the AL in opposition 
to the established parties and their politics.  But the program also contained 
specific and positive programmatic demands, though these often closely 
resembled a grab bag of diverse points rather than a coherent and unified 
program.  The platform itself focused on several main areas: policies relating to 
                                                 
59 Die Nutzung der Natur darf sich nicht nach den Profiten einer 
herrschenden Minderheit richten.  Wahlprogramm 1979, 1. 
60 Wir machen uns keine Illusionen über die Bedeutung von 
Parlamentswahlen, zumal unter den gegenwärtigen Verhältnissen.  Das Ziel 
unserer Parlamentsarbeit ist es, durch Anträge, Kritik und Anfragen den Senat 
zu zwingen, Stellung zu nehmen, und so zu erreichen, dass der Betrug am 
Wähler schwieriger wird.  In diesem Sinne werden wir unsere Arbeit im 
Parlament so nutzen, dass die demokratischen Rechte nicht weiter eingeschränkt, 
sondern erweitert werden. Wirkliche Verbesserungen können wir nur durch 
unsere Aktivitäten ausserhalb des Parlaments erreichen.  Dies wird auch in 
Zukunft so sein.  Wahlprogramm 1979, 2.  Emphasis in the original. 
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Berlin; the decline of democratic rights; nature and environmental protection; 
nuclear power; energy policy; jobs and working conditions; the situation of 
women; housing; transportation; culture; sport; children and youth; universities; 
foreigners; aging and senior citizens; and general health issues.   
 The primary position of and the amount of space devoted to policies 
regarding Berlin indicate the degree of importance assigned by the AL to this 
issue.  In a two-pronged central message, the program insisted that the current 
situation of Berlin must be recognized and accepted as reality, like it or not.  But 
that recognition did not require that the AL be satisfied with the status quo over 
the long term.  Indeed, “Berlin’s special situation should continually inspire us to 
develop ideas for a peace policy in Europe that opens solutions to these 
questions that serve the interests of the peoples of Europe and that open a 
genuine perspective for the future in Berlin.”61 To achieve this, the AL advocated 
expanding economic relations between West Berlin and the Federal Republic, the 
GDR, the European Union, COMECON, and the Third World.  In order not to 
endanger peaceful developments in West Berlin, the West Berlin government 
and the Western Allies should avoid certain provocations.  These included what 
the AL viewed as excessive emphasis on the political connections to the Federal 
Republic, as well as military parades and troop maneuvers.  The program also 
                                                 
61 Die besondere Lage Berlins sollte uns immer wieder inspirieren, Ideen 
für eine Friedenspolitik in Europa zu entwickeln, die der Lösung dieser Fragen 
im Interesse der Völker Europas dient und für Berlin eine wirkliche 
Zukunftsperspektive eröffnet.  Wahlprogramm 1979, 3. 
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criticized the lack of rights held by Berliners when it came to conflicts with the 
occupying forces, mentioning specifically the construction of apartments for the 
families of United States personnel on the Düppeler Field and the right of the 
Allies to forbid political demonstrations.62  Significantly, the AL also emphasized 
that it would condemn with equal fervor political repression and a lack of 
democratic rights wherever they were found.  It specifically extended this to the 
GDR, stating that it viewed it as its duty to support the democratic and socialist 
opposition there and to be the advocates of all people who claimed the right of 
free expression of opinion.  The AL also called for improvements in the issuing of 
visas and general travel conditions, including allowing GDR citizens to travel to 
the West.63 
 Regarding policies toward Berlin, however, the AL defined itself again in 
opposition to the so-called established parties.  The points receiving the most 
emphasis- they are printed in bold in the program text- involved the visions of 
the established political parties for Berlin.  The program attacked these parties’ 
plans to make West Berlin into a center for conventions, service, culture, and 
entertainment.  In an act akin to treason in the eyes of many Berliners, the AL 
explicitly opposed the Law for the Promotion of Berlin, “because this state tax 
policy measure has the populace paying additional profits to industry, and it is 
                                                 
62 Wahlprogramm 1979, 3. 
63 Wahlprogramm 1979, 3. 
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the foundation of legal tax evasion.”64  Furthermore, the AL noted that it opposed 
any attempts to make West Berlin the site of armaments construction or nuclear 
facilities.65 
 The AL ‘s electoral program for 1979 contained a large section on the 
decline of democratic rights, and a number of the issues important to the New 
Left appeared under this rubric.  The platform asserted that the West German 
government had used the fight against terrorists to justify undermining 
democratic rights.  Taking up a key grievance of the New Left, the program 
demanded an end to the practice of excluding individuals from the civil service 
due to their political leanings, as well as the government’s “snooping around in 
order to find out people’s political leanings.”66  In fact, the style of this part of the 
program suddenly becomes reminiscent of the electoral programs of the KPD-
Rote Fahne, with its lengthy lists of slogans better lending themselves to being 
shouted shrilly than being rendered into print.  
 The brief section on environmental protection is in many ways telling.  In 
part, this reflected the concerns of an urban environment, where conventional 
theories of ecosystems would have had little relevance.  In addition, however, 
the section’s brevity is indicative of the lack of genuine commitment to this issue 
                                                 
64 Berlinförderungsgesetz; weil dieses Mittel staatlicher Steuerpolitik die 
Bevölkerung zusätzliche Profite an die Konzerne zahlen lässt und die Grundlage 
legaler Steuerhinterziehung ist.  Wahlprogramm 1979, 3. 
65 Wahlprogramm 1979, 3. 
66 Gesinnungsschnüffelei.  Wahlprogramm 1979, 4. 
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at this stage, and is symptomatic of the AL’s attempt to harness environmental 
concerns as a way of gaining votes without quite knowing what it was getting 
into.  Only over time did the AL flesh out its environmental program, and the 
group was able to attract top experts in environmental policy. 
 First, the program distinguished between environmental protection and 
the protection of nature.  “Environmental protection” as used in the platform 
applies more to the level of ecosystems, whereas the drafters of the program 
used the term “protection of nature” to refer to the specific conditions pertaining 
in West Berlin- an unusual distinction to make given the AL’s full name.  Laying 
out the AL’s views of urban ecology, the program stated: “From our 
fundamental beliefs it follows that the protection of nature has its place not only 
in remote natural landscapes, but also and especially there where numerous 
people live and work- in the large city.”67 In the island city of West Berlin, special 
conditions applied- the urban landscape, characterized by vacant lots, unused 
rail beds, canals, and thickets, contained numerous, diverse areas of a nature that 
was unshaped.  Children seemed instinctively to seek out such untamed spaces: 
in a passage evocative of the Wandervogel, the platform described these spots: “If 
possible, [children] play there where plants and animals are left to themselves.”68  
                                                 
67 Aus unserer Grundeinstellung folgt, dass Naturschutz nicht nur in 
entlegenen naturnahen Landschaften, sondern auch und gerade da, wo 
zahlreiche Menschen leben und arbeiten- in der Grossstadt-, seinen Platz hat.  
Wahlprogramm 1979, 6. 
68 Wenn möglich, spielen sie dort, wo Pflanzen und Tiere sich selbst 
überlassen sind.  Wahlprogramm 1979, 6. 
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These bastions of biological anarchy were threatened with destruction or, worse 
still from the perspective of the AL, a kind of “artificial greening” by the state or 
by construction firms, a process of urban homogenization with not very subtle 
fascist overtones.69  In fact, the AL cast its ideas of nature protection in a kind of 
anti-fascist framework: “We place the individual development of nature 
adapting to itself against the will to order of the authorities, to whom every wild 
growth of plant is a thorn in their side.”70 
 The section of the platform opposing nuclear energy is also revealing.  The 
objections here were two-fold, and related directly to the two primary concerns 
given in the AL’s full name.  The platform attacked nuclear power for being 
environmentally damaging and unsustainable, as well as for being intimately 
tied to the much-feared police state.  To bolster this claim, the AL pointed to the 
enormous police presence needed to secure nuclear power plants and to protect 
the transportation of waste materials.  Instead of nuclear power, the AL 
advocated exploring alternatives such as solar power and energy efficient 
technologies.71 
 The electoral program also included an extensive section regarding the 
situation of women in West Berlin, accusing the established parties of only 
                                                 
69 Begrünung.  Wahlprogramm 1979, 6. 
70 Gegen den Ordnungswillen der Behörden, denen z.B. jeder Wildwuchs 
von Pflanzen  ein Dorn im Auge ist, stellen wir die Entwicklung der sich selbst 
anpassenden Natur.  Wahlprogramm 1979, 6. 
71 Wahlprogramm 1979, 9. 
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discovering women’s issues during the election campaign and ignoring their 
concerns the rest of the time.  As in the program of the KPD-Rote Fahne, the 
electoral platform demanded that Section 218 of the West German penal code 
limiting women’s rights to an abortion be stricken, arguing that existing laws 
restricted women’s self-determination.  Interestingly for a party that seemed at 
that time to disapprove of just about everything American, the AL cited 
comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation passed in Great Britain and the 
United States as exemplary.72 
 The 1979 program addressed issues important to the housing squatters, 
although the elections were held before the squatters’ movement reached its 
peak.73  Nevertheless, already at this point the AL established itself as a leader on 
this issue, criticizing the established parties for perpetuating West Berlin’s acute 
housing shortage and letting older buildings decay until they could be replaced 
by unaffordable luxury apartments that were far more profitable for landlords.  
They condemned the decisions and past practices of the established parties for 
focusing on profits rather than on the need for affordable housing.74 
 In the area of transportation, the AL was able to present a number of 
specific proposals, aiming to lessen dependence on automobiles and make 
alternatives such as walking, bicycling but above all public transportation more 
                                                 
72 Wahlprogramm 1979, 13. 




appealing by making them safer, faster, more affordable, and generally more 
pleasant.  Two things are worth noting here.  First, the program asserted that, 
whereas before World War II, Berlin had had an exemplary public transportation 
system, after the war city planners attempted to make the American Dream of an 
automobile-oriented city a reality, and made decisions accordingly.  Second, 
however, rather than advocating an anti-modern (because anti-car) system, the 
AL promoted solutions relying heavily on technology, including modern trains 
and subways, more frequent buses operating in conjunction with specially-timed 
traffic signals, and better conditions for pedestrians and bicyclists through 
engineering solutions such as extended lights and safer overpasses.  The AL was 
able to develop this part of its program so fully and specifically as a result of its 
cooperation with citizens’ groups.  The section on transportation concluded: “We 
relied on the results of the work of citizens’ initiatives in developing this part of 
the program, and we see our future in cooperation with them!”75 
 After examining the program of the AL, especially in comparison to the 
program of the KPD-Rote Fahne, one thing stands out clearly- there is virtually 
no trace of the language of class struggle, Marxism, or revolution that permeated 
the KPD-Rote Fahne’s program nearly to the point of driving out specific 
programmatic demands.  In fact, in this regard, the AL’s program is nearly the 
                                                                                                                                                 
74 Wahlprogramm 1979, 16. 
75 Wir haben uns bei der Ausarbeitung dieses Programmteils auf die 
Arbeitsergebnisse der Bürgerinitiativen gestützt und sehe unsere weitere 
Perspektive in Zusammenarbeit mit ihnen!  Wahlprogramm 1979, 17. 
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opposite of that of the KPD-Rote Fahne.  The KPD-Rote Fahne’s program and 
action program consisted mainly of the rhetoric of class revolution, with the 
obvious implication that all would be well once the proletariat overthrew the 
bourgeoisie.  Until then, parliaments should be used to attack the established 
parties and preach the gospel of proletarian revolution.  By contrast, the AL’s 
program consisted of virtually no rhetoric of class struggle, and provides 
evidence of a clear shift in the thinking of the Left away from working to 
overthrow the old order, parliaments and all, and toward a reformist approach 
that made its partial peace with the current system, concentrating on improving 
it rather than overthrowing it.  Underlying the program, however, the anti-
capitalism of the Left continued.  The ecological paradigm merely provided the 
Left with new ways to criticize capitalism.  Overall, as the 1979 election program 
reveals, the AL was in the first stage of its gradual transition to a parliamentary 
party as the March 1979 election approached. 
 Economic malaise in West Berlin, increasing conflicts in certain sections of 
the city with foreign workers, and housing shortages provided the domestic 
backdrop for this West Berlin election.  In terms of international relations, shortly 
before the election, Schmidt responded to increased threats posed by Soviet 
nuclear arms via the two-track policy.  This laid out a course preparing for the 
stationing of modernized medium-range United States nuclear missiles while at 
the same time trying to negotiate a reduction in the total number of missiles 
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deployed by NATO and the Warsaw Pact nations.76  This was to play a much 
more important role in the 1981 election, and the issue was not mentioned in the 
AL’s 1979 political program.  
 A song written for the AL’s 1979 campaign revealed the mood within the 
organization just before the 1979 election.77  Largely targeting the other parties, 
the lyrics expressed dissatisfaction with representative politics in general and 
their consequences for West Berlin in particular.  The refrain left no doubt that 
the AL was above all a party of protest: “We won’t elect the Socialists, the 
Liberals, the CDU!!!  Alternative, that’s the name of our ballot, the others won’t 
get our vote!!”78  The song was consistent with the programmatic demands of the 
AL, emphasizing disillusionment with the political system, and singling out the 
dangers of nuclear power, the problems of environmental destruction, and the 
consequences of sex discrimination.  Overall, the song called for groups feeling 
disenfranchised and disillusioned to take their own fate in their hands by 
supporting the AL at the polls: in the last verse, the lyrics noted, “We won’t leave 
it up to others any longer.”79 
                                                 
76 Nicholls, Bonn Republic, 265. 
77 “Solidaritätslied für die Alternative-Liste in Berlin,” song lyrics.  APT: 
AL bis 1983. 
78 Die Sozialen, die Liberalen, die CDU wählen wir nicht!!!  Alternative, so 
heisst unsere Liste, die Ander’n kriegen unsere Stimme nicht! 
79 Überlassen woll’n wir’s nicht mehr Ander’n. 
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 The AL performed better in the March 1979 elections than most people 
had expected, especially given its recent appearance on the political scene.  The 
slightly less than forty-eight thousand votes it received put the AL somewhat 
short of the 5 percent needed to make it into the West Berlin Parliament, but the 
AL did win a total of ten seats in four of West Berlin’s twelve district assemblies.   
 The mass-circulation daily BILD, one of Axel Springer’s numerous 
tabloids, called the success of the AL the “biggest surprise” of the election.80  At 
least for BILD’s editors, the AL did come out of nowhere: the AL’s founding in 
1978 went uncommented in BILD, and articles in the 8 March 1979 issue on the 
upcoming elections making predictions regarding their outcome did not mention 
the AL.  Now that the AL had suddenly appeared on the electoral scene, BILD’s 
reaction was surprisingly objective and accurate, if typically superficial: it 
described the AL as a collection of citizens’ initiatives and Maoist communists, 
and emphasized the role of the AL in helping bring about a devastating loss for 
the Moscow-loyal Socialist Unity Party of West Berlin.81  The Tageszeitung, or 
TAZ, at the opposite end of the political spectrum, focused on the upcoming 
work in the district parliaments and the potential challenge posed by the strong 
presence of the KPD-Rote Fahne in the organization.82  The Tagesspiegel 
concentrated on the implications of the election results for the political system, 
                                                 
80 Grösste Überraschung.  BILD, 19 March 1979. 
81 BILD, 19 March 1979. 
82 TAZ, 22 March 1979, 5. 
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noting that the AL did the best in districts with the worst problems, Kreuzberg, 
Schöneberg, and Tiergarten, where the established parties had little appeal.  The 
article explicitly invoked concerns about the ramifications of this for the 
“established parties,” worrying that the AL’s success meant that the other parties 
were losing their integrative force on the electorate.83  It concluded by invoking 
fears of a return to the Weimar system, drawing comparisons between the 
derogatory phrase “established parties” with the “parties of the system” that 
suffered much scorn under the Weimar system.84  It called on the parties to work 
against this trend.85  The surprisingly good results of the AL attracted national 
coverage in the German weekly Der Spiegel, with a short article emphasizing the 
diversity of the groups cooperating to form the AL.  The article also commented 
on the fact that the AL was proud to work with communist groups to achieve 
parliamentary representation.86 
 In the wake of the electoral “victory” of the AL in the 1979 elections, the 
KPD-Rote Fahne expressed nearly boundless enthusiasm for the newly-formed 
organization.  A party pamphlet hailed the results as the “great success of the 
Alternative Liste: 47,543 votes for democracy and environmental protection,” 
and noted that the results showed that the bourgeois parties had not succeeded 
                                                 
83 Die etablierten Parteien. 
84 Systemparteien. 
85 Tagesspiegel, 20 March 1979, 1. 
86 “Igel am Wall,” Der Spiegel, 26 March 1979, 55. 
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in claiming for themselves concern with environmental degradation.87  This 
shows that the Left was beginning to realize the potential of environmental 
issues as a weapon with which to attack the political establishment.  Even more 
tellingly, however, the KPD-Rote Fahne felt that the results confirmed the AL 
strategy of not limiting the election campaign to matters of environmental 
protection and instead also addressing the defense of democratic rights and 
problems affecting working people.  It also encouraged its members “not to rely 
on the bourgeois parties, but instead to rely on our own strength.”88  
Furthermore, the success “confirms the view of our party that today the common 
struggle of democrats, socialists, protectors of the environment, and communists 
is necessary and possible.”89 Their initial experiment with the parliamentary 
process had proven positive.  Moreover, reaching out to cooperate with other 
groups and in the process abandoning some rhetoric of class revolution and 
adopting a political culture favoring debate and discussion had paid off.  In West 
Berlin, the radical Left had taken a critical next step in changing its attitude 
toward the Western system of parliamentary democracy.  
                                                 
87 Grosser Erfolg der Alternativen Liste.  47543 Stimmen für Demokratie 
und Umweltschutz.  “Grosser Erfolg der Alternativen Liste,” n.d.  AdAPO: 
Ordner KPD Berlin. 
88 … nicht auf die bürgerlichen Parteien, sondern auf die eigene Kraft zu 
vertrauen.  “Grosser Erfolg der AL.” 
89 Der Erfolg der Alternativen Liste, hat die Auffassung unser Partei 
bestätigt das heute der gemeinsame Kampf von Demokraten, Sozialisten, 




 Much of the work between the 1979 and the 1981 elections involved 
searching for common ground and for ways to integrate and unify the diverse 
groups constituting the AL.  Several different factors contributed to this.  One 
was the rise of the ecology paradigm and associated efforts to launch the federal 
Green Party.  The opportunity to help develop the fledgling Green Party made a 
big difference and provided numerous individuals with an incentive to maintain 
their affiliation with the AL, especially early on.  This process will be examined 
in more detail below.   
 The creative use of the green hedgehog as the symbol of the organization 
played an important role in helping the AL’s diverse constituent groups see 
themselves as part of the larger whole.  The hedgehog, which very early on 
became a kind of mascot for the AL, was such a success as a symbol because each 
group could relate to it in some way. The Mitgliederrundbrief featured a cartoon 
with identical hedgehogs bearing diverse symbols of various component groups: 
emblems of the housing squatters, the communists, gay and lesbian 
organizations, pacifists, and the German flag all appeared.  The cartoon bears the 
caption “unity in diversity.”90  Environmentalists saw an appealing but 
endangered animal, threatened by the realities of life in a large city, including 
automobiles and the destruction of remaining wild places that the hedgehogs 
needed for shelter.  The hedgehog was beloved by bourgeois gardeners because 
hedgehogs eat snails and insects that otherwise would devour flowers and 
                                                 
90 “Einheit in der Vielfalt,” MRB 16, 1981. 
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plants.  The quills of the hedgehog were important to those who did not wish to 
appear helpless: pacifists admired the hedgehog because it was peace loving but 
did not lack the ability to defend itself.  This found reflection in Wilhelm Busch’s 
classic poem “Armed Peace,” about a hedgehog that defied a fox’s orders to 
dispose of its quills until the fox disposed of its teeth.  To reinforce this, the poem 
was reprinted in an early issue of the AL’s central publication 
Mitgliederrundbrief.91 
 Another possible source of appeal came from the fact that male and 
female hedgehogs are notoriously difficult to tell apart.  In the German version of 
the ‘Tortoise and the Hare,’ the hero is a hedgehog instead of a tortoise.  The 
story’s punch line comes when the hedgehog’s wife pops up at the finish line 
and, impersonating her husband, tells the incredulous hare, “I’m already here!”92  
To emphasize this aspect of the hedgehog, an early issue of the 
Mitgliederrundbrief reprinted this story.93  On a metaphorical level the hedgehog 
thus became an appeal for equality between the sexes.  The element of trickery 
and deception in the story also probably appealed to those in the AL who saw 
the organization at least in part as a Trojan horse for the infiltration of 
parliament. 
                                                 
91 Wilhelm Busch, “Bewaffneter Friede.”  Reprinted in Mitgliederrundbrief 
(MRB) 6 (1979), 37. 
92 Ick bün all hier. 
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 Furthermore, the stylized hedgehog logo used by the AL was highly 
reminiscent of the sun symbol of the anti-nuclear power movement.  According 
to a founding member of the AL, this was the original reason for the choice of the 
hedgehog.  Initially, however, the hedgehog was supposed to be red, not green.  
In order to be able to distinguish the AL’s symbol from the sun symbol, the 
mascot’s color was altered from red to green.94 
 Humor was also used both to place one’s own past in perspective and to 
keep certain groups in their place, and played an important part in keeping the 
fledgling movement together.  A caricature printed in the third edition of the 
Mitgliederrundbrief helps illustrate this point.  Five men desperately trying to look 
intellectual with their goatees and John Lennon glasses stand in a horse-drawn 
wagon labeled ‘KPD.’  The driver holds a horsewhip and the reins ready, but 
there is no horse, and the wagon stands motionless.  On the rear of the wagon is 
the slogan “forward with the KPD.”  The cartoon was a multifaceted caricature 
of the KPD.  It clearly expressed disappointment about the immobility of the 
party: nothing drew it forward.  Worse still, the leaders neither noticed this nor 
were in a position to do anything about it: they were too busy trying to look as if 
they were in charge.  And the old-fashioned horse-drawn wagon was of course a 
commentary on the dated nature of the party.95 
                                                 
94 Michael Wendt, conversation with author, 16 July 2001, Berlin. 
95 “Vorwärts mit der KPD,” MRB 3, 1979, 15. 
 
 172
 Another, somewhat unsophisticated example of AL members’ making 
light of the KPD’s past (and thus for many their own) comes in the form of a 
poem reprinted in the same edition of the Mitgliederrundbrief: 
The farmer with the tractor 
is spreading manure on the field. 
His son, who studies in the city, 
is reading Mao Zedong. 
 
The farmer, quite stupidly, 
does not know who Mao is. 
He says, “what’s all this about Mao Ze Dung, 
I’ll stick with horse manure.96 
 
 While the AL was in the process of consolidating itself in West Berlin, 
another similar organization was being formed at the national level: the Green 
Party.  The relationship between the AL and the Green Party was to have an 
important effect on the AL.  Here and in the chapters that follow, it will be 
necessary to trace developments in this relationship with a view to 
understanding the AL’s gradual metamorphosis.  The relationship contributed in 
part to the processes of integration, retention, and moderation that helped bring 
the radical German Left into the fold of parliamentary democracy.  Overall, the 
                                                 
96 Der Bauer, mit dem Traktor 
fährt auf den Acker Dung. 
Sein Sohn, der in der Stadt studiert,  
Der liest Mao Tse Tung. 
 
Der Bauer, der sehr dümmlich, 
Weiss nicht, wer Mao ist. 
Er sagt: Was soll Maotse-Dung, 
Ich bleib bei Pferdemist. 
MRB 3 (1979), 4. 
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sometimes bizarre twists in the process through which the AL eventually became 
the Green Party’s sole representative in West Berlin in the long run helped move 
the AL in the direction of a political party embracing the tenets of Western 
parliamentary democracy.   
The AL was by no means identical with the Green Party: in fact the 
founding of the AL predated that of the Green Party by several years, and 
members of the AL participated in the founding process.  Though it cooperated 
with the Green Party, sometimes closely, and was considered by most to be the 
West Berlin branch of the Green Party, it actually did not officially become part 
of the Green Party until 1990, in the wake of the fall of the Berlin Wall, the 
opening of the border with East Germany, and in the course of German 
unification.  This fact helps explain a number of differences between the AL and 
the Green Party.  Joachim Raschke accurately summarizes the relationship 
between the AL and the Green Party by noting, “the AL was different from the 
Green Party in more than name alone, and it was always proud of the 
difference.”97  Nevertheless, the relationship between the AL and the Green Party 
was an important force on the AL that helped integrate the group into the 
parliamentary system. 
The Green Party also played a role in helping to modify the AL’s stance on 
violence.  After all, the Green Party had incorporated nonviolence as one of the 
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four fundamental pillars of its program.  Despite this situation, however, it 
should be made clear at the outset that the relationship between the Green Party 
and the AL was not in itself enough to move the AL to embrace parliamentary 
democracy or even to renounce violence.  Again, this related to the specific 
situation in West Berlin.  West Berlin was the gathering place of some of the most 
radical critics of the West; it was the site of some of the most violent protests in 
postwar Germany, and the shooting of Benno Ohnesorg in 1967 was still fresh in 
the memories of many residents of West Berlin and members of the AL, some of 
whom had witnessed the events first-hand.  From the perspective of the AL, 
nonviolent protest had also recently met with utter failure: as far as the Left was 
concerned, the attempts to stop the clearing of trees for the expansion of Gatow 
Airfield using nonviolent means had been “brutally clubbed down by the 
police.” 98  These two events alone made nonviolence unappealing to the West 
Berlin Left. 
During this critical early stage of the AL’s history, the relationship 
between the AL and the Green Party brought leftists and moderates together, 
and involvement with the founding of the Green Party helped keep the diverse 
wings of the party together, as the various factions cooperated in bringing about 
the birth of the Greens.  Since the creation of the Sonstiger Politischer Verein 
(Miscellaneous Political Union- SPV), the early forerunner of the Green Party 
                                                 




founded in order to contest the 1979 European elections, the AL viewed efforts to 
form an ecology-based party with a mixture of interest and alarm.  At least at 
first, AL members were primarily concerned about the implications for their own 
territory and potential effects on their organization.  From early in the AL’s 
history, some evidence exists that the AL felt threatened by the potential 
founding of a state committee of the Green Party in West Berlin.  At a meeting 
held in November 1979, AL leaders apparently considered advocating that AL 
members join the Greens in order to have the majority in a potential local 
organization.  The AL members would then attend congresses held for the 
purpose of establishing a local Green Party affiliate in order to defeat any 
motions for founding the local affiliate.  Leaders also proposed writing a letter to 
the federal Greens making it clear that the AL would view the founding of a 
West Berlin affiliate as a measure intended to divide the organization.  The 
radical Left’s experiences in the course of the 1970s made it crucial to avoid this 
division.  Giving the rationale behind this suggestion, the minutes of the meeting 
warned against the negative impact of a split between the AL and the Greens in 
West Berlin.  The minutes quote Peter Sellin, an early leader within the AL and 
one of its first parliamentary delegates, as asserting that it was necessary to 
prevent the founding of a Green Party affiliate in West Berlin, reasoning that by 
blocking a local chapter of the Green Party, the AL would benefit.99 
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Not only did the Green Party threaten to split the alternative movement in 
West Berlin, but observers worried it would have the same effect at the national 
level.  A cartoon published in the AL’s membership circular expressed this fear.  
In the cartoon, an overwhelming jumble of posters exhort voters to cast their 
votes for one of more than a dozen green groups.  In the foreground, a voter 
holds his head in disgust.100   
 In late 1979, despite its early reservations, the AL declared its intent to 
participate in the formation of a new political party to run in the 1980 federal 
elections.101  The declaration revealed much about the AL’s motivations in 
working to help found the Green Party.  According to the declaration of intent, 
ten years of the social-liberal coalition at the federal level had resulted in a 
tremendous amount of negative experiences and a great deal of resistance among 
grass-roots movements.  A “progressive alternative” in the federal elections 
should reflect and express this discontent.102  Deciding between the SPD 
moderate Helmut Schmidt or the CSU’s archconservative Franz-Josef Strauss 
would not solve the ecological or economic crisis, or ease the threat of military 
                                                                                                                                                 
document is not certain.  It appears to be part of a packet put together later by 
the rival local chapter of the Green Party assembling evidence of a concerted 
effort on the part of the AL to hinder the founding of that chapter.  My attempts 
to locate another copy elsewhere in the Green Party archive were unsuccessful. 
100 No title, cartoon published in MRB 6 (1979), 36. 
101 “Absichtserklärung der AL, sich für eine eigenständige, fortschrittliche 
Alternative zu den Bundestagswahlen einzusetzen,” MRB 6 (1979), 44. 
102 Eine fortschrittliche Alternative. 
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catastrophe in Europe, and progressive voters should not be forced to choose 
between the “lesser of two evils.”103  Having a broad-based alternative in the 
federal elections was important to grassroots organizations supporting 
environmental protection, democratic rights, and the rights of women, and the 
progressive alternative could advance these causes together and become an 
important factor for change.  The declaration asserted that the AL would retain 
its emphasis on its work in West Berlin.  The declaration then asserted that the 
AL recognized “that progressive politics in West Berlin cannot neglect the fact 
that the federal elections have an impact on West Berlin, in other words that 
policies regarding Berlin are made which the AL campaigns against in the West 
Berlin elections.”104  This rather extraordinary statement was the next link in the 
chain running from a concern for local politics to the recognition of the necessity 
and value of participation at the national level, and helps explain the AL’s 
original involvement with the Green Party. 
 In preparation for the founding meeting of the Green Party held in 
January 1980 in Karlsruhe, the AL sent delegates to a commission charged with 
                                                 
103 Die Wahl eines kleineren Übels. 
104 Dass fortschrittliche Politik in Westberlin nicht ausser Acht lassen kann, 
dass durch die Bundestagswahlen und die Regierungspolitik in Bonn 
Rückwirkungen auf Westberlin, d.h. eine Berlinpolitik bestimmt wird, gegen die 
die Alternative Liste bei den Wahlen in Westberlin angetreten ist.  
“Absichtserklärung der AL,” 44. 
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developing the future Green Party’s program and statute.105  The contributions of 
AL delegates to these meetings also give insights regarding the priorities of the 
AL and its thoughts regarding the potential benefits of a Green Party.  As they 
already had had considerable experience in forging a similar group that predated 
the Greens, AL delegates to the Program Commission shared their experiences 
with the Greens in their proposal for the preamble of the Green Party’s program.  
Their contributions reflected their historical experiences: they advocated 
establishing a new kind of alliance that would be characterized by “unity in goals 
and diversity in basic perspectives” and that would express differences openly 
rather than trying to suppress them as in the ‘established parties.’106  They upheld 
their own group as a model, asserting, not without a certain amount of self-
flattery, that it was “characterized by ecologists, democrats, Christians, socialists, 
communists and persons without party affiliation coming together as equals to 
work for mutual goals.”107  The AL’s reaction to initial drafts of the program 
reflected its priorities and historical experiences.  Its main concern was to 
overcome division: “Our assembly shows one common interest: in light of the 
                                                 
105 Peter Sellin, “Die AL und die Bundesgrünen,” in Die Alternative Liste 
Berlin: Entstehung, Entwicklung, Positionen, ed. Michael Bühnemann, Michael 
Wendt and Jürgen Wituschek (Berlin: LitPol Verlagsgesellschaft, 1984), 122. 
106 Einheit in gemeinsamen Zielen und Vielfalt in den 
Grundanschauungen. 
107 Unsere Alternative zeichnet sich auch dadurch aus, dass sich in ihr 
gleichberechtigt Ökologen, Demokraten, Christen, Sozialisten, Kommunisten 
und Parteilose über Differenzen hinweg für gemeinsame Ziele 
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deep-seated ecological, economic, social, and political problems, we need a 
fundamental alternative to the established parties.  And we need one alternative, 
which leads the various oppositional tendencies away from division und 
opposition and points them in one direction.”108 
 But the AL objected to concrete aspects of the draft program as well.  The 
AL delegates criticized the preamble of the program for paying insufficient 
attention to democratic and human rights.  In particular, they felt that the 
program did not adequately criticize the Federal Republic for undermining these 
rights.  Even more negative was the AL’s reaction to the program’s stance on 
violence.  This objection foreshadowed a major point of disagreement that later 
plagued the relationship between the AL and the Greens.  According to the AL, 
the state employed violence on a daily basis to suppress legitimate protests 
against the nuclear power program or other movements.  The AL insisted that 
those affected by the policies of the Federal Republic should be free to formulate 
their own forms of protest.  This freedom was a direct product of the European 
                                                                                                                                                 
zusammenschliessen.  “Zusatzantrag zur Präambel der Programmkommission,” 
MRB 6 (1979), 43. 
108 Unser Kongress zeigt ein gemeinsames Interesse: wir brauchen 
angesichts der tiefgreifenden ökologischen, ökonomischen, sozialen und 
politischen Probleme eine grundlegende Alternative zu den etablierten Parteien.  
Und wir brauchen eine Alternative , die weg von Zersplitterung und 
Gegeneinander die verschiedenen oppositionellen Strömungen in eine Richtung 
zusammenführt.  “Erklärung der Alternativen Liste Berlin zu dem in Offenbach 
vorgelegten Präambel Entwurf,” MRB 6 (1979), 43.  Emphasis in original. 
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democratic tradition, which should not be suppressed, especially not in 
Germany.109 
 The AL also sent a large delegation to the meetings held in Karlsruhe in 
January 1980 for the purpose of founding the Green Party.  Approximately 600 of 
the AL’s 1600 members joined the Green Party in order to have a voice in 
shaping the fledgling organization.  The AL’s initial experiences with the Green 
Party were far from positive, however, and the AL’s involvement with the Green 
Party nearly ended before it began.  Just as was the case at the founding meeting 
of the AL, controversy erupted over the issue of ‘Declarations of Incompatibility,’ 
measures that would have made it impossible for Green Party members to 
simultaneously belong to another political party.  Because the AL owed its 
existence to the rejection of such measures, delegates were understandably upset.  
The Green Party eventually carved out a specific exception for the AL; 
nevertheless, members viewed this solution as temporary, and were simply 
unwilling entirely to renounce their other political affiliations- in many cases, 
with one of the K-groups.110 
 One contributor to the AL’s monthly membership circular summed up 
these concerns by asking if it would be possible for the AL with its historical 
roots to work within a party that relied on declarations of incompatibility as the 
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vorgelegten Präambel Entwurf,” 44. 
110 Sellin, “Die AL und die Bundesgrünen,” 123. 
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basis for its identity.111  Other AL members found the Green Party’s commitment 
to work within the framework prescribed by West Germany’s constitution hard 
to swallow.  “What do they mean, ‘in the framework of the constitution?’” asked 
AL member ‘Ulli from Steglitz’ bitterly.  “Whose laws are these?  Hasn’t every 
one of us had plenty of bad experiences with these laws?”112 
 Johanna Mayr and Wolfgang Kaiser, who had been leaders in the West 
Berlin KPD-Rote Fahne and who at the time of the founding of the national 
Green Party were dual members of the AL and the KPD-Rote Fahne, wrote an 
extensive analysis of the implications of the founding of the Green Party for the 
West Berlin Left in general and the AL in particular.113  Their article gives unique 
insights into the perceptions of the Left at this important juncture.   
 Mayr and Kaiser’s article suggests that, at least initially, the KPD-Rote 
Fahne was involved with forming the Greens out of a desire to assess the Green 
Party’s potential to serve as another Trojan horse for the radical Left.  But the 
Left’s disguise was already taking on a life of its own, and it was beginning to 
adopt the characteristics it had been pretending to possess.  According to Mayr 
and Kaiser, the time had passed for a purely tactical consideration of working 
                                                 
111 “Kritische Frage zum Verhältnis AL-Grüne Partei,” MRB 7 (1980), 30. 
112 Was heisst denn hier, ‘im Rahmen des Grundgesetzes?’  Wessen 
Gesetze sind denn das?  Hat nicht schon jeder von uns schon reichlich schlechte 
Erfahrungen mit diesen Gesetzen gemacht?  “Betrifft Karlsruhe,” MRB 7 (1980), 
33. 
113 Johanna Mayr and Wolfgang Kaiser, “Stellungnahmen zu Karlsruhe,” 
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with the Green Party, and the moment had come when the Left had to decide 
what positive contributions it could make to the Greens if the Left decided in 
favor of cooperating with them.  If the Greens could gain more than 5 percent of 
the vote, this would have far-reaching implications for the West German political 
scene: thus it was important that the Left take a good look at the long-term 
consequences of their decision whether or not to cooperate.114  The authors also 
posed the question as to how the AL could benefit from a possible affiliation 
with the Greens, raising the possibility of broadening the appeal of the AL 
without alienating other AL members who found the Greens unappealing at 
best.115 
 According to Mayr and Kaiser, one very positive aspect of potential work 
with the Green Party would be the chance to work with new groups: 
“Cooperation with the Greens gives us the chance to work together with newly 
politicized youths and young adults, with repoliticized but scattered Leftists, 
with older people from the environmental movement, and various parts of the 
Left.”116  The increased environmental consciousness of recent years and the 
success of the green and alternative movements were evidence of changes in 
West Germany’s political structure and values in the post-war period.  These 
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changes would not automatically work in favor of the Left, however; this 
rendered the participation of the Left even more important.117 
 Mayr and Kaiser sounded a cautionary note about potential cooperation 
with the Greens, however, holding that it would be irresponsible to work with 
them unless the Left had a clear idea as to what it was getting into.118  Moreover, 
they recognized the implications of the environmental ideology of the Greens, 
and cautioned against attempts to work with the Green Party without 
recognizing the genuine importance of ecological problems.119  As for themselves, 
they conceded that the questions raised by ecological problems were real, and 
were not adequately recognized by Marxism.  But they insisted that a Marxist 
could not see things solely from an ecological point of view, either.120  For them, 
the key was to achieve a balance between left-wing and purely ecological 
perspectives.  To do otherwise would be to encourage division within the Left, 
something that must at all costs be avoided: “The Left cannot place all their bets 
on the Greens and only be politically active within them.  That would be a 
                                                                                                                                                 
Linken, mit Älteren aus der Umweltschutzbewegung und verschiedenen Teilen 
der Linken zusammenzuarbeiten. Mayr and Kaiser, “Stellungnahmen,” 21. 
117 Mayr and Kaiser, “Stellungnahmen,” 21. 
118 Mayr and Kaiser, “Stellungnahmen,” 22. 
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renewal of the sectarianism [of the K-groups].”121  But at the same time, the 
authors asserted, because the concerns of the Left went beyond ecology, leftists 
had something to contribute to the Green Party.  Working on an equal footing 
with all Greens, they could help address ecological problems.  And because these 
problems were associated with capitalism, leftists and Marxists in the Greens 
tried to bring these aspects to other elements of their critique of capitalism.  In 
this way, they hoped to ensure that the environmental movement would be a 
left-wing rather than a right-wing movement.122  Again, however, Mayr and 
Kaiser cautioned against division, noting that an arrangement where either 
Greens or leftists dominated would amount to nothing, as it would bring only 
further fragmentation.  Instead, mutual interests had to remain in the 
foreground, and all participants had to focus on what positive contributions they 
could bring to the movement.123 
 In their article, Mayr and Kaiser made recommendations for the course of 
action they felt the AL should pursue based on their assessment of developments 
at the Karlsruhe meeting.  While it was too soon to make a final decision before 
the final program had been issued, the AL should by all means cooperate with 
the Greens until then.  Should the AL decide to continue its relationship with the 
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Greens, options ranged from joining en masse to supporting the Greens in 
elections but maintaining a critical attitude toward the party.  Mayr and Kaiser 
counseled against the first option, asserting that the point was not to gain a 
majority in the party but rather to achieve a balance among the different political 
tendencies in the Greens, with all sides making concessions.124  Mayr and Kaiser 
strongly advised against taking a stand against the Greens and trying to compete 
with them.  But they also argued that it would be a mistake for the AL to rely 
exclusively on the Greens: conditions in West Berlin necessitated finding a 
solution that would broaden the AL’s appeal, especially toward the center of the 
political spectrum, and to prevent divisions at the local level.  This also involved 
doing everything possible to prevent the loss of AL members who opposed the 
Greens and did not wish to have the AL cooperate with them.125  
 An early look at the AL by one of its founders and a member of its 
Executive Committee gives insights into the reasons the AL remained separate 
from the Greens.  Cordula Schulz advocated a middle position that would 
formalize the relationship with the Greens without sacrificing the individuality 
of the AL.  The group should cooperate with the Green Party periodically as 
circumstances dictated.126  The article shows that at least some within the AL 
consciously advocated a path between continued independence from the Green 
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Party, which would preserve the AL’s autonomy but risked isolating it, and 
dissolution of the AL through fusion with the Green Party, which would bring 
the West Berlin Left a voice in parliament but would sacrifice its individuality, 
local control, and potential coalition partners, especially those not accepting the 
Green Party’s stance on violence.  Schulz’s article also demonstrates the extent to 
which the Left was attempting to capitalize on the increased concern with 
environmental issues, harnessing the stalled wagon of the Left to this new 
impulse.  As has been seen, Schulz likened the new paradigm to a “green train,” 
which the Left nearly missed.   
Despite the value of this contribution, however, Schulz insisted that the 
Green Party could not take the place of the alternative ballots.127  Elaborating, she 
asserted that only the AL was recognized by the independent Left and various 
citizens’ initiatives as a worthwhile partner.  Cooperation between these groups 
was progressing smoothly, and should continue to be developed.  Those who 
wanted to fuse the Greens and the AL risked sacrificing or damaging this 
cooperation.  Instead, the AL should continue to work independently, but should 
occasionally cooperate with the Greens, entering into temporary alliances 
ranging across a broad political spectrum.  Schulz concluded that “neither the AL 
nor the Greens would be capable of going it alone.”128 In addition, Schulz warned 
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about another potential problem involved in moving closer to the Green Party 
that directly related to attitudes toward parliamentary democracy and Berliners’ 
experiences with nonviolent protest.  She feared that the Greens would awaken 
false hopes that demands could be met “without conflict, in other words, without 
violence.  The nonviolent protest in Gatow against the felling of 30,000 trees, 
clubbed down brutally by the police, demonstrates to what massive resignation 
that can lead.”129 
 Schulz also identified an alleged difference in the role parliaments played 
in the strategy of the AL and the Greens, and used this as an argument against a 
direct affiliation with the Green Party.  For her, the Green Party placed too much 
faith in the parliamentary system.  Schulz claimed that, whereas the Green Party 
had one leg in protest movements and the other leg in parliaments, the AL had 
both legs outside parliaments, and used parliament as a “walking-stick.”130  
Whereas the extraparliamentary struggle was important for both the AL and the 
Greens, the Greens depended on the parliaments for ‘support,’ while for the AL, 
the parliaments were merely an aid, a tool to be used for fostering the more 
important activities that went on outside of parliament. 
                                                 
129 Zum anderen erweckt die Seriosität der Grünen die Hoffnung, dass 
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 Another danger of the Greens related more closely to ideas about the 
importance of political involvement in building a political consciousness.  Schulz 
worried that the prospect of having one’s demands resolved by parliamentary 
means alone would result in people never getting involved in citizens’ initiatives 
in the first place.  Thus they would never accumulate political experience 
themselves, and would instead rely on the parliamentarians to take care of 
things.131  The result would be the much-vilified Stellvertreterpolitik, or ‘politics by 
representation,’ which violated the AL’s grassroots political understanding. 
Schulz ended her discussion on a note that represented a dramatic move 
away from the dogmatism of the K-group era.  She asserted that “the times of the 
claim to be the sole representatives of a party and of the discussion ‘only we do 
everything right’ are over!”132  This attitude was born of necessity, and arose out 
of the desire to avoid further fragmentation and the need to reach out to 
potential partners in order to exceed the 5 percent hurdle.  It nevertheless 
constituted a major step in the evolution of the radical Left into a democratic 
party, as it highlighted the radical Left’s newly adopted willingness to relinquish 
its claim to have a monopoly on the truth.133  It also points to an unexpected effect 
of the 5 percent rule: intended to prevent a multitude of single-issue parties from 
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entering the parliamentary system as in Weimar, in this case, it provided the 
incentive for single-issue groups to work together to forge a new party.  Overall, 
Schulz advocated occupying the middle ground between the poles of the Green 
party and autonomous but isolated radical group.  As it happens, this 
arrangement also managed to attract many of the most radical individuals of 
West Berlin, and once in the AL, to integrate them into the constitutional system 
of parliamentary democracy through the effects of parliamentary participation 
and through the increasingly strong role of the Green Party. 
The Green Party also influenced the AL through the AL’s competition 
with the federal Green Party’s West Berlin affiliate.  Shortly after the founding in 
Karlsruhe of the national Green Party, the State Committee of the Greens, or 
Landesverband, was founded in West Berlin.  Some of its founders included 
members of the AL who wished to have an impact on the development of the 
national Green Party: in order to have a vote at the assemblies debating and 
discussing the program and statute of the Green Party, individuals had to 
become members at the local level.  Some of these members then tried to use the 
existence of the State Committee as a way to pressure the AL into adopting a 
more exclusively ecology-oriented stance.  The State Committee became a haven 
for those AL members who felt that the AL was not “green” enough.  Some also 
tried to use the parallel organization to try to move the AL into a stance more in 
line with the Green Party’s views regarding violence.  According to Peter Sellin, 
the Landesverband also included two other camps: a conservative-reactionary 
 
 190
group around the Green Ballot Spandau, as well as some individuals Sellin 
asserts belonged to the New Right; and the so-called Mittelgruppe, or ‘middle 
group,’ consisting of individuals such as Martin Jänicke, Otto Schily, and Eva 
Quistorp.134 
 Developments centering around the West Berlin State Committee of the 
Green Party quickly died down, however, as interest in the national Greens 
waned.  Electorally speaking, the new Green Party was a big disappointment, 
polling only 1.5 percent in the election of 1980.  Furthermore, in West Berlin, 
attention focused on a local political battle, as scandals in the city forced new 
elections to be held in 1981.  The Landesverband was essentially put on hold 
shortly after its formation, and the AL was able to lure away leaders such as 
Martin Jänicke, Ursula Schaar, and even Otto Schily to run on its open ballots.  
Later, however, the West Berlin State Committee of the Greens played an 
important role in attempts to pressure the AL to move closer to the Green Party 
and to distance itself from violent protest: this will be addressed in later chapters. 
 During the period 1979-1981, from the AL’s entry into the District 
Assemblies up to the new elections of May 1981, the AL concentrated both on its 
work of keeping the party together and on making the best of its gains.  This task 
proved to be a sobering experience for the new organization.  The assemblies had 
very limited powers: they had no power to make laws or to determine how 
                                                 
134 Sellin, “Die AL und die Bundesgrünen,” 123. 
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money was to be spent, and they were restricted to making recommendations to 
the Senate and overseeing the local administration.135  
 Because conditions and problems in the four districts in which the AL was 
represented varied greatly, it is not easy to draw general conclusions about the 
actual work in the district assemblies, nor is it useful to look at the work in detail.  
Generally, political scientist Burkhard Schaper’s assertion that work in the 
District Assemblies provided valuable experience for applying new political 
forms and content seems reasonable.136  Nevertheless, it is important to examine 
this era briefly.  Already in this phase, the AL confronted crucial questions 
relating directly to the West German Left’s changing views of Western 
parliamentary democracy.  Were the AL representatives merely the 
parliamentary arm of the grassroots movement, or should they develop their 
own independent policies and strategies?  Was the AL exclusively an opposition 
party, or was occasional cooperation with other parties permissible when it could 
prove advantageous?   
 One episode from this phase of the AL’s development both illustrates the 
AL’s confrontation with the above questions and reveals the AL’s early views 
regarding the role of parliaments.  In 1979, a controversy erupted in the 
Tiergarten district over the AL’s cooperation with the liberal FDP in order to 
preserve a local park.  The AL had filed a joint motion with the FDP promoting 
                                                 
135 Schaper, “Entstehungsgeschichte,” 60.   
136 Schaper, “Entstehungsgeschichte,” 61. 
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its vision for the future of the park and calling on local authorities not to proceed 
with plans to pave it.  This act was enough to spark a debate concerning the 
circumstances under which the AL should cooperate with another political party, 
as well as about the AL’s relationship to the citizens’ initiatives.  One side 
advocated a very close relationship with the citizens’ groups, and insisted that all 
proposals and complaints be submitted to the assemblies for consideration, no 
matter how trivial.  Selecting certain issues brought to the AL by the citizens’ 
groups for enquiries or criticism and rejecting others amounted to a screening 
process that contradicted the AL’s ideals.  The other side insisted that this was 
not efficient, and would end up burying representatives and councils in matters 
that stood little chance of resolution.  This would take resources away from work 
outside of parliaments.  In what would become typical for the AL, the two sides 
could only agree to disagree, and published their debate in the AL’s membership 
circular.137 
 Thus, at this early stage, the AL already confronted the dilemma of 
whether it was more important to achieve a smoothly functioning party 
apparatus or whether it should maintain its close relationship to grassroots and 
citizens’ initiatives.  In essence, this was a conflict between “legitimacy and 
                                                 




efficiency.”138  But the debate is also interesting for what was not at issue.  Neither 
side questioned the primacy of extra-parliamentary work: clearly, both sides 
viewed the work in the local assemblies as secondary.  The debate was about 
means, not ends: it was about how best to serve the extra-parliamentary work of 
the AL.   
 In addition, both sides accepted the premise that working within the 
parliaments served to reveal the contradictions between what the established 
parties said and what they did, and to emphasize the parties’ inability to 
represent the real interests of the people.  This, of course, was a basic strategy of 
the KPD-Rote Fahne, which had used this argument as one of its primary 
justifications for entering parliament.  Again, the debate in Tiergarten was about 
which means would best achieve this end.  One side insisted that working with 
the FDP would reveal the contradictions between what individual FDP 
politicians promised and what they actually delivered, and thus would lead to 
public disillusionment with that party.  The other side feared that working with 
the FDP delegates would have the opposite effect, and would give a false 
impression of the efficacy of the parliaments, perhaps because of the credibility 
that working with the AL as representatives of the citizens’ initiatives would 
bring them.139 
                                                 
138 Legitimität und Effizienz.  Raschke, Die Grünen, 33.  See Raschke, Die 
Grünen, 33-36, for a discussion of this problem applied to the Green Party as a 
whole. 
139 “BVV Diskussion anlässlich der Tiergartener Schwierigkeiten,” 4. 
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 Overall, the AL became increasingly frustrated by its experiences in the 
District Assemblies, and morale quickly deteriorated.  Again, however, it was the 
KPD-Rote Fahne members whose energy and determination to maintain their 
opportunity for meaningful political involvement kept the AL afloat.  Ernst 
Hoplitschek explained the crucial role of the KPD-Rote Fahne in this capacity: “It 
was precisely this ‘handful’ of KPD members who lent their strength to the AL-
organization….  Everyone who was present then will confirm it: if it had not 
been for the KPD-cadre in the party administration, in the interest groups and in 
the districts, the AL would certainly not have survived.”140 
 The AL also received a boost by the fact that elections in West Berlin were 
moved up to 1981 as a result of the political scandal known as the Garski affair.  
Dietrich Garski, a prominent and well-connected West German architect, had 
lost funds to the tune of 160 million DM in bankrupt housing projects in Saudi 
Arabia.  The failure of these schemes should have been evident when the Berlin 
Bank, and hence the city of West Berlin, extended the credit in 1978.  Thanks to 
party cronies, however, he received the loans anyway, and in the process, those 
involved circumvented rules for issuing such credit.  The West Berlin Senators 
                                                 
140 [Es waren] die ‘Handvoll’ KPD-Kader, die ihre Kraft weiterhin loyal der 
AL-Organisation widmeten….Jeder, der damals dabei war wird bestätigen: Hätte 
es jene KPD-Kader im Apparat, in den Bereichen und Bezirken nicht gegeben- 
die AL hätte mit Sicherheit nicht überlebt.  Ernst Hoplitschek, in Die Grünen, ed. 
J. R. Mettke (Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1982), 85 ff, quoted in Die Alternative Liste 
Berlin: Entstehung, Entwicklung, Positionen, ed. Michael Bühnemann, Michael 
Wendt, and Jürgen Wituschek (Berlin: LitPol Verlagsgesellschaft, 1984), 60. 
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for Finance and Economics were implicated in improperly issuing the credit, and 
their subsequent resignation helped propel the early elections.   
 The Garski scandal had a clear impact on the AL’s development.  Not only 
did the scandal precipitate early elections, but it also provided the impetus for 
the AL’s entrance into the Abgeordnetenhaus in another way.  It produced the 
perfect climate in which a party that appeared to be an alternative, outside force 
untainted by corruption and scandal could make significant gains.  For the 1981 
election, the AL portrayed itself in precisely these terms.  In the first part of its 
1981 electoral program, it attacked the infamous Berlin spoils system: “This is not 
the venality of a few people.  This system is comprised of the structures of 
organized corruption, the one ‘party friend’ makes a request, the next ‘party 
friend’ approves it, the third is supposed to keep an eye on things, and all three 
help each other out- and help themselves to the taxpayer’s money.”141 
 The impact of the changed political climate due to the Garski scandal can 
also be seen in the adoption of some structural reforms by the AL.  A few months 
before the elections, the Mitgliedervollversammlung approved structural changes 
to the AL with far-reaching implications.  These changes reflected both the 
continuing concern about the potential domination of the KPD-Rote Fahne (and 
                                                 
141 Der Filz, das ist ja nicht die Bestechlichkeit einiger weniger Leute.  Der 
Filz in West-Berlin, das sind die Strukturen der organisierten Korruption: der 
eine “Parteifreund” beantragt, der nächste Parteifreund “genehmigt”, der dritte 
soll “kontrollieren”, und alle greifen sich gegenseitig ordentlich unter die Arme 




the public’s reaction to this domination) and the AL’s desire to portray itself as a 
political outsider.  At the General Members’ Assembly, AL members made AL 
representatives subject to seat rotation, the “fixed mandate,” and prohibitions on 
holding multiple offices.142  The principle of rotation stipulated that office-holders 
must leave their positions after a set number of years, while the fixed mandate 
required the AL delegates to the Abgeordnetenhaus to vote according to the 
decisions of the General Members’ Assembly, not according to their own 
conscience.  These changes placed obvious limits on the powers of individual 
members or sub-groups within the party.143 
 Also, at about this time, the AL began to exert a great deal of attraction on 
the rest of the West Berlin Left.  This was certainly due in part to the AL’s 
seeming so well poised to enter the Abgeordnetenhaus in the 1981 elections.  Many 
groups, including those who had opposed the AL’s 1979 bid for parliamentary 
seats and run on their own, with disastrous results, wished to back the right 
horse this time.  These groups attempted to explain their change of position, in 
the process giving interesting insights into the thinking of the Left.  The account 
of Siegfried Heimann, Bodo Zeuner, and Christel Neusüss, three members of the 
Sozialistisches Büro (Socialist Office- SB), a left-wing group centered in Offenbach 
but also active in West Berlin, exemplifies the shift that occurred between 1979 
                                                 
142 Imperatives Mandat. 
143 The original decision of the Members’ Assembly is given in 




and 1981.  These individuals distanced themselves from the AL shortly after its 
founding, but when the election of 1981 rolled around, they worked within the 
AL: 
    What caused us to keep our skeptical distance from the AL in 
1979 was the fear, reinforced by individual experiences, that this 
political organization would not be genuinely representative of all 
different tendencies of the alternative and undogmatic left-wing 
movement, but would be dominated or even controlled from afar 
by a specific sectarian group, the Maoist-Stalinist KPD….  
Meanwhile, the KPD has dissolved itself in a remarkable process of 
self-recognition.  The former members of the group continue to be 
active in the AL, objectively and partly subjectively freed of the 
pressure to carry out the orders of a centralistic cadre organization 
and ‘reformed’ regarding…the adoption of Chinese models.144 
 
Summarizing their experiences, they noted further:  
Back then, we feared that the KPD would swallow up the AL- in 
reality, the AL swallowed up the KPD.  To be more precise, the AL 
created political forms in which an intra-Left pluralism can develop 
productively, in which it is possible for groups with different 
assumptions to learn from each other and develop commonalities, 
and where they don’t sweep their differences under the rug, but 
                                                 
144 Was uns dennoch zu skeptischer Distanz gegenüber der AL veranlasst 
hat, war die durch einzelne Erfahrungen untermauerte Befürchtung, dass diese 
politische Organisation keine wirkliche Repräsentanz aller verschiedenen 
Strömungen der alternativen und undogmatisch-linken Bewegung sein würde, 
sondern in Wirklichkeit von einer bestimmten sektiererischen Gruppe, der 
maoistisch-stalinistischen ‘KPD’ dominiert, ja ferngesteuert würde….Inzwischen 
hat die Partei ‘KPD’ sich in einem bemerkenswerten Prozess der Selbsterkenntnis 
selber aufgelöst.  Die ehemaligen Mitglieder der Gruppe wirken weiterhin in der 
AL mit, objektiv und zum Teil auch subjektiv befreit von dem Druck, die 
Parteiaufträge einer zentralistischen Kaderorganisation ausführen zu müssen, 
und ‘geläutert’ in bezug auf…die Übernahme chinesischer Modelle.  Siegfried 
Heimann, Bodo Zeuner, Christel Neusüss, “Organisator produktiver 
Lernprozesse,” Document 10 in Die Alternative Liste Berlin.  Entstehung, 
Entwicklung, Positionen, ed. Michael Bühnemann, Michael Wendt, and Jürgen 
Wituschek (Berlin: LitPol, 1984), 85. 
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deal with them.  We underestimated this positive chance two years 
ago.145 
 
These political forms involved renouncing a dogmatic claim to have a monopoly 
on the truth and a commitment to a culture of debate and discussion as a way of 
arriving at solutions.  While the KPD-Rote Fahne adopted this attitude out of 
necessity, it nevertheless contributed to a democratization of the group, and 
bears a resemblance to the components of liberty outlined by Ralf Dahrendorf.146 
 At the same time that these individuals rationalized their shift of opinion 
regarding working within the AL, they revealed their views of parliamentary 
democracy and the role it should play for their organization in meeting its 
grievances, as well as their motives for participating in parliament: “Two years 
ago, we thought electoral participation of the leftist and alternative groups was 
necessary.  We were of the opinion then and are of the opinion now that a 
movement that sees itself as political and wants to change the forms and content 
of the state’s actions cannot do without participation in elections and 
parliamentary work as a means of exerting pressure.”147  This pressure resulted 
                                                 
145 Wir haben damals befürchtet, dass die KPD die AL schlucken würde- in 
Wirklichkeit hat die AL die KPD geschluckt.  Genauer: Die AL hat Politikformen 
erzeugt, in denen es möglich ist, dass Gruppen mit unterschiedlichen Ansätzen 
voneinander lernen, Gemeinsamkeiten herauszuarbeiten, Differenzen nicht unter 
den Teppich kehren, sondern austragen.  Diese positive Möglichkeit haben wir 
vor zwei Jahren unterschätzt.  Heimann, Zeuner, and Neusüss, “Organisator,” 
85. 
146 Dahrendorf, Society and Democracy, 16. 
147 Schon vor zwei Jahren hielten wir eine Wahlbeteiligung der linken und 
alternativen Gruppen für notwendig.  Wir meinten damals und wir meinen 
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from the fact that parliamentary elections decided the distribution of offices and 
power.  Therefore, “threatening to take away votes from these parties, hence 
lowering their chances of occupying offices, is among the most effective means of 
exerting pressure an opposition movement possesses.”148  Moreover, they too 
viewed parliaments as entities to be used as a means of gathering and 
disseminating information.149  This last point was, of course, identical to a key 
aspect of the KPD-Rote Fahne’s strategy regarding the parliaments.  Summing 
up their revised views of the AL’s achievements, the authors concluded: “A 
political organization as the organizer of productive learning processes- after a 
decade of left-wing sectarianism in Berlin, this is more than a hope, it is an 
achievement worth preserving and defending.”150 
 In addition to the SB, another group of the radical Left altered its view of 
the AL at this juncture.  The KBW, another K-group very similar in program and 
structure to its bitter rival, the KPD-Rote Fahne, had resisted involvement with 
                                                                                                                                                 
heute, dass eine sich als politisch verstehende Bewegung, die Formen und 
Inhalte staatlichen Handelns verändern will, auf die Wahlbeteiligung und die 
parlamentarische Arbeit als Mittel, Druck auszuüben, nicht verzichten kann.  
Heimann, Zeuner, and Neusüss, “Organisator,” 84. 
148 Daher gehört die Drohung, diesen Parteien Wählerstimmen zu 
entziehen und damit ihre Ämterbesetzungschancen zu mindern, zu den 
effektivsten Druckmitteln, über die eine oppositionelle Bewegung verfügt.  
Heimann, Zeuner, and Neusüss, “Organisator,” 84. 
149 Heimann, Zeuner, and Neusüss, “Organisator,” 84-85. 
150 Eine politische Organisation als Organisator produktiver Lernprozesse- 
dies ist nach einem Jahrzehnt linken Sektierertums in Berlin heute schon mehr 
als eine Hoffnung, es ist schon ein Stück weit erhaltens- und verteidigenswerte 
Errungenschaft.  Heimann, Zeuner, and Neusüss, “Organisator,” 86. 
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the AL in 1979.  It now changed its position, and called on its supporters and 
members to cast their votes for the AL in the 1981 election.  The KBW printed a 
brochure in which it explained its position and its reasons for reversing its past 
views.151  Most prominently, the brochure noted the electoral successes of the AL, 
especially compared to its own record.  In the 1979 election, the KBW garnered 
only around thirteen thousand votes, whereas the AL received more than fifty 
thousand, and in the upcoming election, the AL seemed poised to be even more 
successful.152  The brochure also revealed its perception of the AL’s attitude 
toward parliaments.  According to this interpretation, “the AL has been able to 
strengthen its influence in this election campaign, and for the first time since the 
outlawing of the old KPD, a political power that sets itself against all bourgeois 
parties and parliamentarianism has a realistic chance of winning seats in a state 
parliament.”153  The KBW was determined not to miss the boat this time.  
 Nevertheless, the KBW struggled to reconcile its decision with its 
program.  On the one hand, like the KPD-Rote Fahne, its program rested on the 
                                                 
151 “Die Stellung des KBW zu den Wahlen am 10. Mai.  Stimmen für die AL 
sind Stimmen für die demokratische Bewegung- Wählt Alternative Liste!”  
AdAPO: KBW Nord- C1 Flugblätter. 
152 Here, perhaps in its desire to make the AL even more attractive, the 
KBW was overgenerous in its assessment of the AL’s successes in 1979: the AL 
actually gained less than forty-eight thousand votes. 
153 Die AL hat in diesem Wahlkampf ihren Einfluss stärken können und 
das erste Mal seit dem Verbot der alten KPD hat eine politische Kraft, die sich 
gegen alle bürgerlichen Parteien und den Parlamentarismus stellt, berechtigte 
Aussicht, Parlamentssitze in einem Landesparlament zu erreichen.  “Stellung des 
KBW,” 1.  The “old KPD” was outlawed in West Germany in 1956. 
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assumption that parliamentary elections would never bring about the end of 
capitalist rule.  On the other hand, the KBW had now come to embrace the view 
that not participating in the “bourgeois parliamentary elections” would allow 
these elections to be used against “the independent struggles that are 
materializing or have already materialized.”154  The KBW also hoped that the 
elections would help unify the alternative movement.  It calculated that the 
electoral campaign would help create the conditions under which the KBW could 
“build up a unified front in which the working class had the leadership and that 
had the goal of the fall of capitalism.”155  
 As for the AL, the KBW saw it as “a democratic coalition that defended 
itself against the policies of the bourgeois state.”156  In a remarkable shift, the 
KBW argued that working within parliament, the AL could achieve some gains 
for workers: “The candidacy of the AL makes it possible that the multifaceted 
resistance of the workers’ movement and the democratic movement against 
                                                 
154 Überlassen wir aber das Feld der bürgerlichen Parlamentswahlen den 
bürgerlichen Parteien, so werden diese Wahlen zu einem Instrument gegen die 
bereits herausgebildeten und sich herausbildenden selbständigen Kämpfe.  
“Stellung des KBW,” 3. 
155 [Wir wollen die programmatischen Positionen weiterentwickeln], um 
eine Einheitsfront aufzubauen, in der die Arbeiterklasse die Führung hat und 
deren Ziel der Sturz des Kapitalismus ist.  “Stellung des KBW,” 4. 
156 Wir verstehen die Alternative Liste als demokratisches Bündnis, das 




Senate policy will achieve representation also within parliament.”157  The KBW 
also invoked arguments similar to those expressed in the debate in the Tiergarten 
district of Berlin about the purpose of work in the District Assemblies.  The KBW 
hoped that the AL would be better able to point out contradictions between 
rhetoric and reality, especially within the SPD.  This would enable the AL to 
force the government to make concessions, and would make it more difficult for 
the government to pass “reactionary measures” while making it easier to 
uncover and resist “parliamentary maneuvers of the bourgeoisie.”158 
 The KBW’s contribution reveals that the AL was able to overcome the 
divisions between the K-groups that had haunted the Left throughout the 1970s.  
A crucial component of the new approach to intra-Left cooperation was the 
abandonment of the dogmatic claim to the truth and to a commitment to the 
process of debate and discussion as ways of reaching the truth.  The fact that 
KBW members could work together with their archrivals from the KPD-Rote 
Fahne indicates that this strategy worked, as does the fact that Otto Schily 
showed himself willing to work with the AL at this juncture.  Moreover, the 
reward of parliamentary participation exercised great attraction for this former 
archrival of the KPD-Rote Fahne.  But its intentions regarding parliamentary 
                                                 
157 Durch die Kandidatur der Alternativen Liste ergibt sich die 
Möglichkeit, dass der vielfältige Widerstand der Arbeiterbewegung gegen die 
Senatspolitik auch innerhalb des Parlaments vertreten wird.  “Stellung des 
KBW,” 4. 
158 Reaktionäre Massnahmen; parlamentarische Manöver der Bourgeoisie.  
“Stellung des KBW,” 4. 
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participation were the same as those of its former enemy, and boiled down to a 
simple plan for exploiting the parliaments as sources of information and as a 
platform for spreading class struggle. 
 Overall, the years 1978 to 1981 were important ones for the radical West 
Berlin Left, and were a time of significant changes in its attitudes toward 
parliamentary democracy.  Burnout and frustration among the K-groups, 
frustration with parliamentary politics, and a determination to fend for oneself 
politically combined with the rise of the environmental paradigm to lead to the 
creation of a new organization, the AL.  Much evidence indicates that the AL was 
a Trojan horse for the KPD-Rote Fahne, or at least was viewed by this radical K-
group as such.  Nevertheless, as a result of an attempt to at least feign a retreat 
from dogmatism and a partially sincere commitment to a political culture of 
debate and discussion, the KPD-Rote Fahne attracted enough allies to enter the 
Bezirksparlamente.  In these local assemblies, the KPD-Rote Fahne held the new 
organization together through the strength of its members’ determination to 
maintain a place where they could remain politically active, as a way of retaining 
their all-important political homeland.  Party structures evolved that made other 
groups much more comfortable working within the AL, as they tended to 
prevent any one group becoming dominant.  Moreover, the AL members began 
to take their newly adopted ideology seriously, and began already to develop 
into what they originally claimed to be- a group dedicated to spreading 
democracy and committed to environmental protection.  Finally, the new 
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elections came at the perfect time and involved ideal issues that favored an 
outsider party.  The AL began to attract groups and individuals who had 
previously rejected it due to the strong position of the KPD-Rote Fahne within 
the group.  
The Green Party also began to play a role in the AL’s parliamentarization 
and deradicalization at this juncture.  In its struggle to stay united and to attract 
allies in order to preserve the opportunity to maintain its political involvement, 
the radical Left in West Berlin seized the opportunity to become active in the 
Greens.  The rise of the ecological paradigm enabled this, as ‘green’ issues were 
flexible enough to allow for new coalitions and provided scope for new areas of 
cooperation.  The Left actively took advantage of this.  Furthermore, the 
founding of the Green party aided attempts on the part of the alternative ballots 
to develop new ways to communicate and organize, as it elevated discussion by 
providing the Left with a new integrative element: ecological ideas.  The 
phenomenon I call the ‘green-alternative synthesis’- the fusion of environmental 
ideas with concerns about human rights, feminism, affordable housing, 
international peace, and economic exploitation- was already beginning to take 
shape. 
 Despite these changes, though, the AL’s attitude toward parliament 
remained fundamentally ambivalent.  After the 1981 election, one writer looked 
back at the AL’s paradoxical stance as an anti-parliamentary party campaigning 
for office and neatly summarized the AL’s views: “TO HELL WITH 
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PARLIAMENT-  WE WANT IN!”159  The next chapter examines the AL’s fight to 
enter parliament and its early experiences there, when the organization’s 
members faced the next stage in the evolution of their ideas regarding 
parliamentary democracy. 
                                                 
159 SCHEISS AUFS PARLAMENT- WIR WOLLEN REIN!  “Wohin gehst 





The APO in Parliament 
 When the AL entered the West Berlin Abgeordnetenhaus in 1981, the West 
Berlin political scene was confronted with a paradoxical situation: the APO had 
entered parliament.  This was true for both interpretations of the acronym: for 
the AL as part of the  ‘extra-parliamentary opposition,’ in the sense that the AL 
had many of the characteristics of the opposition movements that worked 
outside of parliaments from the 1950s through the 1970s; and for the AL as an 
‘anti-parliamentary opposition,’ with the AL’s fundamentally negative attitude 
toward parliament and parliamentary institutions.1   
 This chapter focuses on the period most marked by this paradox and its 
consequences, 1981-1985.  During this time, the AL continued the course of 
radical opposition it had begun in the early years of its founding.  Propelled into 
parliament to a large degree by the controversies surrounding West Berlin’s 
housing policies, the AL’s presence in the West Berlin parliament brought it 
increased visibility and greater resources with which to develop and articulate its 
alternative proposals.  In its attitudes toward parliament expressed in acts in the 
Abgeordnetenhaus and in its intra-party debates and publications, in its stance on 
violent protest and terrorism, in its attitudes toward the Federal Republic and the 
                                                 
1 Recall that Franz Schneider claimed that “APO,” the German acronym 
for “extra-parliamentary opposition,” ausserparlamentarische Opposition, stood just 
as much for “anti-parliamentary opposition,” antiparlamentarische Opposition.  See 
Schneider, Dienstjubiläum, 49. 
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GDR, in its views of the Western Allies, and in its views of the national question, 
the AL continued to express and build upon the ideology of the radical Left.  
Even in this early phase of parliamentary representation, however, important 
signs of deradicalization and parliamentarization may be found beneath the 
surface of apparent uncompromising radicalism.  Moreover, certain 
developments during this period helped nudge the AL slowly in the direction of 
accepting and embracing parliamentary democracy. 
Though West Berlin was still an ‘island city,’ developments at the national 
and international level during this period also played a role, if mostly as 
developments to be reacted against.  Recent electoral triumphs of laissez-faire 
neo-conservatism embodied by Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan 
foreshadowed the end of the social-liberal coalition in West Germany, when the 
CDU-CSU defeated the SPD and Helmut Kohl replaced Helmut Schmidt as West 
German Chancellor in 1982.  This Wende, or turning-point, in West German 
politics was at least as much a result of the malaise of the SPD as it was about the 
rise of the popularity of the CDU-CSU, as the founding and rise in popularity of 
the West German Green Party attests.2  Moreover, the Cold War, which in the 
past seemed to have been tamed through the process of détente, appeared to be 
intensifying again.  Reagan in the United States and Brezhnev and Andropov (as 
of 1982) in the USSR seemed to be stepping up the rhetoric of international 
                                                 
2 Nicholls, Bonn Republic, 283.  In 1983, the West German Greens became 
the first new political party since 1953 to enter the Bundestag. 
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conflict.  In West Germany, the politics of bloc confrontation reached their peak 
with the so-called Doppelbeschluss, or two-track decision, which in 1983 was 
implemented by stationing modernized medium-range nuclear missiles on West 
German soil.  This decision was highly controversial in West Germany, and 
divided the Left.3 
The two-track decision also provided the focal point for West Germany’s 
peace movement.  During the first half of the eighties, this movement 
“represented the crowning glory of postwar peace protest.”4  Concern over the 
stationing of missiles united a remarkably broad spectrum of groups that cut 
across confessional and political divides to form “by far the largest social 
movement West Germany had ever seen.”5  In 1980 and 1981, public awareness 
and discussion of the two-track decision were intensifying.  In one week during 
October 1983, immediately before the Bundestag was due to make its final 
decision regarding the missiles, between two and four million people took part 
in protests.  Once the stationing had been approved, demonstrators attempted to 
physically block its implementation.6  The West Berlin election was held during 
the early phase of this campaign, and the degree to which the issue had 
                                                 
3 For an in-depth examination of the controversies surrounding the two-
track decision and the insights these provided into West German political 
culture, see Herf, War. 
4 Alice Holmes Cooper, Paradoxes of Peace: German Peace Movements since 
1945 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), 209-210. 
5 Cooper, Paradoxes, 151. 
6 Cooper, Paradoxes, 208-209. 
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permeated the public’s consciousness no doubt contributed to the AL’s electoral 
success in 1981. 
Though all of these factors had an impact on West Berlin, still, local 
concerns dominated West Berlin politics in the early 1980s.  The growing sense of 
crisis in the housing situation in West Berlin particularly influenced the election 
of 1981.  As was seen in the last chapter, the scandal that forced the government 
to move the elections forward was sparked in part by housing speculation.  
Moreover, the election campaign itself played out against the backdrop of a new 
social movement that focused on the housing issue.  Examining this movement 
more closely provides context for the 1981 elections and gives key insights into 
an important clientele of the AL.  The housing issue emerged as critical to the 
historical development of the AL.  In fact, the coalition with the SPD ended over 
the issue of housing squatters, as will be seen in Chapter Seven.  Overall, the AL 
cannot be understood without a closer examination of the housing squatters’ 
movement. 
 The housing squatters do not seem at first glance to be related to the New 
Left, and appear on the surface to have been a single-issue fringe phenomenon.  
When examined more closely and in historical context, however, it becomes clear 
that the squatters were part of the counter-cultural response to the dissolution of 
the SDS, examined in Chapter Two.  What seemed merely to have been about 
affordable housing and a criticism of housing politics turns out to have been far 
more complicated.  Just beneath the surface of the housing debates lurked many 
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other issues, about historic preservation, about capitalism, about the problems of 
modernity, and even about the relationship to the Allies and the legacy of 
Germany’s lost wars.  The movement brought ecologically-minded persons into 
the fold due to the undercurrents of aversion to modern life in West Berlin.  
Furthermore, the energies released by the housing squatters’ movement brought 
other issues close to the West German Left bubbling to the surface, including the 
anti-Springer campaign and prison reform.  Overall, the housing issue of the 
early 1980s became the rallying point of numerous opposition groups concerned 
about the direction in which West German society seemed to be moving.    
 The housing squatters were linked closely to the AL.  As an early advocate 
of affordable housing and as an outsider party untainted by past scandals, the 
AL was able to harness the squatters’ energy and electoral potential and use 
them as a springboard into parliament in the 1981 election.  The AL did the best 
in the 1981 elections in districts such as Kreuzberg, where the housing squatters 
were the strongest: in 1981, the AL polled at 14 percent in Kreuzberg, the center 
of the squatters’ movement.7  And 1981, the year in which the AL swept into the 
West Berlin Parliament, marked the high point of the squatters’ phenomenon.   
 The AL capitalized on the housing squatters’ movement, tapping into its 
members for support.  In the process, however, the K-group veterans, who still 
represented the largest group within the AL, found themselves overwhelmed by 
                                                 
7 Statistisches Landesamt Berlin, 2001.  The AL received more votes in 
Kreuzberg than in any other district in West Berlin. 
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newcomers, who boosted the electoral strength of the AL but further diluted the 
KPD-Rote Fahne’s ability to dominate as a bloc.  This organization dissolved 
itself in 1980, and by the election of 1981, it was no longer apparent that the AL 
had been its direct successor. 
 Squatting houses is a widespread phenomenon in European cities, but the 
situation in Berlin was especially acute, partly due to the destruction of World 
War II but also as a result of policies favoring the practice of purchasing old flats 
and letting them deteriorate so that landlords could tear them down and 
construct more profitable luxury apartments and businesses.8  As a result, West 
Berliners faced a crucial shortage of affordable housing- one estimate is that 
around eighty thousand Berliners were searching for a place to live in 1980. 9  
Some responded by moving into neglected, highly deteriorated vacant buildings 
awaiting the wrecking ball.  This put them in direct conflict with both landlords 
and police, who occasionally would try forcibly to evict the squatters, setting the 
stage for the increasingly violent confrontations between the squatters and the 
police that haunted West Berlin, particularly in the early eighties. 
                                                 
8 Richie, Faust’s Metropolis, 785.  For a Europe-wide perspective on the 
housing squatters, see Wer sind die Instandbesetzer, ed. Volkhard Brandes and 
Bernhard Schön (Bensheim : Paed. Extra Buchverlag, 1981).  The publication of 
the early 1980s Instandbesetzerpost (IBP) provides critical insights into the West 
Berlin housing squatter scene.  The library of the Free University Berlin has a 
nearly complete collection of this source.  Note that as a home-grown 
publication, the pagination of the IBP is very irregular: page numbers  are given 
whenever possible. 
9 Richie, Faust’s Metropolis, 785. 
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 It would be difficult to overestimate the importance of the squatters’ 
movement to West Berlin politics in the early 1980s.  Indeed, the movement 
received an extraordinary degree of public support, sometimes coming from 
unlikely sources.  For example, Heinrich Albertz, the Governing Mayor of West 
Berlin at the time of the shooting of Benno Ohnesorg and formerly the mortal 
enemy of the West Berlin Left, publicly and vocally supported the squatters, and 
an interview with him appeared in the semi-official journal of the movement, the 
Instandbesetzerpost.10   
 The central idea of the movement, often forgotten, was not only to occupy 
houses, but also to renovate them.  By occupying the houses, the squatters 
followed in the footsteps of student demonstrators, who occupied classrooms 
and other university buildings in sit-ins, teach-ins, and so on.  The renovation 
component was new, however.  This emphasis on renovation served a dual 
purpose: it eased the housing shortage, thus providing housing for only the cost 
of the materials it would take to make them livable, and it brought attention to 
the policies of neglect allegedly followed by the landlords and the Berlin Senate.  
The full name of the movement reflects this, but is difficult to translate into 
English.  Instandbesetzer, the German word for the squatters, is a pun describing 
their activities: “Instandbesetzen” is an amalgam of two words, “instandsetzen,” 
                                                 
10 IBP 26 (October 1981), 12-13.  Interestingly, the interview emphasized 
Albertz’s conflicts with the Occupying Powers in 1949 in his capacity as Minister 
for Refugees.  See Schuster, Heinrich Albertz, 14-19 for a brief description of 
Albertz’s conversion to an ally and a father confessor to the West Berlin 
alternative movement.  
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to renovate or restore, and “besetzen,” to occupy.  Thus the word Instandbesetzer 
literally means “squatter-renovator.”  Articles in the movement’s main 
publication, the Instandbesetzer Post  (IBP), gave advice as to how to restore and 
renovate dilapidated houses, and showed how to tap into electricity illegally.  
This advice was implicitly and sometimes explicitly linked with the ideology of 
the movements associated with the Left.  One issue featured a picture of a coping 
saw with the slogan, “handwork creates consciousness!”11 
 The importance assigned to renovation is in fact key to understanding the 
movement and its historical context.  Through its emphasis on renovation, the 
squatters’ movement became a springboard for a renaissance of a back-to-nature, 
do-it-yourself counterculture.  An organization with strong ties to the squatter-
renovators in Kreuzberg, the movement’s unofficial capital, was called 
“KOSMOS- Kiez Organisation Selber Machen Oder Sterben”- Kiez organization do it 
yourself or die.12  The newsletter carried advertisements clearly reflecting the 
back-to-nature movement, promoting products such as homespun wool and a 
sixteen-year long walk across the continent and a “return to the nomadic 
lifestyle” of old.13  Housing squatters even sponsored their own cinemas.14 
                                                 
11 Handarbeit schafft bewusstsein!  IBP 14 (12 June 1981), 25.   
12 IBP 21 (4 September 1981), 37. 
13 IBP 21 (4 September 1981), 4; Die Rückkehr zum Nomadenleben.  IBP 22 
(11 September 1981), 23. 
14 IBP 21 (4 September 1981), 30. 
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  The drive for self-reliance also extended into medicine and policing, 
realms normally left to the state.  This related both to the mistrust of officials and 
the justice system and the importance of protest to the squatter-renovators.  The 
squatter-renovators set up surveillance systems including night watches, a 
telephone chain, and radio contacts in order to guard against theft, police raids, 
and attacks by right-wing gangs.15  They also established independent medics for 
the purpose of giving first aid to those injured in street riots.  The IBP printed a 
suggested list of contents for first aid kits designed to treat injuries sustained 
during street battles, as well as triage instructions.16 
 Other images reveal the anti-modern tendencies of the squatter-
renovators, especially in their images of a utopian Berlin.  The squatter-
renovators’ Spring Festival of 1981 provided inspiration for one such bucolic 
scene.  A man bearing the insignia of the squatter-renovators and holding a 
pitchfork stands next to a woman with a hay rake.  Around them are a sheep, a 
goat, a farm dog, a cow, and assorted poultry, while in the background, the roofs 
of Kreuzberg and East Berlin’s television tower can be seen.17  A cartoon on the 
history of the squatters’ movement features a group of squatters who look much 
more like sturdy German peasants than urban dwellers.18 
                                                 
15 IBP 14 (12 June 1981), 7. 
16 IBP 16 (9 July 1981), 10-13. 
17 IBP 2 (17 March 1981).  See Figure 5. 
18 IBP 14 (12 June 1981).  See Figure 6. 
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 In many ways, the back-to-nature, do-it-yourself thrust of the squatters’ 
movement was a continuation of the “romantic relapse” identified by Richard 
Löwenthal in connection with the student movement.  According to Löwenthal, 
the violence of the student movement resulted from a “romantic despair” 
stemming from a generation’s unwillingness to accept the conditions of modern 
industrial society dominated by technology.19  Similarly, the housing squatters 
rejected aspects of modern society ranging from mass-produced goods to basic 
services such as hospitals and police.  
 Elements of the anti-Springer campaign also were to be found among the 
squatter-renovators, and attacks on Axel Springer and his newspapers were 
common.  One author claimed that as a child, Springer’s favorite pastime was “to 
smear everything with feces.”20  In order not to have to give up this hobby, Axel 
grew up to become a publisher and created the Berlin tabloid BZ.  Squatter-
renovators also accused Springer’s papers of running classified ads promoting 
the services of groups specializing in expelling squatters from private property.21 
 The links between the ideological concerns of the squatter-renovators and 
issues associated with the New Left became especially clear in the context of the 
organization of the so-called “TUWAT conference.”  This international event, 
held in 1981 in West Berlin, was in part a reaction against an event held three 
                                                 
19 Romantische Verzweiflung.  Löwenthal, Romantischer Rückfall, 5. 
20 Alles mit Scheisse zu beschmieren.  IBP 4 (1 April 1981), 3. 
21 IBP 1 (11 March 1981), 3. 
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years earlier- the “TUNIX” conference.  Activists criticized the attendees of this 
first meeting of the alternative scene for theorizing instead of acting, and sought 
to cast their own event in a new light.  Instead of doing nothing, their conference 
would be characterized by action- they would do something about the problems 
facing the movement and the city.22  Moreover, this activism was by no means 
limited to the concerns of the housing squatters.  The “Tuwat Song,” the German 
lyrics of which are only slightly less stilted than the English translation, 
illustrates this well: 
In the beginning for me it was mostly about the house, 
I wanted to live together and get out of my little room. 
But when I see what kind of crap goes on, 
I know for sure that it’s not just about the housing fight. 
I’m doing something now… 
The song also incorporated the anti-nuclear movement:  
 
Soon in Gorleben they’ll build a storage site, 
a radioactive block that fouls up the environment. 
Man, what good will my little home be when the storage site threatens 
to maybe blow up, then I’ll be dead soon! 
I’m doing something now…23 
                                                 
22 Tunix is German slang meaning ‘to do nothing,’while Tuwat is Berlin 
dialect for ‘do something.’ 
23 Am Anfang ging’s mir zum grossen Teil ums Haus, 
wollt zusamm’n leben und aus meiner Bude raus. 
Doch wenn ich sehe, was für Scheisse vor sich geht 
weiss ich sicher, dass es nicht nur um Häuserkampf geht. 
Ich tu jetzt wat ich tu jetzt wat... 
In Gorleben wird bald ein Lager gebaut 
ein radioaktiver Klotz, der die Umwelt versaut 
Mensch, was nützt mir denn mein Häusli wenn das Zwischenlager droht, 
dass das Ding vielleicht doch hochgeht und dann bin ich bald tot! 
Ich tu jetzt wat, ich tu jetzt wat….   




 This was not the only evidence of an environmental consciousness.  In the 
weekly section giving construction tips, the section on painting urged squatter-
renovators not to use spray paint cans for painting rooms because of their 
deleterious effect on the ozone layer.  Their use should be reserved for spraying 
graffiti “in action on the front” in the housing battle.24  One writer suggested that 
squatter-renovators plant more trees along the streets in the ‘Kiez’, the local 
neighborhood.25  Ecologically-oriented bookstores advertised in the IBP.26  One 
initiative of the squatter-renovators involved “greening the Kiez” by distributing 
homegrown plants that could survive the winters, together with watering cans 
and soil.27  Activists also attempted to draw parallels between earlier 
environmental movements such as the protest against the power plant at 
Oberjägerweg in Spandau, with commentators calling this campaign Berlin’s 
largest squatting action before the squatter-renovators.28  Similarly, the IBP 
covered actions of the ‘Citizens’ Initiative Tegeler Forest’ on several occasions, 
keeping readers updated on the fight against construction of a highway through 
a West Berlin forest.29 
                                                 
24 Spraydosen nur für den Einsatz an der Front!  IBP 14 (12 June 1981), 25. 
25 IBP 2 (17 March 1981), 2. 
26 IBP 5 (9 March 1981), 11. 
27 IBP 12 (29 May 1981), 11. 
28 IBP 16 (9 July 1981), 19. 
29 IBP 29 (7 November 1981), 11; IBP 31 (4 December 1981), 12. 
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The RAF prisoners carrying out hunger strikes also received attention, 
and the squatter-renovators viewed their plight sympathetically.  Organizers 
attempted to enlist the squatters in the protest against the conditions under 
which RAF prisoners were confined, and to mobilize this issue’s protest 
potential.  This included attempts to equate the squatter-renovators’ plight with 
that of the prisoners.  The squatter-renovators were “all threatened with jail, 
[they] also stand in the tradition of those who risked something back then...and 
now are fighting for survival against solitary confinement and special treatment- 
June 2 Movement, RAF, those who occupied the Amerika-Haus and others.”30  
Another commentator drew an explicit parallel between the policies of the state 
toward housing and urban development and those of prison:  “This state does its 
best to strangle everything human in concrete- whether in the Märkisches Viertel 
or in Moabit prison.”31 
 Two slogans central to the movement help characterize the mentality of 
the squatter-renovators.  One of the slogans, “Just watch out!” was used 
frequently by the squatter-renovators.32  The other slogan, “Too bad concrete 
                                                 
30 Alle irgendwie von Knast bedroht, irgendwie auch in der Tradition 
deren stehend, die damals schon was riskierten…und jetzt ums  Überleben 
kämpfen, gegen Isoknast und Sonderbehandlung- 2. Juni, RAF, Amerika-Haus-
Besetzer und andere.  IBP 1 (11 March 1981), 3. 
31 Dieser Staat tut sein Möglichstes, um alles Menschliche in Beton zu 
ersticken- ob es nun im Märkischen Viertel oder im Moabiter Gefängnis ist.  IBP 
4 (1 April 1981), 15.  The Märkisches Viertel was a part of West Berlin near 
Kreuzberg 
32 Passt bloss auf!  At its most defiant, IBP 17 (18 July 1981), cover. 
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doesn’t burn!” was often employed by squatters throughout West Germany.33  
Both slogans clearly expressed threats of violent protest.  “Just watch out!” was a 
challenge to general authority, and was also used by the AL to shake up the so-
called established parties.34  “Too bad concrete doesn’t burn” was of course a 
much less veiled threat against property, and also contained an inherent critique 
of the urban policies of the parties in power and their tendency ‘to pave over 
everything.’ 
Squatter-renovators frequently put these threats into action.  When the 
police stormed a squatted house, violent clashes regularly ensued, sometimes 
spilling over into the main part of the city.  Targets of this violence were 
revealing: banks, department stores, and grocery store chains, all symbols of 
capitalism.  One rioter described a typical reaction to police actions in a most 
revealing way: “Due to the hopelessness of the situation about 150 to 200 people 
marched from the Chamisoplatz….  We expressed our anger against banks (the 
real wire-pullers behind all politics) and against Hertie [a super-market chain], 
which has nothing better to do than to wrest the bitterly earned money from out 
of the pockets of us, the little people.”35  Conflicts with the police became so 
                                                 
33 Schade, dass Beton nicht brennt!  IBP 21 (4 September 1981), 30. 
34 The slogan appeared on a banner celebrating the AL’s entry into the 
Abgeordnetenhaus in 1981.  See Mayer, Schmolt, and Wolf, Zehn Jahre Alternative 
Liste, 55.  Also used in a self-ironic way, MRB 58 (September 1989), cover. 
35 Aufgrund der Hoffnungslosigkeit der Lage zogen 150 bis 200 Leute vom 
Chamisoplatz aus….  Unsere Wut entlud sich gegen Banken (die eigentlichen 
Drahtzieher jeder Politik) und gegen Hertie, der auch nichts anderes tut, als uns 
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intense that the protesters sardonically asked the “protective powers” for 
protection from the West German “beating police.”36   
 Most of the time, however, the squatter-renovators were not asking for 
help from the protective powers, however ironically, but were busy criticizing 
them, if only obliquely.  There were strong undertones of reaction against the 
presence of Allied troops in West Berlin among the publications of the squatter-
renovators.  Evidence even indicates that at least some of the squatters viewed 
themselves as guerilla warriors struggling against an occupying army.  In their 
perspective, the West German police were collaborating with the conquerors, 
from whom they thought they were liberating territory for themselves.  An 
article on a police raid in Kreuzberg was headlined “Enemy troops in KO 36.”37  
The front page featured pictures of tanks (actually armored police vehicles) 
doctored to feature SS runes on the front rolling down the streets of Kreuzberg.  
Thus the squatters managed to think of themselves both as anti-fascist and as 
continuing their struggle against the occupiers.  The language used to describe 
this struggle was at times remarkable.  At the end of one demonstration, a 
                                                                                                                                                 
“kleinen” Leuten das sauer verdiente Geld aus der Tasche zu ziehen.  IBP 1 (11 
March 1981), 3. 
36 Besetzer an Besatzer: ‘Wir ersuchen die Allierten Schutzmächte um 
Schutz vor der dt. Prügelpolizei.’  IBP 1 (11 March 1981), 12. 
37 KO 36 was the old postal code for Kreuzberg, and was often used 
proudly by Kreuzbergers to emphasize their unique identity.  When I was doing 
research in 2001 in Kreuzberg, I witnessed native Kreuzbergers still defiantly 
referring to their district as KO 36 in speech and in writing, despite the fact that 
the postal codes had been reformed for decades. 
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participant noted, “We have shown that we will not give up without a fight that 
which we have taken, that we won’t let our conquered living spaces be taken 
from us and that there are ever more who are ready to fight for this.”38  
 As was the case with the K-groups, the anti-capitalism of the squatter-
renovators spilled over into something that, while not overt anti-Semitism, 
certainly appears to have been a xenophobic racism.  In imagining the capitalist 
enemy and in striving to express their fear and hatred of capitalism, the squatter-
renovators employed imagery reminiscent of caricatures used under National 
Socialism.  There is the image of the capitalist as blood-sucking vampire and life-
consuming zombie, and of the capitalist as menacing foreigner controlling the 
greedy, corrupt, and violent police force.39  Similarly, the housing speculator 
made an appearance as the sinister foreigner who extorted his living by charging 
Germans to rent their homes, and as a monster luring innocent blonde German 
women to their doom.40 
 The squatter-renovators in West Berlin thus included many more issues 
than merely the scarcity of housing.  It became something of a catchall movement 
                                                 
38 Wir haben gezeigt, dass wir nicht widerstandslos aufgeben, war wir uns 
genommen haben, uns unsere eroberten Lebensräume nicht einfach wegnehmen 
lassen und dass es immer mehr werden, die bereit sind, dafür zu kämpfen.  “Wer 
ist eigentlich unser Feind, der Staat oder die Mülltonne,” flyer reprinted in IBP 17 
(18 July 1981), 2. 
39 IBP 4 (1 April 1981), cover.  See Figure 7; IBP 2 (17 March 1981), 16.  See 
Figure 8. 




itself, representing a continuity to many aspects of the New Left.  The ability of 
the environmental movement to bring diverse groups together has already been 
mentioned.  The squatters’ movement was able to appeal to so many groups for 
similar reasons.  On a metaphorical level, ecologists saw the practice of letting 
houses decay in the interest of profit as analogous to the plundering of the 
planet.  Groups from the anti-nuclear movement were also involved, as the 
TUWAT song makes clear.  Communists saw the speculators as a prime example 
of capitalist abuse, putting money first and ignoring the needs of people.  Those 
inclined to embrace the peculiar nationalism of the Left saw the housing 
squatters as involved in a larger struggle against the occupiers imposing the 
division of Germany and propping up the capitalist order.  Some also saw 
themselves as defending territory liberated from the invading capitalist armies of 
the Allies, or, even worse, the German capitalists themselves, backed up by the 
politicians and the police.  By harnessing itself to this movement, the AL gained a 
tremendous amount of electoral potential.  It also inherited some problems, 
however.  These problems related especially to the issue of trying to represent 
and protect a movement with highly ambivalent views of the state and especially 
of the role of violence in political protest. 
 Against the backdrop of the housing squatters, the West Berlin political 
parties waged their 1981 election campaign.  In the weeks leading up to the 
election, the AL attracted increased media attention.  The weekly newsmagazine 
Der Spiegel surveyed AL voters and members and concluded that “the Greens are 
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red,” as AL voters classified themselves as far to the left in the political 
spectrum.41  The article also noted that AL voters were much younger than those 
voting for other parties.  Almost all were under 30 years old, and almost none 
were over 50.  AL supporters also tended to be better educated and more widely 
traveled than supporters of other parties.  Finally, the survey found that the AL 
had relatively little support from the working class, and relatively high support 
among officials and white-collar workers.  The patterns of support for the AL 
were thus quite consistent with Markovits and Gorski’s assertion about the link 
between the rise of the Green Party and the weakening link between the Left and 
the workers’ movement.42 
Another Spiegel article focused on the radical nature of the AL and its 
potential to disrupt the West Berlin electoral scene.  According to Tilman Fichter, 
a political scientist and expert on the West Berlin Left, the AL was an “omnibus: 
every single-issue movement can climb aboard as long as it accepts the 
ideological dominance of the driver.”43  The article also noted the presence of two 
former June 2 Movement members on the ballot: Peter Paul Zahl and Gerd 
Klöpper had places on the AL’s electoral list, though their chances of election 
were virtually nil due to their low position on the ballot.  Nevertheless, this 
                                                 
41 “Die Grünen sind rot,” Der Spiegel 35, no. 15 (6 April 1981), 35. 
42 Markovits and Gorski, German Left, 3. 
43 Die AL ist ein Omnibus: jede Einpunktbewegung kann zusteigen, 
solange sie die prinzipielle ideologische Herrschaft des Chauffeurs akzeptiert.  
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revealed a disturbing attitude toward parliament: one discussion participant 
derided parliament as a “crappy joint.”44  The article worried that the AL could 
block the formation of a government in West Berlin if the electoral forecasts 
proved true.  The article also gave the perceptions of the AL from the perspective 
of the other West Berlin parties.  The SPD had the most to lose from the AL’s rise: 
accordingly, the SPD warned that the AL was “a party dominated by dogmatic 
leftist forces.”45  The FDP, which could potentially fall below the 5 percent 
threshold, tarred the AL as “in domestic policy, anarchists, and in foreign policy, 
gamblers.”46  The CDU’s mayoral hope Richard von Weizsäcker called the AL 
“indescribable,” at best just “a conglomeration of opinions.”47  
 The AL’s 1981 electoral platform was remarkable in many ways.  First, 
whereas it began with attacks on the established parties, its self-definition was no 
longer negative: unlike the program from 1979, it gave a fairly clear definition of 
what it stood for rather than against.  It also shows that the AL increasingly 
defined itself in terms of fighting for the rights of women and encouraging 
                                                                                                                                                 
“Berlin: Blockade durch die Alternativen?”  Der Spiegel 35, no. 19 (4 May 1981), 
44. 
44 Beschissener Laden.  “Blockade durch die Alternativen,” 50. 
45 Eine von linksdogmatischen Kräften beherrschte Partei.  “Blockade 
durch die Alternativen,” 37. 
46 Innenpolitische Chaoten und aussenpolitische Hasardeure.  “Blockade 
durch die Alternativen,” 37. 




women to participate in parliament.  Nevertheless, the program retained the 
doctrine of the primacy of the extra-parliamentary.  It insisted, “Grass roots 
movements and citizens’ initiatives are more important to us than parliamentary 
debates and voting on laws.  We have selected our candidates for the Berlin 
legislature and the district councils accordingly.”48 
 Unsurprisingly, housing policy received a prominent place in the AL’s 
1981 electoral program: among the issues addressed with concrete proposals, 
housing policy came first.  The program demanded improved rights for renter’s 
organizations and initiatives “as bearers of collective resistance;” it pledged the 
AL’s commitment to the rights of individual tenants; and it promised to work to 
decentralize decision making regarding housing policy.49  It committed the AL to 
work to legalize the practice of squatting houses in order to renovate them, and 
to achieve amnesty for those arrested in connection with the squatter-renovators 
movement.  The AL pledged to try to prevent the destruction of apartment 
buildings, and announced that it would work to prosecute those carrying out this 
destruction; and it called for immediate renovation of those flats currently 
empty, as well as the reintroduction of rent control.  Finally, the program 
demanded that politicians dismantle the incentive system for modernization and 
                                                 
48 Basisbewegungen und Bürgerinitiativen sind uns wichtiger als 
Parlamentsdebatten und Gesetzesabstimmungen.  Danach haben wir auch 
unsere Kandidaten für das Abgeordnetenhaus und die 
Bezirksverordnetenversammlungen ausgesucht.  Wahlbroschüre 1981, 11. 
49 Träger des kollektiven Widerstandes. 
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construction of new buildings, which the AL held responsible for the housing 
crisis, and called for the return of publicly subsidized housing.50 
 In the program, it now introduced to the public the important structural 
changes adopted a few months earlier.  In particular, the fixed mandate helped 
the AL portray itself as a genuine political outsider untainted by corruption.  
From the perspective of the AL, delegates answering to their own conscience 
were merely able to be bought.51  
 The program laid out the AL’s plans for the Abgeordnetenhaus.  Rather than 
attending to the formalities of law making, the AL made it clear that “if 
necessary, we will kick up a fuss in Parliament.”52  But it also intended to serve as 
a source of hope for those who believed in a more progressive politics, as well as 
those who wished to shake up the political establishment. 
 Like that of 1979, the 1981 electoral program was clearly directed against 
this political establishment: the electoral program enjoined voters to work 
together to “thwart the plans of all the established parties!”53  But the rhetoric had 
shifted: instead of directing its anger at parliaments and the parliamentary 
system in general, the anger focused against the “established parties” and the 
                                                 
50 Wahlbroschüre 1981, 15. 
51 Wahlbroschüre 1981, 11. 
52 Wenn es not tut, werden wir im Abgeordnetenhaus mal auf den Putz 
hauen.  Wahlbroschüre 1981, 12. 
53 Machen wir allen etablierten Parteien einen Strich durch die Rechnung!  
Wahlbroschüre 1981, 9. 
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spoils system with which they were allegedly intimately connected.  Moreover, 
the program linked this spoils system directly to the pressing problems of West 
Berlin.  Under the established parties, the city merely continued to decay.  
Environmental problems plagued the city: the brochure asked, “Who wants their 
children to grow up without knowing what a real meadow and a real forest are, 
or that they only experience it when on vacation?  Who wants always to be sick, 
because the air is so bad that even the children get bronchitis?  Who wants to live 
between building ruins or between highway access roads or between cement 
silos without tree or bush?”54  
 Rather than portraying West Berlin’s problems in terms of the problems 
and failures of capitalism, however, the program set them squarely in the context 
of the city’s geopolitical position: “But the main problem lies deeper!  This city 
has no chance as an independent factor in any matter, it cannot solve any 
problem itself if it cannot rid itself of its role as whipping boy between East and 
West.”55  Thus, to a certain degree, the answer to West Berlin’s problems lay in 
the resolution of East-West conflicts, which the program advocated solving 
                                                 
54 Wer will schon, dass seine Kinder aufwachsen, ohne zu wissen, was eine 
richtige Wiese und ein richtiger Wald sind oder dass sie es nur im Urlaub 
erfahren?  Wer will schon dauernd krank sein, weil die Luft so schlecht ist, dass 
schon die Kinder Bronchitis bekommen?  Wer will schon zwischen Häuserruinen 
wohnen oder zwischen Autobahnzubringern oder zwischen Betonsilos ohne 
Baum und Strauch?  Wahlbroschüre 1981, 9-10. 
55 Doch das hauptsächliche Problem liegt tiefer!  Diese Stadt hat keine 
Chance als selbstständiger Faktor, auf welchem Gebiet auch immer, sie kann 
kein einziges Problem selbst lösen, wenn sie die Rolle des Prügelknaben 
zwischen Ost und West nicht los wird.  Wahlbroschüre 1981, 10. 
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through a European peace settlement that would also involve the dissolution of 
the East and West blocs. 
 The political program did not distance the AL from violence.  In fact, the 
question of the acceptability of political violence would continue to haunt the AL 
throughout the 1980s.  It was a particularly controversial issue for the AL 
because of the violence associated with the protests and rallies accompanying the 
housing squatters’ movement.  Far from renouncing violence, the AL blamed the 
policies of the established parties using what boiled down to a ‘they started it’ 
argument:  “The established parties now rail against violence.  We ask: has 
anyone delivered a better justification for violence than the established parties 
themselves, who for years didn’t give a damn about tenants’ social misery and 
indignation, but who now pose as problem-solvers since the conflicts began.  We 
did not invent the violence, it was already there.”56 
 The program reflected similar motivations for participating in parliament 
that arose in the course of the Tiergarten debate discussed above.  The AL 
wished to enter Parliament in May “in order to make it more difficult to deceive 
voters.”57  And the primacy of the extra-parliamentary work remained in place.  
                                                 
56 Die Etablierten wettern jetzt gegen Gewalt.  Wir fragen: Hat jemand eine 
bessere Rechtfertigung geliefert für Gewalt als die Etablierten selbst, die sich 
jahrelang  einen Dreck scherten um das soziale Elend der Menschen in ihren 
Wohnungen und um ihre Empörung, sich aber jetzt als Problemlöser aufspielen, 
seit die Auseinandersetzungen eskaliert sind.  Wir haben die Gewalt nicht 
erfunden, sondern vorgefunden. Wahlbroschüre 1981, 14. 
57 Um den Betrug am Bürger schwerer zu machen.  Wahlbroschüre 1981, 11. 
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“What is decisive is that which happens outside of parliaments, at the grassroots 
level- everywhere, where people fight for their rights, their environment, their 
living conditions.”58 
 Specific programmatic demands of note included opposition to nuclear 
energy or construction of large power plants that would further degrade Berlin’s 
air quality, and the promotion of renewable energy and more efficient use of 
energy resources; improved transit systems and traffic planning; improved 
employment programs; and an improved social policy.  The program devoted a 
great deal of attention to the plight of women in West Berlin, and demanded 
equal rights and improved treatment of sexual minorities, as well as better 
treatment of West Berlin’s Gastarbeiter.  The program also devoted a large section 
to the dangers of a police state.  Opposition to Berufsverbote and strands of anti-
Springer rhetoric were also to be found.59 
 A remarkably large section of the program addressed policies regarding 
Berlin.  Rather than insisting that Berlin could only serve its function as city of 
peace and freedom if it could handle its urban problems, the AL blamed West 
Berlin’s “unnatural geopolitical situation.”60  Whereas other parties allegedly 
ignored the long-term perspectives for Berlin, the AL saw itself as obliged “to put 
                                                 
58 Entscheidend ist, was ausserhalb des Parlaments geschieht, an der 
“Basis”- überall dort, wo Menschen um ihr Recht, um ihre Umwelt, um ihre 
Lebensbedingungen kämpfen.  Wahlbroschüre 1981, 12. 
59 Wahlbroschüre 1981, 32. 
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its finger on this sore.”61  It noted, “the continuing occupied status of Berlin 
shows that the formation of military blocs in Europe under the leadership of the 
United States and the Soviet Union carries unresolved problems with it.  
Through resolving the German question and ending the confrontation of the 
blocs in Europe, Berlin could gain a future perspective.”62  The AL thus saw itself 
as an advocate of German unity, but was adamant that this unity not involve “a 
central Prussian state.”  Instead, it advocated unity “on a historical, cultural, 
economic, social, and humane level.”63  The forms this might take should be left 
open.  But it viewed as its task combating the lack of rights for Berliners imposed 
by the presence of foreign troops, as seen in the conflict of the Düppeler Field 
and the Gatower Heide. 
 The program also continued to emphasize support for the democratic and 
socialist opposition in the GDR.  The AL advocated free reporting in East and 
West and the unlimited exchange of books and newspapers across the intra-
German border.  It wished to ease travel between East and West by advocating 
                                                                                                                                                 
60 Die unnatürliche geographisch-politische Situation West-Berlins. 
Wahlbroschüre 1981, 33. 
61 Den Finger auf diese Wunde legen.  Wahlbroschüre 1981, 33. 
62 Der andauernde Besatzungszustand Berlins zeigt, dass die militärische 
Blockbildung in Europa unter Führung von USA und Sowjetunion und die 
Teilung Deutschlands ungelöste Probleme in sich bergen.  Durch die Lösung der 
deutschen Frage und die Auflösung der europäischen Blockkonfrontation kann 
Berlin eine Zukunftsperspektive gewinnen.  Wahlbroschüre 1981, 33. 
63 Ein preussischer Zentralstaat; Uns geht es v.a. um eine Einheit auf 
historisch gewachsener, kultureller, wirtschaftlicher, sozialer und menschlicher 
Ebene.  Wahlbroschüre 1981, 33. 
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the end of observation of travelers, as well as the elimination of the mandatory 
currency exchange.  It advocated free travel for all in both blocs.64 
 Finally, its plans for Berlin held that Berlin should become a center of 
peace.  This involved freeing Europe of atomic weapons and dissolving both 
NATO and the Warsaw pact, as well as ending the arms race in East and West.65  
Years earlier, the KPD-Rote Fahne had advocated exactly these measures.  In fact, 
many of the demands and concerns advanced by the KPD-Rote Fahne 
reappeared in both the 1979 and 1981 election platforms.  But the attitude toward 
parliament and the means by which these demands were to be achieved had 
shifted significantly. 
 Its election campaign bore fruit for the AL, and its vote share represented 
a significant increase over the 1979 results.  The AL received 7.2 percent of the 
vote, more than enough to enter the West Berlin parliament, even supplanting 
the FDP as the third strongest party in the city.  Press reaction to the victory of 
the AL and its entry into the West Berlin Abgeordnetenhaus, like press coverage of 
the AL during the election campaign, focused on the implications of the AL for 
the political scene in West Berlin.  The Springer-owned daily BILD stirred up 
fears that the AL posed a threat for West Berlin’s security: it noted that the AL 
would be represented in all committees in the parliament, and would thus have 
access to confidential police documents and Allied records relevant to West 
                                                 
64 Wahlbroschüre 1981, 36-37. 
65 Wahlbroschüre 1981, 38-39. 
 
 232
Berlin’s security.  It also noted that one of the Lorenz kidnappers had been 
elected to a district assembly: Gerald Klöpper had been elected on the AL ticket 
as a representative to the District Assembly in Tiergarten.  The article also noted 
however that the AL promised “not to burn down City Hall.”66  The much more 
reputable (if less widely-read) Tagesspiegel called the AL victory a “warning 
signal” for the established parties, “signaling a loss of trust in all of them.”67  
According to this article, the AL’s victory resulted from the other parties’ lack of 
transparency.  This had allowed voters to form the impression that politicians 
were not out to serve the common good, but rather had exploited their political 
positions and connections to enrich themselves. 
The AL’s entry into the West Berlin parliament also sparked a variety of 
reactions within the AL itself.  When reporting the three hundred thousand 
deutschmark debt incurred by the AL as a result of its election campaign, the 
unnamed financial officer captured the mood of many in the party by asking, 
“What are three hundred thousand DM compared to a historic moment?”68  
Others reacted more soberly.  In the immediate wake of the 1981 elections, an 
                                                 
66 Wir werden das Rathaus nicht anzünden.  BILD, 13 May 1981. 
67 Warnungszeichen; Es signalisiert ein Vertrauensverlust für alle von 
ihnen.  Der Tagesspiegel, 12 May 1981. 
68 Was sind 300,000 DM gegen einen historischen Augenblick?  
“Wahlkampfkosten der AL,” 1 June 1981.  AGG:B.I.1.752. 
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article in the members’ circular posed the question “Where are you heading, 
AL?”69 
In May 1981, leading figures from three different factions within the party 
came together to try to answer this question by devising the AL’s post-election 
political strategy.  The backgrounds of these figures testify demonstrate the 
diverse nature of the groups comprising the AL, as well as the pragmatism of 
these leaders in attempting to forge a strategy that would continue to allow these 
groups to cooperate.  Ernst Hoplitschek, representing the ecological strand, 
Wolfgang Kaiser, a KPD-Rote Fahne member, and Dieter Kunzelmann, the 
former Kommune I member representing a direct link to West Berlin’s radical 
alternative culture, drafted this reaction to the AL’s electoral breakthrough.  For 
these authors, “the electoral success of the AL involves a qualitative leap in terms 
of new possibilities for political influence; we must recognize and exploit this, 
this is part of the responsibility that the AL was given by the 7.2 percent [who 
voted for the AL] and the support of the many grassroots movements during the 
election.”70  This new situation, which represented both opportunity and 
responsibility, required that a political offensive be conducted in the parliament.  
                                                 
69 Axel Mahler, “Wohin gehst Du, AL?”  MRB 14 (1981), 12. 
70 Der Wahlerfolg der AL bedeutet einen qualitativen Sprung, neue 
Möglichkeiten der politischen Einflussnahme; dies müssen wir erkennen und 
ausschöpfen, dies ist ein Teil der Verantwortung, die der AL durch die 7,2% und 
die Unterstützung von vielen aus Basisbewegungen während des Wahlkampfes 
auferlegt ist.  Ernst Hoplitschek, Wolfgang Kaiser, and Dieter Kunzelmann, 
“Diskussionsvorlage für den Delegiertenrat der AL zur nach den Wahlen 
einzuschlagenden Politik der Alternativen Liste,” 13 May 1981. AGG:B.I.1.749 
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According to the authors, the party’s primary goal should be to prevent Ernst 
von Weizsäcker from heading the West Berlin government.71  The second prong 
of their strategy was more significant.  In order to prevent the other parties from 
being able to tar the AL as naysayers and political incompetents, the piece 
recommended taking a positive political initiative immediately.  This would help 
the AL increase its electoral support instead of surrendering it back to 
disgruntled SPD and FDP voters, from whom they realized much of the AL’s 
support came.  At the same time, they recommended consulting with the 
grassroots initiatives to coordinate adopting their political goals.  These steps 
would involve both extra-parliamentary activities and legislative initiatives.72 
A few isolated voices even advocated limited cooperation with the SPD.  
In the aftermath of the AL’s electoral successes in 1981, Jürgen Wachsmuth, one 
of the AL’s first delegates to the West Berlin parliament, recommended that the 
AL tolerate an SPD-minority Senate.73  In reality, though, its position as part of 
the opposition was clear from the beginning: the AL voted to oppose any 
involvement in a coalition, and members of the FDP faction defied the will of 
their state organization by voting to tolerate a minority CDU Senate.  Richard 
von Weizsäcker, the Federal Republic’s future President, was elected Governing 
                                                 
71 The AL immediately failed to achieve this goal: one of the first orders of 
business in the new session of the Abgeordnetenhaus was to elect von Weizsäcker 
Governing Mayor of West Berlin. 
72 Hoplitschek, Kaiser, and Kunzelmann, “Diskussionsvorlage.” 
73 Jürgen Wachsmuth, “Minderheiten-Senat,” 12 May 1981, AGG:B.I.1.749. 
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Mayor of West Berlin, setting the stage for intense confrontations with the AL 
delegation to the Abgeordnetenhaus. 
During the first two years of its existence, the AL had pursued an anti-
parliamentary, anti-party course, defining itself in opposition to the political 
establishment.  In the time period between the 1981 and 1985 elections, the AL 
continued to play the role of the radical opposition, with one key difference: it 
was able to perform this role from within the Abgeordnetenhaus.  It thus 
commanded greatly expanded resources, not least of which was media attention.  
From the outset, its strategy seemed clear: to continue its role of an anti-party 
party, and to use the parliament and its parliamentary position to support the 
extra-parliamentary organizations it saw as its main task to promote and defend.  
Thus, whereas it could occasionally use the parliamentary field to fight for the 
causes advocated by the grassroots movements operating outside of parliament, 
it viewed the extra-parliamentary sphere as the place where most of its work 
took place.  AL members frequently invoked the analogy of the “Spielbein,” or 
kicking-leg, of parliament and the “Standbein,” or support leg, of its extra-
parliamentary activities, to describe this approach.74 
With the election results of 1981, the AL sent nine representatives to the 
Abgeordnetenhaus.  From the beginning of its time in the Berlin legislature, the AL 
                                                 
74 In sports, the Spielbein is the leg used for play, e.g. kicking, while the 
Standbein supports the weight of the player, the pivot leg.  In art, the Spielbein is 




seemed to try everything to cement its role as radical opposition.  The kinds of 
delegates it sent set it apart from the established parties: they were somewhat 
younger, with an average age of 38, and they were more likely to have been born 
in Berlin.  Primarily, however, the AL differed from the other factions in the 
proportion of women in the delegation.  This was far higher than in the other 
factions, with 27.8 percent of the AL’s delegates being women.75  Certainly in this 










AL 27.8 56 38.1 
CDU 6.3 50.6 43.6 
FDP 0  50 48.9 
SPD 11.9 45.8 46.9 
 
Table 1: Breakdown of Abgeordnetenhaus delegations by sex, place of birth, 
and average age, ninth electoral period.77 
 
 The initial actions of the AL left little doubt that the AL faction in the 
Abgeordnetenhaus intended to stir up trouble.  During the first session, AL 
delegate Peter Finger announced that the AL would not vote to recognize the 
rules of order approved by the previous assembly.  Traditionally, the 
Abgeordnetenhaus had adopted these temporarily until new ones had been 
                                                 
75 Data compiled from Handbuch II des Abgeordnetenhauses von Berlin 
(Berlin: Abgeordnetenhaus von Berlin, 1984).   
76 As of 31 December 1981. 
77 The fact that the AL rotated its faction somewhat complicated the 




approved.  But Finger noted that the political situation had changed significantly 
since the last meeting of the Abgeordnetenhaus, and the AL had not been 
represented during the past session.  Moreover, the AL disagreed with the old 
rules on principle.  The AL primarily objected to the lack of opportunity to react 
“directly and spontaneously” to current issues under debate, and the hierarchical 
nature of the rules and regulations, “which serves to maintain power rather than 
foster democratic ways of working.”78  For both these reasons, Finger asserted 
that the AL would not vote to accept the old rules. 
The next conflict came when the three other parties proposed changing 
the rules of order involving a controversial and important symbolic proceeding 
of the Abgeordnetenhaus.  Due to West Berlin’s special status and because of the 
rights reserved for the Allies, federal laws did not automatically apply to West 
Berlin, but had to be adopted by the parliament.  This typically was done in the 
form of the so-called Übernahmegesetze, literally “takeover laws,” which 
combined several such laws.  The past practice in the Abgeordnetenhaus had been 
to combine the first and second readings of such laws, thus circumventing the 
need to discuss the laws in committee.  Technically, a political faction or the West 
Berlin Senate could request that the laws be sent to committee for discussion; 
however, this right had never been exercised. 
                                                 
78 Direkt und spontan; Hierarchische Strukturen dienen der 
Machterhaltung und nicht der Entwicklung demokratische Arbeitsweisen.  
Plenarprotokolle des Abgeordnetenhauses von Berlin (Berlin: Abgeordnetenhaus von 
Berlin, 1981), 9. Wahlperiode, 1. Sitzung (11 June 1981), 4. 
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Now, however, with the arrival of the AL on the political scene, the other 
parties clearly worried that the AL would use this option to delay approval, 
which had to happen within one month of the law’s publication, or otherwise 
sabotage things.  In their view, any discussion of the laws would weaken the link 
between West Berlin and the Federal Republic.  Thus the CDU, SPD, and FDP 
introduced a measure that would require a decision of the entire 
Abgeordnetenhaus to refer such laws to committee for discussion. 
This did not sit well with the AL, which viewed it as an attempt to quell 
discussion and to remove political and democratic rights from the AL.  Peter 
Sellin put it simply: “We view this as a restriction on democracy.”79  The AL also 
voted against adopting the federal budget in December 1981.80  As time went on, 
however, the AL took increasing pains to emphasize that it objected to what it 
viewed as the pro forma adoption of the laws without any debate as a sign of the 
lack of democracy in the body, and did not wish to symbolically question the 
relationship between the city and the Federal Republic.81 
During the first phase of its time in the West Berlin legislature, the AL still 
approached the parliament with a partial view toward exploitation, reflecting 
attitudes carrying over from the K-group and District Assembly phases.  It 
                                                 
79 Wir halten ihn für eine Einschränkung der Demokratie. Plenarprotokolle 
des Abgeordnetenhauses von Berlin (PAB) 9/1 (11 June 1981), 4. 
80 PAB 9/13 (19 December 1981), 734-735. 
81 This was the case when Cordula Schulz opposed taking over laws 
relating to abortion and counseling in 1984.  PAB 9/72 (14 July 1984), 4379. 
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viewed the parliaments as an information source and as a way to promote 
citizens’ initiatives, and occasionally used the parliament in non-traditional and 
provocative ways.  It also strove to maintain an arm’s length relationship to 
parliamentary institutions through humor and satire.  The AL delivered on its 
initial promise to use the parliament as an information source to aid the citizens’ 
initiatives, such as when Jänicke and Sellin posed questions to the Minister for 
the Environment regarding plans for highway construction in the western 
suburbs of the city (the so-called Westtangente).82   The AL initially did not hesitate 
to employ non-parliamentary techniques on the floor of the Abgeordnetenhaus, on 
occasion bringing extra-parliamentary forms of protest into the parliament.  
These included the use of attention-grabbing props as well as placards and silent 
protest.  In a protest against what the AL viewed as the inadequate measures 
taken by the other parties against Waldsterben, a dead pine tree took center stage, 
brought in by AL delegates.83  During von Weizsäcker’s speech on the eve of 
President Reagan’s visit, the AL delegation staged a brief protest, filing to the 
front bench bearing anti-Reagan signs such as “Disarm Reagan” and “The 
borders of the US are the Atlantic and Pacific coasts.”84  The AL also employed 
absurdist elements to make light of its parliamentary role: upon the rotation of its 
delegates in 1983, the AL appointed its youngest delegate, Cordula Schulz, to the 
                                                 
82 PAB 9/18 (11 March 1982), 999. 
83 PAB 9/49 (13 October 1983), 2872-2874. 
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Council of Elders, and the perennial rebel, lawbreaker, and anarchist Dieter 
Kunzelmann was sent to represent the AL on the Committee for the Interior, 
Security, and Order.85   
The AL’s non-conventional parliamentary activities did not stem from a 
lack of experience or knowledge of the workings and rules of parliament, 
however.  There was a method to their madness, at least so claimed AL member 
and parliamentarian Martin Jänicke, who tried to justify the use of satire in 
parliament.  According to Jänicke, satire helped counteract the tendency for 
alternative factions to become part of the political establishment.  Properly done, 
absurdist elements could have an educational effect, and could also help attract 
media attention for the organization and its causes.86  
In fact, even in the first legislative session, the AL faction displayed an 
ability and willingness to use parliamentary procedures and rules to advance its 
agenda.  For example, Peter Sellin was able to quote chapter and verse from the 
                                                                                                                                                 
84 Entwaffnet Reagan; Die Grenzen der USA sind die Küsten des Atlantik 
und des Pazifik.  PAB 9/24 (10 June 1982), 1465. 
85 Handbuch II des Abgeordnetenhauses (9. Wahlperiode).  Schulz’s 
appointment to the Council of Elders was more of a verbal joke than an actual  
one: the average age of committee members as of December 31, 1981 was only 
forty-four, and nothing stipulated that the committee be comprised of only elder 
statesmen.  Still, Schulz at twenty-five was the AL’s youngest delegate and by far 
the youngest on the committee, the next youngest being Gabriele Wiechatzek of 
the CDU at age thirty-three. 
86 “Bericht der Abgeordnetenhausfraktion über die Arbeit von Mai 1981-




rules of order in arguing for an immediate vote on mass-transit issues.87  
Kommune I veteran Dieter Kunzelmann seemed to have more trouble, at times 
speaking out of turn and refusing to obey the rules of order.  However, it is likely 
that his rule violations were intentional, as they fit his persona, and he, too, 
proved quite able to invoke parliamentary procedure when it suited his 
purposes.88 
In 1982, after one year’s participation in the Abgeordnetenhaus, the AL’s 
leadership took stock of its experiences.  Even at this early juncture, the contrast 
to previous attitudes toward parliament is striking.  Klaus-Jürgen Schmidt, one 
of the AL’s first deputies to the Abgeordnetenhaus and a former member of the 
KPD-Rote Fahne, provides a case in point.89  Schmidt noted that the AL had used 
the Abgeordnetenhaus to work against public defamation of the alternative 
movement and to slow down the rise of the reactionary CDU.  He also pointed to 
the AL’s ability to provoke public debates about troop military parades and 
rearmament.90  Summarizing the work of the AL faction in its first year of 
parliamentary representation, he wrote:  
OUR WORK IN THE ABGEORDNETENHAUS PRIMARILY 
SERVED TO CREATE PUBLICITY FOR THE RADICAL 
DEMOCRACY MOVEMENT, TO INTRODUCE ITS VIEWS AND 
                                                 
87 PAB 9/1 (11 June 1981), 20. 
88 PAB 9/48 (22 September 1983), 2794-2795; PAB 9/49 (13 October 1983), 
2863. 
89 See MRB 6 (1979), 14 for Schmidt’s self-declared KPD membership. 
90 “Bericht der Abgeordnetenhausfraktion 1981-1982,” 7.   
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TO COUNTERACT REACTIONARY CONCEPTS.  IT ALSO LED 
TO A BROADENING OF OUR GRASSROOTS SUPPORT AND TO 
BECOMING A CENTER FOR NEW GRASSROOTS MOVEMENTS 
AND PROGRESSIVE PEOPLE.91 
 
These were astonishing words coming from a member of a party that just eight 
years earlier had condemned the parliaments as “A DEEP SWAMP OF 
DECEPTION AND CORRUPTION.”92  
Martin Jänicke also gave an account of his first parliamentary year, in 
which he tried to explain and justify the alternative spectrum’s “borrowing” of 
the parliament.93  First, a parliamentary presence helped overcome the news 
embargo that the AL felt had been imposed on the alternative movement by the 
commercial press.  Second, work within parliament helped force the party 
system to take up themes that it would rather ignore.  Third, parliamentary 
participation brought greatly improved working conditions and infrastructure to 
underfinanced groups, giving them access to office space and equipment, for 
example.  Most importantly, the presence of an alternative party in parliament 
                                                 
91 UNSERE ARBEIT IM ABGEORDNETENHAUS HAT 
HAUPTSÄCHLICH DAZU GENUTZT, ÖFFENTLICHKEIT FÜR DIE 
RADIKALDEMOKRATIE BEWEGUNG ZU SCHAFFEN, IHRE INHALTE 
VORZUSTELLEN UND REAKTIONÄREN KONZEPTEN 
ENTGEGENZUTRETEN.  SIE HAT AUCH DAZU GEFÜHRT, UNSERE BASIS 
ZU VERBREITERN UND ZUM ANSPRECHPUNKT FÜR NEUE 
BASISBEWEGUNGEN UND FORTSCHRITTLICHE MENSCHEN ZU WERDEN.  
“Bericht der Abgeordnetenhausfraktion 1981-1982,” 7.  Emphasis in the original. 
92 EIN TIEFER SUMPF VON VERLOGENHEIT UND KORRUPTION.  
KPD Liste 5 Wahlprogramm, 3-4, emphasis in the original.  See above, Chapter 




gave citizens the chance to articulate political protest through voting.  Jänicke 
also worried, however, that staying in power could become more important to 
alternative parties than achieving the goals motivating their initial entry into 
parliament.  Moreover, according to Jänicke, the alternative movement received 
its impetus from people’s dissatisfaction with the fact that “in parliaments, 
hardly anything is decided anymore.”94  Parliamentary participation on the part 
of the alternative movement must not disguise this fact, as this would remove 
from the political system any pressure for change. 
Over the course of the eighties, both the AL’s growth and its work in the 
parliament also forced the AL to streamline and eventually abandon many of its 
radical-democratic structures.  This was the case as soon as the AL entered the 
Abgeordnetenhaus, and the so-called ‘structure debate’ raged during the early 
1980s.  For one thing, the AL appears to have increased in overall membership 
numbers at the price of its members’ degree of activity in the party: its members 
were no longer able to participate in the General Members’ Assemblies with the 
same degree of commitment or level of information.95  Writing in the AL’s 
Members’ Circular, Wolfgang Gukelberger warned that the Green and 
Alternative movements’ participation in parliament was accompanied by the 
danger of an excessive willingness to compromise, especially with the SPD.  
                                                 
94 Im Parlament [wird] kaum noch etwas entschieden.  “Bericht der 
Abgeordnetenhausfraktion 1981-1982,” 7. 
95 Albi Ehlert, “Nieder mit der Basisdemokratie?” MRB 21 (1983), 3. 
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Weakening the fixed mandate and ending rotation would be the next steps in 
this compromise, which would make the AL little better than the SPD. 96 
Those in favor of streamlining and reform tried to counter the fears of 
those wishing to retain the radical democratic aspects of the party.  Matthias 
Bergmann, Frank Kapek, and Renate Künast, at the time all members of the AL’s 
Executive Committee, argued that the party should not count on structures to 
compensate for a lack of a political theory.97  Volker Schröder, an early AL 
member and the individual then responsible for the AL’s finances, insisted that 
“The person is more important than the structure,” and counseled the party to 
“Remember: ten years ago we were fragmented… [Today] we have power and 
money.  We have opportunities the likes of which no opposition movement has 
had for a long time.”98  These opportunities should not be squandered by a 
conflict about party structure.  
The rotation of the first AL parliamentarians in June 1983 gave them the 
chance to reflect further on their time in parliament.  For Peter Sellin, 
                                                 
96 Wolfgang Gukelberger, “Rein in die Parlamente und dann?” MRB 20 
(1982), 9-10.  Gukelberger was formerly a member of the GDR ruling party’s arm 
in the West, the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Westberlins (SEW).  See “Der 
Unaufhaltsame Aufstieg,” MRB 27 (July-August 1984), 31. 
97 Matthias Bergmann, Frank Kapek, and Renate Künast, “Strukturen der 
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parliamentary work had opened up numerous information channels to the 
citizens’ initiatives.  Significantly, however, Sellin placed more emphasis on the 
information parliamentary work provided- information that the AL itself could 
use to formulate future programs and to modify past approaches.99  This self-
perpetuating process facilitating the AL’s work was an unexpected benefit of 
parliamentary participation.  Michael Wendt, the AL’s first member, also 
attempted to characterize the experiences of the first AL faction in parliament.100  
The AL’s success could not be judged in terms of how many of its proposals had 
been adopted, as the AL was far too small.  The AL could not report any 
measurable success in ending the rule of the conservative CDU; nor had it 
developed an answer to the question of what would happen if and when the AL 
achieved this goal.  The AL had managed to divide the SPD, however, and was 
able to reveal the gap between the SPD’s propaganda and its actual voting 
practices.  Thus in this respect, Wendt’s analysis related more closely to the 
approach favored by the KPD-Rote Fahne earlier.  But for Wendt, the greatest 
success of the first years of AL parliamentary involvement had been the securing 
of the AL on West Berlin’s political scene.  Thus both Sellin and Wendt 
articulated the desirability of a parliamentary presence. 
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The extent to which the AL had come to appreciate the parliamentary 
arena for addressing grievances is also illustrated by the debate about women’s 
representation and quotas in the party and in parliament.  Initially driven by the 
desire to increase women’s representation in the AL’s own internal governing 
bodies, the discussion quickly turned to the question of ensuring that women’s 
voices be heard and their concerns addressed from within the Berlin 
legislature.101  A June 1984 meeting to which all women in the AL were invited 
discussed the issue of what women hoped to achieve in the AL and in 
parliament.  At this meeting, attendees discussed the possibility of sending an 
all-female delegation to the West Berlin legislature.  The discussion involved a 
two-fold argument.  First, such a move would be a provocative way to send a 
message about the alternative nature of the AL.  Second, such a delegation would 
bring women’s issues into all committees of the parliament, ensuring that 
women’s voices and concerns would be heard and addressed in parliament.  On 
the negative side, some participants voiced the concern that the AL and Greens 
had increased the attractiveness of parliament, which had led women to have too 
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many illusions about the potential for parliamentary work to bring about 
change.102 
In an article published in the AL’s membership circular, three members of 
the Socialist Women’s League argued strongly in favor of increasing women’s 
representation in parliaments.  They asserted that it would benefit all women to 
have more women in parliament, as this would radically alter society.  The article 
cited several examples of women leaders in the Federal Republic with 
governmental positions who had worked to benefit women’s lives in concrete 
ways, and asserted that green and alternative parties offered the best chance for 
increasing this representation.103  Overall, the debate about women’s 
representation in parliament again involved arguments based on the logic of 
representation, and thus worked to promote a positive view of parliamentary 
democracy within the party. 
In fact, one of the earliest examples of cooperation between the SPD and 
AL involved women’s issues, when the SPD sponsored a Parliamentary Question 
into the employment situation of women in West Berlin in tandem with the AL’s 
proposal to establish a commission on equal rights for women.104  In general, 
during this period, the AL and the SPD displayed some signs of a willingness to 
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work together on certain issues.  Historically speaking, this was significant 
largely by comparison to the inability to heal the split between the SPD and the 
KPD during the Weimar Republic, often cited as a factor in the demise of 
Germany’s first parliamentary democracy.105  In the postwar context, this was 
further evidence that Bonn was not Weimar. 
In Kreuzberg, an early attempt at an AL-SPD coalition had met with some 
success, in particular in the realm of housing policy: the AL and SPD were able to 
convince nearly all landlords to agree to postpone imminent evictions.  
According to Werner Orlowsky, an AL delegate to the Kreuzberg District 
Council, the “fundamental opposition” to which the AL had earlier pledged itself 
did not meet Kreuzberg’s needs.106  Furthermore, in a confidential SPD paper 
obtained and published by Der Spiegel, the SPD summed up its experiences with 
the AL in the West Berlin parliament by noting a “very interesting about-face” in 
the AL’s behavior. 107  Gerhard Schneider, an SPD delegate to the 
Abgeordnetenhaus, noted that the AL had generally committed no spectacular acts 
in the parliament, but had accepted the rules of order.  The AL representatives 
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demonstrated an “increasing tendency to adapt” in their manner of dressing.108  
Moreover, its desire to be a party of the fundamental opposition was gradually 
receding.  Nevertheless, according to Schneider’s assessment, the AL did not 
represent an automatic coalition partner for the SPD, but shared a certain amount 
in common with the conservative CDU: both the AL and CDU advocated 
increasing personal freedom and reducing the state’s influence.  Schneider went 
so far as to predict that once socially and economically established, the AL voter 
would share more in common with the CDU voter than with the typical SPD 
voter.  Generally, however, Klaus-Jürgen Schmidt’s assessment of the 
relationship between the social democrats and the alternatives speaks volumes.  
As this AL member, KPD-Rote Fahne veteran, and early delegate to the 
Abgeordnetenhaus put it, “Now as before, both sides lack the political common 
ground” needed for a mutual strategy of opposition.109 
 Another indication of the AL’s evolution into a mainstream and accepted 
political presence in Berlin came with the May 1984 decision of Jürgen Kunze, the 
left-leaning former head of the West Berlin FDP, to take a seat among the AL 
faction in the Abgeordnetenhaus.  This change of allegiance brought the AL a 
tremendous amount of media attention and a considerable degree of credibility.  
As Rebekka Schmidt of the Federal Green Party noted, his move demonstrated 
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the attractiveness and the integrative ability of the Green and alternative 
movement.110  It also boosted the confidence of the AL as the elections of 1985 
approached.111 
 Thus the period of the AL’s initial parliamentary representation witnessed 
the AL’s growing acceptance of the parliamentary system.  It also saw the AL 
increasingly flesh out the environmental component of its program.  Some have 
raised the valid question of the actual ‘greenness’ of the AL: Joachim Raschke, for 
example, noted that “green is not its first color.”112  Raschke was correct in the 
sense that the AL had its origins in the radical, red Left, rather than in the more 
conservative, nature-oriented green groups of the late 1970s as was the case with 
other Green Party local affiliates.  Nevertheless, this assessment tends to 
underestimate and downplay the importance of environmental issues to the AL, 
both in terms of holding the group together, as has been seen, as well as in terms 
of providing a new paradigm for critics of West German society. 
Judging by its activities in the Abgeordnetenhaus, there can be no doubt that 
environmental issues were a top priority for the AL.  The AL introduced 
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legislation to make the Tegel Forest off-limits to future road construction.113  It 
sponsored legislation to improve air quality in Berlin, and proposed to allow free 
use of Berlin’s public transit system during smog alarms.114  Its environmental 
expert, Martin Jänicke, worked to support the citizens’ initiative known as BI 
Westtangente, arguing against the construction of a highway in the western 
suburbs, and attacked proposed measures against Waldsterben as inadequate.115  
In a rare, early example of cooperation between the SPD and the AL, the 
environment helped the two parties find common ground, as the AL supported 
an SPD measure to help Berlin’s Grunewald.116  Mostly, however, the AL found 
little to its liking in the other parties’ approach to environmental issues, 
repeatedly claiming that they did nothing concrete, but merely sent issues to the 
Berlin Senate for further study or paid lip service to environmental protection.117 
On occasion, the new environmental paradigm helped the AL deflect 
criticism of its own ideology, especially relating to violence.  During a debate in 
which the other parties attacked the AL as being responsible for incidents of 
violence during Reagan’s visit to West Berlin, the AL’s environmental expert 
Martin Jänicke went on the offensive, accusing the other parties of committing 
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violence against Berlin’s environment.118  On another occasion, the AL tied issues 
of the environment to the debate about violence, asserting that the forest was not 
dying, but was being “systematically murdered.”119  
The new ecological paradigm continued to prove useful in another way as 
well.  The Left continued to use concerns about environmental issues as a tool for 
attacking the presence of the Allied troops, as it had done since discovering the 
convenient overlap of the issue in the late 1970s.  In the Abgeordnetenhaus, the AL 
sponsored a debate on current issues regarding the environmental impacts, 
particularly noise, of military maneuvers by the Western Allies.120  The AL also 
ran a fundraising campaign to support complaints against the Western Allies 
relating to noise and environmental degradation in Gatow.  In the administrative 
structure of the AL, the campaign fell under the rubric of nature protection, 
again demonstrating the ability of environmental issues to support and unify 
protest.121  From the floor of the West Berlin parliament, AL delegate Klaus 
Freudenthal used the issue of the Gatow firing range as a weapon with which to 
attack both the Western Allies and the other political parties, asserting that, by 
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tolerating the use of the firing range, the other parties put the needs of the Allies 
over the needs of their own people.122 
The AL’s relationship with the Green Party also impacted its views of 
parliament.  As seen in the previous chapter, the relationship between the AL 
and the Greens played an important role in the AL’s early steps toward 
deradicalization and parliamentarization.  This continued to be the case between 
1981 and 1985, and in certain areas, this process intensified.  During its first years 
in the West Berlin legislature, the AL continued its relationship with the Green 
Party.  Yet the AL zealously guarded its autonomy, choosing a means of 
cooperation with the Green Party that would alienate as few members as 
possible.  As a result, most radical leftists continued to work within the AL and 
thus continued in the journey toward Western parliamentary democracy. 
During the period of the AL’s first parliamentary representation in the 
Abgeordnetenhaus, the AL began to appreciate the advantages of affiliation with 
the Green Party in new ways.  This appreciation also helped move the AL to 
embrace parliamentary democracy.  AL members in a sense were doubly 
disenfranchised: not only did they feel that the established parties did not 
represent their views, but as West Berlin citizens, they also could not vote in 
federal elections.  The realization that decisions made in Bonn affected the 
situation in West Berlin, and that therefore the AL needed a voice in Bonn that 
only the Green Party could provide, was part of a chain of thinking involving the 
                                                 
122 PAB 9/58 (19 January 1984), 3604. 
 
 254
recognition of the importance of the electoral process and the legitimacy of 
parliamentary representation. 
The potential for the Green Party to provide AL members with a voice at 
the federal level was realized when, in the federal elections held 6 March 1983, 
the Green Party received 5.6 percent and made it into the Bundestag.  The AL 
sent one representative to Bonn.123  Even though West Berlin’s delegates to the 
Bundestag had only limited voting rights, this unprecedented new access to 
parliamentary participation at the national level made the Green Party even 
more appealing to the AL.  
As a result, the Council of Delegates selected a group to negotiate with the 
Green Party about the nature of their relationship.  In August 1983, the Executive 
Committee of the Federal Green Party and these AL delegates convened in 
Bremen to discuss the best means of cementing this relationship.  In the course of 
these discussions, the AL argued that the fact that the Green Party and the AL 
made it into the Bundestag demonstrated that the green-alternative movement 
must be taken seriously.  While it was true that the Green Party’s presence in the 
West German parliament boosted the AL’s own public profile, the AL asserted 
that it was mainly interested in the Greens for their increased importance as an 
extra-parliamentary force.  Explicitly acknowledging the forces pulling them into 
the constitutional system, however, the AL delegates asserted that the political 
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structure of the Federal Republic necessitated work at the federal level, “in order 
truly to have an influence in the sense of producing change.”124  With another nod 
at the forces motivating their participation in parliamentary democracy at the 
national level, the AL noted how the special position of West Berlin between East 
and West and the politics forged at the federal level, which directly affected the 
situation in West Berlin, made it especially important to be affiliated at the 
federal level of the Green Party.125  In a variation of the slogan for the 
environmental movement of the 1980s, which exhorted people to ‘think global 
act local,’ the AL was ‘thinking local’ and ‘acting national.’  Moreover, it did so 
within parliamentary channels. 
Thus it is clear that the AL’s attitudes toward parliamentary democracy 
were affected by both its parliamentary participation and its link to the national 
Green Party.  The same is true regarding the AL’s attitude toward political 
violence.  During the first phase of the AL’s involvement in the Abgeordnetenhaus, 
the debate about the acceptability of violence as a tool of political protest 
continued and intensified.  While the AL was constantly under attack from 
within parliament for its stance on violence, the AL attempted to deflect these 
arguments by invoking Norwegian peace researcher Johan Galtung’s concept of 
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‘structural violence,’ which equated social injustice with violence.126  
Nevertheless, the AL’s presence in parliament kept the issue alive and under 
debate.  This continued to be a factor in the matter of the relationship between 
the AL and the other parties, and was to have particular importance when the 
AL and the SPD forged a coalition in West Berlin in 1989.  But the pressure from 
the presence in the Abgeordnetenhaus alone was also not enough to cause it to 
renounce violence as a political tool. 
Political protests, often involving violent clashes between police and 
demonstrators, were nothing new on the political scene in West Berlin- the most 
memorable example was the 1967 anti-Shah demonstration culminating in the 
shooting of Benno Ohnesorg (See Chapter Two).  These clashes continued in the 
early 1980s: for instance, the 1980 visit by Alexander Haig sparked violent 
protests.   
The period immediately following the AL’s entry into the West Berlin 
parliament was characterized by a qualitatively different kind of protest, 
however.  Three actions sponsored and organized in part by the AL exemplified 
the new dimension of political protest, and drew unexpectedly sharp criticism 
from the public and from within the Berlin parliament.  Though these reactions 
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caused some in the AL to reconsider their tactics, generally, the AL remained 
unrepentant regarding violent protest at this stage. 
The first incident occurred on 25 June 1981, when a crowd of 
demonstrators paraded to the Schöneberg Rathaus, where the West Berlin 
parliament was debating an AL-sponsored motion to give amnesty to 
individuals arrested for squatting houses.  When the protest became violent, the 
AL moved to end the parliamentary session so that the other parties could get a 
sense of what was happening in front of the Rathaus.  Though the AL denied 
responsibility for the violent turn to the protest, it was clear that it had had a role 
in bringing the demonstration to the steps of the Abgeordnetenhaus as a means of 
exerting pressure on the other parties.  As one AL leader put it, “we want to 
make it clear to those in parliament that not only we nine AL representatives 
support the amnesty, but that outside, thousands also share our demands.  That 
is completely legitimate.”127  
Representatives from other parties strongly disagreed, and expressed this 
from the floor of the Abgeordnetenhaus.  Dr. Karl-Heinz Schmitz of the CDU 
asserted that the AL’s cooperation with “anarchists, criminals, but also the 
overly-committed” raised questions about the democratic nature of the AL, and 
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he demanded to know whether the AL distanced itself from violence.128  
Unrepentant, the AL’s Klaus-Jürgen Schmidt replied by demanding that the 
CDU distance itself from the housing speculators.  Gerhard Schneider of the SPD 
took a somewhat milder tone, noting that the SPD did not subscribe to theories 
according to which the AL was the “wire-puller” behind the demonstrations.129  
Nevertheless, unless it distanced itself from the violent demonstrators, the AL 
risked being blamed for the acts of violence. 130  The FDP criticized the AL for 
taking for granted the necessity for violence, and accused it of accepting the 
premises voiced by AL-delegate Rita Kantemir one week earlier.  Kantemir had 
declared that “stones can be arguments” when those in power refused to address 
people’s grievances.131  According to FDP-delegate Edgar Swinne, however, 
“stones thrown at objects and persons destroy dialogue.  The political opponent 
becomes the personal enemy.”132 
In response, Martin Jänicke from the AL took the floor.  He first 
emphasized his own contempt for all forms of violence.  But Jänicke objected to 
what he claimed was the selective definition of violence employed by the 
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governing parties, which allowed them to condemn the violent demonstrators 
while themselves perpetrating acts on a much larger scale that Jänicke and the 
AL considered ‘violent.’  Jänicke used arguments derived from the idea of 
structural violence to question the consistency of those who were upset by 
violent actions of the housing squatters while carrying out violence against 
persons and property by evicting them and destroying their homes in the name 
of modernization.133 
The second incident occurred only a few weeks later.  In the so-called 
“Sunday Stroll” on 12 July 1981, approximately six thousand people marched to 
the posh West Berlin neighborhood of Grunewald to demonstrate against 
twenty-one owners and landlords of flats in Kreuzberg.  The demonstration 
aimed to show the contrast between the squalid conditions in Kreuzberg and the 
luxurious Grunewald villas.  The demonstration proceeded largely without 
violence, with only a few windows broken.  Nevertheless, in its singling out of 
individuals as targets for protest, the demonstration was unprecedented.  Critics 
labeled it variously as “rabble-rousing,” “psycho-terror,” “a pillory,” and “a 
pogrom.”134 
Despite this criticism, the AL noted that it would repeat these tactics in the 
future, which it viewed as merely bringing together parliamentary and extra-
                                                 
133 PAB 9/3 (2 July 1981), 115. 
134 Hetze; Psychoterror; Pranger; Pogrom.  “Wir lassen sie nicht zur Ruhe 
kommen,” Der Spiegel 35, no. 31 (27 July 1981), 50. 
 
 260
parliamentary efforts.  Its stance regarding the role of parliament was still quite 
ambivalent: while insisting that the AL did not view its parliamentary presence 
as a “necessary evil,” it labeled it somewhat ominously as “very useful.”135  As 
one unnamed AL interviewee told a reporter from Der Spiegel, “Parliamentary 
democracy is certainly better than no democracy at all.  But it is no secret that for 
us, parliamentary democracy is not exactly the thing most worth striving for, the 
happiest, the best thing that one can imagine.”136  Instead, the AL would prefer a 
system under which those affected by decisions could participate directly in 
making those decisions. 
These protests and the public reactions to them were dwarfed by the 
events around the 11 June 1982 visit by United States President Ronald Reagan to 
the island city.  Almost exactly one year to the day after the AL entered 
parliament for the first time, it found itself at the center of a heated controversy 
resulting in part from its attempt to represent and protect the city’s independent 
radical Left. 
Clearly concerned not only to avoid violence but also to avoid 
embarrassment, West Berlin authorities banned a protest planned for the day of 
Reagan’s actual visit.  Accordingly, most of the groups planning protests moved 
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the events up by one day.  The AL, too, moved its official plans to 10 June.  But 
the AL Council of Delegates voted to defy the ban to protest what it viewed as an 
attack on the basic right to hold political demonstrations.  It called for 
cooperation with the groups of Autonomen, independent radicals who rejected 
political channels of protest and generally tended to embrace anarchy. 
The demonstrations on 10 June proceeded peacefully.  This was not the 
case the following day, however.  Demonstrators who heeded the call to meet at 
Nollendorfplatz the next morning in defiance of the ban found themselves swept 
up in a vast police action.  Police quickly erected barbed wire barriers around the 
demonstrators, trying to contain them and prevent them from marching to 
Charlottenburg Palace, where Reagan was to speak.  
The result was a disaster.  Demonstrators built barricades, set fire to cars 
parked in the area, threw stones at police, and torched and plundered stores in 
the area.  At times, the intensity of the flying stones hurled by protesters 
prevented firefighters from extinguishing the blazes.  Hundreds of anarchists 
repeatedly charged the police lines, seeking to break out of the barriers.  Some 
statistics give an idea of the scope of the riots: police made 271 arrests, 87 police 
officers were wounded in the melee, 40 demonstrators had to be hospitalized, 
and more than 200 injured were treated at the scene.  Things did not begin 
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calming down until after 4:00 PM.  A masked participant boasted to a reporter, 
“We’ve stolen the show from Reagan!”137 
Public reaction to the violence was vitriolic.  As the only organization that 
had defied the ban and publicly supported the Autonomen, the AL found itself at 
the heart of the firestorm.  Heinrich Lummer, West Berlin’s CDU Senator for the 
Interior, held the AL publicly responsible for the riots because it had ignored the 
ban on the demonstration and followed through with plans for the unauthorized 
rally.  According to leaders in the FDP, the AL had revealed itself as an “enemy 
of democracy” and had violated the rule of law through its involvement in the 
riots.138 
Criticism was not limited to the press.  Within the West Berlin parliament, 
too, the AL faced harsh words.  The violent events around the Reagan visit 
sparked an Aktuelle Stunde, a time reserved for the discussion of current affairs in 
the Abgeordnetenhaus, during which the AL found itself once again under heavy 
fire for its alleged role in the violence.139  The FDP claimed that the AL’s initial 
mistake was to defy the ban on the demonstration, and insisted that the AL must 
recognize the state’s monopoly on the use of force.  The CDU joined the FDP in 
this point, and added that despite its protestations, the AL did not genuinely 
renounce violence.  Instead, it tried to justify it by using the ‘structural violence’ 
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argument.  Nor was the AL consistent in its declarations regarding violence.  On 
the one hand its representatives claimed that ‘stones can be arguments,’ while on 
the other hand it claimed to deplore violence.  The whole issue, moreover, 
showed that the democratic self-understanding of the AL was not complete.  In 
its emphasis on the extra-parliamentary realm, it relied on violence and protest 
and thus did not follow the rules of democracy.  The SPD interpreted the 
violence as a sad result of failed Vergangenheitsbewältigung in the schools and in 
society as a whole.  Violent protest showed that Germans had failed to learn the 
lessons of the Weimar Republic.  The AL should clearly distance itself from 
violence: otherwise, it risked alienating its supporters and discrediting its 
cause.140  
For its part, the AL admitted to having made a mistake in permitting the 
demonstrations to erupt into violence.  Instead, it should have had ready 
techniques of passive resistance and should have insisted that these be 
employed.  However, the AL also insisted that conflicts resulted from structural 
violence surrounding the demonstrators.  Building on Jänicke’s earlier 
arguments, the AL insisted that those who perpetuated these conditions should 
not be so quick to criticize the demonstrators.  Furthermore, the violence had also 
been a reaction to police tactics and armaments, especially the encirclement of 
demonstrators.  Nonviolence took more courage than throwing stones, but 
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throwing stones was a more natural reaction to aggressive police behavior.  It 
required even more courage to wrest the stone from the hand of fellow 
demonstrators and convince them that violence was not the answer.  In the 
future, the AL would endeavor to do this.141 
Moreover, reactions were not limited to condemnation in the press and 
parliament.  The Berlin Senate considered holding the AL financially responsible 
for the damage to the city to the tune of one hundred thousand DM.  
Furthermore, the State’s Attorney considered holding some AL parliamentarians 
criminally responsible.  Finally, in the night of 12 June, unknown arsonists 
firebombed the AL’s main offices and pub in the Wilmersdorferstrasse.  Both the 
office and the pub, which had become an important gathering place for AL 
members and sympathizers, were completely destroyed.142 
 The net effect of the events around 11 June was a dramatic intensification 
of the debate about the role of violence in political protest.  In an interview 
published in Der Spiegel, Otto Schily worried that the violence surrounding 
Reagan’s visit was overshadowing the fact that the AL had in the past sponsored 
many peaceful demonstrations.  To counteract this, the AL should 
unconditionally condemn acts of violence of any kind.  Addressing the question 
of violence would also improve the AL’s image and prevent the established 
parties from using the issue to divert attention away from the city’s real 
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problems.143  Even Dieter Kunzelmann, Kommune I veteran and enfant terrible of 
the Left-wing scene, recommended that “the peacemakers must become more 
courageous, and the militants must become more reasonable” in order to defuse 
the crisis.144 
In addition, the AL formed a commission to study the events and to draw 
lessons from them.  This commission was remarkable not only for the 
conclusions it reached but also for the groups represented on it.  Members 
included Klaus-Jürgen Schmidt, former member of the KPD-Rote Fahne, Martin 
Jänicke, representing the pacifist-ecological strand in the party, “Green Panther” 
Peter Lohauss, representing the more moderate faction advocating cooperation 
with the SPD, and Michael Wendt, the AL’s first member, representing the more 
radical, fundamentalist position within the AL. 
The group published its conclusions in the ‘Commission Report on 11 
June.’145  The report was highly critical of those who condemned the AL for 
violence when they themselves perpetrated what the AL viewed as violence in 
other forms.  Again employing arguments of structural violence, the authors 
cited problems such as unemployment, the destruction of cities, damage to the 
environment, and the perpetuation of hunger in the Third World.  They 
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especially condemned the pending two-track decision.  But the report also 
criticized those who would use these factors in order to justify their own 
destructive impulses.  In the words of the report, those who responded to “the 
arrogance of power with the arrogance of anti-power” were guilty of stooping to 
the level of those they were criticizing.146  Moreover, the report continued, 
violence caused problems of credibility.  It made little sense to use violent means 
to demonstrate against violence, or to try to be the “advocates of the little guy” 
by destroying his property, such as occurred during the protest on 
Winterfeldtplatz on 11 June.147  The AL should criticize, but not exclude, those 
who use this approach.  The AL still supported the idea that it was necessary to 
be able to defend oneself.  While most observers blamed the anarchists for the 
destruction and violence of the protest, the AL looked to social causes, seeing the 
roots of violence in the structural violence of society, especially unemployment 
and poverty in the face of increasing and flaunted wealth.  The AL viewed 
staged, intentional battles as useless, and it rejected them and criticized those 
groups that advocated them.  But the AL would still support demonstrations 
declared illegal if the AL viewed them as legitimate- this included occupying 
houses and construction sites as well as peaceful street protests.   
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Nevertheless, overall, the report rejected violence.  The commission 
justified its position using three primary arguments.  First, violence isolated a 
militant minority from the majority, which wished to use a variety of methods to 
promote social change.  Second, a fixation on violent confrontation with the state 
impoverished the methods of the APO, weakening new techniques of civil 
disobedience and reducing the power and appeal of alternative means of protest 
and living.  Finally, because the political conditions of the Federal Republic 
rested on the consent of the majority of the population, every attempt of a radical 
minority to bring about violent confrontation only resulted in a clash with the 
majority and promoted a reaction by the state, which was bound to win.  This 
would only increase violence and repression.  Overall, as a consequence of 11 
June, the commission recommended that the AL in the future emphasize the 
necessity of nonviolent protest, and that it do everything possible at the 
preparation stage of the demonstration to prevent protesters from resorting to 
violence. 
 This report was far from the final word regarding violent protest, 
however.  Its recommendations were not well received within the AL, and its 
findings were widely criticized for not representing the consensus of the AL as a 
whole.148  Critics responded in the form of another position paper, the awkwardly 
titled ‘Programmatic Declaration Regarding the Basic Democratic Right of 
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Resistance Against the Violence of the Reigning Conditions.’149  Its authors 
prepared this document for consideration and adoption at a General Members’ 
Assembly.  As was the case of the ‘Commission Report on 11 June,’ this 
document was at least as remarkable for its authors as for its content.  Of 
particular interest was the presence and role of Dieter Kunzelmann, as was that 
of Christiane Zieger, formerly of the KBW.  These joined forces with the pro-
Green, pacifist strain represented by Helmut Horst and Ursula Schaar, as well as 
the advocate of democratic rights and former attorney for RAF members 
Christian Ströbele. 
 Their report noted that the AL viewed the development and securing of 
individual rights through a centralized state with a monopoly on the use of force 
as a positive historical development.  But state power only derived its legitimacy 
when it secured the political rights and working and living conditions of the 
people.  Moreover, it was not enough for state power to operate in the 
framework of law and order- this had been the case under Hitler, but this 
obviously had not been legitimate.  The implications for the present were clear.  
To the degree state power invoked its monopoly on the use of force to uphold its 
interests against the wishes of the majority and terrorized those who were non-
conformists in thought or deed, the AL would assert the right to resist.  The 
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authors summed up their position by declaring, “When the state monopoly on 
the use of force does not guarantee all citizens their rights, peace, and equality, 
we will not recognize it as a guideline for our actions.”150  Nevertheless, the 
report proposed programmatic changes recognizing nonviolent resistance as the 
appropriate form for the AL’s political activities. 
According to the document’s authors, all of these assertions stemmed 
from the AL’s view of the German constitution.  This was affected by the idea of 
the inalienability of fundamental human rights.  These superseded the Basic 
Law, in which they were mentioned, but which undermined them through other 
articles and laws.  These rights, however, were essential for citizens’ abilities to 
represent and defend their interests: “Without the maintenance and broadening 
of these fundamental rights, citizens cannot stand up against the atomic threat, 
the ecological crisis and for the improvement of working and living 
conditions.”151  Thus resistance was necessary for survival, and was a natural 
right.  The ruling parties saw their measures as the only correct way to achieve 
things: the AL must convince people otherwise.  Part of this could be done in 
parliament, but when parliamentary majorities and legal decisions rejected their 
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ideas, the AL would not stand idly by.  Legitimacy of actions, not their legality, 
would determine the AL’s course.  Moreover, those affected by policies had the 
right to determine the form of their resistance to these policies.  But the AL did 
not view advocating physical violence as appropriate or effective. 
Late in the course of an already poorly-attended General Members’ 
Assembly in May 1983, the suggested programmatic changes came up for debate.  
The results revealed that the suggestions still went too far for some AL members.  
Dieter Kunzelmann tried to downplay the document’s renunciation of violence, 
insisting, “We have not written a tract on nonviolence.  My name is attached, 
after all.”152  But his radical critics accused him of having put his own past too far 
behind him.   
In the end, the proposed changes were defeated, and instead, the General 
Members’ Assembly adopted language stating that, in light of the structural 
violence being perpetrated locally and internationally, the AL would not 
distance itself from violence.  Furthermore, the General Members’ Assembly 
voted to end debate on the issue, stating that it did not wish to waste its energy 
in a discussion about violence.  All in the party opposed violence, it asserted, and 
AL members did not need to reassure each other of this through more 
resolutions and declarations.  But the resolution ended on a note of defiance: “To 
those who mock our dreams and hopes, our plans and desires, to those who 
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want to encase them in concrete and destroy them, to those who in their greed 
for profit destroy our country, who arrogantly sit on their monopoly on the use 
of force and point at us because we supposedly have an unclear position 
regarding violence- to them there is no reason whatsoever to express our view 
regarding the question of violence.”153 
Shortly thereafter, on 10 August 1983, the Council of Delegates, which had 
begun the whole crisis initially by calling for the AL to ignore the ban on the 
Reagan demonstration, showed its defiance once again.  It voted unanimously to 
adopt a resolution stating that, while the AL would prepare nonviolent protests 
for the coming autumn, when the NATO two-track decision was due, it would 
not distance itself from other groups that had developed other forms of 
resistance.  Moreover, it encouraged those involved with the peace movement to 
discuss all possible forms of resistance.  The declaration concluded: “Our goal is 
the prevention of rearmament.  We must remain unpredictable!”154 
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Helping to counteract the radical and vocal minority that refused to 
distance itself from violence was the relationship with the Green Party.  The 
Green Party’s emphasis on nonviolence had a moderating influence on the AL, 
many of whose members had not distanced themselves from violence as a tool of 
political protest.  Moreover, the AL’s cooperation with the federal Greens helped 
ensure that the acceptability of violence as a tool of protest was always at least 
being discussed and debated.  The special arrangement between the AL and the 
Green Party meant that this remained a source of conflict, even after the issue 
had supposedly been resolved as some have claimed in 1983, when the AL 
‘agreed to disagree’ on the issue and end debate.155  Nevertheless, it is worth 
reiterating the fact that, in part due to the particularities of West Berlin’s history, 
the relationship between the AL and the Green Party itself was not enough to 
induce the AL to renounce violence altogether, despite the Green Party’s having 
nonviolence as one of its four programmatic pillars. 
 Because of the unique situation that developed in West Berlin during the 
1980s, part of the story of the relationship between the AL and the Green Party 
and the effects of this relationship on the AL’s stance on violence involved 
conflicts and interaction with a competing organization, the West Berlin State 
Committee (Landesverband) of the Green Party.  The Landesverband, created 
shortly after the January 1980 founding of the national Green Party, exerted 
continual pressure on the AL to move to the environmental pole and to move 
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closer to the Green Party, solidifying and clarifying its relationship to the 
national Greens.  As events unfolded, the parallel existence of the two 
organizations became a way for certain individuals to try to pressure the AL to 
renounce violence by accepting all four pillars of the Green Party’s political 
program. 
 As shown in the last chapter, the national Green Party’s poor showing in 
the 1980 West German election dampened enthusiasm for the West Berlin State 
Committee, a trend reinforced by the early West Berlin elections.  The AL’s 1981 
electoral breakthrough sparked the AL further to turn away from national 
politics, as it was busy taking stock of its victory and consolidating itself 
politically.  Those AL members who dealt with national politics did so generally 
within the Green Party’s West Berlin Landesverband.  Meanwhile, the AL’s good 
showing at the polls and its new position in the West Berlin Parliament meant 
that it had become an important political factor with which to be reckoned.  In 
short, the national Greens could not afford to ignore the AL, especially in 
preparation for the next elections at the federal level, coming up in March 1983.156  
By contrast, and partially as a result of these developments, the State Committee 
had essentially been put on ice. 
 By the autumn of 1982, however, the State Committee started to show new 
signs of life.  Many AL members of the Landesverband were only passive 
members- they had presumably joined the Green Party in order to have a vote at 
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the Green Party’s founding conference in Karlsruhe, and many had never paid 
their membership dues.  The Landesverband now removed these individuals from 
its membership rolls, in effect expelling them from the Green Party.  This 
provoked an intense reaction, and the AL began to fear competition from the 
Landesverband.157  Meanwhile, other developments involving the electoral 
successes of several of the Green Party’s other state committees, together with 
the approaching national elections, increased pressure to clarify the nature of the 
AL’s relationship to the Federal Green Party.158  Helmut Horst, a dual member of 
the AL and the West Berlin Greens, was one of the most vocal critics of the AL’s 
preference for the status quo, which allowed the AL to be affiliated with the 
Green Party without recognizing the Four Pillars of its platform.  In a paper 
circulated for discussion in October 1982, Horst explicitly tied the issue of the 
AL’s relationship with the Federal Greens to the issue of violent protest.  Noting 
the parallel existence of the two organizations in West Berlin, he asserted that 
most of the “progressive” Greens had joined the AL as opposed to the more 
conservative Landesverband, consciously foregoing activities in an official Green 
organization for the good of the green-alternative movement.159  Increasingly, 
however, these Greens were “asking themselves if they were in the right 
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organization.”160  These doubts sprang especially from the failure of the AL to 
take a clear stance renouncing violence as a tool of protest, in contrast to the 
Landesverband. 
 At the height of the controversy over the violence of the Reagan protests, 
on 4 December 1982, a General Members’ Assembly was held for the purpose of 
settling the relationship with the Federal Green Party.  Members chose from 
three possible outcomes.  Under the first alternative, the AL would replace the 
current Landesverband to officially become the West Berlin State Committee of the 
Green Party.  The second option stipulated that the AL cooperate with the Green 
Party, especially for elections, and work together with them to iron out 
differences in their programs in preparation for an organizational fusion.  Third, 
the so-called Vertragslösung, or “contractual solution,” would enable the AL to 
cooperate with the Green Party and participate in its decision-making with full 
and equal voting rights while preserving its autonomy by concluding a contract 
with the Green Party. 
This third option received a majority of 65 percent of the votes, but only 
because different groups with various motives supported it.  Indeed, the 
proponents of this option came from highly diverse groups within the AL, 
ranging from advocates of nonviolence like Helmut Horst and Ursula Schaar to 
former KPD-Rote Fahne member Johanna Mayr to the epitome of the West Berlin 
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rebel Dieter Kunzelmann.  As Peter Sellin observed, the only thing common to 
these groups was the conviction that the AL must be active in federal politics.161 
 This decision still did not resolve the issue, however.  At the end of this 
General Members’ Assembly, the AL’s Executive Committee resigned en bloc to 
protest what it viewed as a violation of the AL’s all-important principle of 
consensus, which aimed to protect minority views in the AL.162  This related 
directly to the Green Party’s stance renouncing violence as a political tool: the 
Executive Committee wished to uphold the interests of the wing of the party 
composed of those unwilling to renounce violence as a form of protest.163 
 Several days later, a special meeting of the AL’s Council of Delegates 
suspended the contractual solution approved by the General Members’ 
Assembly.  Meanwhile, two groups within the Landesverband were reacting to 
these developments.  One group, centering around Ernst Hoplitschek, wished to 
breathe new life into the Green Party’s West Berlin State Committee.  
Hoplitschek planned to introduce a motion at a General Members’ Assembly 
according to which the AL would agree to become the West Berlin Landesverband.  
He expected the motion to fail and thus spark a reaction resulting in the 
rejuvenation of the State Committee in competition with the AL.  At the same 
time, a group around Ursula Schaar and Helmut Horst, both advocates of the 
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original contractual solution, were hatching similar plans.  In order to increase 
pressure on the AL to embrace nonviolence, Schaar and Horst had renounced the 
contractual solution in favor of a proposal that the AL become the Landesverband 
outright. 
 In mid-February 1983, things came to a head at another General Members’ 
Assembly, where a number of new proposals were introduced relating to the 
relationship between the AL and the federal Green Party.  Schaar and Horst 
introduced a motion according to which the AL would recognize the ‘four 
pillars’ of the Green Party, one of which explicitly renounced violent protest.  
The AL would then become the Green Party’s West Berlin State Committee.  But 
the General Members’ Assembly instead opted to pursue the contractual 
solution, and thus chose the middle ground between going it alone and 
assimilation by the Green Party, a solution that, significantly, would allow it to 
avoid renouncing violence.164 
 This decision provoked immediate public fallout.  On 23 February 1983, 
Ursula Schaar and Ernst Hoplitschek held a press conference where they 
announced their resignations, and Schaar laid down her mandate as one of the 
AL’s representatives in the West Berlin Abgeordnetenhaus.  She linked her 
resignation explicitly and publicly to the issue of violent protest, stating that she 
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now saw “no basis for the principle of nonviolence in the AL.”165  Hoplitschek, 
too, left the party, but linked his resignation to the dominance of the radical Left 
in the AL.  He viewed the defeat of the motion that the AL become the West 
Berlin State Committee of the Green Party as “the final defeat of the ecologists in 
the party at the hands of traditional, subjective Leftists who still hold on to 
outdated solutions and for whom ‘ecology’ comes at best second or third.”166 
Despite these controversies, the AL continued to negotiate with the 
federal Green Party.  In autumn 1983, a commission drafted a text of a 
cooperation contract for approval by the AL’s General Members’ Assembly in 
West Berlin and by the federal Green Party’s Congress of Delegates.  The contract 
would have given the AL full and equal representation in all decision-making 
bodies of the federal Green Party for a period of two years.167  But the contractual 
solution faced one more hurdle mounted from the AL side, even if the hurdle 
was largely symbolic.  On 11 October 1983, when the General Members’ 
Assembly met to vote on the agreement, Michael Wendt, the first member of the 
AL, introduced a competing motion according to which the AL would seek to 
make its relationship with the national Green Party analogous to that between 
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the Christian Democratic Union and the Bavarian Christian Social Union, which 
allowed maximum autonomy to both organizations while allowing them to 
cooperate in elections.  The motion was apparently a symbolic gesture on behalf 
of those AL members who placed a premium on the organization’s autonomy as 
an integral part of its identity.168   
Through this, Wendt seems to have been trying to demarcate a point of no 
return that made it clear to all AL members the consequences of pursuing a 
relationship with the Green Party.  The section of the motion giving the rationale 
behind Wendt’s action indeed made it clear that the AL was crossing the Rubicon 
by taking the contractual path.  Wendt’s text warned that by moving closer to the 
Green Party, “the AL is in the process of losing those who have defied the overall 
trend and who have retained certain political utopias, who wish to preserve at 
least a whiff of the ‘storming of the Winter Palace’….  The work in parliament, 
professionalization, newspaper advertisements instead of leaflets, etc.- this 
fosters the development of the AL to a ‘normal’ party.”169  Nevertheless, the 
General Members’ Assembly approved the contractual solution by a large 
margin.  In the agreement, the two organizations agreed to “remove or clear up 
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supposed or existing differences.”170  This was the only part of the contract that 
hinted at the issue of violent protest. 
 As has been seen, parliamentary participation and the relationship with 
the Green Party helped drive the processes of parliamentarization and 
deradicalization within the AL.  Changes are also discernible in other areas 
besides attitudes toward parliament and violence.  The next section examines the 
AL’s attitudes toward terrorism, the GDR, and the Western Allies as further 
barometers of the AL’s deradicalization. 
 Political violence perpetrated in the course of demonstrations was not the 
only kind of violence haunting the Federal Republic.  Terrorist violence such as 
that perpetrated by the RAF also posed a threat to West Germany throughout the 
1970s and well into the 1980s.  New terrorist attacks in early 1985 in Gauting near 
Munich reinvigorated the debate about the goals and methods of the RAF.  
Groups within the AL had long been active in prison reform, studying the 
problem generated by the practice of isolating RAF prisoners.  But the Munich 
attacks brought the issue of terrorism to the fore again. 
 The AL’s response indicates the degree to which it distanced itself from 
terrorism.  In the wake of the attacks, the AL’s Executive Committee issued a 
press release calling for an end to the “human-destroying high-security prison 
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wings,” referring to the RAF prisoners as “political prisoners” and calling for 
them to be put together in groups as they demanded, putting these demands in 
the context of international human rights organizations such as Amnesty 
International.171  But the press release also clearly distanced the AL from the goals 
and methods of the RAF, emphasizing the irreconcilability of political murder 
and bomb attacks with demands for better prison conditions, and insisting that 
the AL’s support for such improved conditions must not be misunderstood as 
solidarity with acts of violence.  The traditionally more radical Council of 
Delegates echoed these statements, condemning the acts as “deeply 
contemptuous of humanity that cannot be justified,” adding that the attack in the 
end would only cause the state to increase its repressive powers.172  In fact, the 
RAF hoped to provoke just this reaction on the part of the West German state in 
order to reveal its allegedly fascist nature and thus provoke an uprising, the 
fateful leap into the unknown addressed by Varon.  That the AL rejected this 
speaks volumes for the extent to which the RAF’s strategy was failing to appeal 
to the Left.  By no means all AL members were ready to distance themselves 
completely from the RAF: Dirk Schneider, in a piece entitled “Fire and Flame for 
the State,” complained that the AL had gone too far in condemning RAF 
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violence.173  Nevertheless, the fact that the AL’s two leading executive bodies 
distanced the AL from terrorist violence is evidence of considerable 
deradicalization. 
The early to mid-1980s were also a time of changing attitudes and 
responses of the Left to the German question, that is, the legacy of the Second 
World War, the peace settlement, German division, and occupation.  In this area, 
the AL demonstrated numerous continuities to the 1970s, calling for West 
Germany to leave NATO, as well as calling on foreign troops to leave Germany.  
At this phase, between 1981 and 1985, the far Left as represented by the AL still 
viewed the Federal Republic by and large as imperialist and tainted by its fascist 
past.  The AL viewed the Allies as occupiers responsible for noise, environmental 
degradation, and destruction of democratic rights.  Moreover, the AL felt that the 
Allies threatened the peace with provocative military parades and the stationing 
of nuclear missiles. 
 The AL’s views toward the GDR were considerably more complex.  On 
the one hand, the AL’s charter stipulated that the organization support the 
environmental, pacifist, and human rights opposition in the GDR.  On the other 
hand, it is quite clear that many AL members viewed the GDR with at least a 
certain degree of sympathy, if only for the counterbalance it provided for what 
the AL viewed as the crass Western imperialist world, and the anti-capitalism of 
the AL led many members to sympathize with the socialist state surrounding 
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West Berlin.  The days of the KPD-Rote Fahne’s dominance had long passed, and 
with it faded the group’s hatred for the revisionist socialism of the GDR.174  Here, 
the actions of the Stasi must also be considered.  As will be seen, the Stasi had a 
number of paid informants and agents provocateurs working within the AL who 
consistently worked to promote the GDR’s interests. 
One particular incident dating from this period of initial representation in 
the West Berlin parliament shows the AL beginning to support the opposition in 
the GDR.  It also demonstrates the degree to which the GDR feared the potential 
embarrassment sparked by public protests and acts of the AL and the Greens.  
On 31 October 1983, a delegation of the Greens, including several AL members, 
met with East German leader Erich Honecker.  After the meeting, the delegation 
unfolded banners with slogans supporting the Swords to Plowshares peace 
movement in the GDR and calling on the East German nation to disarm.  The 
Stasi report noted that the demonstration was taped by camera teams for the 
West German television networks ARD and ZDF.  The banners were shown at a 
press conference held later that day.175 
 A Stasi report a few days later addressed plans to hold another protest in 
the GDR on 4 November 1983.  The ZDF press correspondent had already been 
                                                 
174 In part, this continued in the Working Group on Policies affecting Berlin 
and Germany (AG-Berlin- und Deutschlandpolitik).  See Raschke, Die Grünen, 
277 nn. 24. 
175 “Hinweise zum Aufenthalt der Delegation der Grünen in der 
Hauptstadt der DDR am 31.10.83.,” 1 November 1983.  Matthias-Domaschk-
Archiv (MDA/MfS): Heft Grüne/AL. 
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informed about the upcoming event.  Members of the AL planned to form a 
chain between the United States and the Soviet embassies in East Berlin and to 
hand over petitions to these embassies.  According to the Stasi, the action was 
especially supported by those “who wish to express an anti-GDR opinion.”176  
Apparently still stinging from the embarrassment of the last public event, the 
SED’s reaction was drastic.  The GDR refused entry to all known members and 
sympathizers of the Greens and the AL, as well as all leftist groups known to 
have supported the East German peace movement in the past.  Moreover, the 
GDR undertook various actions against 118 of its own citizens before anything 
had taken place.  As of midnight on 3 November 1983, ninety-two arrests were 
planned, with four already carried out: the opposition leaders Bärbel Bohley, 
Martin Böttger, Gerd Poppe, and Wolfgang Templin had been taken into 
custody.177  Clearly, the East German government viewed the activities of the AL 
as a threat.   
 These travel restrictions and crackdowns certainly did not help the GDR’s 
image within the AL: in a report on the situation to the Federal Chair of the 
Green Party, AL member Rebekka Schmidt condemned them as “a violation of 
                                                 
176 …eine anti-DDR Stimmung zum Ausdruck bringen wollen.  
“Information über die geplante Aktion am 4.11.83.,” 4 November 1983.  MDA/ 
MfS: Heft Grüne/AL. 
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basic human rights of freedom of movement and self-determination.”178 
Developments such as the refusal of the GDR to allow the friends of the peace 
activist and GDR opposition leader Robert Havemann enter the country to 
attend his funeral also negatively impacted the GDR’s image within the AL and 
the Green Party as a whole.179  
At this stage, the AL’s support extended to opposition groups in other 
Eastern European nations as well, including the Solidarity movement in Poland.  
The Soviet crackdown sparked the AL to declare its support for Solidarity and to 
commit itself to work toward lifting martial law in Poland.180  Moreover, the AL 
faction in the Abgeordnetenhaus donated an astonishing 25 percent of its 1981 
budget to a fund set up by the AL for humanitarian aid to Poland: the AL’s total 
donation was 128,956 DM.181  
 The AL’s programmatic and material support for the opposition groups in 
Eastern Europe was not lost on the East German government.  In fact, 
throughout the 1980s, the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (Ministry for State 
Security- Stasi) of the GDR kept a close watch on the activities of the various 
                                                 
178 Ein Verstoss gegen elementare Menschenrechte wie Freizügigkeit, 
persönliche Entfaltung.  Rebekka Schmidt, “Zur Entwicklung unseres 
Verhältnisses zur DDR,” 6 January 1984.  AGG: 1999/D5 Bibliothekbestand. 
179 Lukas Beckmann, “Begräbnis von Robert Havemann.”  Press release, 16 
April 1982.  AGG: 1999/D4 Bibliothekbestand. 
180 “Entschliessung der Alternativen Liste Berlin zu der politischen 
Entwicklung in Polen und Konsequenzen für uns,” MRB 17 (1982), 3. 
181 “Bericht der Abgeordnetenhausfraktion 1981-1982,” 20. 
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branches of the West German Green Party.182  The AL was no exception.  In fact, 
the Stasi assigned greater importance to the AL than to any other regional branch 
of the party, and the AL played a prominent role in the strategy of the SED.183  
This was due in part to the geographical proximity of the AL to the capital of the 
GDR, but also because the AL’s ideology made the AL both a danger and an 
opportunity for the GDR.  Support for both the opposition and the East German 
government became more than intellectual, with the AL donating money and 
equipment to the GDR opposition, while some AL members acted as spies for the 
Stasi, keeping it well informed of these efforts. 
The Stasi was quite conscious of the danger that the AL’s proximity to the 
capital of the GDR represented: it made it that much easier for certain members 
of the party to support so-called underground activities of the opposition.184  It 
therefore kept itself well informed about efforts on the part of members of the AL 
to support the environmental and social justice opposition in the GDR. 
                                                 
182 Carlo Jordan, Armin Mitter, and Stefan Wolle, “Die Grünen der 
Bundesrepublik in der politischen Strategie der SED-Führung 
(Zwischenbericht),” 9 March 1994.  AGG: 1999 D6 Bibliothekbestand; Hubertus 
Knabe, Die Unterwanderte Republik (Berlin: Ullstein, 1999), 71-73, 100-103. 
183 Ludwig Einicke and Hans-Ulrich Mühlbauer, “Die Grünen im 
politischen System der BRD und ihre Positionen zu den Grundfragen der 
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 The AL’s potential to publicly embarrass the GDR clearly concerned the 
SED, as the arrests described above demonstrate.  As a result, the Stasi was quite 
interested in being kept abreast of upcoming events involving anything that 
might embarrass the GDR.  In setting down the procedure to follow when 
prominent members of the Green Party and the AL entered the GDR, the head of 
the Stasi, Erich Mielke, declared the goals of the Stasi in following the activities 
of the AL to be “to determine all activities involving the organization of political 
underground activities in the GDR and above all to prevent public appearances 
aiming to achieve publicity.”185  This frequently revolved around a desire to 
avoid negative media attention, often and increasingly involving environmental 
issues. 
The Stasi’s thirst for information regarding the activities of the AL cannot 
be overstated.  The Stasi agents who coordinated their information-gathering 
activities repeatedly requested the informers that they handled to provide them 
with general information regarding the activities of the AL.  They were especially 
interested in developments in the AL groups that concerned themselves with 
developing policy toward the GDR, as well as efforts to support the GDR 
opposition.  But the Stasi hoped to gain other information from the AL as well.  
                                                 
185 …alle Aktivitäten zur Organisierung einer politischen 
Untergrundtätigkeit in der DDR…festzustellen und vor allem 
öffentlichkeitswirksames provokatorisches Auftreten vorbeugend zu 
verhindern.” Erich Mielke to Unit Leaders, “Einreisen von Mitgleidern und 
politischen Fuehrungskraeften der Partei Die Grünen der BRD und der 
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This included, but was not limited to, information regarding upcoming events 
and protests; information on current and prospective leaders, both in the AL and 
in the Green Party; information on plans for making contacts to top-level officials 
in the GDR; information on the activities and positions of the Greens in the 
Bundestag; and additional information not directly related to the AL or the 
Green Party but of interest to the SED or its allies for various reasons. 
But the Stasi was not content merely to gather information on the AL and 
the Green Party: it also actively sought to influence the AL’s policies and its 
members’ attitudes toward the GDR, recruiting numerous agents to work within 
the AL to advance the GDR’s interests.  The best known of these is Dirk 
Schneider, a founding member of the AL who became its representative to the 
Bundestag in 1983.  It would be well beyond the scope of this dissertation to try to 
assess comprehensively the degree to which Schneider influenced the AL: the 
true extent of his impact may never be known.186  But any attempt to address the 
AL’s views toward the GDR must be seen in this context and understood with 
this in mind.  Based on a preliminary reading and assessment of Schneider’s 
work in the AL, it is possible to make a few tentative conclusions.187  First, in 
                                                 
186 For an overview, see Knabe, Unterwanderte Republik, 73-77. 
187 For an account by a former colleague of Schneider’s, see the article by 
Elisabeth Weber, “Stasi-Einflussagent mit Einfluss bei den Grünen?” Kommune 
10, no. 2 (February 1992): 35.  Weber assesses Schneider’s impact on the 
formulation of the Green Party’s policies regarding unification, and blames him 
for the Green Party’s lack of preparation for the events of Autumn 1989. 
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everything he wrote, Schneider consistently promoted the interests of the GDR.188  
He also defended the GDR from criticism from within the AL and the Greens, 
often counterattacking by accusing the offender of fascist or imperialist 
tendencies.189  Finally, together with several other AL members, he also kept the 
Stasi well informed of AL efforts to support the East German opposition groups, 
and provided the Stasi with reports on the acts of GDR opposition figures as 
well. 
In general, it will probably never be possible to determine the extent to 
which the Stasi influenced the AL’s stance on the GDR.  Furthermore, it would 
be premature and not reflective of the historical record to ascribe to the Stasi all 
or even most of the pro-GDR stance and policies of the AL.  Nevertheless, the 
AL’s position regarding the GDR must always be evaluated against a 
                                                 
188 Schneider’s most infamous work from this period may be the article 
entitled “Berlin- is it worth it?” published in the AL’s membership circular in 
1984.  Dirk Schneider, “Berlin-lohnt sich das?” MRB 28 (September 1984), 4.  
Schneider also attempted to influence the formulation of Green Party policy: at a 
meeting of leading Greens in the Bundestag for example, Schneider pushed for 
the unconditional recognition of the GDR. Minutes of meeting of AG 
Deutschlandpolitik der Grünen, Bonn, 7 July 1984.  AGG: 1999/D5 
Bibliothekbestand. 
189 Dirk Schneider, open letter to the AL Council of Delegates, “Feuer und 
Flamme für den Staat,” 24 February 1985.  AGG: B.I.1.135.  For reaction to Dirk 
Schneider’s comments regarding the GDR and refugees given in an interview, in 
which Schneider  called GDR citizens fleeing to the West “luxury refugees” 
[Luxusflüchtlinge], see Volker Schröder, “Schweine und Lügner,” MRB 27 (July-
August 1984), 4.  Schneider’s views on policies toward Berlin and Germany led 
to a bitter controversy between himself and the AL’s Working Group on Berlin 
and Germany Policy.  Peter Sellin, “Aussagen zur Kontroverse in der Berlin- und 
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background of manipulation, spying, and infiltration.  Overall, the attitude 
toward the GDR at this time in the AL’s development may be described as an 
important counter-balance to vulgar Western capitalism.  The AL also tended to 
view the GDR as a necessary negotiating partner in solving West Berlin’s 
problems.  These two concerns characterized and influenced the position and 
policies the AL pursued between 1981 and 1985.  As such, and as part of its 
attempts to be part of the international peace movement, the AL promoted a 
series of policies quite compatible with the GDR’s aims, including the 
recognition of GDR citizenship, the end of the Salzgitter station registering 
human rights violations of the GDR, and unilateral West German disarmament.190 
The AL did, however, criticize the military buildup of the GDR, which had 
allowed it to become a pillar of Soviet hegemony.  More threateningly from the 
point of view of East Germany were the AL’s calls for freedom of travel between 
East and West and its demands that the GDR lift travel restrictions it had 
imposed on Green Party and AL members.  In fact, during this phase, the only 
times the AL directly criticized the GDR with anything like unanimity regarded 
travel restrictions, which it condemned as a violation of minimum standards of 
individual political rights.191 
                                                 
190 See Wahlprogramm der Alternativen Liste 1985 (Berlin: Alternative Liste, 
1985). 
191 Wahlprogramm der AL 1985, 323. 
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The ‘German question’ also involved attitudes toward the Western Allies.  
At this stage, the AL viewed the Western troops, especially the American 
soldiers, as occupiers responsible for generating excessive noise, degrading the 
environment, and restricting democratic rights.  The AL did not hesitate to 
violate the taboo against criticizing the Western Allies: in a debate calling into 
question police measures taken against demonstrators at a troop parade, the AL 
condemned the presence of the Allied “occupiers,” and the AL reacted strongly 
against the claim by the other parties that the status of the Allies could not be the 
subject of debate in the Abgeordnetenhaus.192 They viewed the Allied presence, 
especially military parades and the two-track decision, not as a force for peace, 
but as a provocation, and the AL introduced legislation to end the parades.193  
During its first period of representation in the West Berlin city parliament, the 
AL continued to use environmental arguments to argue against the Western 
Allies’ presence.  Moreover, the AL’s new position of power within the 
Abgeordnetenhaus and, as of 1983, within the Bundestag, gave the AL a new arena 
in which to express its opposition to NATO and the Western Allies.  
Unsurprisingly, United States policy was a frequent target, with the AL 
                                                 
192 Besatzer.  PAB 9/23 (27 May 1982), 1367; PAB 9/19 (24 March 1982), 
1081. 
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promoting protests against United States policy in El Salvador and condemning 
its actions in Grenada from the floor of the West Berlin parliament.194 
The role of NATO and the Western allies was also a recurring source of 
debate within the party.  In this phase, clear ideological carryovers from the K-
groups regarding this issue can still be discerned.  In March of 1984, members of 
the AL’s interest group devoted to peace issues published a paper that took up 
many of the KPD-Rote Fahne’s demands.195  The article attacked NATO for its 
“imperialist war preparations.”196  As a way to combat NATO’s plans, the authors 
advocated cooperation between workers and the peace movement, which should 
work toward “an active general strike as a lever for a fundamental revolution in 
social conditions.”197  Parliament was a tool to be exploited to this end: 
“Parliamentary participation as a means of propaganda and the considered 
acceptance of certain progressive aspects of the bourgeois parties must not stand 
in contradiction to our principal oppositional and anti-imperialist goals.”198  The 
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paper demanded a reversal of the two-track decision, the creation of an ABC-
weapons free zone comprising the entire Federal Republic, total disarmament of 
conventional weapons, the Federal Republic’s withdrawal from NATO, and the 
expulsion of NATO troops. 
A rebuttal coming from within the ranks of the AL demonstrates that even 
at this early stage, the AL had begun showing signs of acceptance of the Allies.  
This was closely linked to disillusionment with the Soviet Union and the GDR.  
Thomas Sonnenschein, a member of the AL’s Working Group on Democratic 
Rights, together with AL members Jens Müller and Thomas Holm, published an 
article in the next membership newsletter.199  Their critique attacked the earlier 
article for its failure to recognize the repressive nature of the Soviets, who “came 
as even less of a liberator than did the US.”200  It asked if the 90 percent of those 
who according to pollsters supported NATO “were really all stupid or stirred up 
by the Springer press…?”201  Or was their favorable view of NATO a result of the 
fact “that they see no life perspective in real Socialism and besides feel 
threatened by the Soviet Union’s moving closer?  And for good reason!”202  
Furthermore, the solution proposed in the earlier article lacked any basis in 
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reality: it was far better to plan for European integration and alternative forms of 
defense and to prevent war than “to wait patiently for exploitive capitalism to be 
overcome by revolution.”203 
As this chapter has made clear, the year 1981 marked a watershed in West 
Berlin’s history.  Against the backdrop and with the assistance of the housing 
squatters movement, an anti-parliamentary anti-party with clear ideological and 
personnel links to the radical Left had easily cleared the 5 percent hurdle and 
entered the West Berlin parliament.  The AL brought numerous techniques of the 
extra-parliamentary opposition into the parliament.  Contrary to expectations, 
however, the AL did not create chaos or undermine the parliamentary system, 
and the parliament proved surprisingly able to absorb the challenge.  Even at this 
early juncture, the AL showed signs of parliamentarization and deradicalization.  
It continued to embrace and inculcate a political culture that emphasized debate 
and discussion as ways of arriving at truth.  It carried out a debate on the role of 
violence in political protest, both as a result of its presence in parliament and due 
to its relationship with the Green Party.  It began to show early signs of a 
disillusionment with the GDR and the Soviet Union, with terrorism, and with 
violent protest.  Moreover, it began to see parliaments as the place for bringing 
about change, rather than relying on the extra-parliamentary realm.  Over the 
course of the period examined in this chapter, for the AL, the parliaments were 
                                                 




gradually replacing the extra-parliamentary realm as the main sphere of its 
activities and its main emphasis- in its terms, its ‘Standbein,’ or standing-leg.  In 
short, by the end of 1985 at the latest, the AL had shifted its weight until it had 
reached an equilibrium between parliament and extra-parliamentary institutions.  






Striving for Balance: 
 
The AL in Parliament, 1985-1988 
 
 In December 1988, a student leader wrote a letter to the AL complaining 
about the “mental own-goal” of the AL’s Abgeordnetenhaus representative Günter 
Seiler.1  According to the letter, a group of university students had filled the steps 
of the city hall in Schöneberg, where the West Berlin parliament convened.  The 
students demanded that Eberhard Diepgen, West Berlin’s Governing Mayor, 
come down to them to hear their complaints.  Instead, Diepgen offered to receive 
five students.  The students rejected this overture, and refused to disperse.  
Diepgen then offered to receive ten students.  As the student leader ironically 
phrased it, “This was Günter Seiler’s grand moment.”2  Seiler offered to provide 
students with access to the press office and “advised [the students] to accept 
Diepgen’s ‘generous offer.’  The consequence was uncertainty among the 
students, and their energy disappeared.”3  Three times, administrators 
demanded that the students leave the building, “but did not dare to call the 
police to clear the building.  Instead of allowing us to bring the situation to a 
                                                 
1 Klaus Sprengel to Delegiertenrat, “Geistiges Eigentor des Abgn. Günter 
Seiler,” 8 December 1988.  Reprinted in DR-Info, 14 December 1988.  AGG: 
B.I.1.748. 
2 Das war die grosse Stunde Günter Seiler’s [sic]. 
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head, Seiler betrayed us, and supported Diepgen in a cheap election maneuver 
called ‘Diepgen listens to the problems of the students.’”4 
 This incident illustrates in miniature the strategy pursued by the AL 
during its second period of participation in the West Berlin legislature.  
Essentially, Seiler had used the means at his disposal to de-escalate and defuse 
the situation.  Instead of letting the students provoke a confrontation, he 
encouraged the students to follow the course of dialogue and publicity.  The 
negative reaction of the students also shows the perils of this strategy: the 
students felt betrayed and disappointed.   
 In the period between 1985 and 1989, the AL tried a similar approach.  
This chapter examines developments during this interval.  In its original 
conception of the relative weight of the parliamentary and extra-parliamentary 
realms, the AL had emphasized the extra-parliamentary arena, its Standbein, 
while it sought occasionally to aid this extra-parliamentary struggle through its 
activities in parliament, its Spielbein.  Through its attempt to mediate between the 
extra-parliamentary movements in West Berlin and the West German political 
establishment, the AL hoped to be able to span both worlds and to maintain a 
balance between its parliamentary Spielbein and its extra-parliamentary 
Standbein.  As the above event illustrates, however, it found it difficult to 
                                                 
4 …trauten sich aber nicht, die Polizei zur Räumung einzusetzen.  Anstatt 
uns die Situation auf die Spitze treiben zu lassen, fiel uns Seiler faktisch in den 
Rücken und unterstützte Diepgen bei einem billigen Wahlkampfmanöver nach 
dem Motto: Diepgen hört sich die Probleme der StudentenInnen an. 
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maintain this balance.  In the end, events in this time period saw a gradual 
reversal of the relative ‘weight’ emphasized repeatedly since the AL’s creation.  
Thanks to developments in this period, parliament became its Standbein, while 
the extra-parliamentary arena became its Spielbein.  This culminated with the 
AL’s entrance into power as a coalition partner in 1989.  
 Furthermore, 1985 to 1989 marked a time of particularly intense changes 
within the organization.  Important developments can be seen in its attitudes 
toward parliament; its stance on violence; its relationship with the Green Party; 
its relationship and views of the GDR; and its relationship with the Western 
Allies.  This chapter turns increasingly to the AL’s attitudes regarding these 
issues as a barometer of the party’s parliamentarization and deradicalization. 
 By 1985 at the latest, the AL could no longer rely on its novelty to attract 
attention and support.  The 1985 election campaign reveals the degree to which 
some of the AL’s main programmatic thrusts had become mainstream.  In an 
article published shortly before the election, BILD compared the proposals of the 
four principal parties regarding the environment, which it called “one of the 
most important themes of the election.”5  According to BILD, the CDU wanted to 
promote clean energy, the SPD wanted to toughen rules regulating smog, the 
FDP wished to require all cars to have catalytic converters, and the AL proposed 
                                                 
5 Unsere Umwelt ist eines der wichtigsten Themen des Wahlkampfes.  
BILD, 6 March 1985. 
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banning all private cars from the city.6  Other parties attempted to claim 
ecological themes as their own.  In an interview with BILD, Eberhard Diepgen, 
the CDU’s candidate for Governing Mayor, attacked the degree of the AL’s 
commitment to ecology, emphasizing instead the AL’s plans to expel the 
Western Allies from Berlin.7  On the surface, this is consistent with Anna 
Bramwell’s argument that established political parties would incorporate 
environmental issues into their own programs, thereby weakening the Greens.8  
In the case of the AL, however, the acceptance of ecological arguments actually 
seems to have helped the AL, at least in the short term, by making the AL seem 
less frightening to voters. 
 In the AL’s 1985 campaign, the environment certainly played an 
important role.  The thick, professional-looking electoral program published by 
the AL for the 1985 campaign featured an extensive section on environmental 
policy.9  In the program, the AL presented a long list of environmental woes in 
West Berlin.  The program attacked the other parties for their past environmental 
practices, but also proposed detailed and science-based solutions.  Here, the AL’s 
ability to draw on the talent and expertise of its extra-parliamentary partners can 
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clearly be discerned.  The program addressed energy and clean air; 
environmental toxins; the causes and consequences of water pollution; 
environmental protection and preservation of the landscape; animal welfare; and 
transportation issues.10 
 One of the AL’s proposals from this last category proved highly 
controversial.  In an effort to reduce air pollution, the AL proposed phasing out 
cars from the central city of West Berlin and relying instead on public 
transportation and bicycles.  This last suggestion received perhaps the most 
heated criticism from the electorate.  The AL reprinted in its membership circular 
a letter purportedly from “Berlin workers” advising those concocting such a 
scheme to “get out of Berlin as soon as possible before workers’ fists bust your 
heads in!”11  Whether or not the letter truly was from Berlin workers, the piece 
demonstrated the unpopularity of the idea among some segments of West 
Berlin’s population.  The AL demonstrated its sensitivity to such criticism: in the 
same Members’ Circular, proponents published a list of talking points intended 
to emphasize that the AL did not wish to ban cars outright, but to render them 
increasingly unnecessary over a ten-year period by improving mass transit.12 
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 The AL’s playful, iconoclastic mural campaign in the West Berlin subway 
also featured a variety of murals with an ecological theme.  In the weeks before 
the election, dozens of different large hand-painted advertisements decorated the 
walls of the subway platforms in Berlin.  The murals used humor and satire to 
emphasize the AL’s anti-establishment character and to communicate its most 
important programmatic points.13  Many of these illustrations featured 
environmental issues, including especially Berlin’s polluted air, and posters 
depicted cityscapes where buildings and highways dominated at the expense of 
humans and animals.  Public transportation also was a common theme.  One 
mural featured a man covered in snow standing at a bus station looking at his 
watch.  Only his eyes and his nose are to be seen: the rest is a big heap of snow.  
The caption reads: “At the bus stop at 12:30 AM.  More often would be better.”14 
 Several murals lampooned the sensationalist Springer press and what the 
AL viewed (with some justification) as the one-sided, pro-CDU coverage of the 
paper.  One such picture depicted a magazine page with the same typeset and 
masthead of Springer’s BILD, featuring the cover story “Watch out Berlin!  The 
AL wants to ban spring!  That is their cynical plan: Rain! Rain! Rain!”15  The 
accompanying sketch was of an AL-candidate looking like a deranged terrorist, 
                                                 
13 See the poster collection reprinted in Berlin tut gut (Berlin: Elefanten, 
1985). 
14 An der Haltestelle nachts um halb eins: Öfter wäre besser.  Berlin tut gut, 
no page number. 
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complete with wild beard and crazed eyes.16  Another poster poked fun at the 
CDU’s electoral slogan for the 1985 election, “Berlin is back,” while others 
targeted the SPD and the FDP for their links to recent alleged incidents of 
corruption and bribery, a reference to the infamous Berlin Graft.17   
Another effect of the upcoming 1985 elections was to reinvigorate the 
debate about the nature of the relationship between the AL and the other parties, 
especially the SPD.  In 1984, while the election strategy was being planned, the 
AL’s finance expert Volker Schröder argued in the monthly members’ circular 
that the question as to whether the AL should cooperate with the SPD boiled 
down to a crucial decision about the AL’s nature.  Did the AL wish to be “sand in 
the gearbox,” obstructing every policy in radical uncompromising opposition, or 
did it wish to be the “architect of a new society?”18  Schröder argued against 
working exclusively with the SPD, suggesting instead that the AL cooperate with 
any party on individual issues if it supported the AL.  While the ideological 
distance between the AL and the SPD was certainly less than that between the 
AL and the CDU, the SPD was far from the AL’s “natural partner.”19  His paper 
                                                                                                                                                 
15 Berlin pass auf!  AL: Frühling abschaffen!  Das ist ihr zynischer Plan: 
Regen! Regen! Regen! 
16 Berlin tut gut, no page number. 
17 Berlin ist wieder da! Berlin tut gut, no page number. 
18 Volker Schröder, “Sand im Getriebe oder Architekt einer neuen 
Gesellschaft?” MRB 24 (March 1984), 6. 
19 Natürlicher Verbündeter. 
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advocated a pragmatic approach to cooperation: the AL should work with other 
parties as long as this brought it closer to its overall goal of changing society.  
Such cooperation need not and should not entail surrendering its ideals. 
Other AL members argued against a coalition with the SPD for historical 
and contemporary reasons.  In the view of some contributors to the AL 
membership circular, the SPD was far too intimately connected with the West 
Berlin political establishment and with what the AL viewed as the SPD’s 
disastrous past policies.  Any efforts by the SPD to court the AL were merely 
strategic calculations, as the SPD sought to use the AL to return to power.20  
According to AL member Peter Kaufmann, the AL smelled power in the 
upcoming election and in the potential to form a coalition with the SPD.  The AL 
was tempted to change in order to appeal to voters, but its goal should be to win 
the voters over, not to be changed by them.  Kaufmann emphasized the lack of 
programmatic agreement between the SPD and the AL, as well as fundamental 
differences in visions of the kind of society they wished to achieve.  He 
recommended presenting the SPD with a set of programmatic demands for a 
coalition that the AL knew the SPD would never agree to, so that the AL could 
safely enter four more years of opposition.21  
                                                 
20 Assi Geese and Winni Villwock, “Sekt oder Selters,” MRB 24 (March 
1984), 10. 
21 Peter Kaufmann, “Genug ist nicht genug,” MRB 24 (March 1984), 13. 
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The full membership of the AL was first given the opportunity to voice its 
views regarding cooperation with the SPD at a General Members’ Assembly in 
November 1984.  The outcome demonstrated one of the pitfalls of the AL’s 
grassroots democratic structure: attendance at the assembly was low, meaning 
those that did attend were highly committed, and tended to embrace more 
radical views.22  The resolution passed at this meeting broadly condemned the 
SPD, and ruled out any cooperation between the AL and the SPD that could help 
the SPD to power.  It concluded, “The political and programmatic visions of the 
AL cannot be achieved with this SPD.”23  A closer look at the language of the 
resolution is enlightening, however.  The resolution condemned the SPD for 
being too close to the problems of Berlin, and condemned it for not having been 
an active enough opposition party within the parliament, complaining that it had 
missed parliamentary opportunities to improve the situation in Berlin.  Instead, it 
had either interfered with the AL’s attempts to pursue an oppositional course, or 
had been merely half-hearted in its own efforts.  Language condemning the SPD 
for alleged revisionism or social imperialism was entirely absent.  Hence even a 
declaration passed by a fairly radical segment of the AL concentrated on the 
parliamentary failings of the SPD rather than taking up more traditional left-
wing criticisms of the SPD. 
                                                 
22 Raschke, Die Grünen, 276-277. 
23 Die politischen und programmatischen Vorstellungen der AL sind mit 
dieser SPD nicht durchsetzbar.  “Beschluss der AL-Mitgliedervollversammlung 
zur Zusammenarbeit mit der SPD.”  Reprinted in MRB 30 (January 1985), 10. 
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Still, the debate about working with the SPD remained very much open.  
In part, this was due to the feeling that the poor attendance at the November 
General Members’ Assembly meant that its rejection of cooperation did not 
represent the consensus of the party.  In addition, many were concerned that the 
AL’s apparent determination to oppose any cooperation with the SPD would 
make it responsible for four more years of CDU government.  In January, just 
over one month before the upcoming election, the General Members’ Assembly 
met again to vote on the same question.  This time, it was unable to reach any 
clear decision.24  At this point, the radical Left in West Berlin was simply not 
ready to be reconciled with the SPD.  Its criteria for judging the SPD and for 
making such a decision had changed in important ways, however.  Instead of 
condemning the SPD for selling out at Godesberg and forsaking the class 
struggle, the far Left criticized the SPD’s failure to serve as a strong enough 
parliamentary opposition. 
 The results of the 1985 election seemed to confirm the AL’s apparently 
permanent place in the opposition.  Once again the AL improved on its last 
performance, increasing its share of the vote by nearly 3.5 percent to receive 10.6 
percent of the overall vote, qualifying it to receive 15 seats in the 
Abgeordnetenhaus.25  The AL thus retained its position as West Berlin’s third 
largest party, again surpassing the FDP.  Surprisingly, the FDP improved to 8.5 
                                                 
24 Horst Eckert, “Unentschieden,” MRB 31 (March 1985), 5. 
25 In Kreuzberg, the AL polled a remarkable 25.6 percent.   
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percent, while the CDU dropped slightly by about the same amount of the FDP’s 
gain, though the CDU still received a comfortable 46.4 percent to make it easily 
the winner.  The big loser on the other hand was the SPD, which dropped by 
nearly 6 percent from 1981’s results to garner 32.4 percent, its worst results in the 
postwar era.26 
 The press reaction to the 1985 election results was mixed.  The West Berlin 
daily Tagesspiegel voiced its concerns about the SPD’s lost ability to integrate 
various strands of voters on the far left and right of the political spectrum, and its 
reaction to the elections was tinged with mourning over the fall of a party that in 
its view had played such a crucial role in the democratic development of the 
city.27  The left-leaning daily TAZ predicted “four hard years” for the AL in 
opposition, and noted that the AL had failed to receive the 14 to 16 percent of the 
vote as had been projected.28  The Springer-tabloid BILD also emphasized the 
AL’s failure to achieve the expected share of the vote.  It gave credit to West 
Berlin’s Governing Mayor Diepgen, and claimed that the vote was an explicit 
rejection of a possible red-green coalition, which it described as the SPD’s “flirt 
with alternatives and anti-American dreamers.”29 
                                                 
26 All election results, Statistisches Landesamt Berlin, 2001. 
27  Der Tagesspiegel, 12 March 1985. 
28 Vier harte Jahre.  TAZ, 12 March 1985. 




 The years 1985 to 1989 marked a time of significant changes for the AL’s 
activities in the West Berlin Abgeordnetenhaus.  The composition of the AL 
delegation to the Abgeordnetenhaus altered the complexion of the institution.  In 
the AL’s parliamentary activities, processes of parliamentarization and 
deradicalization continued, as the AL moderated its stance regarding the 
Western Allies and the adoption of federal laws for West Berlin.  Parliament for 
the AL also developed into a site of new areas of emphasis, including most 
notably the use of parliaments to promote a confrontation with the German past.  
Furthermore, this period saw an intensification of the AL’s environmental 
initiatives.  Scandals revolving around the West Berlin State Office for 
Constitutional Protection provided new focus for the AL’s reformist thought, 
and fit in well with the AL’s emphasis on governmental transparency.  
Throughout, but especially toward the end of the legislative period, the AL and 
the SPD increasingly found common ground.  In fact, in many ways, the years in 
mutual opposition were a rehearsal for the SPD-AL coalition.  The AL’s views of 
the SPD shifted from seeing the SPD as the party that represented much of what 
the AL had been founded in opposition to, to viewing the SPD as a party with 
certain common interests, and hence a prospective coalition partner. 
 As was the case in 1981, the AL’s delegation to the Abgeordnetenhaus also 
differed significantly from those of the three other parties in more than political 
outlook.  For one thing, they were much younger than the other parties’ 
delegates.  The average age of the AL delegates was thirty-six, around ten years 
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younger than the other parties’ representatives.  This meant that the average AL 
delegate would have been around seventeen years old at the time of the 1968 
student uprisings- probably too young to participate actively, but a prime 
candidate for the 1968 revolt to have left a lasting imprint.   
 Even more extraordinary than the age difference was the gender factor: 55 
percent of the AL delegates to serve in the tenth electoral period were female.  
Even the relatively progressive SPD had only 19 percent of its delegation 
composed of women, while the CDU and FDP lagged far behind, with 5 and 8 
percent respectively.30  About half of the AL’s delegates were born in Berlin; this 











AL 55 52 36 
CDU 5 59 46 
FDP 8 31 47 
SPD 19 49 46 
Table 2: Breakdown of Abgeordnetenhaus delegations by sex, place of birth, 
and average age, tenth electoral period.32 
 
                                                 
30 Data compiled from Handbuch II des Abgeordnetenhauses von Berlin 
(Berlin: Abgeordnetenhaus von Berlin, 1988).  The eight percent figure is 
somewhat misleading, as only one woman from the FDP served in its small 
delegation. 
31 As of 31 December 1985. 
32 I followed the same procedure as in the ninth electoral period to arrive 
at these figures. 
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 During the tenth legislative period, the AL continued the political Left’s 
struggles against the presence of the Western Allies; this was a major point of 
programmatic emphasis going back to the 1970s, and it continued to find 
expression during the ninth legislative period, as has been seen.  Beginning in the 
tenth legislative period, the AL began seeking a parliamentary redress of these 
grievances.  Two specific practices particularly nettled the Left: the ability of the 
Western Allies to overrule German law through the system of rights reserved to 
the Allies, especially regarding the death penalty; and the military parades.  
During the tenth legislative period, from 1985 to 1989, the AL made one of its 
legislative priorities the reform of the rules governing the presence and conduct 
of the Western Allies.  Both the parliamentary nature of the attempt and the 
debate about the proposal reveal just how far the AL had changed in its attitude 
toward the Western Allies. 
 In a September 1985 debate, AL delegate Wolfgang Schenk expressed his 
gratitude for the role that the Western Allies had played in preserving the status 
of West Berlin, and acknowledged their contribution in maintaining West 
Berlin’s self-determination in the face of the Soviet threat.  He explained that the 
AL merely was asking that the Allies apply their own democratic values to the 
conditions in Berlin.  In his words, “ We call upon the Allies to work together 
with us to remove undemocratic conditions, which by their own values must be 
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considered undemocratic.  You can’t get any more American than that!”33  Schenk 
also objected to the practices of certain West Berlin politicians, who allegedly 
used the special privileges of the Allies to justify their dirty work, work that they 
would not normally have done as it would not have been acceptable to public 
opinion.  As an example, Schenk cited the last Reagan visit, when police cracked 
down on demonstrators and enforced limitations on free speech, claiming they 
were following Allied directives that the AL asserted never existed.34 
 Similarly, the AL’s delegate Renate Künast emphasized the modest nature 
of her party’s proposals.  In an October 1985 debate on an AL-sponsored bill to 
reform the occupation statutes, Künast derided the other parties for what she 
viewed as the alarmist rhetoric about the intentions of the AL in addressing the 
issues of occupation reforms.35  She denied that the AL was attempting to 
undermine West Berlin’s security or change its status.  Instead, she emphasized 
that the AL wished only to enter into conversations with the Allies about the 
rules governing occupation, with a view to increasing West Berlin’s self-
determination, so that under normal conditions, the Allies would refrain from 
exercising their powers and intervening directly in West Berlin affairs. 
                                                 
33 Wir berufen uns auf die Alliierten, um mit ihnen gemeinsam 
undemokratische Verhältnisse abzuschaffen, die von ihrer eigenen 
Wertvorstellung her als undemokratisch benannt werden müssen.  
‘Amerikanischer’ kann man eigentlich nicht mehr sein!  PAB 10/10 (26 
September 1985), 450. 
34 PAB 10/10 (26 September 1985), 449-450. 
35 PAB 10/12 (24 October 1985), 593-594. 
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 Significantly, all four Abgeordnetenhaus parties agreed on language calling 
on the Allies to work with them to purge Allied law of certain objectionable 
elements and to make it more consistent with developments in West German 
law, especially regarding capital punishment.  The proposal, which originally 
had been sponsored by the AL but had been modified slightly, passed 
unanimously.  Künast stated that the AL still objected to elements of the West 
German laws with which Allied law was to be harmonized, and warned that this 
was not the last word from the AL on the subject of legal reform.  But she also 
noted that the AL had agreed to the changes because they represented a way of 
achieving change for the better.36 
 The AL elaborated on its aims regarding the Western Allies in a 
publication issued a year later intended to document its attempts to modify the 
occupation statute.37   In the publication, the AL took a somewhat harder line, 
reacting to the increased visibility and activities of the Allies in the wake of the 
La Belle disco terrorist bombing (see below).  Notably, some of the more 
contradictory elements of the AL’s ideology came to the fore.  The AL again 
denied that it was raising the issue of occupation in an effort to undermine the 
status and security of West Berlin.  At the same time, however, the publication 
questioned the necessity of the Allied forces in West Berlin, as the city could not 
                                                 
36 PAB 10/12 (24 October 1985),596-597. 
37 Besatzungsrecht in Berlin (West) (Berlin: Fraktion der Alternativen Liste 
im Abgeordnetenhaus von Berlin, 1986). 
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be defended militarily.  Nevertheless, the AL took a moderate stance in terms of 
methods, reiterating its desire to establish negotiations with the Allies with the 
goal of having the Allies guarantee the status of West Berlin without intervening 
in the daily business of administering the city.  It also repeated its idea that West 
Berlin residents should enjoy the same rights as the French, British, Americans, 
and for that matter the West Germans, and again accused the other parties of 
using Allied law to justify acting in their own interests.  
 This period also witnessed the reappearance of complaints about Allied 
military parades, another long-standing grievance of the Left.  The difference 
was that the AL now articulated its grievances within parliamentary channels.  
For example, the AL proposed legislation that would have banned the West 
Berlin police from participating in the military parades.  The AL objected that 
this practice represented an attempt to portray the military parade as something 
positive, lending them a festive, carnival-like atmosphere.  At the same time, the 
practice supposedly led to an association of the police with the military, and 
hence a militarization of the police force.38  In another case, the AL proposed the  
“disarmament” of the Allied parades.39  This somewhat preposterous proposal 
can only have been intended as a publicity stunt, as the Abgeordnetenhaus lacked 
the authority to make such a decision.  Nevertheless, the incident revealed the 
AL’s practice of focusing public attention on the problems posed by the Allied 
                                                 
38 PAB 10/31 (12 June 1986), 1794-1795. 
39 Entwaffnung.  PAB 10/76 (9 June 1988), 4572-4573. 
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presence, as well as casting itself as the party that dared to address such a taboo 
issue.  The bill asserted that the point of military parades was to demonstrate 
one’s capacity to make war.  This was not compatible with recent strides in 
détente, but instead had the opposite effect, and was a provocation.  The bill also 
demanded that the restriction on demonstrations within a certain distance of the 
parade be lifted, as it must be possible to protest against a military parade.  
Finally, the AL again employed the weapon of ecology to argue against the 
Allied presence, citing the damage military maneuvers caused to forests and 
habitats, as well as the negative impacts on local residents of such installations as 
the Gatow shooting range. 
 Regarding the issue of occupation law then, it is possible to discern the 
outlines of the AL’s changed strategy.  On the one hand, the AL continued earlier 
attempts to exploit parliament, to use it as a pulpit from which to draw attention 
to problems posed by the Allied presence.  This was a carryover from the K-
group approach of using parliament as a platform from which to spread the 
gospel of class warfare.  The AL also enlisted ecological issues and concern with 
free speech and abuse of power in order to focus attention on the Allied 
presence.  Simultaneously, however, the AL was trying to establish a dialogue 
with the Western Allies regarding its grievances.  This reflected the AL’s 
growing belief in the power of discussion and negotiation to achieve results, and 
also related to the AL’s attempts to strike a balance between the possibilities 
afforded by its parliamentary representation and its extra-parliamentary 
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clientele.  It also foreshadowed the approach the AL would take when it became 
a coalition partner in 1989.   
 Similarly, the AL moderated its stance regarding adopting federal law in 
West Berlin.  In the past, the AL had refused to go along with the practice of 
automatically taking over federal laws for application in West Berlin in a 
procedure necessitated by West Berlin’s special status under German law and 
Allied statute.  The SPD, CDU, and FDP viewed this as purely a formality: in 
their view, to act otherwise would be to question the close link between West 
Berlin and the Federal Republic.  From the time that it entered the 
Abgeordnetenhaus, the AL had made it clear that it did not share this view, and 
objected to the ritualistic nature of the process.  In the tenth legislative session, 
the AL continued its practice of opposing the adoption of some federal laws, 
while also more frequently and vociferously protesting that it did not wish to 
question the link between West Berlin and the Federal Republic.40   
 In one instance, the AL was able to sharpen its criticism of the ritualistic 
approach and what it viewed as the cavalier attitude of the other parties 
regarding this issue.  In the summer of 1988, a bill appeared before the 
Abgeordnetenhaus for the adoption of the controversial tax reform laws that the 
Kohl government had pushed through over the strong opposition of the Social 
Democrats and the Greens.  During debate in parliament, the AL announced that 
it would not vote in favor of the tax reform.  Shortly thereafter, another AL 
                                                 
40 For example, PAB 10/3 (9 May 1985), 125. 
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delegate issued a quorum call.  The parliamentary body was unable to reach 
quorum, as only 59 of the 144 delegates were present, and the Abgeordnetenhaus 
was forced to adjourn without having adopted the federal laws.  The rest of the 
representatives had apparently already left for summer vacation.41  This act was 
calculated to call public attention to what the AL viewed as the delegates’ failure 
to take this part of their duties seriously, and related to its old complaint about 
the ritualized voting for the adoption of federal laws.  Although the other parties 
heavily criticized the AL for what the CDU called “an unreasonable act of 
hypocritical appeal to the rules of order,” the leftist daily TAZ’s assessment that, 
in this case, the AL delegates “revealed themselves, as so often, as the better 
parliamentarians,” seems accurate.42 
 The parliamentary activities of the AL during the period 1985 to 1989 also 
were marked by a new area of emphasis: the use of parliament as the source of 
initiatives promoting Vergangenheitsbewältigung, or a coming to terms with the 
German past.  During the tenth legislative session, the AL sponsored a number 
of initiatives to document and combat what it viewed as an incomplete process 
of Vergangenheitsbewältigung in the Federal Republic, but especially in West 
Berlin.  In this instance, an organization with direct ties to the student movement, 
as well as close connections to groups that had themselves demonstrated a 
                                                 
41 PAB 10/78 (9 July 1988), 4680-4681. 
42 Akt der Unvernunft unter heuchlerischem Berufen auf die 
Geschäftsordnung ; entpuppten sich- wie schon häufig- als die besseren 
Parlamentarier.  TAZ, 11 July 1988. 
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questionable degree of coming to terms with the Nazi past, actively promoted 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung, both publicly and within its own organization. 
 In particular, the AL objected to what it saw as the tendency to forget and 
suppress evidence of the German past.  The AL sponsored a parliamentary 
question for debate in the Berlin legislature on forgotten and ignored victims of 
fascism in Berlin.43  These forgotten groups included homosexuals, the forcibly 
sterilized, Sinti and Roma (‘Gypsies’), and Jehovah’s Witnesses.  The debate 
sought to focus attention on these persons and on the city’s failure to provide 
them with the same compensation given to bomb victims, refugees from the East, 
and the war injured.  The AL tried to exert pressure on the bureaucracy set up to 
take care of the victims of Nazism to address these groups’ needs.  Directly 
linking the issue to processing the past, the AL called on the Senate to provide 
financial and political support to those individuals and organizations performing 
research on the Nazi regime and its post-1945 reception. The AL also submitted a 
written question to the Senate regarding the treatment of homosexuals during 
the Nazi and post-war era.  The AL demanded to know why homosexual men 
who were placed in Nazi concentration camps were not recognized as victims of 
persecution, and asked the Senate to consider ways of stimulating memory and 
increasing knowledge about the treatment of gays and lesbians at the hands of 
the Nazis.44 
                                                 
43 PAB 10/4 (23 May 1985), 164. 
44 “Zur unbewältigten NS-Geschichte Berlins,” MRB 33 (June 1985), 32. 
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 Another example was the AL’s efforts to draw attention to plans to spruce 
up the site of the former Reichssicherheitshauptamt for the 750th anniversary of 
Berlin in what the AL viewed as a sterile manner.45  In a parliamentary question it 
sponsored in September 1985, the AL asserted that the plans for the former 
headquarters were symptomatic of the general treatment of the Nazi past in 
West Berlin during the postwar era.  According to the AL, this treatment was 
characterized by the attitude that anything that reminded Germans of their past 
should be torn down and forgotten about.  Its response linked failed 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung with West Germany’s consumerist society: as the AL’s 
Christiana Zieseke put it, “all that would cause us to think back is gradually 
replaced in city planning by cheap entertainment facilities.”46  To counteract this, 
the AL called for the creation of an “active museum” to serve as “a kind of 
workshop for the confrontation with the Nazi past.”47  In place of passive 
forgetting, the property should become the site of active remembering.  In 
Zieseke’s words, “The site of terror and repression would become a place of 
memory and communication.”48  
                                                 
45 This is now the site of the open-air museum “Topographie des Terrors.” 
46 Das, was uns zum Nachdenken bringen könnte, wird nach und nach 
ersetzt durch billige Unterhaltungsware in der Stadtgestaltung.  PAB 10/9 (12 
September 1985), 376. 
47 Aktives Museum; eine Art Werkstatt für die Auseinandersetzung mit 
der Nazivergangenheit. 
48 Aus dem Ort des Terrors und der Verdrängung würde ein Ort der 
Erinnerung und der Kommunikation.  PAB 10/9 (12 September 1985), 376. 
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 Similar efforts to spark a more active approach to confronting the Nazi 
past came in the form of the AL-sponsored proposal to establish and fund a 
documentation and research center on the Nazi judicial system.  Such a center 
would help address the inadequacy of past efforts to commemorate the past, and 
could help force Germans to come to terms with it.  Renate Künast asserted, 
“Our proposal would like to make an attempt at such a new, forthright, honest, 
and also critical confrontation with the era of National Socialism, and the later 
failure to work through it.”49 
  The sudden attention paid by the AL to processing the Nazi past raises the 
question as to whether the AL had discovered in the issue a new weapon with 
which to attack the other political parties, or whether it was seriously interested 
in advancing the process of Vergangenheitsbewältigung.  The question is a valid 
one; after all, many of the AL’s initiatives regarding the Nazi past came in the 
wake of President Reagan’s widely criticized visit to the military cemetery at 
Bitburg on 5 May 1985.50  Moreover, the AL and the Green Party published a 
brochure shortly thereafter listing the efforts on the part of the AL and the Green 
                                                 
49 Unser Antrag möchte den Versuch machen für eine solche neue, offene, 
ehrliche und auch kritische Auseinandersetzung mit der Zeit des 
Nationalsozialismus und der nicht stattgefundenen Aufarbeitung später.  PAB 
10/44 (22 November 1987), 2719. 
50 Scandal developed when it was revealed that the bodies of Waffen-SS 
soldiers also were buried at this location.  This infamous incident sparked the so-
called Historikerstreit.  On this episode, see Charles Maier, The Unmasterable Past 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997). 
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Party to recognize and compensate victims of the Nazis.51  Thus the timing of the 
AL’s new interest in the issue may be considered suspect.  Nevertheless, the 
evidence suggests that the AL was motivated by a genuine concern for coming to 
terms with the past.  For one thing, the AL’s interest in the issue predated the 
Bitburg scandal.  At the beginning of April 1985, the AL in a press release praised 
efforts on the part of the federal government to make it easier for the German 
judicial system to investigate and prosecute cases of Nazi persecution of Jews.  
But the AL strongly objected to the compromise language of the bill, which the 
AL held equated the expulsion of Germans from the east with the murder of the 
European Jews.  The AL expressed its concern that this would tend to trivialize 
these actions “carried out by Germans in Germany’s name.”52   
 Moreover, the AL strove as much to educate its own members about the 
Nazi past as it did the general public.  The AL reprinted in its membership 
circular information about the Nazi past, and it actively condemned several 
instances of anti-Semitism in West Berlin.53  The AL also printed in its 
                                                 
51 “Anerkennung und Versorgung aller Opfer nationalsozialistischer 
Verfolgung,” 1986.  AGG:PKA 324(2). 
52 …was im namen deutschjlands [sic] durch deutsche geschah.  
“Stellungnahme der AL zum Gesetzentwurf ‘Auschwitz Luege.’”  Press release, 
4 April 1985.  AGG:B.I.1.227. 
53 Norbert Kampe, “Vor 50 Jahren: Reichskristallnacht,” MRB 53 
(November 1988), 26.  The AL wrote a letter to Berlin’s soccer club Hertha 
condemning the anti-Semitic cheers of some fans, and sponsored a written 
parliamentary question regarding the same incident.  Hans-Jürgen Kuhn to 
President of Hertha BSC, 12 November 1988; Kleine Anfrage betr. 
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membership circular information relating to the postwar reinstallation of judges 
who were compromised by their Nazi party membership, as well as on the effect 
of the Nazi period in stifling knowledge about the achievements of women 
during the Weimar Republic.54  Thus this successor to the student movement can 
be seen as continuing the process started in the late 1960s of forcing a 
confrontation with the legacy of the German past and the failure of West German 
postwar society to come to terms with the crimes of the Nazis. 
 In fact, the AL’s drastically increased interest in the Nazi past can also be 
related to the entry of one woman in particular into the West Berlin parliament 
as an AL delegate.  Dr. Hilde Schramm appears to have been the driving force 
behind many of these efforts, and she edited or co-authored many of the 
brochures and articles published by the AL on this topic and sponsored most of 
the bills calling for increased attention to the Nazi past.  Her involvement 
demonstrates another important aspect of the role of the green-alternative 
movement for integrating a postwar generation into the parliaments. 
 Schramm’s biography accounts for her interest in the legacy of the 
German past.  Born in Berlin in 1936, she attended Gymnasium in Heidelberg and 
spent a year in the United States in 1952 through the American Field Service.  
The desire to live in a large city “in the presence of the ruins of German history” 
                                                                                                                                                 
Rechtsradikales Verhalten von Hertha Fans.  Both in DR-Info, 23 November 1988.  
AGG: B.I.1.748. 
54 “Zur unbewältigten NS-Geschichte Berlins,” MRB 33 (June 1985) 31. 
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and her desire to leave Heidelberg “to go to a city where one believed that the 
problems of the time were being addressed” brought her back to Berlin in the 
postwar era.55  There, she studied German language and literature at the Free 
University.  During her time as a university student, she rejected the dogmatism 
of the various radical student groups.  She participated in various 
demonstrations in West Berlin, but her first organized political activity came 
when she joined the AL in the early 1980s.  Schramm was attracted to the party 
by Petra Kelly and her candidacy for the Bundestag.  By her own account, she had 
never wished to belong to a party: “It would have been unthinkable.  I would 
never have joined a party, I can’t imagine having done so if it hadn’t been for the 
Greens.  My conceptions about how politics should be conducted were so far 
removed from those of the other parties, including the SPD.”56 
 Schramm’s reticence regarding political parties, her rejection of the 
dogmatism of the radical groups of the sixties and seventies, and her obvious 
concern for the failure to work through the German past all perhaps stemmed 
from one other biographical detail: She was the daughter of Albert Speer, Hitler’s 
chief architect and armaments minister.  Thus in Schramm’s case, it was a 
                                                 
55 In der Präsenz der kaputten deutschen Geschichte; um in eine Stadt zu 
gehen, wo man meinte, dass die Probleme der Zeit verhandelt werden.  Hilde 
Schramm, conversation with author, Berlin, 27 July 2001. 
56 Es wäre ganz undenkbar gewesen, ich wäre nie in eine Partei gegangen, 
ich kann es mir nicht vorstellen, wenn nicht die Grünen gegeben hätte.  Meine 
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anderen Parteien, einschliesslich der SPD….  Hilde Schramm, conversation with 
author, Berlin, 27 July 2001. 
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personal confrontation with the sins of the father that motivated her intense 
commitment to promoting a confrontation with the past.  But her interest fell on 
fertile ground in the AL.  Schramm found in the AL a political and intellectual 
climate in which she could articulate her own concerns.  In so doing, she helped 
push the AL to promote initiatives that helped promote 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung.  She thus also helped shift this strand of New Left 
ideology into political channels.  This is particularly significant in light of 
scholarship on postwar Germany that posits a direct link between the Nazi past 
and terrorist organizations such as the RAF.57  According to this view, many 
members of the New Left viewed terrorism as a means of righting the wrongs 
committed by their parents’ generation.  Hilde Schramm provides an example of 
someone turning to parliamentary representation as a way to address the sins of 
the parents. 
 As well as witnessing a time of intensified interest in the legacy of the 
German past, the tenth legislative period also saw increased efforts on the part of 
the AL to enact legislation relating to environmental protection.  As has been 
noted above, Joachim Raschke has pointed out that in the AL, “Green was not its 
first color.”58  In the time period examined here, however, environmental 
concerns were becoming progressively more important to the AL. 
                                                 
57 See in general Becker, Hitler’s Children; Varon, Shadowboxing, esp. 315.  
58 Raschke, Die Grünen, 274. 
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 Increasingly, the AL was becoming what it had initially claimed to be: an 
organization devoted to environmental protection.  In a single parliamentary 
session, the AL introduced multiple proposals for nature protection.  These 
included six measures relating to clean water and environmental protection. 59 
The AL also proposed a bill to allocate five million DM to promote research in 
the field of environmental protection.60 
 Environmental issues also of course provided ammunition to attack the 
other parties.  In the opening session of the legislature, the AL’s delegate Stefan 
Klinski lambasted the CDU for its alleged responsibility for West Berlin’s 
environmental problems.61  The AL attacked the solid-waste disposal policy of 
the CDU-FDP Senate.  The AL delegate Gabriele Vonnekold blasted existing 
practices of the city administration from the floor of the Abgeordnetenhaus.  
Instead of waste reduction and recycling, Vonnekold claimed that the West 
Berlin government was solving the waste problem “in a simple and, as we see it, 
very brutal manner- by burdening its neighbor with its garbage.”62  The result 
was that the garbage dumps in the GDR were polluting East German ground 
water with West German trash.  In doing so, Vonnekold asserted, the West Berlin 
                                                 
59 PAB 10/5 (13 June 1985), 227. 
60 PAB 10/52, 14 May 1987, 3151. 
61 PAB 10/1 (18 April 1988), 15. 
62 …wird das Problem auf einfache und- wie wir finden- sehr brutale Art 
dadurch gelöst, dass man seinen Müll dem Nachbarn aufbürdet.  PAB 10/68, 12 
January 1988, 4040. 
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Senate was exploiting the fact that GDR citizens did not have access to the same 
environmental safeguards or opportunities for protest as their Western 
counterparts.  Vonnekold claimed that “here, the Senate seems to find the oft-
bemoaned lack of self determination of our brothers and sisters in the East no 
longer so terrible, and can exploit it quite nicely.”63  In addition, the AL 
sponsored a parliamentary question for debate in session regarding Waldsterben 
in Berlin and air quality in the city, in which it attacked the other parties for their 
past environmental policies.64 
 If environmental issues provided a convenient weapon with which to 
attack the political opposition, they also continued to play a crucial role in 
holding the party together.  One incident illustrates this process particularly well.  
In autumn 1987, the AL passed through a series of crises.  Internal critics of the 
party bemoaned its “dreadful political climate,” condemned its lack of a 
consistent social and ecological policy, and deplored its failure to resolve the 
question of violence satisfactorily.65  The crises had sparked a number of 
prominent AL members to leave the party.  While the number was small, their 
prominence led some to talk of a wave of people leaving a party that was 
                                                 
63 Hier plötzlich scheint der Senat das sonst doch immer so oft und 
vollmundig beklagte Fehlen der Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Brüder und 
Schwestern im Osten nicht mehr so schlimm zu finden und hervorragend 
ausnutzen zu können. PAB 10/68, 12 January 1988, 4040. 
64 PAB 10/39 (27 November 1986), 2313. 
65 Grauenhafte politische Kultur.  TAZ, 1 October 1987. 
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“clinically dead.”66  The crisis attracted national attention, with an article in Der 
Spiegel prophesying “the beginning of the end” for the party.67 
 The November 1987 issue of the membership circular explored this crisis 
and its roots in detail.  In his editorial introducing this issue, Jochen Esser noted 
that the crisis stemmed from a new debate about the direction the party should 
go, a debate that threatened to split the Left.68  The AL’s response demonstrates 
that the Left had learned its lesson from the 1970s, when its divisiveness had 
translated into political impotence: the next Mitgliederrundbrief focused almost 
entirely on environmental issues.  This time, Esser’s editorial noted the crucial 
role the AL could play regarding environmental protection.  Elaborating, he 
emphasized that while that month’s issue was perhaps not as interesting as the 
crisis within the Left, it should make one thing clear:  “The AL is urgently 
needed and must multiply its efforts if the destruction of nature is to be stopped 
and a better quality of life can be brought to our city.”69  Thus that month’s 
members’ circular attempted to invoke the preservation of the environment as 
the cause around which nearly all members could rally.   
                                                 
66 Klinisch tot.  TAZ, 1 October 1987. 
67 “Anfang vom Ende,” Der Spiegel 41, no. 37 (7 September 1987), 87. 
68 Jochen Esser, “Editorial,”  MRB 47 (November 1987), 3. 
69 Die AL wird dringend gebraucht und muss ihre Anstrengungen 
verfielfachen, wenn die Naturzerstörung gestoppt und mehr Lebensqualität in 
unserer Stadt ermöglicht werden soll.  Jochen Esser, “Editorial,”  MRB 48 
(January 1988), 3. 
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 Overall then, environmental issues came to play an increasingly important 
role during the 1985 to 1989 time frame.  In general, the AL proposed a large 
number of environmental initiatives.  But environmental issues both served as a 
weapon with which to attack the parties in power and as the glue holding the 
party together.  If Joachim Raschke was correct in his assertion that green was 
not the AL’s primary color, in the time 1985 to 1989, it certainly ran a close 
second. 
 Another area of emphasis for the AL opened upon the publication of an 
article in West Germany’s leading news weekly Der Spiegel in September 1986 
involving actions of dubious legality on the part of West Berlin’s Office of 
Constitutional Protection.70  The scandal related to a murder case dating back to 
1974, when Ulrich Schmücker, a student and a former member of the West Berlin 
terrorist group ‘June 2 Movement,’ was found mortally injured from a gunshot 
wound in the Grunewald.  Shortly after the murder, the group ‘Black June 
Commando’ claimed responsibility, asserting that it was in revenge for the 
victim’s providing information on the organization to the Office for 
Constitutional Protection.  Twelve years and twelve million DM later, the case 
still had not been closed.  In particular, the question of the involvement of the 
Office for Constitutional Protection remained unclear: allegedly, the Office for 
Constitutional Protection had disappeared the murder weapon in order to cover 
up its role in the murder.  
                                                 
70 “Spitzel aus der Tarantel,” Der Spiegel 40, no. 40 (28 September 1986), 63. 
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 The case was particularly scandalous because the Office for Constitutional 
Protection had been operating since 1981 with no parliamentary supervision.  In 
order to prevent the AL from having access to secret information, the Berlin 
Parliament’s Security Committee was dissolved shortly after the AL entered the 
Abgeordnetenhaus in 1981.71  The September 1986 article in Der Spiegel breaking the 
story prompted efforts to reestablish this parliamentary control.  The 
Abgeordnetenhaus established the Parliamentary Control Commission with the 
task of overseeing future activities of the Office for Constitutional Protection.  
From the AL’s point of view, this response was inadequate: Renate Künast 
sarcastically labeled it “a textbook example of parliaments’ ability to regulate 
espionage agencies.”72  Instead of trying to investigate, the AL asserted that the 
established parties attempted to apply a democratic veneer to the organization.  
Künast labeled the Parliamentary Control Commission a “cover-up commission” 
that in the event of future scandals would “lead the public to believe that the 
legislature is keeping tabs on things.”73  The other parties’ deliberate exclusion of 
the AL from the commission only made matters worse.  Its exclusion certainly 
did not help counteract Künast’s sentiments that “little success could be expected 
                                                 
71 “Trojanische Kavallerie,” Der Spiegel  41, no. 51 (14 December 1987), 90. 
72 Ein Lehrbeispiel parlamentarischer Bewältigung von 
Geheimdienstarbeit.  Verfassungsschutz und Demokratie- vereinbar? (Berlin: 
Fraktion der Alternativen Liste im Abgeordnetenhaus von Berlin, 1987), 4. 
73 Vertuschungskommission ; der Öffentlichkeit vorzugaukeln, [es] würde 




from parliamentary initiatives, and [sic] these do not call into question the work 
of espionage agencies.”74  Despite this anti-parliamentary rhetoric, however, the 
AL by no means abandoned parliamentary avenues in seeking to address this 
grievance.  The AL announced that it would work together with the SPD to 
establish a separate committee to investigate the Office for Constitutional 
Protection.  In contrast to the Parliamentary Control Commission, the details of 
whose meetings were secret, this committee would meet publicly, and would 
publish its results.  Thus the AL conceded that parliament could play a role in 
monitoring this secretive state agency after all.75  
 An article in the leftist daily TAZ appearing in late autumn of 1987 
reopened the issue of constitutional protection in a dramatic way.  According to 
the article, the AL itself had been the target of extensive investigations of the 
Office for Constitutional Protection since the early 1980s.  The article accused the 
office of comprehensive investigations of the AL, including evaluating individual 
members’ loyalty to the constitution and monitoring all activities of the AL, 
including Members’ Assemblies.76  In the same issue, TAZ printed an interview 
                                                 
74 Von parlamentarischen Initiativen von vornherein wenig Erfolg zu 
erwarten war und diese die Arbeit der Geheimdienste nicht grundsätzlich in 
Frage stellen.  Verfassungsschutz und Demokratie, 4. 
75 Verfassungsschutz und Demokratie, 4; PAB 10/49 (12 March 1987), 2915. 
76 TAZ, 30 November 1987. 
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with Wolfgang Wieland, chair of the AL’s parliamentary delegation, in which he 
responded to the allegations.77 
  The CDU reacted quickly to the stories.  In a press release, it sought both 
to attack the credibility of the article’s author and to justify the activities of the 
state office.  It noted that it was revealing that the author, Till Meyer, himself 
belonged to the radical Left fringe: he had served time for his involvement in the 
Lorenz kidnapping in the 1970s.78  Furthermore, the press release asserted that 
“no democratic party is safe from infiltration by enemies of the constitution- least 
of all the AL.” 79  Thus it was in the interest of all true democrats to investigate the 
slightest suspicion of extremism and to support the work of the Office for 
Constitutional Protection.  Finally, the CDU tried to threaten the members of the 
AL with their own history, calling on the Minister for the Interior to “name 
names” of AL members with an extremist past.80  According to the CDU, 
“citizens have the right to know whether the representatives that they elect to 
parliament are at least loyal to the constitution.”81 
                                                 
77 TAZ, 30 November 1987. 
78 See Chapter Three. 
79 Keine demokratische Partei ist davor sicher, von Verfassungsfeinden 
unterwandert zu werden- am allerwenigsten die AL.  Press release by CDU, 2 
December 1987, printed in DR-Info 9 December 1987.  AGG:B.I.1.749.   
80 Namen nennen. 
81 Die Bürger hätten ein Anrecht darauf zu erfahren, ob die Abgeordneten, 
die sie ins Parlament wählen, wenigstens verfassungstreu sind.  Press release by 
CDU, 2 December 1987, printed in DR-Info 9 December 1987.  AGG:B.I.1.749. 
 
 330
 In a letter to Wolfgang Wieland written the same day responding to the 
TAZ interview, the CDU’s Senator for the Interior Wilhelm Kewenig was both 
more candid in refuting the charges raised by Wieland in the interview and more 
revealing about the nature of the AL.  Kewenig insisted to Wieland, “your claim 
is neither new nor accurate.”82  Individual AL members had “a broken or at least 
ambivalent relationship” to constitutional principles.83  Since its founding, the AL 
had been a target for left wing parties and groups.  In the elections of 1979, 1981, 
and 1985, the AL gave left wing extremists the opportunity to stand for election.  
Furthermore, the AL was itself responsible for the fact that it attracted the 
attention of the Office for Constitutional Protection, which was doing its legally 
mandated job.  Assessments done up to now by the Office for Constitutional 
Protection left no doubt that the AL itself as well as its affiliates did not pursue 
goals inconsistent with the constitution.  Nevertheless, left-wing extremists were 
“offered a political homeland in the AL.”84  Thus the Office for Constitutional 
Protection must continue to monitor the AL.  Finally, he called on the AL “to at 
last end its undeniable deceitfulness regarding its stance on violence.”85  He 
called upon non-extremists within the AL to create conditions in the party so that 
                                                 
82 Ihre Behauptung ist weder neu noch richtig.  Wilhelm Kewenig, Senator 
für Inneres, to Wolfgang Wieland, Vorsitzender der AL-Fraktion, 2 December 
1987, printed in DR-Info 9 December 1987.  AGG:B.I.1.749. 
83 Ein gebrochenes oder zumindest zwiespältiges Verhältnis. 
84 In der AL eine politische Heimat geboten wird. 
85 Mit ihrer unleugbaren Doppelzüngigkeit namentlich in der Gewaltfrage 
endlich Schluss zu machen. 
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it would no longer be necessary to continue to observe the AL.  An article in Der 
Spiegel published in early December 1987 painted a somewhat different picture: 
according to this article, Heinrich Lummer, Senator for the Interior in 1981 when 
the AL entered parliament, had at the time viewed the AL as “clearly and 
intentionally hostile to the constitution.”86  The Office for Constitutional 
Protection had been assigned to keep a close eye on the AL due to its stance on 
violence and its cooperation with extremist groups. 
 The AL continued to attack the State Office for Constitutional Protection 
throughout the tenth legislative period.  Just one month before the 1989 election, 
the AL sponsored legislation that would have disbanded the agency.  The AL 
asserted that parliamentarians were unable to regulate it effectively, but also 
attacked the efficiency of the agency itself, arguing, “any news clipping service 
works with more precision and with better results.”87   
 The fact that the state agency was snooping around the personal histories 
of AL members was certainly a factor in the AL’s crusade against the agency.  
However, it is unlikely that this was its major objection.  For one thing, the AL 
had made no secret of its radical past, and some individuals seemed determined 
to flaunt it: Dieter Kunzelmann was certainly one case in point.  Overall, the AL 
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Ergebnis.  “Dringlichkeitsantrag der AL über Auflösung des Landesamtes für 




objected to the State Office for Constitutional Protection for the same reasons that 
it opposed nuclear power.  In the State Office for Constitutional Protection, the 
AL saw the same sort of phenomenon that the nuclear power plants represented: 
a secretive, highly bureaucratic agency beyond ordinary citizens’ control.  In its 
attempts to shut down the office, the AL mobilized the more libertarian aspects 
of its ideology, including ideas about freedom from state interference, emphasis 
on transparency and accountability, and the importance of citizens’ participation 
in decision making.  In the end, moreover, the AL’s mistrust of parliament’s 
ability to regulate the agency proved superficial: after all, the AL left the door 
open for a parliamentary monitoring of the agency through holding open 
parliamentary meetings in cooperation with the SPD, again consistent with its 
ideological emphasis on transparency. 
 The issue of the Office for Constitutional Protection played one other 
critical role: it marked a significant area in parliament where the AL and SPD 
could find common ground.  For instance, the SPD strenuously objected to 
successful efforts of the CDU-FDP coalition to exclude the AL from the 
Parliamentary Control Commission.  It condemned the inclusion of the FDP, the 
smallest parliamentary faction, and the simultaneous exclusion of the AL, with 
two more seats than the FDP, as “endangering democracy.”88  The SPD even 
refused to legitimize the existence of the commission by sending representatives 
to it.  This support was not lost on the AL: AL delegate Wieland expressed his 
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appreciation for the SPD’s support in the fight against what he labeled as a 
“criminal pretense at parliamentary control” over the agency.89 
 The AL and SPD also found common ground regarding the need to 
combat right wing extremism in West Berlin, as well as in the belief that longtime 
residents of West Berlin who were not German citizens should have the right to 
vote at the district level.90  This is significant partly because the AL owed its 
existence to a large degree to disillusionment at the SPD’s abandonment of 
revolutionary Marxism at Godesberg.  In a way then, the Abgeordnetenhaus was 
the site of healing of the rift between the AL and the SPD.  Without this period of 
cooperation in opposition and opportunity to discover common ground, the 
coalition that was to follow would have been unthinkable.  On a more abstract 
level, it also illustrates a key difference between the Bonn Republic and the 
Weimar Republic: under the conditions of the Federal Republic, the SPD and the 
far Left were able to find common ground and work with each other to overcome 
differences instead of fighting each other as occurred in Germany’s first 
parliamentary democracy. 
                                                 
89 Delikt der Vortäuschung einer parlamentarischen Kontrolle.  PAB 10/50 
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 Thus in the period examined here, the AL underwent significant changes 
as a result of its parliamentary participation.  Toward the end of this legislative 
period, several prominent AL leaders tried to take stock of these changes.  Assi 
Geese, Birgit Arkenstette, and Harald Wolf, then all members of the AL’s 
Executive Committee, bemoaned the AL’s shift “from the grand desire to the 
petty parliamentary question.”91  The authors noted a few positive aspects of the 
AL’s parliamentary experiences.  For one thing, they acknowledged that the 
predicted increase of publicity for alternative projects had indeed materialized.  
Moreover, the authors noted that the other political parties had devoted 
increased attention to projects of the alternative scene: due to their fear of losing 
potential voters, the other parties embraced some of their demands.   
 Their overall assessment was negative in some revealing ways, however.  
They bemoaned the fact that in their view, the Greens and the AL “have 
promoted the delusion about the meaning of parliaments, the view that [the 
parliaments are] the locus of decision-making.”92  By focusing on parliamentary 
work, the party had begun to focus on the art of the possible within the 
parliaments.  Parliamentarians came under pressure to be responsible for 
everything, and would get lost in the details of parliamentary work.  This, 
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together with the pressure to compromise, meant that efforts at reform became a 
matter of enacting reforms within the parliamentary system, rather than 
changing the political system itself.  If the AL continued moving in this direction 
and was unable to resist the forces of parliamentarization, commentators worried 
that this would mean the end, if not of the AL, then the end of the AL as the 
party of radical opposition.93  Embodying the ambivalence felt by the Left at this 
point toward parliament, the article concluded by suggesting a satirical slogan 
for the AL: “Down with parliamentarianism!  Forward into the next legislative 
session!”94 
 In fact, these leaders had put their finger on exactly the processes 
occurring within the AL.  Only a few months after these prominent AL leaders 
penned this article, the AL left the opposition to join the SPD in a government 
coalition in the West Berlin parliament.  This serves further to highlight the 
changes that parliamentary participation had helped induce.  But while the 
experiences of the AL in the tenth legislative period were indeed crucial to the 
processes of deradicalization and parliamentarization examined here, the 
parliament was not the only site of this change.  The relationship with the Green 
Party also played an important role, especially regarding the question of 
violence, as had been the case in the past.  
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Legislaturperiode!  “Von der grossen Sehnsucht,” 9. 
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 In part, the relationship to the Federal Greens was impacted by the 
activities of the competing West Berlin State Committee.  Despite the fact that the 
contractual agreement between the AL and the national Greens had been 
concluded, the Landesverband continued to make trouble for the AL.  The small 
group of Greens, which had earlier promised not to campaign against the AL in 
the upcoming 1985 elections, seemed to be retreating from its earlier 
commitment.  The federal Green Party clearly preferred the single candidacy of 
the AL: expressing the views of the chair of the federal Green Party, Rainer 
Trampert of the West German Greens noted, “It is politically absurd that, next to 
the AL with its 3,000 members and a level of support in Berlin that brought it 
into the Abgeordnetenhaus, there is a little green rival organization with 160 
members flailing about.”95 
Other voices within the Green Party’s West Berlin State Committee still 
insisted on campaigning against the AL, however.  State Committee member 
Michael Breuer argued that the Landesverband should contest the 1985 elections, 
first and foremost because of the AL’s position on violence.  According to Breuer, 
the AL was too strongly left-wing oriented for ecological policies to have taken 
root in the organization.  Invoking the Green Party’s ‘Four Pillars,’ he concluded 
                                                 
95 Es ist politisch unsinnig, dass neben der AL mit ihren 3,000 Mitgliedern 
und einer Unterstützung in Berlin, die sie ins Abgeordnetenhaus brachte, ein 
kleiner Grüner Konkurrenzverband mit 160 Mitgliedern  herumrudert.  
Declaration by Rainer Trampert, 7 November 1983.  AGG: B.I.1.744. 
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that “ecological, social, nonviolent, and grass-roots democratic politics in Berlin 
need the candidacy of the Greens, because the AL alone doesn’t do it…”96   
In the end, despite intense pressure from the national Green Party not to 
run against the AL in the March 1985 elections, the West Berlin State Committee 
of the Greens went ahead with its plans, with predictably abysmal results, 
polling at around .5 percent in its electoral ‘stronghold’ of Schöneberg.  Its chair 
continued to harangue the AL even after the election, however, lambasting it for 
its left-wing views and for scaring off voters with its concepts of an auto-free city 
and its supposedly intentional, provocative attempt to portray itself as the 
“citizens’ terror.”97 
Desertions of prominent leaders due to its decision to contest the election 
anyway, together with its miserable election results, helped further weaken the 
small party.  Moreover, in a bizarre turn of events, right-wing groups had 
apparently successfully taken over the West Berlin state committee of the Greens 
in late 1984.98  The Federal Green Party, now confronted with a public relations 
disaster, had reached the limits of its patience, and it decided to dissolve the local 
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organization.99  By the weeks after the election, the Landesverband was leading a 
shadow existence, and its days were clearly numbered.  In a last-ditch effort to 
avoid dissolution, the Landesverband issued a court challenge to the decision by 
the Federal Green Party dissolving the State Committee, and it sent delegates to 
the Federal Green Party’s national meeting in June of 1985, where the national 
party promptly denied them voting rights.100  At this meeting, a two-thirds 
majority of the Greens confirmed the decision of the Federal Committee 
dissolving the State Committee “for serious violations of program and statute of 
the party.”101  The Landesverband had finally been dealt a deathblow. 
For the AL, the disappearance of the Landesverband from the political scene 
had important consequences.  The Landesverband was no longer a continuous 
thorn in the side of the AL, constantly nagging it to become part of the federal 
Green Party while accusing it of embracing violence and being excessively left-
wing.  This thus marked the end of failed attempts to use the existence of the 
Landesverband to pull the AL into the Green Party and have the group accept all 
four pillars, including that of nonviolence.  The AL’s 1985 electoral program 
reflected this, as it conspicuously, even defiantly omitted the ‘nonviolence’ pillar 
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of the Green Party: the program quoted three of the four pillars verbatim, but did 
not mention nonviolence.102  In addition, the demise of the Landesverband also 
meant that there was nowhere for ecologically minded activists disillusioned 
with the SPD to go besides the AL.  From now on, moderates worked within the 
AL alone.  This also meant that the AL now increasingly could attract 
environmental experts it could draw on for its program and proposals.  
Moreover, the Landesverband was no longer there to give the AL an excuse for not 
becoming an official part of the Green Party.  Thus the AL actually came under 
increased pressure to fill the void left by the Landesverband. 
 Accordingly, AL leaders sped up the process of becoming the official 
Green Party for West Berlin.  On 11 May 1985, the AL’s Council of Delegates had 
passed a declaration in which it stated its intention to become the West Berlin 
State Committee of the Green Party.  The declaration mentioned that differences, 
real or imagined, would be discussed before any final decision was made, 
mentioning specifically the differences of opinion regarding the renunciation of 
violence.103  Indicating the degree to which the disappearance of the 
Landesverband had caught the AL off guard, as well as suggesting that the AL had 
in the past been only half-serious about becoming the Green Party’s West Berlin 
State Committee, the AL only now began to investigate the legal and electoral 
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implications of becoming the West Berlin Green Party.  A letter to electoral 
authorities requesting information on the legal implications of a potential name 
change reflected the priorities of the matured organization.  These included 
concerns about the reimbursement of election costs, as well as worries that the 
AL would no longer qualify for television and radio time in proportion to its 
strength.104 
 As it happens, these concerns about the legal ramifications of becoming 
part of the Green Party seem to have been justified.105  As a result, the AL 
concluded another contractual agreement with the Federal Greens, which 
established the AL as the sole representative of the Federal Green Party in West 
Berlin.106  With this decision, the relationship between the AL and the Greens was 
finally settled until German unification.  The AL and the Green Party then 
entered into another phase in their relationship, in which the AL managed to 
                                                 
104 Letter to Federal Elections Coordinator from Johann Müller-Gazurek, 
Berlin, 8 July 1985.  AGG: B.I.1.746.  This financial aspect of the relationship 
between the AL and the Green Party should not be ignored.  In November 1988, 
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maintain its identity in a way that ensured that the moderating aspects of the 
Federal Greens did not alienate the extreme Left within the party.  Again, the 
form of the agreement gave the AL enough autonomy to prevent a mass exodus 
from the party and to keep the radical Left on board. 
 In this phase, the AL occasionally criticized the Green party quite sharply, 
especially about issues it felt were its own bailiwick.  The criticism the AL voiced 
regarding the activities of the Federal Green Party was most clearly exemplified 
by the controversy surrounding a proposed trip to Kreuzberg by a delegation of 
federal Greens.  The episode demonstrates the importance of the AL’s autonomy 
to certain groups within the AL, and reveals the degree of buried antagonism 
toward the Greens. 
 In July 1987, members of the Federal Green Party’s Working Group on 
Social Policy wrote to the AL delegation in the Kreuzberg District Assembly 
informing them of plans to send a delegation from the Federal Green Party to 
Kreuzberg that September in order to discuss local conditions and problems.  
The letter enclosed a list of participants and a proposed agenda, which involved 
a reception at Kreuzberg’s City Hall, as well as visits to various self-help projects 
and other community initiatives.  The letter asked the local Kreuzberg AL 
members for assistance in logistical arrangements.107 
                                                 
107 Margherita Zander to Volker Härtig and Dirk Jordan, Bonn, 21 July 
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 This seemingly routine request sparked a vitriolic reply from the 
Kreuzberg AL.  It is worth sampling some of the Kreuzberg group’s response, 
reprinted in the membership circular: 
Perhaps it would be more appropriate...if you would sit down first 
(in case your busy schedule and your numerous travel 
commitments allow this) and consider what you all want here, 
what your business here is, or, put more politely, what good is your 
trip, what you want to achieve with your press conferences and 
your threatened theses regarding the situation in Kreuzberg....  Our 
time is too valuable to spend it attending your performance of 
‘How Little Fritz From the Federal Green Party Imagines That He 
Can Solve Kreuzberg’s Problems.’  Perhaps it would not have hurt 
to ask in advance those on site if your visit was even desired, and if 
so, what it should involve.108 
 
Instead of the planned reception at City Hall and a meal in the canteen, the AL-
Kreuzberg recommended a swim in the polluted Landwehrkanal, as well as a 
number of less pleasant activities. 
The tone and content of this response document a number of pent-up 
resentments.  Clearly, Kreuzbergers did not appreciate having been presented 
with what they saw as a fait accompli, nor did they wish to serve as window 
                                                 
108 Vielleicht wäre es angebrachter, dass Ihr Euch ersteinmal in Ruhe 
hinsetzt (falls Eure Vielbeschäftigung und die zahlreichen Reiseverpflichtungen 
das erlauben) und Euch ein paar Gedanken dazu macht, was Ihr überhaupt hier 
wollt, was Ihr hier zu suchen habt oder, höflicher ausgedrückt: wozu Eure Reise 
gut sein soll, was Ihr mit Eurer Pressekonferenz und Euren angedrohten Thesen 
zur ‘Situation in Kreuzberg’ erreichen wollt….  Für den Besuch einer Aufführung 
des Stückes ‘Wie Klein-Fritzchen von den Bundesgrünen sich vorstellt, die 
Kreuzberger Probleme lösen zu können’ ist uns unsere Zeit- mit Verlaub- zu 
schade.  Vielleicht hätte es ja zumindest nicht schaden können, vorher vor Ort 
anzufragen, ob Eure Aufwartung überhaupt erwünscht ist, und wenn ja, wie sie 
dann aussehen sollte.  Volker Härtig and Werner Orlowsky to Die Grünen im 
Bundestag.  Berlin, 23 July 1987.  AGG: B.II.1.4650. 
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dressing for politicians from Bonn.  Primarily, however, it seems likely that they 
resisted being treated as a subsidiary of the party, and their letter was a way of 
demonstrating their autonomy.   
 Significantly, the resolution of this conflict revealed a willingness to 
cooperate with the Greens on equal terms.  A few months later, at the beginning 
of September, leaders within the AL-Kreuzberg, including Volker Härtig, a 
delegate to the West Berlin Abgeordnetenhaus, wrote back to the Federal Green 
Party, this time using a much more conciliatory tone.109  This letter noted that, 
whereas the earlier correspondence was perceived by both sides to have been 
“arrogant,” enough time had passed that the controversy was subsiding and the 
issue could be discussed rationally.110  The letter noted that the AL was of course 
prepared to answer questions from a Green Party delegation or organize a tour 
of Kreuzberg, but suggested that the trip be postponed.  The letter then 
emphasized that Kreuzberg posed issues that would soon be encountered in 
other parts of the Federal Republic.  Many of the responses in Kreuzberg could 
serve as models for dealing with such problems, and Kreuzbergers were often 
proud to show off some of these solutions.  Instead of either version of the tours 
proposed in the earlier correspondence, Härtig proposed visiting some of the 
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places where these solutions had been implemented in order to see how they 
might help solve or give insights into similar problems elsewhere. 
 Demonstrating the leadership’s attempt to balance the concerns of the 
local group and those of the Greens, the letter also reestablished an equal 
relationship between the Green Party and the AL.  Härtig emphasized that the 
idea was to render mutual assistance: “We propose helping each other: you can 
help the AL and its local urban policies, and we can help you by extending the 
concrete case of Kreuzberg to abstract social, youth, and financial policies.  
Perhaps in the end we all can benefit, not least of all the people and the cause we 
care about.”111  The Working Circle on Social Policy postponed its trip as 
requested.112  This episode again demonstrates the AL’s position as mediator 
between poles, in this case, between highly independent-minded Kreuzbergers 
resentful of any outside interference and well-meaning but naïve and perhaps 
overbearing Green Party politicians from the national organization. 
 On several occasions, the AL continued to assert its autonomy from the 
national Green Party regarding the issue of violence and its use as a tool of 
protest.  For example, the AL’s Executive Committee issued a declaration 
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criticizing plans of the federal Greens to hold a discussion on nonviolence on the 
twentieth anniversary of the shooting of Benno Ohnesorg.  The declaration 
acknowledged the internal and external pressure to renounce all forms of 
violence.  West Berlin’s unique experiences with the police and political protest 
justified the AL’s refusal to do so, however, and the AL would view it as 
“cynical” if on this date those in power received the unambiguous renunciation 
of violent protest they demanded:  “Particularly in West Berlin, we are quite 
conscious of the reasons why we decline to be used as referees to decide which 
forms of political resistance are legitimate.”113  The letter also objected to the 
planned visit by the Bundestag faction of the Greens on 17 June 1987 to the 
Reichstag building in West Berlin to participate in a discussion on policies 
affecting Germany.  According to the letter, this planned trip and the symbolism 
of its choice of date and venue meant that the Green Party was joining the ranks 
of the other parties to condemn the GDR, despite the Greens’ acceptance of the 
two-state policy.  The Greens canceled this trip as well.114 
 Some of those AL members who had worked within the Landesverband to 
bring the AL into conformity with the Federal Green Party’s stance on 
                                                 
113 Zynisch; Gerade in West Berlin sind wir uns sehr deutlich bewusst, 
warum wir es ablehnen, uns bei jeder Gelegenheit zur Schiedsrichterin darüber 
umfunktionieren zu lassen, welche Formen des politischen Widerstandes legitim 
sein sollen.  Open letter from Birgit Arkenstette, printed in DR-Info, 10 June 1987.  
AGG: B.I.1.749. 
114 Protokoll der Sitzung vom 11.06.87, Rat der Bereichs- und 




nonviolence continued to do so within the AL.  Peter Sellin was probably the 
most active example of this.  In 1988, as the AL’s delegate to the Bundestag, Sellin 
published an article in the AL’s monthly membership newsletter in which he 
argued for a renunciation of violence against persons, but left open the question 
of violence against property under certain conditions.115  In this piece, Sellin tried 
to chart out a middle ground, using a new definition of nonviolence that was 
consistent with that of the Green Party but was radical enough for the AL to 
accept. 
  As has been seen, the nature of the AL’s relationship to the Green Party, 
while still asserting some pressure on the AL to renounce violence, was such that 
it also was not enough to force the AL to renounce violence or even take a clear 
stand on the issue.  One thing is clear, however: far from dropping the debate 
about violence by ‘agreeing to disagree,’ as Raschke asserted, the issue continued 
to be a source of contention within the party.  During the time period 1985 to 
1989, however, certain events occurred that revealed the AL’s stance on violence.  
These events include the terrorist attacks on the La Belle disco in Berlin; the 
second Reagan visit; the fatal shooting of a police officer during the 
demonstration against the expansion of the Frankfurt airport; and the 
demonstrations against the International Monetary Fund meetings held in West 
Berlin.  While the AL had not officially renounced violence, its reactions to these 
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events revealed that it had significantly moderated compared to past years.  In 
all of these instances, the AL actively attempted to assert a moderating role, 
trying to defuse difficult situations and to prevent violence.  Though it did not 
always explicitly articulate this shift in policy, its actions reveal an important 
difference nonetheless.   
 One incident of violence hit close to home in West Berlin.  On 5 April 1986, 
a bomb exploded in the La Belle disco in West Berlin, killing an American soldier 
and a young Turkish woman and wounding over 230 others.  The AL did not 
mince words in condemning this terrorist attack, articulating its “deepest disgust 
in the face of this crime” from the floor of the Berlin Parliament.116  Reimund 
Helms, an AL parliamentarian, emphasized that the AL condemned the violence 
regardless of motives and regardless of the perpetrator.  There was no sense of 
‘clandestine joy’ on the Left here, as Helms asserted, “there can be no justification 
for this crime.”117  Foreshadowing the Left’s reaction to future events, however, 
the AL warned the other parties not to use the event as an excuse to further 
restrict civil liberties, and condemned the United States for accusing the USSR 
and the GDR of providing the logistical support for this alleged act of Libyan 
state-sponsored terror.  When the United States bombed Libya in retaliation 
shortly thereafter, the AL condemned the bombing as an “unjustifiable act of 
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April 1986), 1412. 
117 Für dieses Verbrechen kann es keine Rechtfertigung geben.  PAB 10/26 
(9 April 1986), 1412. 
 
 348
state terror,” and asserted that by harming innocent civilians, the United States 
placed itself at the same level as the terrorists.118  The AL advocated a peaceful 
solution brought about by European-led negotiations rather than United States 
missiles, and worried that the measures adopted in the wake of the La Belle 
bombing would not fight terror, but would instead merely serve to contribute to 
fear and prejudice regarding people of Arab descent. 
  The United States provided another test for the AL’s changed stance 
regarding violence.  In June 1987, as part of the 750th anniversary celebrations of 
Berlin’s founding, President Ronald Reagan visited West Berlin in a reprise of his 
visit exactly five years earlier.  His previous visit had triggered enormous 
protests and violence, and the AL had come under heavy criticism for its links to 
these violent protests.  This time, however, the AL pursued a different course.  It 
strove to play the role of mediator between the extra-parliamentary groups, 
including the Autonomen, the violence-prone anarchist groups, and the state.  The 
AL made it clear that it did not welcome Reagan’s second visit; in fact, it viewed 
his invitation by the Berlin Senate to visit Berlin as a “provocation.”119  The AL-
issued flyer publicizing the demonstration organized by the AL portrayed 
Reagan’s visit as a propaganda act intended to distract attention from domestic 
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scandals plaguing the Reagan administration.  The flyer noted that the city’s 
establishment planned to entertain Reagan with “obsequious expressions of 
obedience.”120  The demonstration was intended as a way for the rest of West 
Berlin to make its feelings known by taking to the streets.  Taken as a whole, the 
flyer was not a call for violence, but neither was it an appeal for restraint. 
 Five years to the day after Reagan’s last visit sparked massive riots, West 
Berlin again witnessed violent clashes between police and autonomous groups.  
Between thirty thousand and sixty-five thousand demonstrators participated in 
the protest against Reagan’s presence.  The demonstration began peacefully, with 
a large but restrained police presence keeping an eye on things.  Then, in an 
apparent reaction to word that the end point of the demonstration had been 
changed, approximately two thousand Autonomen began throwing stones and 
firecrackers at buildings.  Demonstrators smashed windows and looted shops 
between Wittenbergplatz and Uraniastrasse.121   
 Internal AL documents reveal the AL’s attitude in the aftermath of the 
violence.  Most notably, the AL’s response to the events was marked by a sense 
of trying to determine what went wrong.  This was very different from the 
unrepentant attitude bordering on defiance expressed by the AL’s leadership 
after the last Reagan visit, which put the AL on the defensive, but where the AL 
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offered no real apologies for the violence that ensued in the course of the 
demonstration.  The minutes of the AL Executive Committee meeting held the 
evening after the violence surrounding the second Reagan visit show that the 
meeting was an attempt on the part of the AL leadership to find out what had 
sparked the rioting and how to avoid it in the future.  Those attending cited 
logistical and planning problems that made it impossible for the AL to lead the 
crowd away from Wittenbergplatz, the center of the violence.  In addition, some 
held that the demonstration itself had been too boring, and speculated that 
perhaps this, too, was partially responsible for the violence.  By its own 
admission, in order to avoid any “self-flagellation,” the AL leadership decided to 
put on a brave face and hail the demo as a “huge success,” and emphasized the 
police’s failure to show restraint as promised as the source of the violence.122 
 In another internal paper, Peter Sellin, a member of the AL’s 
parliamentary delegation during the previous legislative period, also tried to 
analyze the causes of the violence.  According to Sellin, the organizers of the 
demonstration had tried to create a political climate that made it clear that they 
wanted demonstrators to conduct themselves peacefully.  Nevertheless, events 
got out of control, with unacceptable consequences.  He particularly condemned 
the damage to persons and property resulting from the riots: as well as the 
random smashing of windows along the demonstration route, non-participants 
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and innocent passers-by had been injured, both by rioters and by police.  He 
blamed the Autonomen for the violence, but suspected that there might be 
political factions within the AL that had an interest in allowing these groups to 
be violent.  He advocated actively combating certain political strategies and 
actions by these autonomous groups.  His paper also speculated on the role of 
boredom in sparking the riots and fostering violence, and cited the 
romanticization of violent acts in what many seemed to view as a kind of “game 
of ‘cops and robbers.’”123  This had very undesirable consequences for the Left 
and the city in general, however, as it justified the city’s efforts to arm police and 
equip them in what demonstrators interpreted as a provocative way.  In short, 
Sellin worried that violent protests pushed political change in a direction 
undesirable to the AL.  
 Thus one aspect of the AL’s response to the violence was to try to figure 
out what had gone wrong and to study ways of avoiding it in the future.  But 
another means of response was just as revealing.  In the immediate wake of the 
Reagan visit, the AL requested a special session of the Abgeordnetenhaus.  The 
session would focus exclusively on Reagan’s visit and its consequences for 
political developments in the city.  The AL also planned to try to hold Wilhelm 
Kewenig, Berlin’s Senator for the Interior whom the AL blamed for the actions of 
the police, politically accountable by attempting a vote of no confidence in the 
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minister.124  In this way, the AL pursued a parliamentary path for the solution of 
its grievances.  
 The AL also attempted to fulfill its newfound role as mediator in the wake 
of the shootings during the Frankfurt airport protests.  On 2 November 1987, six 
years to the day after police had expelled demonstrators from the shanties where 
the demonstrations against the expansion of the Frankfurt airport had begun, 
two policemen were shot and killed and two others wounded.  This marked the 
first time in the history of the Federal Republic where demonstrators had shot 
police.125  As was the case at the time of the La Belle disco bombing, the AL 
quickly denounced the attack.  In elaborating, the AL revealed how far it had 
changed its attitude toward the West German state as symbolized by the police 
force.  The AL condemned the image of the police as an “object of hate or 
dehumanized agent of state repression.”126  It also voiced its concern that the 
expected escalation of violence in the wake of the shootings threatened to 
destroy any possibility of shaping politics in a positive way.  The AL therefore 
announced that it would work to ensure that the coming conflict would proceed 
peacefully, and it called on all participants, both those acting on behalf of the 
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state and those advocating a strategy of militant, violent action, to take steps to 
ensure that violence would at least be reduced. 
 The AL’s new role as mediator between radical groups and the 
parliamentary political system can also be discerned in its approach to the 
protests surrounding the meeting of the IMF in West Berlin in autumn 1988.  This 
event produced the AL’s least ambiguous statement to date regarding its 
changed stance on violence.  On the eve of the meeting, the Executive Committee 
declared that it was absurd to assert that the AL promoted violence in any way 
in order to promote its policies.  Then followed the statement that both internal 
and external critics of the AL’s stance on violence had been waiting for: the 
declaration asserted that “for the AL, violence is no means of conducting 
politics.”127  Still, however, the AL refused to distance itself from left-wing 
groups, including those using violence, but would continue to work with them.  
If necessary, the AL would discuss, debate, and conflict with other groups about 
their means of articulating protest, but it would not exclude them.  Moreover, the 
existing political order still required reform, and peaceful, orderly 
demonstrations often did not get any attention.  The declaration concluded, “It is 
sad but not to be overlooked that again and again, the establishment reacts only 
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to violence.”128  That the AL renounced violent means while refusing to distance 
itself completely from groups who utilized violent protest was a crucial 
component of the AL’s unspoken strategy of mediation and de-escalation.  If the 
AL had ceased working with all groups that promoted violence, its role as 
mediator, its ability to defuse potentially violent situations, and its ability to 
bring the radical Left into the parliamentary system would have been lost.  
 Similarly, the AL strove to achieve a balance between its evident 
sympathy for certain aspects of the GDR and its clear disapproval of other facets 
of its ideology.  This involved attempting to steer a course between GDR leaders 
and those of the Federal Republic, and to strike a balance between supporting the 
GDR government and the GDR opposition.  It expressed this desire in its 1985 
election program, when it declared, “We no longer wish to be loyal to East or 
West, but rather to each other.”129  In the event, however, the AL’s support for the 
GDR gradually eroded, and support for the opposition gradually increased.  A 
growing sense of disillusionment with the GDR can be discerned in this time 
period, both in terms of the GDR’s environmental and human rights record and 
in terms of one of the strongest sources of its legitimacy and appeal in the eyes of 
the AL- East Germany’s own degree of coming to terms with the German past. 
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 The AL was in the unusual position of being the most consistent advocate 
of the GDR’s official positions while at the same time attracting some of its most 
vehement critics.  The AL acted in many ways to support the interests of the 
GDR government.  The AL, as well as the Federal Green Party, supported the 
GDR’s demands that the Federal Republic recognize East German citizenship, 
among other key issues.  The role of the Stasi has already been partially explored 
in the previous chapter.  In the time period examined here, these efforts 
continued.  Unfortunately, it will probably never be clear to what extent the AL’s 
stance on the GDR was shaped by infiltrators like Dirk Schneider, who continued 
to play leading roles in positions impacting the development and articulation of 
AL policy toward the GDR.  In this context, however, it is important to note three 
things.  First, the Stasi infiltration alone cannot explain the AL’s support for the 
GDR, and the words of Schneider and his cronies fell on fertile ground.  Second, 
the AL was not the only West Berlin political party to fall prey to infiltration; in 
fact, all of the major West Berlin parties hosted Stasi infiltrators.130  Third, 
whether or not the Stasi’s systematic attempts to infiltrate and influence the AL 
were responsible, in the mid-1980s, the attitude of the AL toward the GDR was 
significantly different from what it had been at the time of the AL’s founding.  
Then, the AL’s largest group, the KPD-Rote Fahne, had been clearly 
contemptuous of the GDR.  This group had gradually been squeezed out of 
influence by those embracing a more pro-GDR stance.  A group that had 
                                                 
130 See Knabe, Unterwanderte Republik, 88-103. 
 
 356
previously mocked the GDR now called for immediate recognition of GDR 
citizenship, and supported a host of other demands quite to East Berlin’s liking.  
By the mid-eighties, the AL’s loyalty and support was East Germany’s to lose.  
For revealing reasons, it did lose it, as will be seen. 
 While it is difficult to evaluate the influence of the Stasi, the two most 
prominent informers working within the AL, Dirk Schneider and Klaus 
Croissant, were closely involved in every position paper and lobbying effort that 
tried to move the AL closer to an unquestioning acceptance of the GDR party 
line.  One of the most important position papers to come out of the pro- East 
Germany faction within the AL, “On Linking Questions of Peace and Human 
Rights,” was authored in part by these two Stasi agents.131  The article appeared 
in both the AL’s membership circular and in Kommune, a monthly publication of 
the far Left.132  The article attacked the idea that states violating human rights 
could not develop and pursue a peaceful international policy.  Furthermore, the 
authors asserted that those in the West had no right to view their human rights 
situation as superior.  In their view, linking matters of peace and human rights 
stemmed from Western arrogance. 
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 Croissant and Schneider also helped draft another important piece that 
attempted to influence the AL’s policy toward the East bloc.  The article “Twenty 
Theses Regarding West Berlin” explicitly embraced many of the key demands of 
the GDR government.133  Asserting that Berlin had no claim to be the capital of all 
Germans, the authors recommended that West Berlin politicians abandon this 
hope and focus instead on taking advantage of West Berlin’s unique status as a 
bridge between East and West.  West Berlin should work toward more autonomy 
from the Federal Republic, and work to improve relations with the GDR, thus 
solving many of the city’s problems.  The paper called for an end to the special 
rules governing the Allied presence in West Berlin, and recommended that the 
Western military presence be reduced to purely symbolic levels.  It insisted that 
the Federal Republic should relinquish its claim to represent all Germans on the 
international stage (the so-called Alleinvertretungsanspruch), and recommended 
that West Berlin work to become a “city of peace” and the place of mediation 
between East and West.134  The paper also asserted that normal relations with the 
GDR were impossible as long as the West demonized it and tried to mobilize 
East German citizens against their own government.  The theses did include an 
important caveat, however, stating that this did not mean that the Left should 
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not criticize the East German political system.  Nor should it refrain from efforts 
at solidarity with victims of persecution. 
 Both these papers sparked discussions inside and outside the party.  The 
essay questioning the linkage between human rights and international peace 
provoked the strongest reaction, leading to a response by several prominent 
Greens, including Petra Kelly, also published in Kommune.135  The rebuttal tarred 
the earlier article as a unilateral attempt to revise a basic consensus of the Greens 
in the realm of East-West relations, the idea that domestic and foreign peace 
belonged together.  It also condemned the piece for attempting to restrict 
relations between East and West to the level of official contacts.  Moreover, the 
accusation leveled by Croissant, Schneider and others that the Greens were not 
critical enough of Western human rights violations could only stem from a lack 
of knowledge of the Green Party’s efforts in this field.  The reaction to the 
“Twenty Theses Regarding West Berlin” was more muted, but came from within 
the AL itself.  The AL attempted to distance itself from the piece, issuing a press 
release stating that the article was not an official AL paper, and was not 
approved or discussed within the AL, but rather represented the views of the 
thirteen individual AL members who had signed it.136  Nevertheless, the 
                                                 
135 Uli Fischer and others, “Was soll das Geholze?” Kommune (June 1986), 
58. 
136 “20 Thesen kein offizielles AL-Papier,” AL press release, 27 November 
1986.  AGG:B.I.1.227. 
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prominence of the authors reveals the extent to which pro-GDR sentiments 
pervaded the party at the time. 
 The AL also showed its commitment to official contact in the GDR by 
participating in the 750th anniversary celebrations of Berlin as the only delegate 
from the West.  Other invitees from the West Berlin political establishment 
declined their invitations under pressure from their own parties and from the 
Western Allies, who viewed visits to the ‘capital of the GDR’ as undermining 
West Berlin’s independent status.137 
 Nevertheless, during this period, a growing sense of disillusionment with 
the GDR can be discerned on the part of AL members.  This problem related 
especially to the GDR’s treatment of its opposition, its restrictions in allowing 
entry visas to many members of the AL, and its own coming to terms with the 
past. 
 One obvious area where the AL could not help being exposed to the 
blatant, oppressive character of the regime was in the area of human rights 
violations, the most obvious of these being the Berlin Wall and the shootings at 
the border.  The AL did not hesitate to condemn these acts.  When a shooting at 
the Wall sparked a proposal to condemn the order to shoot fugitives who tried to 
cross the border illegally, the AL representative Wolfgang Schenk spoke for the 
faction in condemning “such inhumane acts of state violence” in shooting a 
refugee who was trying to exercise a basic human right in deciding where to 
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live.138  Schenk called on the GDR to rescind the order to shoot at the border, and 
to grant its citizens basic human rights, including freedom of travel.  Not all AL 
members agreed, however.  The degree to which the relationship to the GDR 
divided the AL can be seen by the AL–representative Dagmar Birkelbach’s 
announcement that she would abstain from voting to condemn the order to shoot 
fugitives at the border.139  Birkelbach based her objections on two points.  First, 
she held that the proposal gave a misleading impression that the 
Abgeordnetenhaus always supported human rights.  Second, she argued that the 
proposal placed too much pressure on the GDR to change by making revoking 
the order to shoot a prerequisite for the process of détente.  In her view, no 
preconditions for détente should exist.  Birkelbach’s stance also perhaps reflected 
the fruits of Schneider’s efforts: Birkelbach was one of the signers of the 
statement condemning the linkage of human rights and matters of international 
peace discussed above.140 
 Arrests of some GDR opposition figures also hurt the image of the GDR 
among the AL.  Periodically, the AL called on the GDR to release members of 
opposition groups who had been detained by the East German government.  
This practice continued even when Dirk Schneider was press spokesperson for 
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the AL.  A 1988 press release bearing Schneider’s name called for the release of 
imprisoned opposition figures, and articulated the AL’s bafflement that the GDR 
would criminalize the activities of critics who protested against restrictions on 
democratic rights in both East and West Germany.  The press release also 
insisted that dialogue could only occur when it was not disrupted by restrictions 
on entry into the GDR, criminal charges, and arrests.141  
 These travel restrictions particularly vexed the AL.  The East German 
government prohibited numerous members of the AL from crossing the border 
as a result of protests and scattered incidents of support for GDR opposition 
groups starting in the mid-1980s.  This proved a decisive hindrance for the 
GDR’s attempts to establish contacts with AL leaders, especially those in the 
Abgeordnetenhaus, which the GDR hoped would boost its credibility.  In this 
matter, too, however, the AL resisted being used.  When the GDR refused entry 
to AL members Renate Künast (then an AL delegate to the Abgeordnetenhaus) and 
Michael Wendt (then member of the AL’s Executive Committee) a few weeks 
before they were to lead an AL delegation to meet with East German officials, the 
AL simply cancelled the scheduled meetings.  The Executive Committee cited 
this as further evidence that the GDR wished to allow official visits while trying 
to prevent AL members from making contact with those citizens in the East who 
were critical of their government.  While the AL still viewed the talks at the 
                                                 
141 “AL erneuert Forderung nach Freilassung von DDR-Oppositionellen,” 
AL press release, n.d.,printed in DR-Info 17 February 1988.  AGG: B.I.1.748. 
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official level in the GDR as necessary, the AL emphasized that it would not 
sacrifice its contacts with critical East German citizens as the price for these 
talks.142  
 A further sign of disillusionment with the GDR became the crucial area of 
coming to terms with the past.  As has been seen, the GDR derived a great deal 
of its legitimacy among the Left from its alleged anti-fascism and its supposedly 
complete break with the National Socialist past.  During 1985 to 1989, however, 
the GDR suffered some chinks in its anti-fascist armor that indicated that the AL 
was recognizing this increasingly for what it was: propaganda.  In May 1985, 
East German officials prevented the AL-Abgeordnetenhaus delegation from 
traveling to Sachsenhausen, a concentration camp site on the outskirts of Berlin.  
The AL delegation had planned the trip to observe the fortieth anniversary of 
German capitulation.  Instead, due to restrictions on entry impacting AL 
members, the AL lashed out against the GDR’s own coming to terms with the 
past.  Preventing the AL from visiting the former concentration camp revealed 
that “obviously the other German state also has significant problems coming to 
terms with the German past.”143  This was particularly damaging for a state that 
sought to portray itself as anti-fascist.  Obviously, the statement concluded, the 
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only kind of anti-fascism that was allowed was that which was compatible with 
the Soviet liberators and “leaves out every critical question regarding the 
German past.”144  Also, as part of the fortieth anniversary commemoration of 
German capitulation, the AL released a packet intended for high-school students 
and teachers in West Berlin regarding coming to terms with the past.  The packet 
included essays by historians on the German past, a statement by the Jewish 
community in West Berlin, and texts by Günter Grass, Stefan Heym, and 
Heinrich Böll.  The package also contained documents about the official line 
regarding coming to terms with the past in the GDR, which, according to the AL, 
“also renders many questions taboo.”145   
 Clearly, then, the GDR’s anti-fascist robes were beginning to tatter in the 
sight of the West Berlin Left.  The reasons for this are revealing, and relate to the 
nature of the East German regime.  Despite its extensive attempts to infiltrate and 
influence the AL, only a small part of which is detailed above, the GDR 
government never gained the unqualified support of the AL, but instead 
squandered its existing sympathies.  The GDR reacted to the AL in the only way 
it knew how: by placing restrictions on travel and free speech; by undertaking 
smear campaigns, including some against some AL members; by causing 
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massive pollution, then declaring environmental data secret; and by arresting 
opposition leaders.  This approach, essentially the antithesis of that favored by 
the AL by this time, served only to alienate a group that was otherwise well 
disposed toward the East German state.  In many respects, the AL leadership’s 
sympathy was the GDR’s to lose.  Thanks largely to the paranoid and restrictive 
nature of the regime, it lost it. 
During the AL’s second period of parliamentary representation at the 
state level, the AL underwent important changes.  Its attempts to balance the 
extra-parliamentary and the parliamentary realms did not succeed, and by the 
end of the electoral period, its emphasis was changing from the extra-
parliamentary to the parliamentary realm.  In the parliament, the AL discovered 
some commonalities with its erstwhile enemy, the SPD, and revealed it had 
moderated its early stance regarding the Western Allies in the city.  It also 
discovered the appeal of the parliaments as a place where the problematic 
German past could be confronted, and the AL used its parliamentary resources 
to educate both the general public and its own members about the German past.  
Controversies surrounding the State Committee for Constitutional Protection 
gave the AL new ammunition to use against the state.  In the end, though, its 
response revealed its parliamentarization.  It harnessed liberal arguments about 
freedom from state interference, and even reluctantly conceded a role for the 
parliaments in monitoring and regulating the organization.   
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Its stance on violence changed as well, in part conditioned by its 
experiences in the Abgeordnetenhaus, in part due to its affiliation with the national 
Greens.  This can best be seen in the contrast in its reaction to the violence 
around the second Reagan visit compared to that of his first visit exactly five 
years earlier.  Attitudes the AL expressed toward terrorist attacks, attacks on 
police in Frankfurt, and the anti-IMF demonstrations also reveal a changed 
stance on violence.  Finally, the AL resisted extensive efforts on the part of the 
Stasi to infiltrate and influence the AL, demonstrating deradicalization stemming 
in part from a growing disillusionment with the GDR ‘s paranoid and repressive 
policies. 
Overall, then, parliamentarization and deradicalization continued apace 
during the years examined in this chapter.  This helped set the stage for what 
seemed to be the final stage in the AL’s evolution: its participation with the SPD 








 Embracing Power, Embracing Parliament 
This chapter examines the AL’s experiences in the crucial interval from 
1989 to 1990.  During these years, the processes of parliamentarization and 
deradicalization explored throughout this dissertation climaxed.  This period 
represented the final phase in the AL’s transformation from an anti-
parliamentary organization to a coalition partner accepting and embracing 
parliamentary democracy.  Moreover, by 1989, the AL had fully become what it 
had originally claimed to be: an organization working to promote democracy 
and protect the environment. 
In part, frustration with the balancing act it had attempted during the last 
electoral period led it to commit fully to parliamentary participation.  It 
expressed this commitment by becoming a coalition partner sharing power with 
the SPD.  Furthermore, by 1989, the AL had renounced violence: in the 1989 
electoral program the AL explicitly embraced all four of the Green Party ‘pillars,’ 
including that of nonviolence, for the first time.  Finally, the AL continued to 
embrace a culture of debate and discussion as ways of arriving at truth, 
identified by Ralf Dahrendorf as a key component of a democratic culture.  
These years also witnessed extraordinary historical developments that 
changed the context in which the AL operated.  The revolution in the GDR and 
the fall of the Wall seemed to awaken hopes among the West Berlin Left for 
revolutionary changes in Western society, hopes that had gone dormant as a 
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result of its concentration on parliamentary participation.  The fall of the Wall 
and the momentous changes in 1989-1990 finally purged the radical Left of these 
millenarian ambitions.  Once these hopes had been dashed, little remained for 
the radical Left to do but to return to its parliamentary course, sadder but wiser 
for the experience.   
The AL’s transformation can be seen in part in its campaign for the 1989 
election in West Berlin.  Generally speaking, a number of factors influenced this 
contest.  At the federal level, the CDU was losing support, especially due to its 
health policies and rising patient costs.  The corruption scandal surrounding the 
Charlottenburg city councilman and CDU Representative Wolfgang Antes, 
accused of bribery and improper donations, dominated the local political 
campaign.  Controversy regarding the activities of the West Berlin Office for 
Constitutional Protection, accused of observing opposition politicians and 
journalists, also played a role in the election, as did the planned end to rent 
control and increased housing prices.  The presence of the right-wing 
Republikaner, campaigning for the first time on the West Berlin political scene, 
provoked debate and counter-demonstrations.  Generally, however, the 1989 
election campaign was lackluster: one observer called it “an election without 
issues.”1 
                                                 
1 Ein Wahlkampf ohne Themen.  Horst Schmollinger, “Die Wahl zum 
Abgeordnetenhaus von Berlin am 29. Januar 1989,” Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen 
20 (March 1989): 312. 
 
 368
For its part, the AL was showing signs of becoming an established player 
on the West Berlin political scene.  The AL’s program for the 1989 election tried 
to counteract this by emphasizing continuity with the past, billing itself as a 
supplement to the 1985 program.2  Nevertheless, looking in depth at the 1989 
version reveals just how far the AL had moved to embrace parliamentary 
democracy. 
For one thing, the AL had altered its view of the role of parliaments in an 
important way.  Past programs had downplayed the potential for parliaments to 
effect change, insisting that the real force for change was to be found in the extra-
parliamentary realm.  At the most, parliaments could occasionally be used to 
support the extra-parliamentary movements.  By contrast, the authors of the AL’s 
1989 program found it necessary to remind readers that parliamentary 
participation alone was not enough: real change needed the support of extra-
parliamentary organizations.  In a small but significant shift, the AL now viewed 
the extra-parliamentary realm as its Spielbein, whereas the parliaments had 
become its Standbein.3 
Still, the AL insisted that its view of parliaments would continue to differ 
from that of the other parties.  The AL saw parliaments as the place where it 
could present alternative views of social development.  Instead of pursuing 
                                                 
2 Das Wahlprogramm der Alternativen Liste 1989 (Berlin: Alternative Liste, 
1989). 
3 Wahlprogramm der AL 1989, 3. 
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Stellvertreterpolitik, or ‘politics of representation,’ the AL sought to democratize 
local government by involving the populace in decisions.  This would take the 
form of a “radical decentralization of decision-making” ranging from soliciting 
input from citizens’ initiatives to referendums.4 
Significantly, the AL’s program revealed that it supported an alliance 
between itself and the SPD, even before such an alliance seemed possible or 
realistic.  The program emphasized that the CDU-FDP Senate must be defeated, 
but the AL would not be able to do this alone: this would only be possible with 
the SPD, and the AL should not stand in the way by being shy about embracing 
power.  In fact, the group tried to overcome the ambivalence many still felt 
regarding parliamentary power by downplaying the question of cooperation 
with the SPD and cloaking it in pragmatism: “What’s important to us is not 
governmental participation in itself, but rather practical successes of a policy that 
consistently gives ecology top priority, that leads to a democratization of society, 
to more rights for citizens, to equal rights for immigrants and refugees, to social 
conditions that render possible a life fit for human beings.”5 
                                                 
4 Eine radikale Dezentralisierung von Entscheidungen.  Wahlprogramm der 
AL 1989, 3. 
5 Dabei kommt es uns nicht auf die Teilhabe am Regierungsgeschäft an, 
sondern auf praktische Erfolge einer Politik, die der Ökologie konsequent 
Vorrang einräumt, die zu einer Demokratisierung der Gesellschaft führt, zu 
mehr Rechten der BürgerInnen gegenüber dem Staat, zu gleichen Rechten für 
ImmigrantInnen und Flüchtlinge, zu sozialen Verhältnissen, die ein 




Ecological issues continued to play a key role in the party program.  For 
example, environmental concerns dominated the programmatic section on the 
issue of West Berlin and the GDR, revealing the degree to which the AL’s view of 
East Germany had become colored by that state’s ecological problems.  The 
location of West Berlin meant that West Berlin was constantly at risk of air 
pollution from brown coal and risky nuclear power plants in the GDR.  But West 
Berlin also burdened its surroundings, for example, with great quantities of 
garbage, some of which was quite toxic.6  A credible cross-border environmental 
policy must begin with a readiness not to burden one’s own neighbor with one’s 
trash.  The right to a clean environment must exist on both sides of the border.  
This necessitated that all environmental data be made public, whereas in the 
GDR, this was treated as a state secret.  The program called for free contact 
between environmental organizations on both sides of the border, and the AL 
emphasized that its own experiences had taught it the importance of citizens’ 
initiatives and public discussions about ecological problems.  Hence the AL 
promised its “unlimited support” for environmental groups in West or East 
                                                 
6 On this issue and its link to the opposition in the GDR, see Erhart 
Neubert, Geschichte der Opposition in der DDR 1949-1989 (Bonn: Bundeszentrale 
für politische Bildung, 1997), 746. 
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Germany.7  The AL also expressly criticized “the attempts of the GDR leadership 
to stifle and mute individual voices.”8 
In terms of environmental policy for West Berlin, the AL took up a cause 
of the squatters by advocating that the city “green up courtyards” by planting 
trees and vines to cover roofs and building facades.9  It also proposed to reduce 
traffic and improve quality of life by bringing living areas, business districts, and 
recreation areas closer together.10  It pledged to work for a person-friendly 
instead of a car-friendly city, and would work to give priority for pedestrians, 
bicyclists, buses, and trains.11  Over long distances, mass transit would receive 
priority over individual automobile traffic.  Moreover, the AL claimed that these 
suggestions were affordable and would create jobs.12 
The program also advanced a policy in which civil liberties would be 
strengthened against the encroachments of the state.  The AL emphasized 
increasing decision-making at the local level, giving foreigners the right to vote 
                                                 
7 Uneingeschränkte Unterstützung. 
8 Die Versuche der DDR-Führung, unabhängige Stimmen abzuwürgen 
und mundtot zu machen.  Wahlprogramm der AL 1989, 13. 
9 Hofbegrünung. 
10 Wahlprogramm der AL 1989, 14. 
11 Wahlprogramm der AL 1989, 15. 
12 Wahlprogramm der AL 1989, 18-19. 
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in local elections, and incorporating plebiscitary elements into the election 
process.13 
Regarding education policy, the AL sought to portray educational 
institutions as the seedbeds of democracy.  According to the program, the AL 
viewed democratizing schools as a way to democratize society.14  Universities 
played an even more important role: according to the program, “society needs 
the criticism from the universities for its development.”15  This emphasis also 
reflected the connections between the AL and the student movement of the 
1960s. 
The AL outlined its utopian vision of a West Berlin as a “model of a civil 
society” which in its view would have geopolitical ramifications.16  As such, the 
city would need no military, no Allied listening posts, and no armed police force.  
It would also help improve East-West relations: “The city will contribute to 
overcoming the power blocs and the Wall through its peace policies, its science 
and cultural policies, and its environmental and economic policies.”17  West 
                                                 
13 Wahlprogramm der AL 1989, 23. 
14 Wahlprogramm der AL 1989, 32. 
15 Die Gesellschaft braucht in ihrer Entwicklung die Kritik der Hochschule.  
Wahlprogramm der AL 1989, 34. 
16 West-Berlin wird Modell einer zivilen Gesellschaft.  Wahlprogramm der 
AL 1989, 35. 
17 Die Stadt trägt durch ihre Friedenspolitik, ihre Wissenschafts- und 
Kulturpolitik, ihre Umwelt- und Wirtschaftspolitik dazu bei, dass die 




Berlin’s disarmed and demilitarized society would also have an impact on the 
Allied presence, which should be reduced to a symbolic level.18 
Regarding violence, the AL program articulated the AL’s desire “to take 
the democratic path to achieve our ecological, social, and peaceful 
reconstruction.”19  But the AL and the extra-parliamentary groups agreed that 
voting and electoral representation alone were not enough to achieve an 
ecological, social, and nonviolent society.  Other means such as demonstrations, 
civil disobedience, strikes, occupations, boycotts, and so on were also necessary.  
In planning these, the AL would try to guarantee the safety of political 
opponents, non-participants, and themselves.  But these actions led to 
confrontations with police.  To exclude this risk would be to end these actions 
altogether.  This would surrender control to the establishment, and the 
alternative movement would lose its only means of resistance.  At this point, the 
AL drew on an explicit historical lesson in justifying its insistence on maintaining 
certain forms of resistance: “Resistance comes too late when democracy has been 
suspended or there is already war.”20  In contrast to many politicians and 
journalists, the AL did not consider acts of civil disobedience to be forms of 
violence.  According to the program, however, violent means corrupted the idea 
                                                 
18 Wahlprogramm der AL 1989, 41. 
19 Wir wollen unseren ökologischen, sozialen und friedenspolitichen 
Umbau auf demokratischem Wege erreichen.  Wahlprogramm der AL 1989, 45. 
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of a humane society, and injured those using the violence as well as those against 
whom the violence was directed.  The AL then cast itself in the role of the 
revolutionaries of 1848: “An evaluation of violence and nonviolence that is 
independent of time and place is not possible when one considers history.  Also 
the Liberals in 1848, men and women, built barricades and fired shots.”21 
The program then assessed the different positions in the AL regarding 
violence: many believed that the stones that were thrown at the time of the 
squatters’ movement were legitimate arguments that were necessary to wake up 
public opinion and politicians.  Many others believed that every riot distracted 
from the cause for which the AL was actually fighting, as the media reported 
about the violence instead of about its underlying causes.22 
The program at this point conceded that one formula could not cover all 
positions on violence within the AL.  Instead, the AL issued guidelines for future 
actions and demonstrations in Berlin.  The AL would not rule out working with 
groups not explicitly renouncing violence or guaranteeing nonviolent behavior.  
In fact, the AL emphasized that it intended actively to continue working with 
these groups.  The AL did not wish to give up this cooperation, and wished to 
                                                                                                                                                 
20 Widerstand kommt zu spät, wenn die Demokratie bereits ausser Kraft 
gesetzt ist oder wenn ein Krieg bereits begonnen hat.  Wahlprogramm der AL 1989, 
46. 
21 Eine von Zeit und Ort unabhängige Bewertung von Gewalt und 
Gewaltfreiheit verbietet sich aber allein schon im Blick auf die Geschichte.  Auch 
die Liberalen bauten 1848 Barrikaden, und es  schossen Männer wie Frauen.  
Wahlprogramm der AL 1989, 46. 
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live up to its credo that “those affected must determine the forms of their own 
resistance and protest.”23  But the AL nevertheless wished to avoid the perception 
that it took a laissez-faire attitude toward those groups, or that it avoided conflict 
regarding these groups’ understanding of radicalism and militancy.  In fact, the 
AL stated that it would resist the tendency to avoid conflict and actively pursue 
discussion with these groups: “In the future and as appropriate, we will take 
counter-positions in internal and public debates.”24  Again, the AL emphasized a 
culture of debate and discussion, and it increasingly strove to bring this culture 
to other organizations as well.  This arguably helped instill in these other groups 
the virtues of debate and discussion as ways of getting at the truth, thus 
contributing toward a democratization of the Left that transcended the 
boundaries of the AL.  The AL was careful not to alienate these groups: it 
emphasized in the program that if on occasion the AL condemned certain forms 
of action, this should not be interpreted to mean that it sought to exclude these 
groups or individuals from left-wing solidarity.  Still, the AL would work to help 
others renounce violence: invoking the phrase “Berlin disarms,” the AL 
                                                                                                                                                 
22 Wahlprogramm der AL 1989, 47. 
23 Die Betroffenen bestimmen die Formen ihres Widerstandes und 
Protestes selbst.  Wahlprogramm der AL 1989, 47. 
24 Wir werden in Zukunft gegebenenfalls in internen und öffentlichen 
Streitgesprächen Gegenpositionen beziehen.  Wahlprogramm der AL 1989, 47. 
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emphasized that it would apply this to work with other groups to attempt to 
break the spiral of violence.25 
The AL also incorporated a number of other emancipative elements: it 
vowed to fight for “a society without oppression of women,” to fight the double 
discrimination female immigrants faced, and to campaign for a free choice of 
lifestyle and partner for homosexual couples.26  It took up the old issue of 
affordable housing, calling for making affordable housing a basic right, calling 
for protection for tenants, and explicitly bringing in ecological elements by 
advocating so-called “green construction.”27 
The AL also criticized West Berlin’s government and society for failing to 
come to terms fully with the German past.  It interpreted construction policies, 
street names, research, care for victims, as well as government statements and 
lack of attention to the German past as symptoms of failed 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung.  To counteract this, West Berlin should become a 
center of scientific, political, and cultural confrontation with German fascism and 
its consequences.28  Here, the AL cast its entire program as lessons learned from 
the German past.  Its protests against restrictions on asylum seekers as well as its 
fight against racism and the rise of right-wing extremism all followed from the 
                                                 
25 Berlin rüstet ab.  Wahlprogramm der AL 1989, 47. 
26 Eine Gesellschaft ohne Frauenunterdrückung.  Wahlprogramm der AL 
1989, 48, 54-55. 
27 Grünes Bauen.  Wahlprogramm der AL 1989, 69-72. 
28 Wahlprogramm der AL 1989, 83. 
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memory of the Nazi era.  As the program phrased it, “In conscious memory of 
the past, the AL works for a society in which openness to the world, tolerance, 
and solidarity can be lived.”29 
The program reserved the bombshells for the end.  In the summary, it 
noted that the AL saw itself as combating purely materialistic, undemocratic 
forms of rule.  It wished to supplant these with other principles: ecology, 
nonviolence, social responsibility, and collective self-determination.30  The AL 
then noted that, while capitalist society contradicted the society its members 
wished to achieve in the long run, nevertheless, “a large part of our program can 
be realized within the framework of an industrial capitalist society.”31  In making 
this statement, the AL echoed Eduard Bernstein’s revisionist arguments made 
nearly a century earlier.32 
The program’s closing sentences contained the most explicit statement so 
far regarding the critical nature of debate and discussion for the AL: “The 
strength of the AL rests not only in its electoral vote, but also on the debate about 
its policies and its visions.  We therefore wish ourselves not only many voters, 
                                                 
29 In bewusster Erinnerung an die Vergangenheit arbeitet die Alternative 
Liste für eine  Gesellschaft, in der Weltoffenheit, Toleranz und Solidarität gelebt 
werden können.  Wahlprogramm der AL 1989, 85. 
30 Wahlprogramm der AL 1989, 86. 
31 Ein grosser Teil unserer Programmatik ist jedoch im Rahmen einer 
kapitalistischen Industriegesellschaft realisierbar.  Wahlprogramm der AL 1989, 86. 
32 Donald Sassoon, One Hundred Years of Socialism: the West European Left in 
the Twentieth Century (New York: The New Press, 1996), 26. 
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but also many committed persons.  Only thus and only then will the chances and 
hopes of our politics be realized.”33  This final section of its 1989 program shows 
just how extensive the processes of deradicalization and parliamentarization had 
been.  First, the AL now embraced principles deriving directly from all of the 
Green Party’s Four Pillars, for the first time including nonviolence.  Second, the 
AL revealed that it had largely made its peace with a reformist path to socialism.  
Finally, through its endorsement and emphasis on this distinctly Dahrendorfian, 
liberal ideology, the AL revealed the extent of its genuine democratization. 
With its program, the AL had apparently struck the right tone with voters.  
The AL achieved 11.8 percent of the vote in the West Berlin elections held on 29 
January 1989, its best result to date.  It managed to improve its excellent showing 
of four years earlier by just over 1 percent.  But the 1989 West Berlin election was 
remarkable for several other reasons as well.  First, the electoral math meant that 
the figures were there for either a coalition government between the AL and the 
SPD or a so-called Grand Coalition between the SPD and the CDU.  Accordingly, 
the SPD began negotiations with both the AL and the CDU to establish the next 
West Berlin Senate.  Second, in a much more disturbing development, the 1989 
elections marked the entrance of an extreme right-wing party, the Republikaner, 
                                                 
33 Die Stärke oder auch die Kraft der AL beruht nicht nur auf 
WählerInnenstimmen, sondern auch auf der Auseinandersetzung mit ihrer 
Politik und ihren Vorstellungen.  Wir wünschen uns nicht nur viele 
WählerInnen, sondern noch viel mehr engagierte Menschen.  Nur so und auch 
nur dann entwickeln sich die Chancen und Hoffnungen unserer Politik.  
Wahlprogramm der AL 1989, 86. 
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onto the political scene.  With 7.5 percent of the vote, the Republikaner appeared 
to have come out of nowhere, capitalizing on growing anti-immigrant sentiments 
in West Berlin to easily make it into parliament.  Third, for the first time in ten 
years, the SPD was able to increase its share of the vote, polling at 37.3 percent, 
just behind the CDU, which had continued to lose ground slightly, with 37.7 
percent.  Fourth, a fixture of the political landscape for decades, the FDP, which 
had consistently polled at around 6 percent, suddenly disappeared from the 
scene as it failed to make the 5 percent hurdle.  The 1989 election was indeed “a 
surprising shift in [Berlin’s] party system.”34 
The West Berlin daily Der Tagesspiegel reacted with concern to the outcome 
of the election.  The editorial giving its reaction was headlined “Between 
Extremes,” invoking fears of a Weimar-like end to democracy.35  The paper 
termed the electoral results “the break-in of the irrational into Berlin politics,” 
noting that while some support for the AL as a protest vote had come to be 
expected, the degree of support for the Republikaner had come as a surprise.36  
Again invoking Weimar, the paper noted “the weakening of the rational 
democratic center in favor of the powers on the fringe of the democratic 
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spectrum.”37  Moreover, as under Weimar, in places where the AL had done well 
before, it was now face to face with a strong Republikaner party.  The parties 
formerly governing West Berlin were not blameless, however.  The article 
accused the CDU and FDP of overconfidence and arrogance in avoiding real 
issues in the election campaign.  In addition, the Tagesspiegel worried about the 
implications of the election for West Berlin, especially the economic 
consequences for the city if people lost confidence in the city’s governability.  
Finally, the article speculated that the results would be felt in Bonn, too: Kohl 
had thought that West Berlin was safe and could be counted on to support the 
CDU, but the West Berlin elections could be a foretaste of developments to 
come.38 
Ironically, the much-despised nemesis of the Left, the Springer-owned 
mass-circulation daily BILD, reacted to the election results more soberly, taking 
the triumph of the AL in stride.  In fact, 1989 marked the first year that BILD 
treated the AL like a normal party: this year, for the first time, BILD included the 
AL in its daily coverage of the election.39  Moreover, at least one issue 
championed by the AL had become even more mainstream by 1989 than in 1985: 
environmental concerns.  For example, BILD ran a daily series in 1989 called 
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“Advice and Help for Your Environment,” giving practical if rather superficial 
tips for avoiding pollution, and advocating that schools include environmental 
protection as a required subject.40  But BILD also noted the strengthening of the 
extremes at the expense of the parties of the Center.  It too asked, “Can Berlin 
now be governed?” and noted that, since Berlin’s problems seemed to 
foreshadow developments in West Germany as a whole, the parties faced 
challenges ahead.41  The results should force the parties to ask themselves if they 
knew the concerns of the people, and while the parties had grown larger and 
stronger, they had begun to lose their appeal to ordinary citizens. 
Even before it entered governmental responsibility, the AL faced the 
dilemma of how it should respond to the presence of the right-wing Republikaner 
in the West Berlin parliament.  Both the timing and nature of its response 
indicate the extent to which the AL now accepted and embraced the rules of 
parliamentary democracy, even as it strove to maintain vestiges of its radical 
roots.   
Notably, the AL had begun to plan its reaction to the Republikaner as soon 
as it became clear that the right-wing party had gained enough votes to enter the 
parliament, before the AL had decided to enter the coalition with the SPD.  As a 
memo printed in the Council of Delegates bulletin of 22 February 1989 shows, 
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the AL was keenly aware that parliamentary rules would make the opening 
session of the Abgeordnetenhaus particularly controversial because the rules of 
order stipulated that the Elder President lead the session together with the four 
youngest members present.  This would include three AL members and one 
delegate from the Republikaner.  The AL then discussed ways to “observe the 
minimal formal rules” regarding their conduct in the Abgeordnetenhaus, but went 
on to state that the AL could not fail to protest the enhancement of status that the 
Republikaner would experience as a result of their parliamentary presence.42  The 
AL would consider what steps to take at the opening of the parliamentary 
session to demonstrate against the Republikaner, “without calling into question 
the opening of the parliamentary session itself.”43  The fact that this concern 
predated the AL’s status as coalition partner shows that the AL was not 
motivated by a concern about losing face as a governing party, nor was it 
mandated by a commitment to the SPD to uphold the Abgeordnetenhaus and its 
traditions.  Instead, it stemmed from a genuine desire not to undermine the 
legitimacy of parliament.  
In the end, the protest itself was rather mild, though it did represent a 
carryover from attempts to use parliament as a forum for protest.  Albert Eckert, 
one of the AL’s representatives and one of the first openly gay representatives of 
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the West Berlin parliament, refused to sit next to the Republikaner delegate 
Carsten Pagel during the ceremony.  After repeated warnings, Ernst-August 
Poritz, the Elder President of the body, had Eckert escorted from the podium 
under protest and replaced with the next youngest member, this time a delegate 
from the CDU faction.44  Somewhat later in the proceedings, during a speech by 
the head of the Republikaner faction, the AL delegates proceeded to the entrance-
side of the chamber, each bearing one letter of the anti-fascist slogan “Nip these 
things in the bud!”45  They then filed out of the chamber.  It is noteworthy that 
the AL staged this protest during a parliamentary question it had sponsored on 
the dangers of political extremism for parliamentary democracy.46  Thus the AL 
combined parliamentary with extra-parliamentary techniques to protest against 
right-wing extremism. 
In addition to coping with the sudden appearance of a radical right-wing 
party, West Berlin faced the question of what parties would provide the next 
ruling coalition for the city.  This issue dominated political discussions in the 
immediate aftermath of the election.  Just two days after the vote, BILD noted 
that the AL was interested in a coalition with the SPD.  It quoted AL leaders 
Christian Ströbele and Renate Künast downplaying the differences between the 
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parties.47  The SPD and the AL had not planned on a coalition, however; in fact, 
right up to the eve of the election, the SPD leader Walter Momper had declared 
his opposition to working with the AL, and had denied that this was even an 
option.  In a phone interview with BILD readers, Momper vehemently rejected 
the possibility of an SPD-AL coalition, insisting that such a coalition would be 
“over in a week.”48  Momper went on to list the reasons he predicted such a 
coalition would be short-lived: he noted doubts about the reliability of the AL, 
and asserted that a coalition would end the moment a controversial federal law 
reached the Abgeordnetenhaus for approval and the AL voted against it.  Finally, 
as long as the AL did not clearly and unambiguously renounce violence as a 
political method- and in the eyes of the West Berlin political establishment, the 
AL had not yet done this, since it still worked with groups that used violent 
means of protest- the SPD could not work with it. 
Nevertheless, once the election figures came back favoring either a Red-
Green or a Grand Coalition, the SPD began negotiations.  The manner in which 
these negotiations came about is also indicative of a certain drift away from 
radical grassroots democratic values on the part of the AL.  Representatives from 
the SPD approached the AL’s Bernd Köppl, a member of the pro-coalition Green 
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Panther faction within the AL, and asked him to set things in motion for 
negotiating a possible coalition.  Köppl then assembled a small group of AL 
leaders representing diverse strands within the party, including Harald Wolf 
from the coalition-hostile Left Forum and Renate Künast, a moderate integrative 
figure.49  In contrast to usual practice, which would have involved first calling a 
General Members’ Assembly for discussion, this group met informally and 
privately with the SPD representatives.  This group of AL members then 
informed the Council of Delegates about the talks.50 
The controversial nature of these negotiations and the proposed Red-
Green coalition are difficult to imagine in retrospect.  At the time negotiations 
began, however, even some AL members did not think that the Western Allies, 
who had broad leeway in intervening in internal West Berlin political affairs, 
would permit a Red-Green coalition.51  Indeed, news of a possible Red-Green 
coalition triggered a harsh reaction from the Springer Press, which emphasized 
Momper’s course reversal regarding cooperation with the AL.  BILD noted that 
just eleven days after Momper promised not to coalesce with the AL, “today he 
and his democratic comrades are holding meetings with the radical Leftists, the 
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political group that among other things has yet to clearly distance itself from 
violent actions and psycho-terror against individuals.”52 
For the SPD, however, it was clear that its preference was to work with the 
AL, and it viewed the prospect of a Grand Coalition only as a last resort.53  The 
SPD therefore seized the initiative with the AL.  Knowing full well the 
controversial nature of its prospective partner, the SPD presented the AL with a 
sine qua non: a list of three points to which the AL had to agree as a basis for 
cooperation.  These points, which became known as the ‘Three Essentials,’ aimed 
at the heart of the AL’s radical politics.  First, they required that the AL recognize 
the status of West Berlin and accept the presence of the Allies in the city.  Second, 
the Essentials required that the AL recognize the unity of West Berlin with the 
Federal Republic and automatically accept federal laws when they came before 
the Abgeordnetenhaus for a vote.  Third, the AL had to agree to accept the state’s 
monopoly on the use of force, which meant finally and unambiguously 
renouncing violence as a tool of political protest.54 
The AL’s reaction to the Three Essentials speaks volumes regarding the 
degree to which the party had been parliamentarized and deradicalized over the 
past decade.  Early on in the negotiations with the AL, it became clear that 
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recognition of the Three Essentials would not represent a stumbling block for the 
coalition, and on 2 February 1989, in full knowledge of the preconditions, the 
generally radical Council of Delegates unanimously approved continuing 
negotiations with the SPD.55  These negotiations continued throughout February 
and into March.  A few weeks before the AL’s Mitgliedervollversammlung met to 
decide whether or not to approve the coalition, former RAF attorney and AL 
parliamentarian Christian Ströbele labeled the prospect of a coalition with the 
SPD “the chance of a century.”56  Apparently most of the AL agreed: at a General 
Members’ Assembly on 11-12 March 1989, 80 percent of those members 
attending voted to accept the Three Essentials and enter the coalition. 
 Motivations for accepting the Three Essentials were numerous and 
diverse.  In fact, there were probably as many motivations as there were AL 
members.  For some, especially those who earlier had been active in the rival 
State Committee of the Green Party, work with the SPD meant a further chance 
to reform the AL from within, sparking the AL to further distance itself from 
groups utilizing violence.  Many others hoped to be able to reverse certain CDU-
FDP projects through participating in governmental power.  Furthermore, nearly 
all hoped that parliamentary participation would finally give the AL the chance 
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to see at least certain aspects of its agenda realized.57  On the other hand, many 
apparently feared that if the AL did not embrace power and work in a 
constructive way, but instead continued to pursue an obstructionist, opposition 
role, this would amount to “political suicide.”58 
 The coalition agreement itself was an ambitious, comprehensive, and 
progressive program laying out what its authors hoped would be a new 
direction for West Berlin.59  Heading the agreement were points relating to 
policies regarding Berlin and Germany.  The agreement noted the crucial nature 
of the Western Allied presence, the attachment of West Berlin to the Federal 
Republic, and its membership in the European Community.  This should serve as 
the secure basis for the development of closer contacts to the GDR and the East 
Bloc.  Moreover, the future of West Berlin depended on overcoming the division 
of Europe.  In the foreseeable future, this would take place in the context of the 
existence of two German states that did not mutually question each other’s right 
to exist.  The signatories agreed to strive for cooperation between the two states.  
While borders should not be changed, they should lose their “divisive 
character.”60 
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 In the realm of finance, the parties agreed to fight unemployment, 
poverty, and environmental destruction.61  The agreement asserted that future 
environmental policy was crucial to securing the livability of Berlin.62  The parties 
pledged to adopt an efficient and sustainable energy policy, to preserve green 
spaces, to reduce solid waste, and to work with the GDR to reduce pollution.63  
Transportation policy would give priority to pedestrians, cyclists, and public 
transit over automobiles, and the parties pledged to double the budget to expand 
Berlin’s commuter trains and subways.64  In the politically charged area of 
housing policy, the parties promised to construct seven thousand new flats to 
fight the housing shortage, to preserve green spaces and the environment, and to 
reinstitute rent control.65 
 The agreement also pledged to enact reforms to the city’s government, 
striving to make it smaller, friendlier, more locally oriented, and less 
bureaucratic.  It was to be committed to customer service and to the openness of 
information.66  The agreement also committed the parties to a new course in 
domestic policy in which they would combat the causes of violence and aim to 
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find political solutions to social problems.67  They pledged to reform, not 
eliminate, the State Office for Protection of the Constitution and end its abuses, to 
restrict the data that could be collected on individuals, and to allow people to see 
their files.68  Regarding foreigners, the signatories pledged to work for a multi-
cultural society without putting foreigners under pressure to assimilate.  They 
would fight hostility toward foreigners, and work to grant non-Germans the 
right to vote in local elections.69  In the realm of law and justice, the agreement 
called on the Senate to begin negotiations with the Western Allies to reform 
Allied Law and to purge it of outdated elements, especially regarding the death 
penalty.  It also called for a general reform in sentencing.70 
 Regarding women’s rights, the agreement cast efforts to achieve equality 
between men and women as a key aspect of developing a democratic society, 
and the signatories pledged to end sexual discrimination.71  In education and 
research, the partners pledged to strengthen the autonomy of the universities 
and reduce their dependence on the state.  They promised to work to 
democratize the decision-making process at the universities, called for more 
interdisciplinary work at institutions of higher learning, and pledged to increase 
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support of research dealing with social and ecological issues.72  School policy 
aimed to reduce bureaucracy and to democratize decision-making.  In addition, 
the agreement stipulated that administrators should combat the actions of right-
wing groups in the schools through debate and argument regarding the goals of 
such groups.73  Thus the AL applied its ideological emphasis on debate and 
discussion to this controversial issue as well. 
 Culture received particular consideration in the agreement, which viewed 
culture as playing a special role in promoting cooperation and an exchange of 
experiences in an increasingly multi-ethnic West Berlin.  The agreement 
implicitly criticized West German society’s consumerism even as it spoke its 
language: Art and culture should help enable people to “set self-determination 
and activity against uncritical consumption and passivity,” and supporting 
culture was “an investment in the future.”74  Cultural policy should be as free 
from state interference as possible.  But modern German history should receive 
special attention and support. 
 The agreement pledged to open and expand opportunities for the elderly, 
the handicapped, and the economically disadvantaged.75  It emphasized disease 
prevention as a part of social and ecological efforts to renew health policy.  The 
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coalition partners pledged to try to shift away from high-tech health centers in 
favor of a less centralized approach.76  They also pledged to mainstream 
handicapped and non-handicapped children in the schools, increase the number 
of places in day care, and step up work involving youth and culture.77 
 Finally, the signatories pledged to reform the parliamentary system.  They 
based this promise on their view that the democratic state under the rule of law 
became endangered when the role of the representative body became weakened 
in the public’s eye or lost ground to the bureaucracy.  The AL and SPD pledged 
to work for reforms that strengthened parliament while preventing 
inappropriate means of influence.  Again demonstrating commitment to debate 
and discussion as ways of arriving at truth, they pledged to strengthen the 
opposition’s position in parliament by granting opposition parties increased 
personnel resources, time for speeches, and physical space.  They also committed 
themselves to make public the incomes of elected representatives, to crack down 
on bribery and nepotism, and to make all political donations a matter of public 
record.78 
 Overall, the coalition agreement was perfectly compatible with and 
reflected the green-alternative synthesis, and could easily be reconciled with the 
Green Party’s Four Pillars.  It reflected the AL’s concerns with environmental 
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protection, social responsibility, nonviolence, and grassroots political 
involvement.  It took up an old cause of the Left by seeking to modify the rights 
of the Allies in West Berlin, but did so in a way thoroughly compatible with the 
rules of parliamentary democracy, and couched it in an appeal to modernization.  
In its pledge to assist the opposition by placing more resources at its disposal, it 
revealed its commitment and faith in the process of parliament and its conviction 
that parliament was the best place for grievances to be addressed and resolved.  
By agreeing to this point, the Left also implicitly stated its belief that the 
parliamentary system of the Federal Republic both needed and was capable of 
reform.   
 The Red-Green government officially began on 15 March 1989.  The AL 
received three seats in the Senate, which it filled with three women who were not 
members of the AL but under party rules could nevertheless serve.  In fact, the 
Red-Green Senate formed under Momper with the SPD and AL marked the first 
time in German history that women held the majority in a government: the SPD 
sent five men and five women to the Senate, for a total of eight female and five 
male Senators.79  The delegates sent to the Abgeordnetenhaus also reflected a 
greatly increased presence of women as a proportion of the delegates.  In the 
eleventh electoral period, women comprised 47 percent of those serving for the 
AL: this was actually down slightly from 55 percent during the previous period. 
Of those serving for the CDU, 14 percent were women, up from only 5 percent in 
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the tenth legislative period, while of the SPD delegates to serve, 37 percent were 
women, up from 19 percent in the last legislative period.  There were no female 
delegates from the Republikaner.80  It seems reasonable to attribute at least part of 
the growing presence of women in the delegations of the two mainstream parties 










AL 47 24 39.4 
CDU 14 59 47.8 
Republikaner 0.0 82 44.3 
SPD 37 54 47.6 
Table 3: Breakdown of Abgeordnetenhaus delegations by sex, place of birth, 
and average age, eleventh electoral period. 
 Reactions to the formation of the Red-Green coalition were on the whole 
surprisingly muted.  Several factors can account for this.  First, the AL had been 
on the West Berlin political stage for ten years now, and it seemed quite well 
entrenched, even ‘established.’82  Second, the environmental issues that were one 
of the AL’s main areas of emphasis and competence had generally become quite 
well accepted in West Berlin by this time.  Finally, the conservatives’ desire to 
scare voters away from the AL was perhaps tempered by long-term calculations 
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that once Red-Green had been in power for a while, the dreadful consequences 
would drive the voters to the CDU in droves. 
 Gudrun Heinrich, who has analyzed this particular phase of the AL’s 
history in depth from the point of view of political science, divided the period of 
the AL’s cooperation with the SPD into three phases.  According to her analysis, 
the first phase was characterized by euphoria on the part of the AL, which 
quickly faded as the limits of coalition government became clear. 83  From the 
beginning of this phase, the AL was confronted with problems affecting its 
former Standbein, the extra-parliamentary realm.  Immediately upon entering the 
coalition, the AL had to defuse a crisis that related directly to the AL’s left-wing 
identity.  The Autonomen, independent groups for which the AL viewed itself as 
responsible, greeted the formation of the Red-Green government by defiantly 
occupying houses in Kreuzberg.  The AL senators promptly ordered their 
expulsion.  Thanks to a dual strategy pursued by the AL, this decision did not 
have the grave consequences that might have been expected.  The squatters were 
occupying houses that were only temporarily vacant so that they could be legally 
renovated- they were not the object of speculation.  Thus the AL senators 
announced that they would expel the squatters, but emphasized that the 
condition of the buildings justified their vacancy pending renovation.  At the 
same time that they evicted the squatters, the senators declared that the Berlin 
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government would crack down on housing speculation that resulted in vacant 
buildings.84 
 Similarly, the AL effectively applied a dual strategy in dealing with the 
traditional May Day protests.  Despite the AL’s efforts to reduce violent protests 
by limiting the police presence and the actions of demonstrators, protest on 1 
May 1989 turned violent.  The AL criticized the violent demonstrations, while at 
the same time emphasizing that it would combat what it viewed as the roots of 
this violence.85  Also, the AL was able to claim credit for one early victory that 
increased its credibility considerably: against all expectations, the Western Allies 
lifted the death penalty in West Berlin.  Renate Künast hailed this move as “an 
initial success for Red-Green.”86 
The decision to enter the Red-Green coalition paid off handsomely for the 
AL in another aspect as well: its membership numbers expanded dramatically.  
The bulletin of the Council of Delegates reported in April 1989 “the highest 
number of members in the history of the AL.”87  According to the bulletin, total 
membership of the party had now reached 3,200: this represented a 10 percent 
increase since November of 1988.  The three districts with the greatest number of 
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members were Kreuzberg, Schöneberg, and Charlottenburg, with 563, 517, and 
401 members respectively. 
Nevertheless, the first phase was also increasingly marked by 
disappointment.  Not only was the AL unable to see its legislative priorities 
passed; it was also unable to block several older CDU-FDP sponsored projects it 
had long opposed and which it had hoped to be able to end once in power.  For 
example, the AL was forced to accept completion of the renovation and 
construction of the Rudolf Virchow clinic.  Similarly, despite serious 
environmental concerns, the border crossing at Schichauer Way was expanded 
and renovated, and an initiative to lower the speed limit on a stretch of the 
autobahn running through West Berlin also failed due to financial pressure from 
the federal government.  The results were increasing tension between the 
grassroots and the party and a growing sense of frustration.88  For its part, the 
SPD began to show hints of impatience with its coalition partner as well, with 
Governing Mayor Walter Momper calling on the AL to reform its structures to 
make decision-making easier.89   
 Compared to the second phase of the AL’s first experience in power, 
however, the first one hundred days of Red-Green were a honeymoon.  Heinrich 
characterizes this second phase as a time of disappointment and frustration at 
the fact that it was more difficult than expected for the AL to get its way and to 
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see its legislative priorities passed.90  During this phase, Joachim Raschke’s classic 
designation of the Green Party’s central dilemma, the conflict between legitimacy 
and efficiency, most affected the AL.91  Moreover, in the midst of this growing 
frustration came developments that radically changed the conditions facing the 
coalition.   
 The first challenge in this second phase of the AL’s participation in 
government related directly to the AL’s grassroots democratic structure.  This 
structure worked well when the AL was in the opposition, as it could effectively 
mobilize resistance and responses to policies it opposed.  The situation was very 
different when the AL was in power and the General Members’ Assembly had to 
come up with positive legislative initiatives or make painful decisions.  For 
example, upon accepting governmental responsibility as a member of the ruling 
coalition, the AL had agreed to the binding nature of the contracts concluded by 
the previous government.  However, the General Members’ Assembly voted to 
reverse a contract for a power line construction project that had been widely 
condemned for its environmental impact.  The resolution demanded that the AL 
senators revoke the contract and block construction of the power lines.  
Moreover, it phrased the decision in a way that made compromise virtually 
impossible.  The AL senators knew that voting against the construction project 
would have meant the end of the coalition.  They refused to end the project, 
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violating the principle of the fixed mandate, though their decision met with no 
consequences from the AL’s governing body.92 
 Another area of conflict between the two coalition partners revolved 
around extending voting rights in local elections to non-German residents of 
West Berlin.  Long an AL priority, the AL had hoped that participating in 
government would finally enable it to achieve this goal, especially since the SPD 
had in the past supported the AL on this issue.  Conflict now arose because the 
AL felt that the SPD was catering to its right wing and was delaying bringing the 
issue up for a vote jointly with the AL as stipulated in the coalition agreement.  
In this case, the AL introduced the legislation alone, violating another part of the 
coalition agreement committing the parties to introduce legislation jointly.93 
 By far the most significant issue to arise during the second phase of the 
Red-Green Coalition concerned German unification.  Even before the wave of 
protest in the East began in the summer of 1989, unification became a hotly 
disputed topic, on the Berlin political scene, between the coalition partners, and 
within the AL itself. 
 The controversial nature of German unification is illustrated well by an 
incident in the West Berlin Abgeordnetenhaus just before the fateful summer of 
1989.  Before the opening of each session of the Berlin parliament, the presiding 
                                                 
92 Heinrich, Rot-Grün in Berlin, 43. 
93 Heinrich, Rot-Grün in Berlin, 43-44. 
 
 400
officer would speak what became known as the ‘Exhortation for Reunification.’94  
This practice dated back to 1955, when then-Governing Mayor Willi Brandt acted 
at the request of a group called the Committee for an Indivisible Germany to 
incorporate the phrase into the ceremony.95  The formula underwent several 
permutations over the decades, for instance, to reflect the construction of the 
Berlin Wall.  In 1989, it read, “I hereby open this session of the Berlin 
Abgeordnetenhaus and express our unshakeable will that the Wall must fall and 
that Germany with its capital Berlin must be reunified in peace and freedom.”96  
Over time, the formula seemed to many to have become an anachronism.  
Lawmakers tried in 1982 to replace it with language more acceptable to all that 
was more reflective of the geopolitical situation, but the attempt failed.97 
The issue erupted again in late May 1989, when AL delegate Hilde 
Schramm, in opening the Abgeordnetenhaus session in her capacity as vice 
president, refused to deliver the exhortation of unification, instead asking the 
president to do so.  The reaction was chaotic beyond anticipation, and was also 
heavily polarized.  According to the minutes, the CDU and Republikaner reacted 
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with “consternation,” whereas the SPD and AL erupted in spontaneous 
applause.98  Explaining her action before parliament, Schramm asserted that in 
her view, the tradition contradicted day-to-day politics that had now come to be 
based on the acceptance of the continued existence of two German states.  She 
could not in good conscience speak the phrase, which she viewed as a relic of the 
Cold War, and still hope for détente’s success.99  
Reactions by the party delegations again demonstrated the divisiveness of 
the issue.  Eberhard Diepgen of the CDU branded the act as an “affront to the 
entire Berlin Abgeordnetenhaus.”100  Bernhard Andres of the Republikaner claimed 
that Schramm’s act was a slap in the face of all Berliners and demonstrated that 
the AL was incapable of behaving democratically.  He called on Schramm to 
resign to make room “for someone with their feet rooted in this democracy.”101  
The SPD’s Gerd Löffler responded much more sympathetically.  He noted past 
and present efforts on the part of the SPD to find a formulation that was more 
appropriate and better reflective of the times.  Any such formulation should 
emphasize “self-determination,” and should reject language calling for 
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“reunification” in favor of advocating “unity within a European framework.”102  
Albert Statz of the AL asserted that Schramm had broken a hollow convention 
stemming from a consensus that no longer existed, and that she was correct to 
refuse to read the formula.  Statz related the decision and problem directly to 
what he asserted was the AL’s version of the German question.  This was not the 
question as to whether or not there would be unification of states.  Instead, Statz 
emphasized, “the German question is the question our neighbors ask of us.  It is 
our question regarding the working through of our own history.”103 
In making this assertion, Statz identified the underlying motive behind 
the AL’s policies regarding Germany.  Unification was not problematic only 
because it would rule out a utopian possibility, nor did it solely relate to the 
concern of Germany’s neighbors about the consequences of a strong, unified 
Germany and its possibilities for hegemony in Europe.  Even more important 
were concerns that Germans had not yet worked through their past, that 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung had not yet run its course.  The presence of the 
Republikaner in the parliament served only to highlight these concerns. 
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Much has been made of the ‘generation gap’ in postwar German history, 
the conflict between the perpetrators and the perpetrators’ children.104  Indeed, 
this episode seemed to epitomize this phenomenon.  By all indications, 
Schramm’s refusal to deliver the ‘Exhortation for Unification’ was a spontaneous 
act motivated by deep mistrust of the consequences of a unified Germany.  This 
mistrust can be better understood when one recalls Schramm’s family 
background.  As the daughter of Albert Speer, Hitler’s chief architect and 
Armaments Minister, Schramm had good reason to mistrust and fear a united 
Germany.   
The AL’s position on nationalism was closely linked to that of the federal 
Green Party.  This can be seen in other episodes as well.  The AL and the Green 
Party issued a joint statement on 15 June 1989 regarding the celebration of 17 
June as a national holiday, calling it a “relic of the Cold War.”105  The press release 
asserted that this ‘Day of German Unity’ did not promote German unity, but 
instead harnessed the workers’ uprising for anti-communist purposes.  In lieu of 
using this divisive date to promote unification, the AL and the Green Party 
suggested instead that both the Federal Republic and the GDR celebrate 18 
                                                 
104 See Becker, Hitler’s Children for the most extreme manifestation of this 
thesis. 
105 “17. Juni als Relikt des kalten Krieges,” AL and Green Party press 
release, 15 June 1989.  AGG:B.I.1.753.  17 June commemorated the 1953 workers’ 
uprising in East Berlin. 
 
 404
March to commemorate the revolution of 1848, which they called “a European 
movement for democratic rights, freedom, and friendship among peoples.”106  
Not all within the AL opposed a united Germany, however.  In September 
1989, a group of AL members printed a flyer calling “For a Berlin without walls 
in a Germany without tanks in a Europe without borders.”107  In the flyer, the 
signers expressed their disagreement with the AL leadership’s emphasis on 
preserving two German states.  Far from advocating the takeover of the Federal 
Republic by the GDR, however, these AL members promoted a different 
solution.  They declared their desire to “develop utopias instead of cementing 
realities.”108  Asserting, “We want one GDR,” defiantly written in lower-case 
letters, these members asserted that insisting on two German states was to “fight 
the wheel of history.”109  They decried the two-state model as the “blind alley“ in 
which the two Germanys were stuck:  as the flyer put it, the AL and the Greens 
“should be satisfied with neither real existing capitalism nor real existing 
socialism.”110  Nor could China offer a model: the Tiananmen Square massacre on 
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4 June 1989 showed that the Chinese leadership was nothing more than 
“dreadful old men.”111 
The flyer also explicitly linked the issue of German unification to 
Germany’s troubled past, but with a different emphasis.  The signers asserted 
that, in the realm of Vergangenheitsbewältigung, the participation of both 
Germanys in setting right old historical wrongs was necessary for Germany to be 
credible.  They criticized both German states, decrying the Federal Republic’s 
consumerism as socially irresponsible, while lashing out at the GDR as a police 
state with travel restrictions and a generally repressive system.  Their utopia 
would be “one german [sic] democratic republic in which social justice rules, 
pluralism exists, democratic rights are fulfilled, and ecological policies are 
pursued.”112  Finally, it took up an old concern of the Working Group on Berlin 
and German policy, stating that “negation and suppression of the national 
question has devastating consequences,” and the national question must not be 
surrendered to the right wing.113  
This document was significant for several reasons.  First, it shows the 
persistence of ideas explored in the Working Group on Berlin and German 
policy, even though it had dissolved itself in 1988.  For example, the Working 
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Group had expressed concern about the effects of suppressing ideas about 
national identity, and asserted that this should not be ceded to the Right.  As was 
seen in Chapter Three, such nationalist ideas can be traced back at least as far as 
the KPD-Rote Fahne.  Second, it demonstrates the diversity of viewpoints still 
present at this fairly late date in the AL’s history.  Again, the capacity of the 
‘Green-alternative synthesis’ to unite groups with dramatically opposing views 
regarding some issues proved remarkable.  It also refutes the view that the Left 
was uniformly anti-nationalist, while supporting the idea that the Left called for 
a working through of the German past.  In fact, both opponents and advocates of 
a united Germany shared the goal of Vergangenheitsbewältigung; they merely 
differed regarding how to realize this goal.  Finally, these ideas were later 
available for the AL to draw upon once it became clear that unification was 
inevitable.  The existence of this viewpoint arguably made unification more 
acceptable to the Left when it finally did come about. 
Events beginning at the Hungarian-Austrian border in the summer of 
1989 ensured that the issue of German unification would not remain purely an 
academic question.  Beginning in May, Hungary stopped controlling its border 
with Austria, in effect opening up an easy route to the West.  The sudden 
permeability of the Cold War border began a chain of events that had massive 
repercussions.  Streams of refugees fled to the West, and East Germany 
                                                                                                                                                 




witnessed unprecedented levels of protest, culminating when the Berlin Wall 
was opened on 9 November 1989. 
The AL interpreted the protests sweeping East Germany in a manner that 
reveals its concerns and priorities, as well as its self-perception.  An AL press 
release dated 4 November 1989 reacting to the mass demonstrations in East 
Germany outlined the policies the AL would pursue over the next months.114  
Projecting its own concerns with self-determination and grassroots democracy 
onto the East German opposition movement, the AL interpreted the 
demonstrations as signs that citizens were taking control of power themselves, 
rather than striving to replace current leaders with a new elite.  This attempt to 
determine its own destiny meant that the movement could “surpass the Western 
understanding of democracy without having to catch up.”115  Hence the East 
German populace needed no advice from the West.  Moreover, the press release 
asserted that the demonstrators carried no banners and shouted no slogans 
regarding unification.  This indicated that GDR citizens wanted to pursue their 
own path toward socialism, and their demands therefore could not be 
incorporated into the political and social system of the Federal Republic.  The 
press release also made two additional recommendations that would become the 
cornerstones of the AL’s policy regarding the momentous changes in the East.  
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First, the AL called upon the Federal Republic to recognize East German 
citizenship without condition.  Second, the AL claimed that the developments 
sweeping the GDR should induce West German citizens to push through radical 
demands for democratization and environmental protection in the Federal 
Republic. 
 Once the border had been opened and the Berlin Wall breached, 
developments accelerated at a dizzying pace.  The initial reaction of the AL was a 
curious mixture of idealism and realpolitik.  The AL delegation in the 
Abgeordnetenhaus issued a list of “immediate measures” to take in light of the 
border opening.116  The delegation first cited the need for West Berliners and 
West Germans to use the new opportunities for contacts to find ways “to be 
infected by the democratization movement in the GDR.”117  In other words, the 
AL hoped that the momentous changes would jump the Wall and spark similarly 
far-reaching developments in the Federal Republic.  Turning quickly pragmatic, 
the announcement used the opening of the border to argue against the 
completion of several projects it had tried thus far to block unsuccessfully within 
the Abgeordnetenhaus.  It used the new situation to argue against the completion 
of the controversial renovation of the border crossing at Schichauer Way, and 
argued that the new situation rendered the long-contested German Historical 
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Museum, conceived as a counterpart to the museums in East Berlin, no longer 
necessary.  The list also emphasized the new significance of mass transit projects 
for Berlin, calling for normalization of travel between East and West and 
demanding improvements to mass transit connections.  A new mass transit 
system and the use of train travel over long distances should help reduce the 
smog danger facing Berlin. 
Even the ordinarily radical residents of Kreuzberg expressed their “joy 
and excitement” in the face of the opening of the borders.118  Again, however, this 
excitement stemmed in large part from their hope that the revolution in the East 
would trigger similarly sweeping changes in the West.  The district group for 
Kreuzberg noted that if the GDR could develop “a convincing socialist 
alternative to real existing capitalism,” this would greatly aid the struggle in the 
West for a more just society.119  In an announcement of a discussion about the fall 
of the Berlin Wall involving representatives of the AL and the SPD, the AL 
echoed these sentiments.120  Successful reform of socialism in the East would 
mean new chances for reform in the West, and would involve a shift toward a 
society that was more ecologically-minded, socially responsible, and grassroots 
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democratically oriented.  The announcement called for an independent way 
“beyond capitalism and bureaucratic real existing socialism” in both East and 
West Germany.121  
A few days later, the AL and the Green Party issued a joint declaration 
regarding the fall of the Berlin Wall in which they reiterated and elaborated on 
their demands in light of developments.  The Greens and the AL welcomed and 
supported the movement for the renewal of the GDR and Eastern Europe.  They 
called for the Federal Republic to drastically reduce its armaments, and predicted 
that both NATO and the Warsaw pact would have no place in Europe.  In order 
to achieve the desired changes, West Germany should recognize the GDR as a 
sovereign state.  Reunification would only bring an annexationist move by the 
Federal Republic against East Germany.  Instead of striving for German 
unification, Europe should adopt policies that would help make national borders 
meaningless.  Finally, the Federal Republic should not force its economy and 
consumption patterns onto the GDR.122 
A decision by the AL’s Council of Delegates elaborated on the AL’s post-
Wall aims.  Again denying any pro-unification sentiment on the part of the 
demonstrators, the AL insisted that the demonstrators were instead making 
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demands for self-determination for citizens, democratic collaboration, a healthy 
environment, and for an environmentally and socially responsible economic 
order.  It condemned attempts to use the revolutionary changes in the GDR to 
portray capitalism as particularly successful and to promote it as a solution to 
East Germany’s problems.  It insisted that “the bureaucratic, undemocratic, and 
environmentally destructive mistakes of ‘real socialism’ were and are no reason 
to turn a blind eye to the millionfold misery, poverty, repression, and 
environmental destruction that have been the consequences of the capitalist 
world order, both here and above all in the exploited nations of the so-called 
Third World.”123  The developments leading to the opening of the inner-German 
border led to new concrete possibilities for alternative politics in Berlin.  These 
were to emphasize effective environmental protection, new energy and 
transportation policies, and a car-free city.  The programs would involve 
extensive economic assistance for the GDR, and should involve no preconditions.  
Immediately following this statement came the preconditions.  The programs 
should be environmentally oriented; they should improve energy conservation; 
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should enable a shift away from nuclear power; they should expand the rail 
networks; should promote clean air and water; and should reduce solid waste.  
The new policies also would have geopolitical consequences: the Council of 
Delegates advocated the immediate withdrawal of all Allied soldiers from Berlin 
except for small symbolic levels appropriate to the status of the city.  This would 
reflect reforms in the East that would allegedly make their presence unnecessary.  
Reducing the level of Allied troops would also contribute to peace, and would 
benefit the Berlin population by providing newly vacant flats and new green 
spaces.  At the federal level, this would free up financial resources that could 
then be used for ecological and social initiatives.124 
As time went on, the AL began to increasingly react against the plans of 
the other political parties regarding unification.  Albert Statz of the AL’s 
Abgeordnetenhaus delegation and Harald Wolf of the AL’s Executive Committee 
at the end of November 1989 issued a press release reacting to plans expressed in 
the Bundestag by the CDU, SPD, and FDP for a confederation between the two 
German states.  Statz and Wolf lambasted the parties for their support of Kohl’s 
plans, calling them nationalistic, and asserting that they were merely “the 
overture to the incorporation of the GDR into the Federal Republic.”125  Attaching 
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political and economic preconditions to offers of economic help showed that 
Kohl wished to extend the Federal Republic’s political and economic system to 
the East in what the AL called an “annexation born of poverty.”126   
Trends toward greater nationalism and increased restrictions on 
foreigners further strengthened AL concerns.  In a flyer printed by the AL’s 
parliamentary faction, the party warned against the racism of the Republikaner 
and by extension the CDU, especially in the wake of the increased nationalism 
that seemed to follow on the heels of the fall of the Berlin Wall. 127  As an 
alternative, the AL held up a vision of a Berlin that was truly a “city without 
walls,” either between Germans or between Germans and foreigners.128  If Berlin 
aspired to be a “world city,” then foreigners must feel welcome there.129  
According to the flyer, one way to work toward this would be to adopt voting 
rights for foreigners at the local level.  This was a remarkably progressive 
programmatic point consistent with the AL’s emphasis on upholding and 
expanding the rights of those affected most acutely by state policies. 
Unification and the fall of the Wall inevitably had an impact on the AL-
SPD coalition.  By early December 1989, the split between the coalition partners 
regarding unification became increasingly apparent.  Whereas the SPD reacted 
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favorably to Kohl’s Ten-Point Proposal regarding the path to German unity, the 
AL rejected Kohl’s proposals because they failed to recognize unconditionally 
the GDR.  Furthermore, the AL felt that unification amounted to an annexationist 
settlement and an eastward expansion of NATO and the European Economic 
Community.  In view of the significant disagreement between the SPD and AL 
regarding Kohl’s plans, the AL requested that the coalition committee meet in 
order to discuss the differences in opinion regarding unification.130  The fact that, 
in light of significant disagreements, the AL pursued channels laid out in the 
coalition agreement to resolve these differences, testifies as to the degree to 
which the AL had internalized the workings of parliamentary democracy.  A 
commitment to parliamentary participation as a coalition member, not anti-
parliamentarianism, characterized the AL’s reaction.  It also reflects the degree to 
which the AL, once it had entered the coalition, felt obliged to stay the course 
and exercise the ‘voice’ option for as long as possible before settling finally for 
‘exit.’131 
Early December 1989 also marked a qualitative turning point in the AL’s 
policy toward the momentous events in East Germany.  At this juncture, the AL 
stopped merely reacting against events, trying to apply the brakes to the process 
of unification, and began to attempt to influence the course of events and shape 
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developments in a more positive way.  The first sign of this came with the 
formation of the “Solidarity Office- Renewal GDR.”132  The AL created the 
organization in part in an attempt to take the pressure off the Executive 
Committee, the Abgeordnetenhaus delegation, and the AL’s press office, the 
capacities of which were already overtaxed simply due to being part of a 
governing coalition.  The office served as a center for organizing activities, 
evaluating press coverage, and coordinating activities with other groups for all 
issues regarding the fall of the Wall.  It attempted to provide a left-wing oriented 
counterbalance to what the AL viewed as the federal government’s and the 
Right’s attempts “to harness the events in the GDR for their own dark 
purposes.”133  The office would support the democratic movement in the GDR, 
while also addressing the problems associated with capitalism; it would broaden 
and intensify the AL’s contacts with groups engaged in initiatives within East 
Germany; and it would organize events and discussions about current events 
and problems for participants in East and West.  The organization was to be 
located in the AL’s main offices, and was sponsored, administered, and funded 
by the AL. 
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While the Solidarity Office represented an attempt to take an active hand 
in order to influence the course of events, it still operated under the assumption 
that the two-state model was the only way in which to address its aims.  It 
became clear at last to the AL that this option was no longer viable.  At a 
February 1990 retreat for the AL’s Abgeordnetenhaus delegation, the AL 
developed a new position.134  Whereas the AL had in the past based its policies on 
the two-state model, “the historical situation has changed.”135  The AL recognized 
that the majority in the GDR wanted German unification, and economic and 
political decline there would only perpetuate this.  As a result, the AL would 
have to focus its practical policies on integrating the two states.  The AL’s desire 
to slow down and even halt developments in the direction of a unified state was 
understandable, but it ran the risk of being overtaken by the process of 
unification.  Alternatively, the AL could have an active impact in shaping 
unification.  The AL delegation then assessed the situation, and gave a sobering 
conclusion and series of recommendations.  The AL’s arguments against a 
unified Germany had not lost their relevance, and the AL should continue to 
voice its skepticism.  But instead of merely being a naysayer, the AL should bring 
its democratic, social, and ecological goals and concerns to bear in the present 
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process and thus have the chance to influence it.136  The AL would pay special 
attention to several main concerns about future developments.  The AL was 
wary about the formation of a new power center and its potentially disruptive 
effect on European peace.  It worried that unification would weaken and isolate 
the USSR, and it predicted that the potential economic and social problems 
associated with unification would trigger increased hostility toward foreigners.  
The AL also was concerned that due to its sheer size and concentration of power, 
a united Germany would interfere with the necessary processes of 
democratization, decentralization, and regionalization of politics.  Prophetically, 
it worried that a unified state under which the GDR ceded its power to the 
Federal Republic would cause GDR citizens to doubt their own abilities and lead 
to a crisis of confidence.137 
In part, the AL directed its criticism against the approach used by the 
other, pro-unification parties.  In its view, holding up the magic word ‘unity’ as a 
panacea was irresponsible and misleading, and set the stage for later 
disappointments and a potentially dangerous nationalism.  The AL worried that 
the ‘established parties’ were trying to hasten the process of unification out of a 
concern for electoral gain.  This could only intensify problems: East Germany 
thus risked mass unemployment, a decline of living standards, and a loss of its 
social safety net.  In order to counteract this, the AL now proposed an 
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“equalization of burdens,” which should come from drastic cuts to the military 
budget, not from cutbacks affecting the already disadvantaged.138  Summing up 
its recommendations, the paper assigned to the AL a difficult role: “We see as 
our task educating about foreseeable difficulties and contributing to a national 
sobering up.”139   
Three weeks later, the AL parlayed these suggestions into official action, 
when on 3 March 1990 the AL General Members’ Assembly adopted a resolution 
calling for a new approach to the AL’s policies toward unification.140  Justifying 
its past approach, the declaration noted that the AL had hoped to use the 
continued existence of two German states in order to prevent the creation of a 
central European state with political, cultural, and economic hegemony.  German 
division had been viewed as a guarantee against German chauvinism, 
nationalism, and hegemony.  The resolution noted that the two-state model had 
clearly been overtaken by developments.  Moreover, the statement rationalized, 
it had been adopted before East German citizens had had a chance to articulate 
their will.  Holding on to the concept of two states had led to an inability to act 
politically; instead of repeating the desire to maintain two states, or merely 
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defining itself negatively as a stumbling block or someone forever applying the 
brakes, the resolution called on the AL to take active steps in order to point 
developments in a positive direction. 
What is the overall assessment of the AL’s policies toward unification and 
its reaction to the revolution that swept the old order from power in the East?  
Many have condemned the AL and the Greens for foot-dragging.  Several, most 
notably Elisabeth Weber, blamed the influence of the Stasi for a lack of a coherent 
policy toward Germany at the time of unification.141  But neither of these 
objections holds up to closer scrutiny.  Instead of being paralyzed by inaction or 
influenced by infiltration, the AL’s actions were entirely consistent with its 
program.  Furthermore, in upholding the idea of two independent states, the AL 
acted in support and agreement with the GDR opposition and the Green party.  
One major impetus behind a two state solution was the concern to avoid a 
repetition of the Nazi past.  Acutely aware of its neighbors’ concerns about the 
consequences of a united Germany, the AL acted to prevent this, and looked to 
the classic two-state model to block this outcome.  Moreover, some of the AL’s 
members had personal experiences with the consequences of a united Germany, 
as the example of Hilde Schramm makes clear.  Notably absent in the AL’s late 
treatment of the problems posed by German unification was concern for its 
                                                                                                                                                 
140 “Beschluss der AL vom 3.3.1990,” printed in DR-Info 21 March 1990.  
AGG:B.I.1.751. 
141 Weber, “Stasi-Einflussagent,” 35-38. 
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implications for the process of Vergangenheitsbewältigung.  It appears that the 
arguments of those AL members who argued that unification could actually help 
Germans come to terms with their past had enabled the majority of the AL to 
make its peace with this aspect of unification at least.   
The AL also took a pragmatic stance regarding developments in the East, 
as it sought to use them to end unpopular projects and to achieve disarmament 
and apply the dividends to support social and ecological projects.  Again, all of 
this was entirely consistent with its program.  The AL also hoped that a reformed 
socialism in the GDR would end opposition to democratic reforms in the West.  
The AL initially refused to recognize that the demonstrations were about 
unification, and instead chose to support the determination of its partners in the 
East German opposition to go their own way without Western interference.  
When it could no longer ignore the East German majority’s desire for unification, 
the AL shifted its approach, consistent with its democratic principles.  In the end, 
the AL and the Greens chose a rather sobering and unpopular stance.  Many of 
their fears regarding the consequences of unification proved correct. 
Clearly, the disagreements over unification took their toll on the coalition 
between the SPD and the AL.  Relations between the coalition partners were 
further strained by disputes over domestic policy.  For example, the AL defied its 
coalition partner and supported a strike by daycare workers.  The AL’s General 
Members’ Assembly insisted that the workers be given new contracts, again 
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delivering its senators an ultimatum with no room for compromise.142  In late 
March 1990, partly as a result of this specific situation, but also due to frustration 
and disappointment with the general course of the coalition, Heidi Bischoff-
Pflanz, an important integrative figure for the left wing of the AL, resigned her 
seat in the Abgeordnetenhaus.143  Her resignation marked the end of what Heinrich 
designated the second phase of the AL’s experiment in governmental 
responsibility. 
The final stage of the coalition between the AL and the SPD was 
characterized by mutual distrust between coalition partners and constant debate 
about ending the coalition.  Appropriately, Potsdamer Platz, formerly the 
thriving center of Berlin but in West Berlin a desolate plain on the edge of no-
man’s land, played a prominent role in the drama.  This property had been sold 
to Daimler-Benz at a very low price in what amounted to a back room deal by 
Governing Mayor Momper, without consulting the AL, or for that matter 
Momper’s own party.  Both the low price and the new role of Potsdamer Platz 
became highly controversial: in the wake of the fall of the Wall and preparations 
to bring the divided city together, Potsdamer Platz was transformed from a not 
particularly desirable property on the fringe of town just meters away from the 
ugly Berlin Wall to a prime piece of real estate and the new center of the city.  
AL-Senator Michaela Schreyer balked at approving the sale, and the AL 
                                                 
142 Heinrich, Rot-Grün in Berlin, 45. 
143 Heinrich, Rot-Grün in Berlin, 46. 
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delegation in the Abgeordnetenhaus refused to support it as well.  The sale was 
pushed through by an SPD-CDU vote that expressly violated the coalition 
agreement and circumvented the responsibility of an AL-controlled post, City 
Planning and Environment.144 
Despite these developments, the General Members’ Assembly voted in 
June 1990 to continue the Red-Green Coalition, asserting that it saw “no political 
alternative” but to remain a coalition partner.145  Nonetheless, July 1990 saw 
another controversy, when the AL senator in charge of reactor safety refused to 
grant a permit for the continued operation of the research reactor at the Hahn 
Meitner Institute.  As a result, the SPD threatened to remove this responsibility 
from her portfolio.146 
Clearly, frustration was building to the breaking point.  In August 1990, 
prominent left-leaning AL members signed a declaration stating, “We’re entering 
the opposition to the majority in the AL.”147  These individuals voiced their 
frustration with the coalition, and warned that continuing the coalition against 
the will of the majority of the active members of the AL would lead to the self-
destruction of the party.  Many of these leftists were then leaving the AL for the 
Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus  (Party of Democratic Socialism- PDS), 
                                                 
144 Heinrich, Rot-Grün in Berlin, 47. 
145 Keine politische Alternative.  Heinrich, Rot-Grün in Berlin, 48. 
146 Heinrich, Rot-Grün in Berlin, 49-50. 




seeking in the PDS a political homeland that they felt they had lost when the AL 
surrendered its innocence through governmental participation and 
compromise.148 
On 15 November 1990, just over a year after the fall of the Wall and after 
twenty months as part of the governing coalition in Berlin, the AL left the 
coalition.  The incident that precipitated this move related to a key component of 
the AL’s self-image.  In the eastern part of the now-united city, police raided 
squatted houses in Lichtenberg, Friedrichshain, and Prenzlauer Berg, leading to 
violent confrontations.  Burning barricades, masked rioters slinging steel balls 
and throwing Molotov cocktails, and automobiles and streetcars in flames again 
were seen on the streets of Berlin, this time in the East.  According to Der Spiegel, 
law enforcement confronted “a brutality toward police revealing a contempt for 
humankind never before seen in our city.”149  On the first night of the riots alone, 
137 police were injured.  Notably, most of the rioters were apparently from the 
western part of the city.  Judging from the rioters’ equipment, organization, 
tactics, and weapons, police concluded that squatters well versed in the housing 
battle were at work in the East.150  In deciding to evict the squatters, the SPD had 
                                                 
148 Heinrich, Rot-Grün in Berlin, 50.  The PDS was the allegedly reformed 
successor to the East German Socialist Unity Party, which was then establishing 
itself in West Berlin and West Germany and attracted many Greens. 
149 Eine in unserer Stadt noch nie erkennbare menschenverachtende 
Brutalität gegenüber Polizisten.  “Der mittelenglische Umgang,” Der Spiegel 44, 
no. 47 (19 November 1990), 131. 
150 “Der mittelenglische Umgang,” 131. 
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again left the AL ‘out of the loop’ in an area clearly under its authority.  This 
proved to be the “straw that broke the camel’s back,” as observers put it, and 
served as a welcome excuse to leave a now much-despised coalition.151 
Interestingly, the decision to leave the coalition was made by the 
Executive Committee and the AL delegation in the Abgeordnetenhaus, and was 
not brought before the General Members’ Assembly.  It was also opposed by the 
AL senators, who nevertheless resigned out of loyalty to the party.152   
It was clearly much more than the housing squatters’ expulsion that led 
the AL to end the coalition, however.  The AL was the product of very specific 
conditions found only in West Berlin.  When the Wall fell, the coalition suddenly 
found itself confronted with new challenges, and the symbolic value and very 
nature of the city had changed radically.  This took a much greater toll on the AL 
than on the SPD, which had a history and experience long predating West Berlin.  
When the Wall fell, the unique environment that had produced and nurtured the 
AL vanished forever, literally overnight.  Had the AL still been in the opposition, 
it would have faced a major process of adaptation.  That it was simultaneously 
faced with another significant challenge, that of participating in government in 
cooperation with the very political party in opposition to which it had originally 
been founded, simply proved too much.  The drain on the AL of individuals 
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leaving the party to join the PDS was merely another symptom of the problem.  
In the wake of unification, and in the loss of the environment that spawned and 
nurtured it, the AL turned to the Green Party for support and the East German 
opposition for hope.  The fact that the Red-Green coalition lasted for over a year 
after the fall of the Berlin Wall testifies to the AL’s commitment to change 
through parliamentary means, change that it realized only its status as a coalition 
member helping actively to shape policy could bring about. 
Remarkably, after it ended the coalition, despite all the frustration and 
bad blood between the AL and SPD, and despite the disillusionment with its 
experiences sharing governmental responsibility, the AL did not rule out another 
Red-Green coalition.  The AL reiterated its willingness to enter a coalition during 
the 1990 election campaign.153  The AL thus had come full circle, and made the 
journey from attempting to undermine parliamentary democracy to a partner 
within it.  It had seen its hopes dashed repeatedly.  But the power of 
parliamentarization had been so great that it not only resolved to continue its 
parliamentary presence, but also declared its willingness to do so as a coalition 
partner again. 
In the period between 1989-1990 examined in this chapter, the AL 
embarked on the final stage in its journey toward becoming a parliamentary 
party.  Even before it accepted power as a coalition partner, processes of 
parliamentarization and deradicalization had transformed the AL into a party 
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accepting and embracing parliamentary democracy and rejecting violence and 
GDR-style socialism.  With the decision to enter a coalition with the SPD, it 
appeared that the AL’s journey was complete.  But the momentous events of 
autumn 1989 intervened: the hothouse environment of West Berlin that had 
created the AL had been forever breached.  Moreover, the chain of events 
released a final stream of utopian energies, when most AL members hoped that 
the revolution in the GDR would help usher in similarly sweeping changes in the 
West.  When it was no longer deniable that the majority of East Germans wished 
to abandon the course of a reformed socialism in favor of unity on Western 
terms, the AL’s last revolutionary hopes were dashed.  Its more radical members 
finally abandoned ‘voice’ and opted for the ‘exit’ option, leaving the party for the 
PDS.  Little was left for those remaining but to continue within the parliaments.  
Moreover, despite growing frustration with the SPD-AL coalition, which finally 
led the AL to leave the coalition, those remaining in the party expressed a 
willingness to return to power as a coalition partner if new election results 
allowed it.  Its history over the past twenty years, and the Left’s experiences with 





Conclusion and Epilogue 
 
Daniel Cohn-Bendit recently called Joschka Fischer’s transformation from 
stone-throwing radical to Germany’s foreign minister “the greatest 
possible…that our generation could experience- I would say worldwide.”1  This 
has been a study of a related and similarly dramatic transformation- that of a 
segment of the West German Left from vehement opponents of the constitutional 
order to adherents and advocates of Western parliamentary democracy.  It has 
attempted to show how and why a radical anti-parliamentary movement 
evolved into a political party operating within the framework of the 
constitutional system.  To do this, this dissertation has identified and tracked 
processes I label parliamentarization and deradicalization.  I applied these 
concepts to show that, through the interaction of their experiences in the AL and 
key developments in German history centering in Berlin, a significant segment of 
the radical West German Left came to accept and embrace parliamentary 
democracy. 
During the time period analyzed here, the radical Left underwent several 
metamorphoses.  In the immediate postwar period, it fully expected to play a 
leading role in rebuilding Germany along socialist lines, only to see its hopes 
                                                 
1 Joschka Fischer [hat] die grösstmögliche Entwicklung durchgemacht, die 
unsere Generation- ich würde sagen: weltweit- durchleben konnte.  Cohn-Bendit, 
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dashed in the Cold War era.  Alienated from the SPD and for a while virtually 
exiled from the parliamentary political spectrum, the radical Left found a 
temporary home in the APO.  In the 1960s, the radical Left, embodied by the SDS 
and the student movement, came into increasing conflict with the state and with 
the West German populace in general.  Its inability to find support among the 
working class sparked a severe crisis, epitomized by the self-destruction of the 
SDS at what seemed to be the height of its influence.   
During the 1970s, the radical Left was fragmented and weak, spending 
more energy in infighting and rivalry than in working to achieve its agenda.  Its 
political program was avowedly anti-parliamentary, and aimed to achieve the 
dictatorship of the proletariat through violent revolution.  In the late 1970s, 
however, things changed.  Apparently in an attempt to follow through on 
Dutschke’s program of infiltration and exploitation of political institutions, 
several groups from the radical West Berlin Left, in particular the KPD-Rote 
Fahne, formed the AL.  In its organization and political culture, the AL was in 
many ways a reaction against the K-groups.  In place of the rigidly organized, 
top-down hierarchy and dogmatism of the K-groups, the AL adopted a 
decentralized, grassroots democratic structure and a political culture 
emphasizing debate and discussion.  But in its attitudes toward parliament, 
capitalism, democracy, and in most other matters of ideology, the AL continued 
many aspects of the K-groups.  While the AL at the time claimed to be a party 
working toward environmental protection and democracy, many of its members 
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apparently viewed it as a Trojan horse, a vehicle in which the radical Left could 
enter parliament.  Once in parliament, the Left hoped to exploit it by gathering 
information and spreading the doctrine of class struggle.  In order to surmount 
the 5 percent hurdle, however, the KPD-Rote Fahne, the radically anti-
parliamentary communist group comprising the largest bloc in the new 
organization, reached out to more moderate groups.  Crucially, it abandoned its 
dogmatism, at least superficially, and claimed to concede that it did not have a 
monopoly on the truth, but rather that the truth could be arrived at only through 
open debate and discussion.  In so doing, the KPD-Rote Fahne initially made a 
virtue of necessity.  But eventually, even it came to believe its own claim.  The 
AL increasingly embraced a political culture that encouraged debate and 
discussion as ways of arriving at the truth.  This shift in approach and its gradual 
permeation of the AL’s political culture represented an enormous stride forward 
in embracing democratic values of the kind identified by Ralf Dahrendorf.  This 
view combined with an increasing emphasis on environmental issues to forge the 
green-alternative synthesis that characterized the AL and allowed diverse groups 
to work together.  
 As a result, the next decade was the radical Left’s gradual Godesberg, in 
which, like the SPD at Bad Godesberg decades earlier, it relinquished the 
ideology of class struggle as a route to achieving socialism.  This began with a 
name: the Alternative Ballot for Democracy and Environmental Protection seems 
initially to have genuinely stood for neither of these things.  In a sense, the AL’s 
 
 430
name became its destiny.  Through its experiences in parliament and in West 
Berlin, the AL gradually metamorphosed into that which it had initially claimed 
to be: an organization sincerely committed to democracy and environmental 
protection.  Increasingly distancing itself from violence, the AL also came to 
embrace parliament as the best place to achieve its aims.  Its view of parliament 
changed from walking stick to Spielbein to Standbein, the arena that it viewed as 
its main center of activity and the place where genuine change could be brought 
about. 
In 1989, the AL took what seemed to be the final step in its journey from 
anti-parliamentary anti-party to parliamentary party, when it entered into a 
coalition with the SPD.  Through work in the coalition, the AL hoped to achieve 
its aims using parliamentary means.  Shortly thereafter, however, the East 
German protest movement and the fall of the Berlin Wall changed the 
circumstances under which the coalition operated.  The AL reacted with 
excitement to the sweeping changes in the East, but initially, these changes 
released pent-up utopian hopes for radical renewals in the West as well.  When it 
became clear that this was not to happen, however, the AL adapted accordingly, 
and, crucially, remained committed to parliamentary democracy.  Furthermore, 
despite its agonizing experiences as a coalition partner, the AL did not rule out 
returning as part of a coalition.  It did not give up on parliamentary democracy, 
but repeated its commitment to the parliaments. 
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The story of the AL presented here contains clues to three crucial issues in 
postwar West German historiography.  The first issue concerns the sources of 
stability: despite worries about the Green Party’s and the alternative movements’ 
effects on the stability of the political system, the case of the AL indicates that in 
the end, they actually may have helped stabilize the Federal Republic.  Zbigniew 
Brzezinski has argued that the violence and revolutionary rhetoric of the New 
Left were “nothing more than the farewell performance of the historically 
irrelevant.”2  It is possible to turn this thesis around to demonstrate the effects of 
parliamentary participation on the Left.  Once the Left became historically 
relevant again, the violence and revolutionary rhetoric of its adherents faded 
away.  The Green and alternative parties were the vehicle through which they 
regained their historical role: parliament did its job.  If violence and 
revolutionary rhetoric resulted from feelings of historical irrelevance as 
Brzezinski argued, then the AL made a crucial contribution to Germany’s Long 
Way West.  By bringing successors of the New Left into parliament, the green-
alternative movement defused a critical situation in which people resorted to 
violence as a result of feeling themselves disenfranchised.  Their parliamentary 
involvement provided an outlet for their protest energies and channeled them in 
a positive, constructive direction.   
                                                 
2 Nichts weiter als eine Abschiedsvorstellung von historisch Irrelevanten.  
Brzezinski, "Revolution oder Konterrevolution,” 222 
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Furthermore, part of the overall story of the AL’s experiences in 
parliament involved the chance for the AL and SPD to work together in 
opposition and to discover common ground.  This helped them overcome their 
differences to form the AL-SPD coalition in 1989.  That they were able to do this, 
especially when confronted by the rise of a party of the radical Right, serves 
further to point out the contrast between Bonn and Weimar.  The developments 
traced here also clearly support Jeffrey Herf’s thesis about the rise of a political 
culture in which the “political boundary between the moderate and the hard Left 
had blurred,” however.3  Interestingly, in the case of West Berlin at least, this 
blurring worked in both directions, with the radical Left gradually adopting the 
moderate Left’s parliamentary orientation.  Not only were the Federal Republic’s 
parliamentary system and political culture able to block a potential threat posed 
by a party of the radical Left, but they also worked to transform the party into a 
group accepting, embracing, and even promoting parliamentary democracy.   
This finding has further implications concerning proportional 
representation.  Opponents of proportional representation often argue that it has 
a paralyzing effect on governments, and merely leads to increased fragmentation 
and conflict among factions.4  The case of the AL demonstrates otherwise.  
Besides giving groups the chance to be heard, the research presented here shows 
                                                 
3 Herf, War, 79. 
4 Hanna Pitkin, The Concept of Representation (Berkeley and Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 1967), 64. 
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that proportional representation, together with a 5 percent hurdle, can have a 
profoundly integrative effect on marginal groups, even on vehemently anti-
parliamentary parties.  Judging from the case of the AL, the true crisis of a 
parliamentary system may come not when critical voices enter it, but rather 
when they reject it entirely and do not participate. 
The second issue regards the legacy of 1968.  Many commentators viewed 
‘1968’ as anti-democratic, even leading to terrorism.  The example of the AL 
shows that the ‘Long March through the institutions’ ended not in murders and 
kidnappings, but in political moderation born of parliamentary participation.  In 
his classic work on the student movement, Richard Löwenthal laid out what he 
viewed as disturbing continuities between the left-leaning intellectual 
establishment of the 1960s and the Nazi criminals against which they reacted so 
strongly.  Löwenthal claimed that left-leaning intellectuals were no better than 
their predecessors at coping with the “basic facts of a faithless industrial 
society.”5  Löwenthal was especially concerned that these intellectuals, again like 
their predecessors, would look to extremist solutions, and would refuse “to 
invest their responsibility and energy in improving and humanizing this society 
and its institutions, including its lackluster democratic state.”6  Through their 
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involvement with the AL and the Green Party, West German intellectuals and 
activists overcame this refusal.  Candide-like, members of the radical West 
German Left had ceased looking for El Dorado, the best of all possible worlds, 
and had reconciled themselves to cultivating their garden- trying to make the 
best of the world they had been given and improving it one problem at a time. 
The third issue relates to coming to terms with the troubled German past.  
Because it rejected the West German state for its perceived failure to break with 
the Nazi past, the radical Left throughout the 1960s and 1970s viewed violence 
directed against the state in a favorable light.  In the course of its debates on 
violent protest during the eighties, the radical Left as embodied by the AL 
distanced itself from violence, and thus reconciled itself with the Federal 
Republic and its place in the West.  Furthermore, the Left has been condemned 
for thwarting the process of working through the Nazi past.  Again, however, in 
the case of the AL, the Left helped push through a confrontation with the past, 
both in the general public and, crucially, among its own members.  Moreover, the 
‘Children of Hitler’ pointed to by many as the source of the West German 
terrorist impulse found in the parliaments a viable place to promote and pursue 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung. 
The crucial nature of green ideas for the processes of parliamentarization 
and deradicalization explored here also suggests a new way of conceiving of the 
Greens.  The Green Party has often been compared to a watermelon, that is, 
green on the outside, but a vibrant, socialist red in the middle.  The 
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developments charted here suggest that a more fitting comparison may be to a 
fruit Jell-O mold.  From its creation, the AL consisted of pieces of other 
movements, especially those rendered politically homeless through the 
dissolution of the SDS and the K-groups, but also citizens’ initiatives, 
countercultural groups, and so on.  These can be compared to pieces of fruit held 
together by Jell-O.  What started out as a conglomeration of bits and pieces of 
movements supported loosely in a green framework became over time 
increasingly homogeneous, as ideological overlaps became clear and 
interconnections were fleshed out to form the green-alternative synthesis.  Part of 
the task of this dissertation has been to analyze this mixture to determine the 
origins of its constituent ingredients by tracing their developments in time. 
In the course of such an analysis, issues of continuities and discontinuities 
inevitably arise.  The AL in many respects represented a profound break with the 
political forms and ideologies of the radical Left.  The AL renounced the highly 
centralized and rigidly structured political forms of orthodox Marxism-Leninism.  
Moreover, like the SPD at Bad Godesberg, the AL renounced revolution in favor 
of parliamentary routes to socialism.  Adopting a longer-term view, the history 
of the AL represents another victory of revisionism, harking back to Bernstein’s 
ideas renouncing the doctrine that socialism must be achieved through 
revolution in favor of a reformist approach.  For the AL, green ideas played a key 
role in these changes.  This suggests a new periodization for the time considered 
here.  Gerd Koenen offers a label for one distinct time in postwar German 
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history.  According to Koenen, the 1967 shots in West Berlin (Ohnesorg) and the 
1977 shots in Stammheim (RAF) provide the terminal points for a distinct era in 
West German history, and he calls this era the “Red Decade.”7   If events in West 
Berlin examined in this dissertation are any indication, much can be said for 
calling the period 1978-1989 the “Green Decade” in postwar West German 
history.  However, as important as the Left’s rethinking of its opposition to the 
parliamentary system was, and as much as the AL represented a caesura in 
postwar West German history, elements of continuity also were present.  Most 
significantly, the Left retained its fundamental opposition to the capitalist 
system.  This opposition came to be the radical Left’s defining characteristic.  
Still, Green ideas proved perfectly compatible with this critique, and even 
enhanced it. 
 In a sense, too, the story presented in the previous chapters is an 
incomplete one.  German unification ushered in a new chapter in the Left’s 
evolution and in its acceptance of Germany and the West that is ongoing, as the 
debates about military interventions in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq make 
clear.  As for the AL, after unification, when its hopes for similarly sweeping- 
though emphatically emancipative- changes in the West were dashed, it turned 
back to the parliaments, sadder but wiser.  Initially, the party faced electoral 
setbacks in the first all-Berlin election of 1990, when it ran as a full-fledged 
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representative of the Green Party, slipping to 9.4 percent.  But the Berlin Greens 
came back in 1995 to earn 13.2 percent, their best-ever results.   
When it became the official Berlin State Committee of the Green Party, the 
organization surrendered much of its autonomy.  Certain reminders of its unique 
history persist: it still uses its green hedgehog emblem instead of the Green 
Party’s sunflower, and its members, including especially Christian Ströbele, now 
a delegate to the Bundestag, tend to be the harshest critics of United States policy.  
While I was in Berlin completing the research for this dissertation in 2000-2001, 
another political scandal led the SPD and the Greens to form another coalition, 
and the Greens had entered the Berlin parliament as a ruling party again. 
Other things were forever changed, however.  This time, the 
Abgeordnetenhaus sessions were held in the magnificently restored Prussian 
Landtag building in the vicinity of the nearly completed shopping and 
entertainment complex at Potsdamer Platz, and the impressive Rotes Rathaus near 
Alexanderplatz served as the seat of government.  The coalition with the SPD 
proved short-lived: despite electoral successes of the Greens, this time, the SPD 
forged a coalition with the PDS, the ‘reformed’ successor organization to the East 
German Socialist Unity Party.   
Moreover, the political fortunes of the former AL, renamed the Berlin 
State Committee of the Federal Green Party, are now much more linked to the 
fate of its national organization.  The Green Party, as part of a national coalition 
with the Social Democrats, is in turn dependent on the political fortunes of the 
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SPD.  On the one hand, Joschka Fischer, the brilliant autodidact and former street 
fighter integrated into the parliamentary system through the Green Party, 
continues to be Germany’s most popular politician.  On the other hand, economic 
malaise, continued high unemployment, especially in the former East, and 
controversy over the veracity of economic data presented to the electorate just 
before the elections, pose a continuing strain on the coalition.   
Finally, another result of the developments in 1989 was the irreversible 
alteration of the unique ecosystem that had fostered the development of the AL.  
As a result, it was much easier for the AL to surrender its autonomy and a part of 
its identity in favor of affiliation at the national level.  But the former AL and the 
other parties also now face the presence of a fifth major party on the city’s 
political scene, the PDS.  Nevertheless, the Berlin Green Party’s vote hovers at 
around 9 percent.  Clearly, the electorate feels that the Greens still have 
something to contribute.   
The nature of this contribution has changed forever too, however.  In the 
course of the eighties, the Greens served as the vehicle bringing the radical Left 
safely into the parliamentary fold until German unification and the dissolution of 
the USSR altered the conditions in which the Left operated, as well as the threat 
the Left posed.  The party no longer needs to perform this integrative function.  
Its contribution is now limited to providing alternative visions of development 
that incorporate environmental and social concerns.  This is of course an 
important contribution that should not be understated.  But as Germany has 
 
 439
moved metaphorically westward, the processes of parliamentarization and 
deradicalization have moved physically eastward, to the former GDR and, by 
extension, the nations of the former East Bloc.  In Berlin, and in the former East 
Germany, the PDS, the ‘reformed’ East German Socialist Unity Party, continues 
to do very well.  It will be interesting to observe both the continued evolution of 
this party and its electoral clientele in the future, and the ability of the German 
parliamentary system to channel conflicts and settle disputes.  If developments in 
West Berlin during the Green Decade are any indication, Germany, and the 






Figure 1.  The courtyard in the Krumme Strasse where Benno Ohnesorg was 






Figure 2. “We’ll get you taken care of. (Saving the foot is not economical.)” 










































Figure 8.  The corrupt and violent police force under the control of the 
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